# Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn.

> District Court, D. New Jersey · February 18, 1994 · 836 F. Supp. 1049

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1949204

## Case

- **Full name:** HATCO CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. W.R. GRACE & CO.—CONN., Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., Et Al., Third-Party Defendants
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** February 18, 1994
- **Citations:** 836 F. Supp. 1049; 1993 WL 394391
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Wolin
- **Judges:** Wolin
- **Cited by:** 21 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Modified by Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn., 849 F. Supp. 987 (1994).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1949204

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “it is unlikely that subsequent periodic impacts to the surface soils redistributed PCBs” spread by Grace over AEC 2 during the pond elimination program
- stating that Hateo should have commenced its remedial investigation in 1985, not 1988

## Opinion text

OPINION
WOLIN, District Judge.
No-wax vinyl floor tiles, artificial sweetener, automobile
engine
protectants and sporting goods provide a few examples of the products available to ease and enrich our lives. The irony of sugar-free sweetness and these other effort-saving modern conveniences lies in the grudging chemical residues that persist in the soils and groundwater of a New Jersey coastal industrial tract from which components of these products originated.
For almost a decade this eighty-acre parcel of land and the chemical plant within its borders have served as the target of state environmental regulatory scrutiny, the object of study and debate of environmental consultants and the subject of sworn conversations with many past and present employees. These inquiries have generated a wealth of information about the facility’s thirty-three years of operation and a detailed accounting of the current environmental condition of the property.
During the past four years this site also has demanded the attention, patience and resources of the Court as Hateo Corporation and W.R. Grace
&
Co.-Conn., the current and former owners of the facility, have sought to assign the costs of these and any future efforts to the other based on the contractual relations between them, common law principles and the legislative schemes of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) and the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (the “Spill Act”). In this time, the Court rejected plaintiffs strict liability claim, limited defendant’s defenses, struck plaintiffs demand for attorney’s fees and dismissed defendant’s first and third counterclaims.
In addition, the Court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability for all response costs under CERCLA. In reaching this decision, however, the Court recognized the fact of defendant’s liability. Thus, when the bench trial commenced on July 12, 1993, the principal task remaining for determination was the scope of defendant’s liability.
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To aid the Court in this decision, plaintiff called two environmental experts, Dr. Dan Raviv and Dr. John Trela, both of whom are associated with Dan Raviv Associates Incorporated (“DRAI”), the environmental consulting firm plaintiff engaged to address the problems that spawned this litigation. Dr. Raviv offered an opinion on the proper apportionment of liability between the parties, and Dr. Trela gave testimony about plaintiffs remedial measures to date.
Hateo also introduced several past and present employees, including Mr. Alex Kaufman, plaintiffs president and sole shareholder, Mr. George Chryss, plaintiffs executive vice president and chief operating officer, and Mr. Harry Reid, a former assistant to Mr. Kaufman, chief engineer and consultant to Hateo. Together these witnesses traced
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the site’s history from a managerial perspective.
Grace presented two expert environmental witnesses, Dr. Charles Staples and Mr. Richard Gryzinswki. Dr. Staples presented the Court with a second opinion on the proper apportionment of liability between the parties. Mr. Gryzinswki evaluated plaintiffs plant and practices in light of the standard of environmental due care in the industry.
2
Three and a half weeks later the parties went home, leaving behind over 3365 exhibits, unwieldy demonstrative evidence, volumes of designated deposition testimony and 3100 pages of trial testimony. At the direction of the Court, plaintiff and defendant filed proposed findings of fact on August 9, 1993 and August 25, 1993, respectively. Both parties submitted proposed conclusions of law on the eve of trial.
The size of the record underscores the complexity of the causation inquiry and the wisdom Congress exhibited in declining to require such a showing as a prerequisite to CERCLA liability. A routine stroll in other tort contexts, to resolve the causation question in the environmental arena, the Court must cross a mine field with a faded map as its guide. Despite the mass of information gathered during the parties’ seemingly exhaustive search, the limitations inherent in science as well as the mandate of CERCLA compel the Court to qualify many of the answers it hands down today. Mindful of these limitations, the Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I.FINDINGS OF FACT
3
BACKGROUND
A.The Parties
1. Plaintiff Hateo Corporation (“Hateo”), a New Jersey corporation, is the present owner of the property at issue in this case.
2. Defendant W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. (“Grace”), a Connecticut corporation, is the prior owner of the property at issue in this case and a wholly owned subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Company, a New York Corporation. (Stipulation No. 46)
4
B. The Property
3. The property at issue in this litigation is an eighty-acre parcel of land located in Fords, New Jersey (the “Fords property”). (Stipulation No. 1) The Fords Property is situated approximately 4000 feet from the Raritan River, (47:19 (Raviv)),
5
and is bounded to the north by King George Post Road, to the east by Sling Tail Creek, to the south by Industrial Highway and to the west by Crow’s Mill Creek. (DE002)
4. The slope of the Hateo site is generally south-southwest. Groundwater flow and surface drainage events follow the site’s surface topography, which is high in the center (34:13 (Raviv)), and run toward and are collected by Sling Tail Brook and Crows Mill Creek. (Stipulation No. 9)
5. The soil profile of the Hateo site, moving from the surface to the underlying soils, changes from fill with clay to light to dark gray clay to clay mixed with sand to clay to poorly sorted sand and finally to dark gray clay. (357:6 (Raviv)) The natural dark clay layer is significant because its lower permeability prevents the movement of contamination. (357:21 (Raviv))
C. Plant History
1. Ownership
6. In the eai’ly 1950s, a brick and tile manufacturer used the Fords Property as a clay pit. (Stipulation No. 2)
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7. In approximately 1954, Mr. William Hackman (“Hackman”), the owner of the Hateo Chemical Company, pm-chased the Fords Property and relocated his chemical manufacturing business there. (Stipulation No. 3) The Hateo Chemical Company previously was located in Kearny, New Jersey, where it manufactured plasticizers, synthetic lubricants and napalm. (Stipulation No. 4)
8. From approximately 1954 until 1959, Hackman owned and operated the Hateo Chemical Company on the Fords property (the “Fords facility”). (Stipulation No. 5)
9. In June 1959, Grace purchased the Hateo Chemical Company from Hackman for approximately $5.4 million. (E10 at WRG 06767) The business became a division of Grace known as the Hateo Chemical Division.
6
(Stipulation No. 6)
10. Hackman remained at the helm of the Hateo Chemical Division until 1962 when Mr. Alex Kaufman (“Kaufman”) became president of the Hateo Chemical Division. Kaufman held this position until his resignation in 1978. (Stipulation No. 85)
11. From 1959 until August 21, 1978, Grace owned and operated the Fords facility. On August 21, 1978, the Farben and Fuss Corporations purchased the Fords facility from Grace for $9.6 million. (E671 at H037006; 2032:18-2033:6 (Kaufman)) The Fuss Corporation (“Fuss”) purchased the “Chemical Realty” of the Hateo Chemical Division. The Farben Corporation (“Farben”) purchased the “Chemical Assets other than the Chemical Realty” of the Hateo Chemical Division. (Stipulation No. 7) Kaufman held controlling interests in both Fuss and Farben. (1967:6-9, 2032:18-21 (Kaufman))
12. On September 1, 1978, Farben changed its name to the Hateo Chemical Corporation. On September 30, 1978, Fuss merged into the Hateo Chemical Corporation. On October 28,1986, the Hateo Chemical Corporation was renamed the Hateo Corporation. (Stipulation No. 8)
2. Manufacturing
13. Upon arrival at the Fords property in 1954, the Hateo Chemical Company had one reactor, one stripper, one refiner, a filter press and tanks. (1878:5 (Kaufman))
14. From approximately 1954 until 1959, two plants were in operation at the Hateo Chemical Company: (1) an esterification plant (Ester I) where plasticizers and synthetic lubricants, including dioctyl phthalate, dibutyl phthalate and diisooctyl phthalate, were manufactured from acids and alcohols; and (2) a sebacic acid plant where raw materials were generated to make aviation turbine oils. (Stipulation No. 5; (1882:9) (Kaufman))
15. During this period, alcohols, sebacic acid and phthalic anhydride were stored at the site and the railroad siding was used to load and unload tankers. (1989:22 (Kaufman)) Other raw materials brought to the site included octyl alcohol, butyl alcohol, 2-ethylhexyl alcohol and castor oil. (E10 at WRG06810; Hackman Dep. 52:12) •
16. Grace’s 1959 purchase brought the necessary capital for expansion. (1884:20 (Kaufman)) Besides continuing to produce various phthalate esters in the Ester I plant, during the 1960s, additional manufacturing-facilities were built at the site.
17. In 1960, the Hateo Chemical Division constructed and began operating a benzyl chloride plant. The plant manufactured benzyl chloride which in turn was combined with phthalic anhydride to produce butyl benzyl phthalate (“BBP”), a plasticizer. (Stipulation No. 15) The benzyl chloride plant operated until 1965. (37:8 (Raviv); Stipulation Nos. 15, 60) Plaintiff Hateo never has manufactured butyl benzyl phthalate. (Stipulation No. 35) .
18. In 1961 and 1963, the Hateo Chemical Division built two plants on the eastern portion of the Fords property, known as PA-1 and PA-2. These plants manufactured phthalic anhydride from naphthalene. (Stipulation No. 10) George Napack was hired to oversee the construction and operation of the' PA plants. (Napack Dep. 18, 217 — 18)
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19. The Hateo Chemical Division began the manufacturing operations of PA-1 in 1961 and PA-2 in 1963. (Stipulation No. 11) Production of phthalic anhydride at the two PA plants ceased in 1971. (Stipulation No. 12)
20. The Hateo Chemical Division continued to use phthalic anhydride in its operations, purchasing quantities from outside suppliers to manufacture various esters. The use of purchased phthalic anhydride at the Fords facility continues to the present day. (Stipulation No. 13)
21. While the PA plants were in operation, still bottoms from the PA production were deposited in an area to the east of the PA plants referred to as the “PA Residue Area.” (Napack Dep. 47-48)
22. In 1961, the Hateo Chemical Division installed a molecular still in the Ester I Tank Farm to separate by-products manufactured in the sebacic acid plant. The molecular still was closed in 1965. (Stipulation Nos. 16, 60; 1066:2-11 (Trela))
23. In or around 1960, the Hateo Chemical Division installed two thermal units (“SH-1 and SH-2”) to provide heat for a new reactor added in the Ester I plant. (E22, 23, 29) From approximately 1961 to 1966 aroclor was used as a heat transfer fluid in the hydrotherm units. (Stipulation No. 27)
24. In 1970, Grace constructed a second esterification plant (“Ester II”) to manufacture DOP and other phthalate esters. (1239:21 (Reid)) The Ester II plant remains in operation today at the Fords facility.
25. After Hateo purchased the facility in 1978, it continued to manufacture a variety of plasticizers, including di-n-butyl phthalate (“DBP”), bis (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (“DEHP”), diisodecyl phthalate and DOP. (E1043 at A301887; 186:25-187:2 (Raviv) (Hateo and Grace made same use of Ester I complex)); 2170:18-21 (Staples) (same))
26. Other chemicals that have been used and stored at the site since 1978 include benzene (“BZ”), 1,1,1-TCA (“TCA”), methylene chloride, styrene, xylene and toluene. (E968, 1241, 1737)
27. In the post-1978 period, Hateo began the manufacture of phenyl xylyl ethane (“PXE”), which required the use of xylene and styrene. (E1043 at A301975, 1410 at A301646; 1243:5 (Reid) (PXE manufacture began in early 1980s))
28. Since 1978, Hateo has used the Ester II plant to manufacture various phthalate esters, including DOP, DEHP and DIDP, and to distill PXE and TCA bottoms. (2179:22-2180:11, 2905:4-23 (Staples); Lynch Stipulation ¶¶ 6, 7; Maimón Stipulation ¶ 34; E1404)
29. In 1983, Hateo modified existing facilities and constructed a new plant at the Fords site to manufacture Z-Aspartic Acid (“ZAA”). (Maimón Stipulation ¶¶ 1-3; Na-pack Dep. 45:20-46:9; 152:8 (Raviv)) These facilities are located in the area of the former benzyl chloride plant. (146:16 (Raviv)) By June 1984, the ZAA facility was in the semi-commercial startup phase. (1339:15 (Chryss))
30. In 1986, plaintiff Hateo dismantled the two PA plants at the Fords facility. (Stipulation No. 72)
3. Waste Treatment
31. Between 1954 and 1959, Hackman dug at least one settling pond at the Fords facility that was designed to handle waste by allowing product to separate from water. (1881:14 (Kaufman); 33:10-19 (Raviv); E10 at WRG06830; DE001) During this period, liquid wastes flowed into the pond system. (E10 at WRG06830) After settling, the effluent was released from the pond and flowed through marsh land into the Raritan River.
Id.;
(1891:19 (Kaufman))
32. By 1961, Grace had expanded the pond system, adding additional ponds, one of which subsequently was divided into two ponds, for a total of four ponds at the site. (E12, 15; Stipulation No. 59)
33. With the settling pond system, Grace sought to minimize the amount of process waste discharged and to recover suspended solids containing product. To accomplish these goals, Grace skimmed the esters and other organic matter that floated to the surface of the ponds and neutralized the remain
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ing liquid effluent with lime slurry. The recovered product was returned to the plant to manufacture off-color plasticizer (“OOP”) to sell as a Grace product. (Stipulation No. 18)
34. While in operation, semi-solid matter accumulated in the ponds, thereby necessitating periodic cleaning. (Stipulation No. 17) Known as “demueking,” this process involved scooping solid material from the bottom of the ponds. (Stipulation No. 19) The dredged material was deposited in an area west of ponds three and four known as the “muck storage area.” (40:16^13:5 (Raviv))
35. From 1959 until 1971, Grace discharged waste products from the various plant operations into the ponds system. Aroclor leaks, liquid waste effluent from the Ester I and benzyl chloride plants and Ester I leaks and spills of phthalates and raw materials were discharged to the ponds. (Stipulations Nos. 31-34)
36. In 1966, Grace completed the construction of sewer lines at the site to connect the Fords facility to the Middlesex County Sewerage Authority (“MCSA”). The MCSA later changed its name to the Middlesex County Utilities Authority (“MCUA”). (Stipulation No. 20)
37. As part of the MCSA connection, Grace installed two clay-lined lagoons at the Fords facility. (Stipulation No. 21) The lagoons were designed and used, until 1971, as a temporary storage location for plant effluent prior to discharge to the MCSA. (Stipulation No. 36; Ackelsberg Dep. 204:14-20)
38. When Grace’s gravity-based settling pond system and the clay-lined lagoons were in operation between 1966 and 1971, process effluent flowed from the settling ponds to the clay-lined lagoons to sewers connected to MCSA. (Stipulation Nos. 22, 36) Liquid waste
from the
phthalic anhydride plants was released to the lagoons and ultimately to the MCUA. (Stipulation No. 37)
39. In 1969, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (the “DEP”) directed the Hateo Chemical Division of W.R. Grace to eliminate the ponds because of odor problems. (Stipulation No. 24) The Hateo Chemical Division completed the pond elimination program in March 1971. (Stipulation No. 25) Plaintiff Hateo never operated the settling pond system or the muck storage areas. (Stipulation No. 26)
40. In 1990, plaintiff Hateo began operating an effluent pretreatment plant (the “EPT plant”) at the Fords site. (Stipulation No. 13) The main purpose of the EPT plant was to reduce the organics in Hatco’s effluent prior to its discharge to the MCUA. (715:7-14 (Raviv))
4. Location of Site Facilities
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41. Throughout the history of the site, the manufacturing and waste disposal facilities largely have been situated in the central portion of the site. In aerial photographs, this concentration of buildings and other artificial structures forms a capital letter “T” with the vertical structures traveling north to south and the horizontal improvements running east to west.
42. During Grace’s ownership, the Ester I complex served as the industrial center and was bounded on the west by the Ester I Tank Farm and to the east by the two PA plants. To the south of the PA plants four large tanks, known as the “M tanks,” were installed to store the naphthalene used in PA production. Continuing south from the M tanks, the Ester II building appears. West of Ester II, two railroad sidings, one serving each ester plant, run north from the southern boundary of the property.
43. Directly to the south of the Ester I complex two ponds were located, pond number one to the west and pond number two to the east. Two larger ponds were found further to the south, pond number three to the east and pond number four to the west. The sebacic acid plant was situated to the east of
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ponds one and two. East of ponds three and four, the benzyl chloride plant was located. A muck storage area was created southwest of ponds three and four. At the southern boundary of the property, just west of the railroad sidings, the two lagoons were constructed.
44. Due north of these manufacturing and waste structures, a pilot plant, the quality control laboratory, the alcohol tank farm and drum storage areas were located.
45. Many of these structures remained unchanged following Hatco’s purchase of the site. During the pond elimination program, Grace reclaimed the areas of the site the ponds and muck storage areas had occupied. Hateo constructed the EPT plant in the area of former pond four. Hateo also added the ZAA facility, converting the former benzyl chloride plant and constructing a new building just south of former ponds one and two.
D. Contamination Overview
1. Sampling
46. In August 1979, the DEP visited the Hateo site and took a single sample from the surface of each of the two lagoons. (1220:3-1221:10 (Reid); E699) In March 1980, DEP officials returned to the Hateo site and gathered soil samples. (1229:7-17 (Reid))
47. In 1981, the DEP selected seven groundwater monitoring well sites, beginning the first systematic testing at the Hateo facility. (214:15-23 (Raviv)) Paulus, Sokolowski and Sartor, Inc. (“PS & S”), an environmental consulting firm, installed these wells in 1982. (66:11-15 (Raviv))
48. Subsequent DEP spot sampling of the lagoons and other portions of the site occurred in 1981 (876:23 (Trela); E720), 1984 (879:6 (Trela); E825) and 1985. (883:1 (Trela); E881) The MCUA drew samples of Hateo’s sewer waste water in 1986. (886:19 (Trela); E1040)
49. As a result of the DEP’s continued interest in the site, in 1986 Hateo hired DRAI to provide advice with respect to the DEP’s demands. (1443:3-10 (Chryss)) DRAI installed additional groundwater monitoring wells in 1987, 1990 and 1992, (65:23-66:22, 214:15-23 (Raviv)), and performed surface and subsurface soil investigations in various areas throughout the site in 1987, 1988, 1991 and 1992. (E2253) The DEP specified the groups of chemicals to be tested as well as the testing methods. (97:7-21 (Raviv))
50. Based on evidence of historical activities at the Hateo site, DRAI created areas of environmental concern (“AECs”), a basic concept in any kind of environmental investigations of plants, which allowed it to examine the impact of particular operations at relevant parts of the site. See Appendix III. (54:2-23 (Raviv)) DRAI also developed a grid system to guide its soil studies. (DE013; 64:11-19 (Raviv)) In areas where contamination was found, the density of the grid was increased in order to fine-tune its delineation. (64:20-65:22 (Raviv))
51. In 1987 and 1988 Exxon Chemical, a potential Hateo purchaser, hired Environ, an environmental consulting company, to come to the site and conduct testing. Environ examined soil and groundwater conditions at Hateo. (1472:8-20 (Chryss))
2. Contaminants
52. The resulting data indicates that the Hateo site contains three principal contaminants: (1) base neutrals (“BNs”); (2) poly-chlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”); and (3) volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”). (69:6 (Raviv))
53. BNs, also known as semivolatiles, are a subset of organic chemicals. (919:11 (Trela)) This category includes different phthalate esters, including DEHP, BBP, DEP, DBP and DOP, (93:4, 69:8, 75:21 (Raviv)), as well as petroleum products and naphthalene (“Naph”). (2068:2 (Staples)) BNs are the source of the greatest volume of contamination at the Hateo site. (2067:2-15 (Staples))
54. Two types of PCBs were found at the site, aroclor 1248 and aroclor 1254. . When tracing the history of PCBs, it is important to evaluate reports of the presence or absence of PCBs carefully. (882:12 (Trela)) Obtaining accurate PCB results is difficult, because the applicable testing method is susceptible to interference by organic chemicals, such as the phthalate esters present at the
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Hateo site. (880:5, 881:1 (Trela)) Testing of soil borings is more accurate than testing of groundwater samples. (888:6 (Trela))
55. Sampling also revealed the presence of a variety of VOCs. This category of chemicals includes solvents such as toluene, xylene, TCA, TCE and benzene. (76:3 (Raviv))
56. These pollutants are distributed throughout the site at various depths and concentrations. To some degree, each group of contaminants is present in the soils and the groundwater. Often these chemicals are commingled in the same soil. The DEP primarily is concerned with the VOC contamination in the groundwater and the PCB soil contamination. (742:4-20 (Raviv); E2453 at A216332)
E. Apportionment of Responsibility
57. While the assignment of responsibility for the remediation of this contamination ultimately requires a judgment regarding the sufficiency of the mechanism of division, a question of law, initially the Court must explore the causation relationship and identify, as a matter of fact, the actions that led to the problems that exist at the Hateo facility.
1. Relevant Factors
58. It is the commingling of contaminants within the soils and groundwater that complicates attempts to draw conclusions about the relationship between site activities and contamination. This burden is not insurmountable, however, as the expert testimony at trial revealed. A number of variables distinguish the respective parties’ uses of the Hateo site, including time of use, manufacturing activities and production rates. The migratory aspects of the contamination and the exclusive use of certain chemicals also guide the causation inquiry. While the utility of the former list of factors is evident, the latter category, whose members dominated the testimony at trial, merits more thorough treatment.
a. Exclusive Use of Chemicals
59. The causation inquiry begins with an attempt to identify the party who introduced the contamination feu the site. Frequently this quest will uncover-multiple sources. At the Fords facility, however, some chemicals found in the soil and groundwater can be traced with certainty to either Grace or Hateo, but not to both. For example, the record indicates that Grace served as the sole source of PCBs and that only Hateo used TCA in its manufacturing activities.
60. The utility of the exclusive use factor is limited, however, because it alone may not reveal which party is responsible for the precise distribution of contamination at the site. Nevertheless, exclusive use serves an important default function. If no evidence supports an alternate explanation for the way in which a chemical reached its current location, the party that brought the chemical at issue onto the site will retain responsibility for the resultant contamination.
(1) Grace
61. From approximately 1961 through 1966, Grace purchased and used heat transfer fluids at the Fords facility that contained PCBs, including aroclor 1248, aroclor 1254 and Therminol FR-2. (Stipulation Nos. 27, 29) Grace also used convaelor, a mixture of aroelors. (Stipulation No. 28)
62. Grace used aroelors in the hydrotherm units, the molecular still, the capryl still and in the manufacturing operation at PA-2. (Stipulation Nos. 28, 38; (1066:15 (Trela)) Grace used aroclor 1248 as a heat exchange fluid in the hydrotherm units and aroclor 1254 in the manufacture of OCP. (1064:5-21 (Trela))
63. Plaintiff Hateo never has purchased PCB products in conjunction with its manufacturing activities at the Fords facility. (Stipulation No. 30)
64. The PCB contamination at the Hateo site is widespread and generally is found in the areas where Grace used PCBs. (1064:25-1065:5 (Trela))
65. The evidence indicates that Grace purchased trichloroethylene (“TCE”) in 1964, (255:4 (Raviv); E159), and used it to clean the hydrotherm units. (2422:19 (Staples); 1063:11-16 (Trela); E163 (Grace reporting TCE cleaning to manufacturer); 1062:5-24 (Trela); E159 (TCE purchase order))
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66. There is little evidence of TCE in the sampling data. TCE is found in shallow and deep wells east of the lagoons and in a shallow well north of the lagoons. (2765:23, 2766:12 (Staples)) TCE also was detected in former ponds one and two at depths of 2-3 and 6-14 feet (2768:10 (Staples)) and ponds three and four from 4-6 ft. (2769:23 (Staples))
67. Despite suggestions to the contrary, (376:1 (only Grace used toluene) (Raviv); (2777:7) (toluene last introduced to site in 1965) (Staples)), both Grace and Hateo brought toluene to the Fords site. During Grace’s tenure, toluene was a benzyl chloride production material. (£14(^,2¶4) Hateo also purchased toluene post-1978. (698:16 (Raviv); 2115:23 (Staples))
68. Lagoon samples from 1979 and 1980 contained toluene. (375:13, 809:11, 810:1 (Raviv)) Subsequent tests Hateo commissioned confirmed the initial toluene result. (2897:9 (Staples); E751) Today, in the area around and downgradient of the former benzyl chloride plant, the data reveals traces of toluene at the surface and toluene contamination in the subsurface soils. (2779:2 (Staples))
(2) Hateo
69. From 1983 to 1990, plaintiff Hateo used 1,1,1-trichloroethane (“TCA”) in the manufacture of ZAA. (811:3 (Raviv); Maimón Dep. 242:12-15; Maimón Stipulation ¶¶ 7, 10) Hateo used over 250,000 pounds of TCA annually in the production of ZAA. (E1780 at A300773; 583:6-584:4 (Raviv), 2842:14-2843:8 (Staples))
70. Hateo recovered and later distilled TCA used in the ZAA manufacturing process in the Ester II and ZAA plants. (Maimón Dep. 43:25-46:20; Maimón Stipulation ¶¶ 11, 16, 34) The distillation process created “TCA bottoms.” TCA bottoms contain benzyl chloride, dibenzyl carbonate, TCA and butyl alcohol. (Maimón Dep. 46:5-20; Maimón Stipulation ¶¶ 15, 27)
71. There is no evidence that Grace purchased or used TCA at the Fords facility. (578:15 (Raviv); 2090:1 (Staples)) Athough a report of 1979 DEP surface lagoon sampling results indicated the presence of TCA in the lagoons, this finding was not supported by data. (2090:8 (Staples)) Today, there is no TCA contamination upgradient of the ZAA plant of the Hateo facility. (2091:10 (Staples))
72. Xylene also is unique to the posH978 period. (2174:12 (Staples)) Hateo used xylene in the production of PXE. (376:7 (Raviv); 2112:18 (Staples)).
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73. There is no evidence that Grace used xylene.
9
Athough 1980 lagoon sampling of the DEP revealed the presence of xylene, (810:1 (Raviv); 2502:18 (Staples); E737), Hateo disputed this finding, (2895:3 (Staples); reading E774 at 29712; 2896:10 (Staples)), and commissioned additional tests that refuted the initial results. (2897:9 (Staples); E751; 2503:25 (Staples))
74. An August 27, 1984 analysis of a lagoon skimming sample indicated the presence of PXE. (692:5 (Raviv); E841) Xylene itself was present in a sample taken from the lagoon skimmings on October 5, 1984. (692:16 (Raviv); E847) Today xylene is found in monitoring wells 15S and 17S. (2113:6 (Staples)
b. Migration of Contaminants
75. As indicated above, however, the Court must do more than identify the source of contamination at the Hateo facility to resolve the instant dispute; it must determine who is responsible for the distribution of contamination at the site. The interaction among chemicals and between chemicals and the environment, referred to as fate and transport analysis, controls this inquiry and
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supplies the second portion of the causation equation.
76. Chemical fate and transport analysis is crucial to determining which of a number of activities contributed to the contamination at the site. (2080:11-20 (Staples)) If the activities of either party transport a contaminant from the location in which the other party placed it to a different location, for purposes of divisibility, the party responsible for the transport caused the contamination. (Cf. 1181:7 (Trela noting that there is more to allocation than identity of source)) The use of chemical fate and transport analysis in the assessment of. environmental property damage has been endorsed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). (2116:18-2117:12 (Staples))
(1) General Dynamics
77. Various properties unique to each chemical determine the ways in which chemicals react with the environment and with each other. These attributes include density, volatility, degradability, solubility in water, solubility in other chemicals, and the tendency to adsorb or stick to soils. .(2080:21-2081:11 (Staples)) The profile generated by these properties helps predict the behavior of chemicals and discern the cause of environmental harm.
78. The place in which a chemical is introduced into the environment also affects its migratory potential. Above the water table, contaminants generally will move-vertically down through the soil column. (474:15 (Raviv)) A chemical’s behavior below the water table, where the soil and water columns are equivalent, (2086:4 (Staples)), is controlled by its density. Low-density chemicals disperse and float in the groundwater, (2085:14 (Staples); DE056), while higher density substances migrate downward into the aquifer. (DE055)
79. PCBs exhibit stubborn characteristics. This group of contaminants adsorbs to soil particles, (460:6 (Raviv); 2084:2 (Staples)) and does not biodegrade. (2084:8 (Staples)) PCBs have very low water solubility, (464:20 (Raviv); 2084:1 (Staples)), but higher solubility in solvents. (2085:9 (Staples)) If released onto soil, PCBs will remain in place unless impacted by some external force. (2085:7 (Staples))
80. The BNs or phthalate ester products manufactured at the Hateo site have low densities, around .9, and tend to float ■ on water. This characteristic enabled the parties to use skimming operations and oil-water separators to capture recyclable BNs contained in plant effluent. (2082:14, 2852:18-2853:22 (Staples)) Some BNs do not degrade easily in the environment, while others have some tendency to biodegrade. (2082:1-4 (Staples))
81. VOCs, as their name suggests, are more volatile than their sister organics, BNs. (2074:4 (Staples)) This category of chemicals moves through the soil column faster than PCBs. (460:20 (Raviv)) VOCs can solubilize PCBs, (464:22 (Raviv)), and, under the right circumstances, move them down through soils. (465:7 (Raviv))
82. The manufacturing activities at. a plant site also. contribute to the distribution of previously released contaminants. Events such as spills, leaks and drips and sewer and tank overflows can mobilize and rearrange chemicals in the environment.
83. Another important catalyst is surface water run-off generated by rainfall and other precipitation. Generally, this run-off will not contaminate subsurface soils. Contamination of the subsurface occurs when water dissolves contaminants at the surface before infiltrating downward through the soil column to the water table. Once dissolved, the contamination will travel with the water. (180:1 (Raviv))
84. With respect to BNs and PCBs, the short time period associated with run-off events is insufficient to dissolve these materials. (180:22, 181:6 (Raviv)) Although rain water percolates through BNs and PCBs, because these chemicals have low water solubilities, they do not infiltrate down to the water table., (230:16 (Raviv))
85. In contrast, water will dissolve- and carry VOCs. (180:18 (Raviv)) When rainwater comes into contact with VOCs on the surface, it will dissolve a portion of the VOCs and move them to the water table. (460:24 (Raviv))
*1062
(2) PCB Contamination
86. The passage of time alone will not move PCBs. (2706:3 (Staples)) Generally, as a result, one would not expect PCBs to migrate to the subsurface soils or into the groundwater without decades or hundreds of years. (745:9 (Raviv))
87. PCBs can reach deep soils as a result of mechanical means or transport by another chemical. (2668:11 (Staples); 1089:10 (Trela) (spills of organics mobilize PCBs in physical and chemical sense))
88. Similarly, PCBs can reach the groundwater in one of three ways, specifically through: (1) physical introduction, (743:11 (Raviv)); (2) transport by VOCs, (743:23 (Raviv)); and (3) direct contact between the groundwater and PCB-soils. This third method, however, dissolves extremely low levels of PCBs into solution. (744:17 (Raviv))
89. The transport of PCBs is accomplished by chemicals in which PCBs solubilize. These chemicals carry PCBs downward as they migrate through the soil column to deeper soils and eventually to the water table. (2085:9 (Staples)) After reaching the water table, a low-density solvent will disperse and float on the surface of the groundwater, (2085:14 (Staples); DE056), while a solvent of higher density will continue to migrate downward into the aquifer. (DE055)
’ 90. PCBs will remain in the solvent after it reaches the water table provided that the solvent is in substantial, enough concentrations. At the edge of the solvent, however, PCBs will disperse into the water. (2086:17; 2107-2112 (Staples))
91.This solvent migration theory was used to explain the distribution of contaminants at the J.T. Baker site, a case with which both apportionment experts were familiar. There, DDT, a chemical that shares the low water solubility of PCBs, (468:2 (Raviv)), was found thirty-five feet from the surface in soils below the water table. A plume of chlorobenzene, a solvent with properties similar to those of TCA, (2104:9 (Staples); 468:8 (Raviv)), appeared in the groundwater downgradient from the DDT deposits, (469:23 (Raviv)), but only traces of chlorobenzene were found in the soil column with the DDT. (470:11, 476:12 (Raviv)) Both apportionment experts who testified in the instant case agreed that the chlorobenzene was the driving force that “allowed DDTs to migrate downward.” (468:25, 471:5 (Raviv); 2105:7 (Staples))
92. Examples of VOCs present at the Hateo site that have the potential to cause the migration of PCBs include TCA, TCE, toluene and xylene. Toluene and xylene have densities less than one and therefor could not move PCBs down through the water table. TCA and TCE, in contrast, are heavier than water and capable of transporting PCBs to soils below the water table.
93. TCA and TCE degrade into similar chemicals. (2101:10 (Staples)) In fact, all TCA daughter products are also TCE daughter products. (2744:14 (Staples)) The primary daughter products of TCA are 1,1 DCA and monochloroethane (or chloroethane (“CA”)), while the primary daughter product of TCE is 1,2 DCE. (2095:4 (Staples)) Daughter products help discern the identity of the parent chemical. (2101:19 (Staples))
94. The principal method by which TCA and TCE degrade in an aquifer is the removal of chlorine atoms, a process known as reductive dechlorination which produces DCA and DCE, respectively. (2824:11-23 (Staples); DE090)
95. Although TCE can degrade into DCA, the double-bonded carbons of the TCE molecule make degradation to DCA more difficult. (2824:24 (Staples)) The reductive dechlorination process which transforms TCE to DCE occurs almost thirty times more frequently than the degradation of TCE into other daughter products. (2825:17-21 (Staples))
96. Although the monitoring well data at the Fords facility indicates no exclusive TCA daughter products, but some exclusive TCE daughter products, (2765:13 (Staples); DE088), the relative concentrations of these chemicals indicate that the DCA and CA degraded from TCA not TCE. (2886:7 (Staples); DE088A)
97. TCA and its daughter products are found in substantial concentrations, while TCE and its specific daughter products are
*1063
not. (2828:5-19, 2874:25-2886:23 (Staples)) Most TCE and specific TCE daughter products appear in estimated concentrations below the testing laboratory’s detection limit. (2827:13-23 (Staples))
98. Although a more detailed analysis of the TCA-PCB phenomenon is necessary before the Court can use this theory to explain the contamination at the Fords facility, this inquiry is better incorporated into the discussion pertaining to the areas in which defendant argued that the presence of TCA explained the PCB contamination.
c. Toxicity of Contaminants
99. Without a risk assessment, which details and determines the risk of exposure posed by chemicals detected at the Hateo site, the relative toxicity of chemicals detected at the Hateo site is not a relevant factor in dividing responsibility for contamination. (2265:22-2271:24 (Staples and the Court))
d. Remediation Costs
100. The cost of the disposal of contaminated material is controlled, in part, by whether it is classified as a hazardous waste as opposed to a hazardous substance. (969:17 (Trela)) This classification rests on the concentration and properties of the chemical as well as its source. (970:2, 963:18 (Trela))
101. Without the hazardous waste categorization the charge for removing VOC and BN contamination is $50-$150. PCB removal requires an expenditure of $200-$400 per ton at low concentration levels, $400-$1000 at medium levels and $1000 if the concentrations reach the 500 ppm threshold. (965:2 (Trela))
102. Because the investigation and analysis of the contamination at the site is not complete, neither a risk assessment nor a remediation plan has been proposed or approved, and the ultimate remediation will not occur for several years, speculation as to remedial technologies or remediation costs appropriate to the site are premature and cannot be taken into account in an allocation of responsibility for the contamination at the site. (2258:18-22, 2259:12-22 (Staples))
e.Pre-1959 Manufacturing Activities
103. Due to the limited information about pre-1959 activities, (2173:21 (Staples)), and the increase in production of existing 1959 facilities, (522:25-23:24 (Raviv)), levels of Ester I production pre-1959 much lower than post-1959) as well as the construction of additional manufacturing plants which have dramatically changed the potential for impact to environment', (526:4 (Raviv)), the activities of the Hateo Chemical Company will not shape the apportionment decision of the Court.
10
104. This result is consistent with the approach of both apportionment ¿xperts. (526:4 (Raviv); 2173:21 (Staples)) Neither expert offered an opinion regarding the level of contamination caused by the pre-1959 operation of the Fords facility. (526:14 (Raviv))
F. Apportionment — Soil Contamination
105. The Court will follow the areas of environmental concern devised by plaintiffs expert. This site division has been incorporated into the remediation plans and reports previously submitted to the DEP. In addition, the numerous divisions offer a degree of detail that facilitates a complete discussion of the contamination at the Fords facility.
1. Areas of Joint Use
a. Lagoons (AEC 1)
(1) Respective Uses
(a) Grace
106. Between 1959 and 1966, prior to the installation of the lagoons, effluent reached
*1064
off-site marshlands through unlined (391:11 (Raviv)) ditches (388:17 (Raviv)), one of which crossed the portion of the site that the west lagoon now occupies. (390:10 (Raviv))
107. Constructed in 1966, the two lagoons were installed atop clean fill with a man-made clay liner separating the lagoon bottoms from the underlying soils. (2203:6-12 (Staples)) Thereafter, Grace used the lagoons to drain the ponds. (380:11 (Raviv)) During this period, the lagoons received liquid waste from the pond system, (2203:6 (Staples)), and all chemicals discharged to the ponds reached the lagoons. (2414:10 (Staples)) Although Grace’s skimming of the ponds, (670:2 (Raviv)), reduced the contamination in the liquid sent to the lagoons, (674:20 (Raviv)), contamination remained in the effluent because the pond skimming was not a constant operation. (830:1 (Raviv))
108. Following the pond elimination program in 1971, during which Grace installed by-pass piping around the lagoons, (2861:19 (Raviv); E368), Grace’s effluent went directly from the sewers to .the MCUA, and did not pass through the lagoons. As such, from 1971 to 1978 the lagoons were used only sporadically. (1318:5-12 (Reid); 2203:6 (Staples))
109. Grace did not skim the lagoons. (661:5 (Raviv) (no "evidence of lagoon skimming at any time prior to 1984); Dominach Dep. at 472:3)
(b) Hateo
110. Hateo skimmed the lagoons for a period of twelve months from May 4, 1984, (538:1 (Raviv); 2373:17 (Staples), E840) to April 18, 1985. (726:6 (Raviv); 2374:24 (Staples); E909, 892)
111. During the skimming project, Hateo closed the sewer line from the west lagoon to the MCUA, fitted the west lagoon with a boom, and skimmed product from the surface of the west lagoon. (401:20 (Raviv)) The line from the east lagoon to the MCUA remained active. (401:24 (Raviv))
112. Hateo pumped contaminated storm water run-off, (1752:10, 1755:1, 1842:19 (Chryss); E1070 Bates 002221), from the Ester I railroad swale area into the east lagoon, (681:5 (Raviv)), from 1985 to 1991. (1751:18 (Chryss))
113. Following the lagoon skimming project, Hateo used the lagoons on an “emergency” basis during periods of heavy rainfall as a retention basin for sewer overflows. (1382:4 (Chryss); E918)
114. Hateo took the lagoons out of service in 1991 and covered them with a plastic cap. (984:23-985:23 (Trela))
(2) Contamination
115. DRAI conducted lagoon sampling in 1988. The capping of the lagoons made subsequent sampling impossible. (82:3 (Raviv))
116. The sludge layer above the clay liner of the west lagoon contains actionable 1,1-DCA and 1,1,1-TCA, actionable PCBs, specifically aroelor 1248, and actionable DEHP, BBP, DBP and DOP.
11
117. The sludge layer above the clay liner of the east lagoon contains actionable BZ and 1.1-DCA, actionable PCBs, specifically aroclor 1248, and actionable DEHP, BBP, DBP and DOP.
118. The soils below the clay liner in the west lagoon contain actionable 1,1-DCA and 1.1.1-TCA, actionable PCBs, specifically aroclor 1248, and actionable DEHP, BBP, DBP and DOP.
119. The soils below the clay liner in the east lagoon contain actionable PCBs, specifically aroelor 1248, and actionable DEHP, BBP, DBP and Naph, but no actionable VOCs.
120. The PCB and BN contamination in the east and west lagoons both above and below the clay liner is similar. The same menu of contaminants appears at similar orders of magnitude. (412:20, 24, 413:20 (Raviv); 2219:4 (Staples))
121. Although the east and west lagoons above the clay liner both contain 1,1-DCA and 1,1,1-TCA, the orders of magnitude differ across lagoons. In the east lagoon the
*1065
results for DCA range from 1.6 to 4.2 ppm and for TCA from 1.4 to 8.2 ppm. In the west lagoon the values for DCA range from 5.7 to 180 ppm and for TCA from 12 to 3600 ppm.
122. No DCA or TCA was detected below the clay liner'-in the east lagoon. Below the clay liner in the west lagoon, from zero to one-half of a foot, DCA and TCA were found in concentrations of 320 and 430 ppm, respectively. Between 0.5 to 2 feet, however, these values drop off dramatically to 0.03 ppm and nondetect (“ND”) for DCA and 0.1 and 0.01 ppm for TCA.
123. The groundwater in this area contains TCA and its daughter products. Sampling from monitoring well 6S, located south of the east lagoon recorded: an initial 1,1,1-TCA value of 120 ppb in April 1988 that decreased steadily to ND in April 1992; 1,1— DCA at a concentration of 1100 ppb in April 1988 that decreased steadily to 54 ppb in April 1992; the first appearance of ehloroethane in October 1988 at a level of 15 ppb that increased steadily to 91 ppm in April 1991 and then dropped to 68 ppb by April 1992. Located south of the west lagoon, monitoring well 7S never has tested positive for 1,1,1-TCA, but contained 1,1-DCA at values of 74 ppb in April 1988 which decreased steadily to ND by April 1992. Chloroethane first appeared in monitoring well 7S in October 1988 and increased to 330 ppb by April 1991 before dropping to 250 ppb on April 1992.
(3) Apportionment of Lagoons
124. The location of PCBs below the clay liner of the lagoons was a problem for which Dr. Raviv had no ready explanation at the time of his deposition. (736:2 (Raviv)) The similarity in the BN and PCB contamination across the lagoons, as well as the finding of aroclor 1248 at a depth of 4.5 feet in the east lagoon, (731:19 (Raviv)), defeats the theory offered at trial that the pre-1971 ditch that traversed the area in which the west lagoon is now located caused the PCB contamination below the lagoon liner. (730:24 (Raviv))
125. It is clear, however, that some external mechanism is required to mobilize PCBs. PCBs in a liquid form will migrate vertically with a driving force. (733:20 (Raviv)) The introduction of large volumes of effluent creates an hydraulic head that mobilizes contamination in the lagoons downward. (666:14-667:1 (Raviv)) Alternatively, PCBs mixed with BNs or other liquids can migrate vertically. (732:17, 733:11 (Raviv))
126. The data indicates the presence, of TCA and its daughter products in both monitoring wells 6S and 7S. Due to the site’s south-southwest groundwater flow, as depicted on demonstrative exhibit 33, the VOC contamination found in monitoring well 6S, located east of the west lagoon, did not originate from the west lagoon. As a result, the east lagoon is the source of the TCA found within well 6S.
127. Time of use, exclusive use of contaminants and the migratory properties of PCBs guide the apportionment of responsibility for contamination in the lagoons area.
128. Based on exclusive use, the PCBs within the soil above the liner in the east and west lagoons will be assigned 100% to Grace. Similarly, the TCA and TCA daughter products found above and below the clay liner in the west lagoon will be assigned 100% to Hateo.
129. VOC contamination in the soils above the clay liner in the east lagoon, which results from both Grace and Hateo chemicals, will be divided between the parties according to time of use as will the BN contamination throughout the lagoons.
130. PCB contamination in the soils below the clay liner in the east and west lagoons also will be divided among the parties according to time of use. During their respective periods of lagoon use, both Hateo and Grace created the enhanced conditions needed for PCB movement. The introduction of BNs and VOCs to the lagoon area as well as the physical effects of introducing large-volumes of liquid into the lagoons mobilized the PCBs in the sludge and caused them to reach depths below the clay liner.
12
*1066
131. The time of use factor accounts for periods of full use and partial use. Full use is measured according to the number of years during which the lagoons received plant effluent. (620:10 (Raviv)) Partial use, designed to quantify the impact to the environment of storm water accumulation, sewer overflows and temporary run-off, (622:22 (Raviv); 2210:11 (Staples)), is the equivalent of two days of full use each month.
13
(620:10 (Raviv))
132. Grace’s full use of the lagoons spanned 4.25 years while its partial use of the lagoons continued seven more years. Hatco’s full use filled one year, and its partial use lasted for eleven years. As such, Grace is responsible for 73.2% of the YOC contamination in the east lagoon,
14
the PCB contamination below the clay liner and the BN contamination, and Hateo is responsible for 26.8% of the VOC contamination in the east lagoon, the PCB contamination below the clay liner and the BN contamination.
b. Former Ponds Area (AEC 2)
(1) Respective Uses
(a) Grace
133. From 1959 to 1971, Grace operated a settling pond system, to which Grace discharged all plant effluent and from which Grace periodically removed semi-solid muck.
See
¶¶ 32-35
supra.
134. By 1962, this system consisted of four unlined ponds which were created by digging large holes in the earth. (Stipulation No. 59; DE003; DE005; Napack Aff. ¶6) Effluent from manufacturing processes went directly into ponds one and two. Ester material floating on top of these ponds was removed, and the waste water then went to pond number three. The main waste water pond, pond three, was skimmed periodically, and the skimmed material was pumped to pond one -for reclamation. Pond four also was used for waste water storage. (Napack Aff. ¶ 7)
135. Until 1966, this waste water was discharged off-site through unlined trenches. (DE002; 35:23-36:2 (Raviv); Napack Dep. at 275:11-24) Thereafter, skimmed pond effluent flowed to the lagoons. (Stipulation No. 22)
136. As of 1970, the dimensions of the ponds were as folldws: <a) pond one measured 85 feet by 50 feet; (b) pond two was 75 feet by 45 feet; (c) pond three reached 90 feet by 95 feet; and '(d) irregularly-shaped pond four was slightly larger than 90 feet by 90 feet. (E363 at H501626) The ponds and muck areas themselves occupied only a fraction of the ponds region depicted in AEC 2. (2671:21 (Staples))
137. By early 1971, Grace had eliminated the ponds. To accomplish this reclamation, Grace first dug diversionary trenching in the earth throughout the pond area. Used for pond drainage, these trenches carried effluent from the ponds to the sewage authority via the lagoons. (Dominach Dep. at 190:14-91:13)
138. The ponds were then excavated. The “oil-laden earth” removed was easily identified by its black color. (273:12 (Raviv); 2223:11 (Staples)) Engineering plans estimated excavation depths from two to six feet. (E338 at H516540; 277:8 (Raviv) (two, three and six feet scenarios measure depth of excavation, not depth from surface)) Photographs taken during the pond elimination program indicate that Grace excavated pond two to roughly twelve to fifteen feet below the surface. (1115:22-1116:11 (Trela))
*1067
139. The water table in the area of the former ponds, allowing for seasonal variations, ranges from near the surface to ten feet below the surface. (274:17-20, 278:13-22 (Raviv)) In the portion of the area formerly occupied by ponds one and two, the depth to water measures between six or eight to ten feet below the surface. (278:13-18 (Raviv)) In the area south of former ponds one and two, the water table moves closer to the surface, finally reaching the surface in the area just north of the lagoons. (278:19-22 (Raviv))
140. To fill the areas of excavation, Grace brought clean soil from the Ester II area, (267:12 (Raviv)), and mixed it with contaminated soil located between and around the ponds. (272:6 (Raviv) (data indicates this)) Grace also used the contaminated dike walls from the muck storage area as fill material. (269:14 (Raviv); 2223:11; 2676:10-2681:14 (Staples) (corroborating use of contaminated dike walls))
141. Grace’s pond elimination program did not remove from the Fords site all of the contamination from the former ponds area, (263:22, 267:5 (Raviv)), as the distribution and depth of PCBs in the former ponds and muck storage areas indicate. (267:7 (Raviv)) One estimate 'indicated that Grace removed eighty-three percent of the contaminated soil dui’ing its program. (2229:15 (Staples))
142. The remaining pond x’esidue material is not distributed evenly throughout the pond x’egion. This material is readily identified in the data where very high PCB concentrations are found. (2233:3 (Staples))
(b) Hateo
143. Plaintiff Hateo constructed the EPT plant in 1990 in the center of the pond region where former pond four was located. (566:11-22 (Raviv)) This plant functions as oil-water separator, (712:16 (Raviv)), x*emoving any dissolved, suspended or floating organic chemicals from the water. (931:1 (Trela)) It does not produce an effluent. (2306:15 (Staples))
144. Plaintiff Hateo also operates a portion of the ZAA facility and storage in the former ponds area. (2222:4 (Staples))
(2) Contamination
145. The former ponds area is home to widespread BN, PCB and VOC contamination in the surface and subsurface. Actionable BNs found in the surface soils include DEHP, BBP, DEP, DBP, DOP and Naph. The DEHP appears throughout the area, while the remaining BNs are clustered near the locations of the former ponds.
146. Actionable PCBs are spread over the surface of the entire central portion of the area. Data indicates the presence of both aroclor 1248 and aroclor 1254.
147. The VOC contamination is more isolated with actionable BZ, TCE and xylene detected in the sui'face soils.
148. In the subsuxface soils a broader menu of BNs are spread more widely across the area. BNs remain at actionable levels to depths of ten to eleven feet across the site and at fourteen feet within former pond two. The highest concentrations of BNs appear in the former ponds and muck storage areas.
149. Extensive subsurface PCB testing measured actionable readings from two to twenty-one feet. At two to five feet, aroclor 1248 dominates the results with only two actionable findings of aroclor 1254, one each in pond two and pond three. At this depth, concentrations crossed the thousand ppm mark near pond three and the muck area. At five to seven feet, the high concentrations continue south of pond two and in and south of the muck area. From seven to eleven feet, pond two soils contain PCBs at levels greater than one thousand ppm, while concentrations in other portions of the area have declined. At twelve to fourteen feet in pond two concentrations measux’e 250-400 ppm.
150. In the subsurface, within the VOC category, actionable BZ appears at points throughout the area, one sample on the edge of pond three contained actionable toluene, actionable TCE was found in four samples, three in pond two and one in pond three, and lastly xylene turned up twice south of the ZAA facility and once at a depth of fourteen feet in fox-mer pond two.
*1068
(3) Apportionment
151. Because of the different impacts on portions of the site and the distinguishing behavior of the categories of chemicals, the ponds region is best apportioned by examining the surface and subsurface soils separately. Here, the types of use and the migratory potential guide the Court’s liability assignment.
152. Grace’s operation of the settling pond system and its implementation of the pond elimination program largely contributed to the contamination in the surface and subsurface soils of the former ponds area.
153. The demucking operations introduced PCBs, BNs and VOCs to the soils below water table. (2569:9 (Staples); 1102:18-1105:7 (Trela) (describing chemicals contained in pond muck)) Generally, the depth of PCBs contamination correlates with the depths of the ponds. (277:2 (Raviv)) PCBs reached this depth because of the operation of the ponds. (278:4 (Raviv))
154. The pond-area-wide regrading spread contaminants across the surface of the area, (272:6 (Raviv)), as did the use of cranes and dump trucks for the pond excavation, (1105:16-1108:14 (Trela)) and the drainage trenches. (1109:3-12 (Trela))
155. Sewer backups and overflows and surface water runoff also contributed to the contamination of the surface areas of the ponds region. (2243:13 (Staples)) These events moved and redeposited existing surface contamination, (178:16-22 (Raviv)), and brought additional contamination from other areas of the plant, including the Ester I building and the Ester I tank farm, to the ponds area. (163:20-164:5 (Raviv)) Such incidents also incited the movement of VOCs to the subsurface soils.
15
See
¶¶ 83-85
supra.
156. Grace will be responsible for 100% of the BNs and PCBs found in the subsurface soils of the former ponds area.
16
The pond elimination program provided the mechanical means of placing these substances in the deep soils.
157. This result is not inconsistent with the conclusion in the lagoons area, where there was evidence of TCA in the groundwater where the PCBs were found in the soils.
158. Grace also will be fully accountable for the surface PCB contamination. Because of the physical properties of PCBs, it is unlikely that subsequent periodic impacts to the surface soils redistributed PCBs.
159. In contrast, because surface events contributed to the BN and VOC contamination found in the former ponds area in the surface soils as well as the VOC contamination in the subsurface soils, time of use will guide the allocation of these BNs and VOCs. Following the full and partial use formula used in the lagoon area, Grace will receive 93.1% and Hateo will receive 6.9%
17
of the actionable surface BN contamination and surface and subsurface VOC contamination.
18
*1069
c. Ester I Complex (AEC4)
(1) Respective Uses
160. During the past thirty-three years, both Grace and Hateo have manufactured similar products and generated similar waste in the Ester I facility. (186:25 (Raviv)) Throughout this period, Ester I operated without periods of closure. (185:20-24 (Raviv))
161. One important exception to this characterization is the use of PCBs. Between
1961
and 1966, Grace used aroclor 1248 in the hydrotherm units located in the Ester I area. (186:18 (Raviv))
162. Grace’s operation of the hydrotherm units was extremely problematic. (1042:15-24 (Trela)) In addition to startup troubles, oil leaks, and fires, Grace was plagued by a series of coking problems that clogged the system and required frequent fluid changes. (1043:11-16, 1059:19-1060:15 (Trela))
163. From 1959 to 1971 the drainage facilities in the Ester I complex to capture runoff and spillage remained the same. (515:4 (Raviv)) In 1967, Grace installed an underground sewer system that was connected to the lagoons and the MCUA. (513:21 (Raviv)) The sewer hookup took place physically outside the Ester I complex. (513:24 (Raviv))
164. During the post-1978 period, Hateo stored tens of thousands of pounds of TCA bottoms in the Ester I area. (739:17-740:14 (Raviv); E933; DE039) Hateo also manufactured PXE here.
(2) Contamination
165. Of four VOC surface samples, one sample contained actionable xylene in the northwest corner of the area adjacent to the Ester I tank farm. Actionable xylene and BZ both were found in subsurface VOC samples.
166. Numerous subsurface BN samples yielded actionable DEHP and DEP in the Ester I railroad tank farm. No actionable BN contamination was detected in the subsmfaee soils in this area.
167. Surface PCB testing revealed three samples of actionable aroclor 1248, one each in the railroad tank farm, the hydrotherm building and the southwest portion of the area. Limited subsurface PCB sampling revealed actionable PCBs at four feet in the hydrotherm building and in monitoring well 15S.
(3)Apportionment
168. Contributing to the contamination in the Ester I area were spills, leaks, drips, and trench overflows. (E1690; 2175:15-23, 2903:2 (Staples)) Releases of contaminants also resulted from boilouts and breakdowns of the kettle reactors of Ester I and the hydrotherm units, (2175:17 (Staples)), and the process of draining and replacing the fluid in the hydrotherm system. (1060:8-20 (Trela))
169. Based on the parties’ similar uses of this portion of the site, the BN and VOC contamination found in the Ester I area will be assigned based on time of use. As such, Grace will receive 57.6% for its nineteen years of use and Hateo will receive 42.4% for its fourteen years of operation.
170. The presence or absence of sewers at the site does not alter this allocation. The existence of sewers has little impact on the Ester I complex. Sewers did not serve most of the area and drainage trenches were in place throughout Grace’s ownership. (2174:16 (Staples))
171. Moreover, whether spills and leaks within the Ester I complex traveled through trenches to the ponds or through trenches to the sewers to the ponds, the impact of runoff and spillage is better allocated within the former ponds region. Any other approach raises the specter of double-counting.
172. Grace will receive full responsibility for the PCB contamination in the Ester I area based on its use of aroelors in the hydrotherm units. Aroclor 1248 contamination occurs in proximity to the hydrotherm units in Ester I. (1065:1-2 (Trela))
d. Ester II (AEC 5)
(1) Respective Uses
173. Ester II was built in 1971. (Napack Dep. (1-29-90) at 43:14) The resultant increase in ester production capacity raised the volume of esters produced at Grace from 26 million pounds in the first quarter of 1970 to
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39 million pounds in the first quarter of 1971. (Memorandum from Alex Kaufman to J. Peter Grace, Jr. (April 27, 1971), E405 at WRG08198 (contradicting 1239:21 (Reid testimony that Ester II went on line in 1972))
174. Before construction, Ester II had a projected production capacity of 150 million pounds per year. (E324 at WRG 13222; see also 1240:5 (Reid) (daily production of DOP “close to a half a million pounds”)) Based on the production rates Kaufman reported, reiterated above, the initial annual Ester II production was 52 million pounds. At the time it ceased operations in 1979, Ester II was producing DOP at a rate of approximately 140 million pounds per year. (Donnelly Stipulation, ¶ 25)
175. Hateo operated the Ester II plant from 1978 to 1979, when the supply of raw materials was exhausted. (E722 (Ester II not operating in April 1980); Stipulation No. 8, ¶ 7 (DIDP was not produced at Ester II plant between 1980 and 1986)) Hateo reactivated the Ester II plant in 1987 with a production rate of ten million pounds a year which eventually grew to the current rate of 100 million pounds a year. (1450:20 (Chryss))
176. In addition, from 1979 to 1987 for a period of 14 years Hateo distilled PXE in Ester II. In 1988, for a period of twelve days, Hateo hydrolyzed TCA bottoms in Ester II. (Maimón, ¶ 34, E1404)
177. In 1987, Hateo relocated Tank 908B to the northwestern quarter of the Ester II area for use in the oil-water separator system. (2177:21, 2178:10 (Staples)) Previously, Tank 908B had been used during the lagoon skimming project to receive skimmings. (2906:17 (Staples)) Following its relocation to Ester II, PCB-liquid was detected in Tank 908B. (2906:21 (Staples))
178. In July 1989, Hatco’s environmental manager classified the Tank 908 system as an area in urgent need of a spill control plan based on “recent spill history and overall chemical hazard.” (2907:22 (Staples); E1565 at H030823, 030827)
(2) Contamination
179. No actionable VOC contamination has been detected within the Ester II area. Actionable BNs, specifically DEHP, have been detected in the surface and subsurface of the Ester II area. PCB concentrations in excess of action levels have been detected in the surface of this area, but not in the subsurface.
(3) Apportionment
180. Due to the introduction of Tank 908B to the Ester II area and the PCBs found in the M tanks area located upgradient from Ester II, the PCB contamination will be assigned fully to Hateo.
181. BNs will be allocated based on annual production rates multiplied by years of use. Grace operated the Ester II plant from 1971 to 1978 for a period of seven and one half years, producing 52 million pounds of product in the first year and 140 million pounds thereafter for a total of 962 million pounds. During its seven years of operation, Hatco’s Ester II production totaled 650 million pounds, with 140 million pounds produced from 1978-79, 10 million pounds created in 1987, the first year back on line, and 100 million pounds for each of the remaining five yeai's. Based on these production rates, Grace will receive 59.7% for BNs and Hateo will receive 40.3%.
e. RR Sidings and Swale (AEC 3)
(1) Respective Uses
182. This area contains two railroad sidings, the siding that serves Ester I which has been in operation for thirty-three years, and the siding that serves Ester II which has been in operation for roughly fifteen years.
183. Years of use of the railroad swale area mirror the periods during which the respective facilities were operating. (2185:9 (Staples))
184. Grace used the Ester I railroad siding for nineteen years, and Hateo used the Ester I railroad siding for fourteen years.
185. Grace used the Ester II railroad siding for 7.5 years, and Hateo used the Ester II railroad siding for seven years.
(2) Contamination
186. This area contains no actionable VOC contamination in the surface or subsur
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face soils. Actionable BNs and PCBs appear in isolated areas of the site at the surface and subsurface.
(3)
Apportionment
187. Sources of BN and VOC contamination include the movement of raw materials and products to and from the Hateo site and the storage of hazardous waste tanks. (2184:3 (Staples)) The PCB contamination in this area originated from the Ester I complex and the hydrotherm units located upgradient from the swale area. (184:23 (Raviv))
188. Because Grace used PCBs in the Ester I complex, it will receive full responsibility for the PCB contamination within this area.
189. The BN contamination is best apportioned based on time of use. Grace’s combined years of Ester I and II use equals 26.5 years while Hatco’s figure is twenty-one years. As a result, Grace will receive 55.8% and Hateo will receive 44.2% of the BN contamination in the swales.
190. A time-based apportionment for BN contamination is appropriate because the railroad sidings generally were used in the same fashion pre- and post-1978, with both parties bringing in the same loads of the same type of chemicals at similar frequencies. (183:20-184:8 (Raviv))
f. Ester I Tank Farm (AEC 9A)
(1)Respective Uses
191. Used to store raw materials, products and waste, the Ester I tank farm has been in existence throughout the parties’ combined thirty-three years of ownership. (2192:3-10 (Staples))
192. Grace stored Hatcol 27 and other off-color plasticizer in the Ester I tank farm. (1065:2-5 (Trela); Boyd Stipulation If 4(b), (c)) Grace used aroclor 1254 in the manufacture of off-color plasticizer. (1078:11-18 (Trela))
193. The 204 series tanks are located in the Ester I tank farm. (2193:10 (Staples)) This oil-water separator served the main processing unit throughout most of the pre- and post-1978 periods. (2193:10-21 (Staples))
(2) Contamination
194. Widespread actionable BN contamination is detected in the surface soils in the Ester I tank farm. DEHP appears most frequently, but BBP, DEP, DBP and DOP also wei’e found. With DEHP, BBP, DEP and DBP in the subsurface soils, the menu of actionable BNs is similar although it appears less frequently.
195. Actionable PCBs are found in the surface and subsurface soils in this area. Both aroclor 1248 and 1254 were detected. The PCB concentrations are relatively low, reaching a high of 19 ppm in the surface and 13 ppm in the subsurface.
196. Xylene was the one actionable YOC detected in the surface soils of this area. In the subsurface, xylene again was detected at actionable levels along with BZ and TCE.
(3) Apportionment
197. The contamination in this area was caused by spills and releases from the various tanks during loading and unloading and leaking valves. (2193:5 (Staples)) Post-1978 there were numerous spills and leaks around the 204 series tanks. (E1490, 1468, 1565 at H030824, A030827,1732 (204 series operating in April 1990))
198. The series 204 tanks contain PCBs that originated from the operation of the hydrotherm units, lagoon skimmings
19
and the sewer system material, all of which passed through the separator system.' (2193:24 (Staples)) Although the precise date on which PCBs were introduced to this oil-water separator is uncertain, (2194:23 (Staples)), 1961, which marks Grace’s first use of aroclors, is an acceptable estimate. Similarly, Hatco’s activities could not have contributed to the PCBs in the 204 series tanks until after 1984, the year the lagoon skimming project began.
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199. Grace’s use of aroclors in the molecular and capryl stills from 1961 to 1966 impacted this area. (194:24-195:17 (Raviv); 1065:19-1066:20 (Trela)) In addition, Grace’s storage of OCP introduced aroelor 1254 to the Ester I tank farm: (1076:19-1078:18 (Trela))
200. Consistent with the allocation in the Ester I complex, time of use is an appropriate means of allocating responsibility for the BN and VOC contamination in the Ester I tank farm. (195:12 (Raviv)) Grace’s nineteen years of use and Hatco’s fourteen-year long operation, yield 57.6% for Grace and 42.4% for Hateo for BNs and VOCs.
201. For the i*easons expressed above, the sewer factor does not alter the BN and VOC allocation.
202. As the primary source of aroclors in this area, Grace will receive 100% responsibility for PCBs in the subsurface soils. Through the 204 series tanks, however, both Grace and Hateo introduced PCBs to the surface soils of the Ester I tank farm. Classifying Grace’s aroelor use as full use and the operation of the oil-separator system as partial use, responsibility for surface-soil PCB contamination will be divided with 94.9% to Grace and 5.1% to Hateo.
20
g.
Naphthalene (M) Tanks (AEC 9C)
(1)Respective Uses
203. During the operation of the PA plants from 1961 to 1971, Grace stored naphthalene in the M tanks. (2544:5 (Staples))
204. Hateo stored lagoon skimmings in the M Tanks. (205:15 (Raviv)) The lagoon skimming operation began in 1984, and the resultant PCB-liquids remained onsite until 1988. (E1332)
205. Hateo stored one million pounds of PXE residue in the M-tanks, specifically M1B and MIC. (1389:10 (Chryss); E950; 693:13 (Raviv))
(2) Contamination
206. Actionable BNs including DEHP, Naph and DBP were found in the surface soils. In the subsurface, one sample yielded a DEHP concentration in excess of its action level.
207. PCBs, primarily aroelor 1248, were detected throughout the area in the surface soils. While actionable, the concentrations were relatively low with the 18 ppm the highest reading. Subsurface PCB testing yielded nondetects or concentrations below action levels.
208. The surface soils were not tested for VOCs. Subsurface VOC sampling yielded no concentrations in excess of action levels.
(3) Apportionment
209. Because Hatco’s activity introduced PCBs to the M-tank area, where previously there was no PCB contamination (529:19 (Raviv)), Hateo is responsible for 100% of the PCB contamination found in the surface soils in this area.
21
210. Because both Grace and Hateo introduced BNs to the M tanks, Grace through naphthalene storage, (2545:21 (Staples)), and Hateo through lagoon skimmings storage, (2544:5 (Staples)), BNs will be apportioned based on time of use. Based on a ten-year Grace period and a five-year Hateo term, Grace will receive 66.7% and Hateo will receive 33.3% for the BN contamination in this area.
h. ZAA Complex (AEC 19)
(1) Respective Uses
211. Grace manufactured benzyl chloride in this area, using quantities of toluene in the process.
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212. During its ownership, Hateo has operated the ZAA facility in this area. From September 1983 to October 1990, Hateo used TCA in the ZAA process. Benzyl chloride is a by-product of the manufacture of ZAA.
(2) Contamination
213. Actionable BNs and PCBs were detected in the surface soils. Four samples contained DEHP with values ranging from 140 to 1500 ppm, while two samples revealed aroclor 1248 and one held a combination of aroclor 1248 and 1254. No surface samples were tested for VOCs.
214. All categories of contamination appear in the subsurface soils. Again, the BN contamination consisted of DEHP. Two samples contained PCBs, specifically aroclor 1248, at low concentrations of 3.2 and 3.9 ppm. Of the VOCs, actionable concentrations of TCA and DCA were found at a depth of six feet.
(3) Apportionment
215. The parties’ respective uses guide the allocation of responsibility. In this area, the nature as well as the time of use are determinative.
216. As the sole TCA source in this area, Hateo will be assigned 100% responsibility for actionable TCA and its daughter products. (152:1 (Raviv))
217. Similarly, because Grace used toluene in its manufacturing activities in this area, it will retain 100% responsibility for any toluene contamination.
22
218. Neither party supplied a direct source of BNs or PCBs in this area. Because the ZAA ai*ea is located downgradient of the Ester I building, it is reasonable to conclude that the Ester I building is the indirect source of the BN and PCB contamination detected in the soils in this area.
(See
¶ 187,
supra
(source of contamination in railroad swale area upgradient manufacturing area)) As such, the BN and PCB allocation in the ZAA area will mirror the Ester I complex percentages,
see
¶¶ 169-172
supra,
with Grace receiving 100% of the PCBs and 57.6% of the BNs and VOCs and Hateo receiving 42.4% of the BNs and VOCs.
(i) Sewers (AEC 22)
219. Although the sewer system is home to PCBs and other chemicals, it is not treated like other areas of joint use. There is no direct correlation between the location of the sewers and the contaminated soils. Rather, the contamination found adjacent to the sewer lines can be traced to other activities. (331:14-332:17 (Raviv)) These problem soils already have been included in the overall volumes of impacted soils. (332:1-4 (Raviv))
220. Waste water and sewage sludge can escape to surrounding soils from imperfections in sewer lines located above the water table. (922:16-923:8 (Trela)) Recent inspection of the Hateo sewers, however, revealed that they were in good condition with only a few locations requiring small repairs. (923:15-23 (Trela))
2. Hot Spots
221. Areas that are clean with the exception of isolated contamination have been designated “hot spots.” These portions of the site are located to the northwest and southeast of all historical and existing manufacturing activities. These areas include the Tarry Area (AEC 8) and the Southeast- Fill Area (AEC 13) to the southeast and the Alcohol Tank Farm (AEC 9B), the Seales Tank Farm (AEC 9D) and Pilot Plant II (AEC 18B) to the northwest.
222. The hot spots reasonably can be linked to the transport and storage of chemicals at the site. The hot spots found in the southeast region are found in or immediately adjacent to internal paved roadways. In the northwest the hot spots are located in and around tanks.
223. Where, as here, the handling of chemicals had the determinative role in eaus
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ing contamination, the identity of the chemicals will guide the apportionment decision. PCBs, introduced to the site by Grace, null be apportioned 100% to Grace. BNs, utilized by both parties, will be apportioned based on time of use, yielding 57.6% for Grace and 42.4% for Hateo.
3. Areas of Exclusive Use
224. Grace alone utilized certain portions of the site, including AECs 6, 7A, 14, 10B and 17. (154:23-155:13 (Raviv))
225. These areas will be apportioned 100% to Grace because, historically, that area of the site was used only prior to 1978. This area includes the PA Process Area, the PA Residue Area and the Naphthalene Area. (2133:23-2134:12 (Staples); DE059 (area mai’ked “4”))
226. In addition, the actionable BNs and PCBs found in Sling Tail Creek (AEC 21B) resulted from drainage of the drum storage and K024 areas, which only Grace used. (154:14 (Raviv))
4. Uncontaminated and Untested Areas
227. Sampling conducted in the remaining portions of the site has detected no actionable contamination. The clean areas include the No. 6 Fuel Oil Tank A"ea (AEC 9E), the Current Drum and Waste Storage Area (AEC 10A), the Underground Storage Tank (AEC 11A), the Salt UST Area (AEC 11B), the Research and Development Laboratory (AEC 16), the Clean Fill Area (AEC 17), (134:3 (Raviv)), Pilot Plant I (AEC 18A), (134:12 (Raviv)), and the area east of Sling Tail Creek (AEC 20). (134:15 (Raviv)) (DE059) (areas marked “1”, “2”, “3”; 2131:9-2133:21 (Staples))
228. In the No. 6 Fuel Oil Tank Area, the single sampling location measured BNs and PCBs at the surface and subsurface, but revealed no actionable contamination.
229. No sampling was conducted within the Current Drum and Waste Storage Area.
230. The Underground Storage Tank sampling included surface and subsurface testing for BNs and VOCs. Surface samples contained no actionable contamination. Subsurface samples were non-detect for VOCs and non-detect or not actionable for BNs.
231. No sampling was conducted within the Salt UST Area.
232. The numerous surface samples in the Research and Development Laboratory area revealed no actionable BNs and non-detect or non-actionable PCBs. At the subsurface BNs were not actionable and PCBs were non-detect. The only VOC sample was taken from the subsurface and was not actionable.
233. In the Clean Fill Area, the BNs detected at the surface and subsurface were not actionable. The PCBs samples from the surface soils were non-detect or non-actionable, while all subsurface PCB samples were non-detect. The only VOC samples came from the subsurface soils, and they were not actionable.
234. Widespread BN and PCB sampling in the surface soils of the Pilot Plant I area yielded levels of contamination that are not actionable. The one surface VOC sample also was not actionable. Subsurface samples for all three categories of contaminants were non-detect or non-actionable.
235. Only surface samples were pulled from the soils in the area east of Sling Tail Creek. VOC and PCB tests yielded non-detects while the BN samples were not actionable.
G. Apportionment — Sitewide Groundwater Contamination
1. Delineation
236. The first monitoring wells (“MW”) at the Fords facility date back to 1982. By 1992, the installation of additional wells raised their number to twenty-eight.
237. The DEP determined the location of some of the monitoring wells, while DRAI chose the remaining sites based on the area of environmental concern division. (214:18, 215:1 (Raviv)) Three wells were placed north of any industrial operation to determine the natural water conditions at the site. (212:13 (Raviv)) Since 1986, DRAI has conducted quarterly groundwater sampling. (415:16-25 (Raviv))
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238. The monitoring wells were dug above and below the natural clay layer. This system of shallow and deep wells allows the measurement of the quality of the shallow and deep groundwater. (214:9 (Raviv))
239. Once in place, the monitoring wells are used to measure the levels of the water table, to determine the direction of the groundwater flow and to detect contamination. The combination of this information allows the definition of the groundwater contamination plume. (210-211 (Raviv)) A plume represents a continuum of contamination. (224:23 (Raviv))
2. Contamination
240. Initial contamination estimates showed that
the
groundwater at the Hateo site included 97.2% BNs, 0.2% PCBs and 2.6% VOCs. (E2458) Based on October 1992 sampling, (436:12 (Raviv)), the targeted contamination is comprised of 82.9% BNs, 1.2% PCBs and 15.9% VOCs. (435:1 (Raviv))
241. The groundwater contamination is concentrated in the areas of manufacturing and waste disposal activities. (232:10 (Raviv)) As one travels further from the groundwater plume, the data indicates the presence of less subsurface contamination. (232:10 (Raviv); DE023)
242. Generally, rather than plumes, the deep aquifer contains only spot contamination. (224:24 (Raviv)) The deep aquifer is not impacted with VOCs with the exception of the area immediately adjacent to former pond one. (224:2 (Raviv))
243. The shallow aquifer contains BNs, PCBs and VOCs. (DE036, 037) The menu of chemicals varies across the different monitoring wells. (223:5 (Raviv))
244. Data indicates numerous plumes within the shallow aquifer. The type and concentration of contamination varies between each plume, (222:16-223:11 (Raviv)), preventing their connection into one sitewide plume. (223:5 (Raviv))
245. The DEP adopted and promulgated groundwater regulations. (226:9 (Raviv)) The PCB limit is zero, making an ND the only acceptable result, (226:21 (Raviv)), while actionable BN levels range from single to double digits. (226:24 (Raviv))
246. Plumes of VOC contamination include: plumes of 6000, 3000, 1000 and 100 ppb around MW17S, located southeast of the ZAA facility; plumes of 200 and 100 ppb around MW1S located east of the east lagoon; plumes of 200 and 100 ppb around MW7S located south of the west lagoon; a plume of 100 ppb around MW22s, located southwest of warehouse number four; a plume of 3000 ppb around MW19S which is encircled by a plume of 1000 ppb that also includes MW16s with both wells located south of the Ester I tank farm in the area of former ponds one and two; plumes of 20,000, 3000 and 1000 around MW15S, located in the Ester I area. A larger plume of 100 ppb encloses MWI5S, 16S and 19S. Excluding Ester II the entire region of manufacturing activity is marked by a plume of 10 ppb.
247. BN and PCB groundwater contamination is less wide-spread. The highest concentrations of these two categories appear in MW15S with BNs at 171,000 ppb and PCBs at 24,000 ppb. In the former ponds one and two area, MW19S contains 880 ppb BNs and 810 ppb PCBs, while the adjacent MW16S holds 120 ppb BNs and 974 ppb PCBs. MW17S located north of the former muck storage
area
contains 3279 ppb BNs and 510 ppb PCBs. To the southeast the readings in MW10S are 225 ppb BNs and 41 ppb PCBs. Plumes encircle MW15S, MW19S and MW16S, MW17S and MW17S and MW10S. Moving south toward the lagoons, samples were non-detect for BNs and PCBs, with only MW5S east of the railroad sidings containing BNs at 1 ppb.
248. Monitoring Well 15S contains a NAPL layer made up of PCBs, xylenes and phthalates. (236:6; 244:2 (Raviv); 1182:2 (Trela)) Almost one foot thick, this black layer resembles oil, (245:2 (Raviv)), and floats on top of the water. (244:14 (Raviv))
249. Monitoring Well 17S, located north of the former muck storage area, also contains xylene. (749:16 (Raviv)) The order of magnitude of the xylene concentrations differs across wells 15S and 17S. It is much greater in well 15S. (753:8 (Raviv)) In addition, well 17S contains three additional com
*1076
pounds not found in Well 15S, specifically TCA, 1,1-DCA and chloroethane, both daughter products of TCA. (752:6; 753:21 (Raviv)) The TCA in well 17S is present in significant concentrations. (581:5 (Raviv))
250. Groundwater data from wells in the former ponds region indicates that there are areas where PCB-contaminated soils are in direct contact with the water table. (276:19 (Raviv)) Despite their low water solubility, given enough time, if PCBs are in constant contact with the water table, some PCBs will enter water table. (277:21; 278:13-280:4 (Raviv) (examples of deep PCB findings at or below water table from DE016/17))
3. Apportionment
251. A variety of occurrences contribute to groundwater contamination including spills and percolating run-off. (234:1 (Raviv)) In addition, groundwater is dynamic; as it flows it comes in contact with various contaminated soils. Thus, time of use offers the best approach to the apportionment of groundwater contamination. (435:6 (Raviv))
252. Where relevant, however, a party’s exclusive use or fate and transport properties may provide a better means to apportion certain chemicals. (755:24 (Raviv))
253. Accordingly, BNs and VOCs will be divided 57.6% to Grace and 42.4% to Hateo based on time of use, with exceptions for VOCs used exclusively by Hateo such as xylene and TCA. For example, the xylene in well 15S will be assigned to Hateo. Hateo used xylene in PXE production, and the xylene in monitoring well 15S is along the xylene route between Ester I and Ester II. (234:16 (Raviv))
254. With one exception, PCBs in the groundwater will be awarded 100% to Grace. Prior to 1971, Grace deposited the PCBs in soils just above the water table and below the water table. (233:9 (Raviv)) Anywhere that the ponds penetrated the water table or the bottoms of the ponds were near the water table, a direct impact to the groundwater resulted. (275:15 (Raviv))
255. The exception to the PCB apportionment involves the PCBs found in the NAPL layer in monitoring well 15S. These PCBs will be the responsibility of Hateo. Upon contact with the PCB-soils, the xylene leached the PCBs from the soil — bringing them from a solid to a liquid phase — into solution in the free product layer. (242:3, 747:25, 748:20 (Raviv))
H. Apportionment — Contribution Factors
256. Grace seeks contribution from Hateo based on equitable considerations. Prior to trial, the Court examined the equitable factors suggested by the parties and, based on the events of the instant case, named six equitable factors that would guide its evaluation of Grace’s claim for contribution under section 113. These factors include: (1) the knowledge Kaufman acquired during his Grace employment and his acquiescence in contaminating activities following Hatco’s purchase of the site; (2) the degree of care exercised by the parties, taking into account the relevant statutes and regulations; (3) the degree of cooperation with federal, state and local officials exhibited by the parties to prevent harm to public health or the environment, without regard to periods of ownership; (4) any financial benefit to the parties arising from remediation; (5) the extent to which Hateo undertook reasonable efforts to mitigate the environmental damage; and (6) any benefits the parties received from the activities that lead to the environmental damage.
1. Knowledge of Kaufman
257. Alex Kaufman (“Kaufman”) is the president and sole shareholder of Hateo. As the sole shareholder, Kaufman receives any and all dividends the company pays. (1785:22 (Chryss))
258. In resolving the statute of limitations issue Grace raised to defeat Hateo’s strict liability claim, the Court found that Kaufman had “extensive knowledge of waste disposal practices at the site” and an “intimate familiarity with the day-to-day operations of the site developed over two decades.”
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.,
801 F.Supp. 1309, 1324 (D.N.J.1992). Kaufman’s knowledge and management of the site also is a factor that is relevant to the section 113
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contribution inquiry.
(See
May 13, 1993 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4)
259. Trained in chemistry but not engineering, (1872:17-25, 1879:10-11 (Kaufman)), Kaufman began what was to be his career-long association with Hateo in the 1950s as a laboratory dishwasher. (1875:12-1876:3 (Kaufman))
260. Before succeeding William Hackman as the President of the Hateo Chemical Division in 1962, Kaufman
served
as a laborer, a laboratory technician and chemist and the Ester I plant manager. (Stipulation No. 84; 1876:13-1877:13 (Kaufman)) These jobs took Kaufman to the Ester I plant and the research and development laboratory, (1879:4— 8 Kaufman)), where he was responsible for process development and improvements in manufacturing processes. (Stipulation No. 83; 1879:4-8 (Kaufman))
261. During this period Kaufman developed the process to make sebaeic acid at the Hateo facility. (1878:9-18 (Kaufman)) Later, he also recommended the installation of the benzyl chloride plant. (1888:20-1889:18 (Kaufman)) In the 1960s, Kaufman and other management personnel determined which laboratory projects were “scaled up” from the pilot lab at the Hateo site into full production. (R. Miller Dep. 115:18-16:14)
262. As plant manager Kaufman also was familiar with the waste disposal practices at the facility. (2001:17-2004:14, 2004:21-2005:2 (Kaufman); Hackman Dep. 210:20-211:13; Ackelsberg Dep. 151:18-53:14) In particular, he knew that the ponds were used to separate and recover useable organic material, (1881:20-24 (Kaufman)), although he had no role in their design or construction. (1881:17-19, 1897:13-18 (Kaufman))
263. In 1960, Alex Kaufman hired Dr. David Fine, an engineering professor, to investigate and provide recommendations concerning the Hateo Chemical Division’s waste disposal practices. (E35) Dr. Fine submitted his report on the Hateo Chemical Division’s waste water disposal practices to Kaufman in August 1960. The report describes, among other things, the operation and suggested improvements for the pond recovery system in use at the Hateo Chemical Division at that time. (E36, 37)
264. With the presidency in 1962 came new duties, as Kaufman assumed responsibility for the profit and loss of the Hateo Chemical Division. (1898:14-1899:18 (Kaufman)) He then hired additional people to assist in running the business. (1899:20-1900:20 (Kaufman))
265. With his academic and employment background, Kaufman enjoyed a detailed understanding of the chemical processes used at the Fords facility. (1998:22-2000:18 (Kaufman)) Within the Grace organization, Kaufman was respected for his extensive knowledge of organic chemistry, and among the group executives, probably had the greatest know-how and experience in organic chemistry. (Robbins Stip., ¶ 2D; Grace Dep. 224:24-26:18)
266. Grace management put this expertise to use, instructing Kaufman to expand the business. (1902:9-13 (Kaufman)) In keeping with the directive he had received from Grace management, Kaufman began to acquire companies on behalf of Grace. (1909:13-19 (Kaufman)) Expansion of the business for Grace became Kaufman’s primary focus. (1902:3-8 (Kaufman))
267. The acquisition
program
required much of Kaufman’s time. (Grace Dep. 254:9-23) In addition to the acquisitions that were completed, Kaufman devoted time to potential acquisitions that were not consummated. (1922:2-7 (Kaufman)) He became preoccupied with acquisitions and with the administration of the newly-acquired businesses. (1205:6-16 (Reid))
268. Indeed, by August 1964, Grace management recognized that the acquisition program Kaufman was pursuing “will require more of Alex Kaufman’s time and more delegation of responsibility.” (E152) Kaufman in fact delegated responsibility. (1913:8-1914:2 (Kaufman))
269. Kaufman’s duties in the 1960s required substantial travel, including trips to Europe, the Far East and Mexico. (1932:3-10 (Kaufman); Robbins Dep. 263) In 1962, Mr. Kaufman spent a high percentage of his time at the Fords facility, but as time went
*1078
on, he spent less time there. (1994:12-19 (Kaufman); Roth Dep. 187:14-188:19)
270. As a result, the day-to-day operation of the Fords facility fell to other employees. John Gutai was responsible for the plant from 1962 to 1964. (1201:6-19 (Reid)) Kaufman later hired Oscar Ackelsberg, who joined the Hateo Chemical Division as Vice President of Operations in February 1964 and took over responsibility for plant operations. (1900:12-20 (Kaufman); E637 at WRG15908) He remained in charge of the daily operations at the Fords plant until about 1969 when Hugo Biertuempfel assumed this post. During the 1970s, George Napack was general manager of the plant. (1965:25-1965:4, 1966:24-1977:3 (Kaufman)) The Hateo Chemical Division also staffed an engineering department in the 1960s. (1901:5-7 (Kaufman))
271. By November 1968, the Hateo Group included businesses in eight different industries: ticking and upholstery fabrics, footwear, women’s wear, vinyl products, chemical products, polyesters, office supplies and equipment and resale products. (E308 at WRG078642)
272. In all, Mr. Kaufman arranged the following acquisitions on behalf of Grace:
Company Acquisition Date
Howards & Sons February 1964
Elm Coated Fabrics July 1964
Marco Chemical March 1965
Southern Resins June 1965
Southbridge Plast. June 1965
Ellay Rubber Products March 1966
Joshua Meier October 1967
Golding Bros. April 1968
Consol. Inti. Trading (CTIC) July 1968
Letisse, Inc. August 1969
Pix of America December 1969
Futura Footwear January 1970
Bekaert January 1970
Herman’s Sporting-Goods May 1970
Lawrence Maid Footwear & Superior Shoe Co. May 1970
(Kaufman Stipulation, ¶ 1)
273.Once the acquisition program was completed, the resultant group of companies continued to demand much of Kaufman’s time. Kaufman had supervisory responsibility over the various businesses in the Hateo Group, (McNair Dep. 41:6-42:6), and his responsibilities during the period that Grace owned and operated the Fords facility for seeing that those companies ran and for seeing that they were integrated into Grace were very substantial. (1951:16-52:1 (stipulation by counsel for Grace))
274. Grace had an extensive reporting system. (1903:14-24 (Kaufman)) Every group or division head prepared a one-year budget, a five-year budget, and a ten-year plan for each business and product line in which the group or division was engaged. (1923:5-11 (Kaufman)) With the acquisition of each new business, Mr. Kaufman became responsible for providing business reports to Grace. (1911:15-24, 1916:5-22-1916:15 (Kaufman))
275. The reporting responsibilities to Grace for the many businesses Mr. Kaufman was in charge of took a tremendous amount of time. (Kunze Dep. 25:22-27:2) About forty percent of top management’s time was devoted to reporting to Grace. (Kunze Dep. 27:6-11)
276. In addition, Kaufman spent a great deal of time learning the new businesses and dealing with the executives of the various businesses that were acquired, many of whom were upset by the decline in value of Grace stock, which they had received in exchange for their companies, and required considerable attention. (1925:5-1926:11 (Kaufman))
277. As a result, during the 1970s Kaufman was not involved in the day-to-day operations of any of the divisions of the Hateo Group. (Donnelly Stipulation, ¶ 14 (addressing 1974 to 1976)) Thus, although Mr. Kaufman was President of the Hateo Chemical Division, he did not take a particularly active part in running it. (Napack Dep. 24) With his office located in a building at the northern boundary of the Fords site (DEC02), he very seldom ventured into the plants. (1901:17-1902:6 (Kaufman)) Instead, during the 1960s and 1970s, he relied on key personnel such as George Napack, Oscar Ackelsberg, Thomas Boyd, Martin Roth and Dr. Donald Denny to keep him apprised of the
*1079
activities and operations of the plant. (Ackelsberg Dep. 460; Boyd Dep. 51, 112-113; Roth Dep. 157-58, 179; Denny Dep. 20-22, 28)
278. From 1962 to 1978, however, he was the ultimate decision maker on significant matters relating to the various divisions of the Hateo Group, including the Hateo Chemical Division. (1996:1-22 (Kaufman)) Kaufman required the heads of the various operating divisions of the Hateo Group to keep him informed of any significant environmental problems. (2014:16-18 (Kaufman); R. Miller Dep. 252-54)
279. As President of the Hateo Chemical Division, Kaufman was concerned about what was going on environmentally in the 1970s at the Hateo facility. (2025:24-2026:4 (Kaufman)) He regularly was informed of any contacts with governmental agencies on environmental matters, (2014:19-2015:1 (Kaufman)), any other alleged environmental problems and its pollution control expenditures. (2011:14-2014:18, 2025:19-23 (Kaufman); E262, 272, 302) Between August 1973 and April 1978, Kaufman received numerous monthly environmental reports, reflecting whether or not the Hateo Chemical Division had been involved in any governmental proceedings involving the enforcement of environmental laws. (1964:1-16 (Kaufman))
280. After Kaufman purchased the Hateo facility in 1978, most of the senior executives that had worked for him at the Hateo Chemical Division, including George Napack and Harry Reid, stayed on and worked for Kaufman at the Hateo Corporation. (2047:24-2048:20 (Kaufman)) Thus, Kaufman and the management of Hateo after the 1978 acquisition were intimately familiar with all of the activities at the Fords facility prior to the sale. Kaufman acknowledged his expertise in the sale agreement. (E671 § 8.01 (acknowledging that “Buyers are expert in the plasticizer and synthetic lubricant business”))
281. As of 1978, Kaufman also was aware of the increasing concern of governmental agencies regarding the environmental consequences of past and present chemical manufacturing activities. (2027:6, 2028:3 (Kaufman); E432) Kaufman was kept advised of impending environmental regulations in the 1970s, including federal statutes such as the Toxic Substances Control Act. (2029:20-2031:1 (Kaufman); E596) Indeed, Kaufman understood as of the 1970’s that whoever owned and ran the Hateo facility would, to an increasing extent, have to be concerned about environmental regulations. (2027:24-2028:3 (Kaufman))
2. Degree of Care
282. A party who acts in accordance with applicable environmental standards and who is unaware of the potential for harm from its actions is less deserving of responsibility for the costs of remediation than a party who acts in willful disregard of known environmental standards, statutes and risks. (533:3-23 (Raviv)) Accordingly, whether each party exercised due care in its management of the site is a factor that must be considered in determining their equitable contributions to the remediation of the site. (May 13, 1993 Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 6)
283. PCBs were first detected at the Hateo site in 1981, following DEP soil, liquid and leachate sampling in various locations throughout the site in July of that year.
23
(E771 at WRG02118) Test results revealed aroelor 1248 in concentrations of 18, 28.9 and 40.3 ppm. (E720, 771 These PCB readings were below the regulatory limit of 50 ppm in effect at the time. (877:18 (Trela)) The Amended Administrative Order issued to Hateo by the DEP shortly thereafter highlighted benzene, xylene, toluene and phthalate findings, but not the PCB detections. (E771 at WRG 02117 ¶¶5, 6 and 8, WRG 02118 ¶¶ 9 and 10)
284. Despite the fact that George Napack (“Napack”), Hateo’s then-Senior Vice President and General Manager, had headed the PA plants, an area of stipulated aroelor use, (Stipulation No. 38), he reacted with disbelief
*1080
to the DEP’s early findings. (1231:5-1233:11 (Reid))
285. On or before March 26,1985, George Chryss (“Chryss”) learned that samples taken from the lagoon sludge in January 1985 had tested positive for PCBs in excess. of then-current PCB action levels. (1668:2-1671:18 (Chryss); E871, 888) On or about March 27, 1985, Hateo learned that the rerun of the PCB test on the lagoon sludge sample confirmed the previous results. (E890) Around this time, Chryss triggered an investigation into the presence and use of aroclors at the Hateo facility (1671:1-14 (Chryss); E886, 889) and ordered another round of tests. (1672:7-9 (Chryss))
286. At least as early as 1982, while Chryss was employed by Burmah-Castrol, he knew that aroclors contained PCBs and understood that the presence of PCBs would pose a substantial concern for any industrial facility. (1626:19-1628:16 (Chryss))
287. On April 2, 1985, after PCBs had been detected in the lagoons, Chryss met with Kaufman and Napack to discuss the use and presence of PCBs at the Hateo site. (1675:20-1677:16, 1834:23-1835:18 (Chryss)) At this meeting, Napack told Chryss that he did not believe that PCBs ever had been used at the Fords site. (1677:13-20 (Chryss)) During this conversation, nobody advised Chryss that previous testing at the site in 1981 had detected the presence of PCBs at several locations.
24
(1677:21-1678:5 (Chryss))
288. On April 3, 1985, Chryss received documents establishing that aroclors were used at the plant in the 1960s. (1678:11-16 (Chryss); E900; 1521:6-18 (Hateo counsel clarifying contents of document for record))
289. Although these documents referenced the Monsanto Company, Hateo never contacted Monsanto at or about this time to determine whether Hateo ever purchased aroclors from Monsanto. (1678:17-1679:3 (Chryss)) Although the issue of PCB use at the Hateo site remained unresolved, (1678:7-10 (Chryss)), Hateo did not conduct any further inquiry.
25
(1683:18-1684:5 (Chryss))
290. On or about April 5, 1985, Hateo received the retest results from a sample taken from the west lagoon. The report indicated the presence of PCBs at a level of 194 ppm in the lagoon sludge. (1672:10-1673:15 (Chryss); E903 at H500367)
291. Despite these additional test results, raising the number of reports of actionable PCBs to three, Hateo management refused to conclude that PCBs had been at the site. (1679:4-1681:4 (Chryss)) Napack rejected the test results due to the interference of phthalate esters with PCB testing (1679:8-13 (Chryss)), but Hateo did not attempt more accurate studies.
292. Although Hateo also was aware at this time that hundreds of thousands of pounds of skimmed material had been recovered out of the PCB-contaminated lagoons and stored in various tanks at the site, throughout the remainder of 1985, Hateo did not undertake any effort to determine whether or not the lagoon skimmings were contaminated with PCBs. (1688:10-1690:9 (Chryss))
293. By April 1986, Hateo had grown anxious about the volume of organic waste stored at the Fords facility and the resultant complication of its permit process. (E992) Faced with the urgent need to convert or dispose of these organics, Hateo tested the stored materials. (E992, E991) Test results dated April 23, 1986 indicated the presence
*1081
of PCBs in Tank 7000C (also referred to as “MIA” in concentrations of 91 and 100 ppm. (E999, 1000) Test results dated September 12, 1986 indicated the presence of PCBs in Tank MIA in concentrations of 86 and 97 ppm and in Tank M1B between 97 and 147 ppm. (E1037)
294. By October.1986, Hateo began investigating possible off-site disposal facilities for the incineration of Hatco’s surplus by-products. (E1042, 1044 and 1048) In November 1986, one such plant in Cementon, New York, returned a shipment of surplus organics to Hateo due to their high PCB content. (E1051, 1053)
295. After PCBs were detected in the M tanks, Hateo did not test other tanks for PCBs or test the soil around the M tanks for possible PCB contamination. (Ho Dep. 183:4-15) Hateo stored lagoon skimmings at the site until 1988. (E1332)
296. In November 1990, Hateo began operating an effluent pretreatment plant. The purpose of the EPT plant was to comply with the MCUA-mandated effluent permit requirements, effective November 5, 1990, which at that time included standards for total petroleum hydrocarbons (related to organic content of effluent) and ph control. (Mustacchio Stip. ¶ 16)
297. Hateo considered several locations for the EPT facility, taking into account factors such as distance from the convergence of the main sewer lines, truck access, degree of soil contamination, future land use and cost-effectiveness. (Id ¶ 17) The site selected for the EPT plant was as far north as economically feasible given the Hateo sewer line configuration. (Id ¶ 18)
298. Chryss chose the location for the EPT plant after hearing and evaluating recommendations concerning alternative locations. (1532:7-22 (Chryss)) At the time he made this decision, he did not believe that location was in an area where there were high concentrations of PCBs. He relied on a drawing Andrew Soos, Hatco’s environmental manager, presented to him that showed the proposed EPT plant site between former ponds two and four. (1532:23-1535:13 (Chryss)) The precise proposed site was immediately adjacent to, and even slightly overlapped, former pond four. (E1631 at H030943) Chryss did recognize, however, that the facility would be installed over a contaminated area. (1780:16-23 (Chryss))
299. Hateo constructed the EPT plant without excavating soil underneath it. Hateo justified its failure to remediate the area before laying the EPT foundation by claiming that it did not have the financial resources to remediate or properly dispose of any soil. (1777:25-1781:3 (Chryss))
300. DRAI informed Hateo prior to the construction of the EPT plant that the center of the ponds area was not the best location for the plant. Hateo constructed the plant there anyway based on cost and flow efficiency considerations. (567:1-568:7 (Raviv))
301. The location of the EPT will complicate remediation in that area to the extent that excavation of the underlying soils becomes necessary. (1779:3-18 (Chryss))
302. From 1985 to 1991, Hateo pumped accumulated surface water run-off from the railroad swales into the lagoons and used the lagoons to capture sewer overflows.
303. During his 1987 site inspection for Exxon, Robert Marmara described the swales as heavily contaminated earthen ditches. (E1136 at Exxon 04909-04911) Hateo itself knew the swales were contaminated. (1750:22-1752:10 (Chryss); E916, 918, 919)
304. Hatco’s environmental and legal personnel cautioned against this form of lagoon use. As early as 1985, plant manager Larry Rotter recommended that Hateo establish “as a priority project” a system that eliminated such pumping. (1751:6-1752:2 (Chryss); E918, 919) In April 1986, Hatco’s attorneys advised Hateo that if the lagoons were contaminated there was “absolutely no way that [the lagoons] can be used even for emergencies.” (1764:1-1765:9 (Chryss); E990) Finally, in 1989, Soos advised Chryss that directing the Ester II swale discharge to the lagoons was not in good faith compliance with Hatco’s NJDPES permit. (1754:24-1758:8 (Chryss)) Still, Hateo continued the pumping until 1991.
305. Despite its awareness that the lagoons were contaminated and contributing to
*1082
groundwater contamination, Hateo originally contemplated the use of the lagoons to store excavated soil generated from the construction of the EPT plant. (Mustacchio Stip., ¶ 21) The DEP rejected this proposed use of the lagoons.
(Id.,
¶ 23)
3. Cooperation with Government Officials
a. Grace
306. In December 1962, the State Department of Health (the “Department”) ordered Grace to cease its discharge of industrial waste to the Raritan River by April 1963. (E82) By this date, Grace had met with state officials and hired a waste water consultant to sample its sludge and effluent in order to determine the best way of addressing the problem. (E89, 90, 91) Grace kept the state apprised of these efforts and the Department agreed to take no further action pursuant to the cease and desist order. (E93, 96, 97, 99, 109, 155, 130, 131)
307. In December 1963, the Department asked Grace to provide a commitment to remedy the effluent problem by March 1964, advising Grace to connect their property to the MCSA. (E96,117) Following a September 1963 meeting with the MCSA and the receipt of its consultant’s report, (E110, 114), Grace submitted a request for the funds needed to complete the sewer hook-up, receiving approval by February 1964. (E129, 130)
308. Growing impatient when the project remained incomplete in May 1966, the Department advised Grace that it would have to treat its effluent onsite before release if Grace did not tie in to the municipal sewer. (E218) Grace completed the MCSA connection in November 1966. (E232) Legal difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary easements from local officials and a high water table had impeded construction. (E219, 232) State officials acknowledged Grace’s efforts and expressed their appreciation. (E131, 289)
309. In May 1967, the Army Corp of Engineers called Grace’s attention to the problems caused by their effluent streams that remained unconnected to MCSA. (E254, 263) This effluent was discharged through three unlined ditches that flowed into Sling Tail Creek, (E254, and Crow’s Mill Creek; E263, 270 at WRG01860) Grace diverted a portion of the effluent streams to its ponds, (E261, 281) (same document), and by November 24, 1967 all three ditches were tied into the MCSA. (E261, 281, 290 at H513896)
310. Grace recognized in April 1968 that closure of the ponds would be necessary. (E294) The pond elimination program was completed in early 1971. (E393) During the pond excavation, monthly progress reports concerning the project were sent to the state.
(See e.g.,
E343, 345, 348, 349, 356, 363, 364)
311. No state, local or federal governmental authority sought to involve Grace in the remediation of the Hateo site until April 1992. (E2201; Conway Dep. 59:22-60:5) At this time, the DEP informed Grace that Grace would have the opportunity to sign the draft ACO that had been negotiated during the previous six months between Hateo and the DEP. (E2193, 2201)
312. In April, May and June 1992, Grace advised the DEP that it could not unilaterally sign the proposed ACO due to concerns about site access and compliance stemming from Hatco’s possession of the site. (E2221, Conway Dep. 59:22-62:17)
313. On August 5,1992, the DEP issued a joint Directive to Hateo and Grace. Grace submitted a timely response to the DEP, but did not sign the ACO. (E2342)
b. Hateo
314. In July 1979, the DEP visited Hateo to investigate oil discovered in Crows Mill Creek. (1216:1-1217:19 (Reid); E696) Shortly thereafter, Hateo set out to remedy deficiencies DEP officials noted during their visit. (1218:1-1219:12 (Reid); E698) During a return visit in August 1979, Hateo showed DEP its improvements. (1219:20-1221:13 (Reid); E699)
315. In October 1979, DEP wrote Hateo and directed it to undertake a pollution abatement program during the course of which Hateo would remove contaminated soil
*1083
from the lagoons and other areas of the site and install monitoring wells.
26
(E704)
316. Hateo engaged counsel to evaluate the statutory basis for the DEP’s demands and hired an environmental consultant to verify the DEP’s determinations with respect to the lagoons. (E709, 717) After an exchange of correspondence and information about the site, Hateo advised the DEP in April 1980 that it was prepared to submit a full proposal to the DEP based on the advice of its environmental consultant. (E723)
317. On June 16, 1981, based upon visual site inspections, (E733, ¶ 2), and test results that revealed lagoon contamination, (E720), the DEP issued an Administrative Order to Hateo which directed that Hateo perform soil borings, install monitoring wells, cease groundwater pollution and remove contaminated soils from the site. (E737) In response, Hateo ordered sampling from the lagoons to confirm the DEP findings and requested an administrative hearing. (E742, 739)
318. Following additional sampling, (E744), and site inspections, (E757), the DEP issued an Amended Administrative Order. After negotiations, the DEP and Hateo agreed that Hateo would investigate the environmental contamination at the site. This agreement was reflected in an Administrative Consent Order signed on September 28, 1982. (E784) Pursuant to its terms, Hateo agreed to install seven groundwater monitoring wells and sample the wells periodically during the next five years. (E784) Hateo complied with these terms. (864:11-24 (Trela))
319. In April 1983, Hateo applied for a NJPDES permit, seeking authorization for its then sporadic use of the lagoons. (1237:13-1238:11 (Reid); E792) On November 26, 1984, Hateo sought information regarding a temporary permit authorizing the lagoon skimming project that was instituted in April 1984. (E859) Hateo submitted a formal request for the temporary permit on December 5, 1984. (E857, 858)
320. In response to Hatco’s application for a special permit, the DEP required testing of the lagoons. (E862) Results of the January 16,1985 sampling, E870, received
on
March 4,1985, revealed the presence of aroelor 1248 in the lagoon sludge. (E881) By April 8,1985, Hateo had developed a preliminary program to shut down the lagoon skimming operation. (E892, 904)
321. During an April 3, 1985 telephone conversation, the DEP instructed Hateo to discontinue discharging effluent to the lagoons. (E905) This order was repeated in writing on April 15, 1985.
(Id.)
Hateo closed the effluent line to the lagoons on April 18, 1985. (1379:2-18 (Chryss); E910)
322. On December 16, 1985, the DEP issued a draft New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination Permit (“NJPDES permit”) to Hateo that required Hateo to submit to the Department a plan for the closure of the lagoons. (E959 at H501648)
323. Negotiations between Hateo and the DEP followed. (1422:5-1424:1 (Chryss)) The parties met on February 7, 1986 and February 25; 1986. (1425:18-1437:13 (Chryss); E971, 977) After several extensions were granted, (E975, 978), Hateo submitted its comments on the draft permit on March 20, 1986. (E984) Around this time, Hatco’s environmental expert, DRAI, began sampling work at the site. (1447:23-1448:24 (Chryss); Stipulation Nos. 42, 44)
324. The DEP issued the final NJPDES permit on April 22, 1987. (E1070) Negotiations between the parties continued through September, (1454:9-14, 1460:7-21 (Chryss); E1091), and DRAI prepared a proposed work plan which was submitted to the DEP. (1457:9-1458:1 (Chryss); E1083, 1087) By November 1987, Hateo began work in order to meet the minimum regulatory requirements set out in the permit. (E1125, 1188) In January 1988, the parties met to discuss Hatco’s progress toward compliance and to set up a timetable for completion. (1480:12-25 (Chryss); E1158)
325. By letter dated December 14, 1987 Hateo informed the DEP of Hatco’s under
*1084
standing that the requested remediation and closure plans would await results of the sampling program currently underway. (E1137 at H505636) By letter dated February 26, 1988, the DEP agreed with minor modifications. (E1182)
326. Hateo kept the DEP apprised of its progress with the site investigation. (E1196) Negotiations and modifications in the compliance schedule continued until May 1989, (1519:20-15:20-1 (Chryss); 1488), when a proposed compliance schedule was issued. (E1517)
327. By the spring of 1991, Hateo recognized the need for an ACO to complete the site remediation. (1561:16-1562:18 (Chryss)) The first draft ACO, issued on October 30, 1991, called for a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (“RI/FS”) and implementation of a remedial action plan to clean up the contamination at the Hateo site. (E2109) After receiving an extension, Hateo responded to the DEP proposal on December 9, 1991. (E2128) Negotiations continued until March 1992 when Hateo received a final revised draft ACO. (1567:1-18 (Chryss); E2187)
328. On August 5, 1992 the DEP issued a Directive to Hateo and Grace. (E2262, 2264) Within thirty days, they were to arrange for the cessation of the environmental threat. (E2262 at A215317, ¶ 29) Hateo filed its draft RI work plan with the DEP on August 26, 1992, and signed the ACO on September 9, 1992. (E2348)
329. Pursuant to the ACO Hateo has completed a remedial investigation and a scoping report and investigation, which included a remedial investigation work plan, field work and a final report. (1140:22-1141:18 (Trela))
4. Financial Benefit of Remediation
330. The financial benefit derived from remediation is a factor that must be considered in determining the equitable contribution of each party to the remediation of the site. (May 13, 1993 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 8-9)
331. In 1978, Kaufman-controlled corporations purchased the Fords facility from Grace for approximately $5.5 million after adjustments. Grace fixed the price. It was not negotiated. (1967:10-18 (Kaufman))
332. Grace’s sale of the Fords facility to Kaufman followed a three-year effort of Kaufman himself and others to divest the entire group of Hateo businesses. (Kunze Dep. at 31:13-32:9; Robbins Dep. at 281:8-282:7) When these efforts proved unsuccessful (1960:25-1963:10 (Kaufman); Kunze Dep. 31:15-20), Grace decided to sell individual businesses in the Hateo Group. (Kunze Dep. 47:18-25)
333. Initial efforts to sell the Fords operation to U.S. Steel, ICI, Badische and a Canadian company failed. (Kunze Dep. 48:17-49:23; Robbins Dep. 288:17-22)
334. At the time of the 1978 sale, the Hateo Chemical Division was facing the loss of its supply of oxo-alcohol, a critical raw material in the production of DOP in the Ester II plant. (1967:20-24 (Kaufman); Grace Dep. 280:16-281:10, 284:18-285:23) That prospect created a tremendous business risk. (1967:25-1968:4) In addition, Grace believed that the operation at Fords would face greater competition in the future. (Robbins Dep. 81:17-82:3)
335. In November 1988, Exxon offered Kaufman $70 million for the total assets of the Fords facility. (1551:24 (Chryss); E1365 at Exxon 0122) This offer was net of a $45 million discount which represented the estimated environmental clean-up costs, (1550:1 (Chryss)), but did not account for the costs associated with the K024 cleanup. (1614:17 (Chryss))
336. Much of the increase in the value of Hateo since 1978 is attributable to the development, by Hateo, of new products, new technology, and new customers. Hateo transformed itself from a large-volume producer of low-margin chemicals to a specialty chemical business.
337. When a party completes a cleanup pursuant to an ACO, the DEP issues a no-further-action letter which describes terms and conditions of the DEP’s approval of the cleanup at that time. (1164:1-5 (Trela)) The no-further-action letter may result in a deed notice or a deed restriction on the title for
*1085
the property at the county clerk’s office. (1164:6-10 (Trela)) In no-further-action letters, it is standard practice for the DEP to reserve its right at any future time to require additional investigation and/or remediation if the department determines that conditions at the site are a threat to the environment or public health and safety. (1165:7-20 (Trela)) Subsequent investigations and remediation are not atypical even after compliance with an ACO. '(1165:21-1166:10 (Trela))
338. Thus, compliance with an ACO combined with the receipt of a no-further-action letter from the DEP does not relieve a company from the burden of complying with later changes in cleanup standards. (1168:4— 22 (Trela)) This uncertainty prevents an accurate prediction of the environmental status of the Hateo site subsequent to its compliance with the ACO. (1169:5-20 (Trela))
5. Hatco’s Failure to Mitigate Damages
339. Whether Hateo failed to mitigate environmental damage at the site is a factor that must be considered in determining the equitable contribution of each party to the remediation of the site. (May 13,1993 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7-8)
340. The Court previously held that, at least as early as 1981, Hateo “should have discovered,” through “the exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence,” the extent of the environmental damage at and around the site.
Hateo,
801 F.Supp. at 1323-24 .
341. Since its purchase of the Fords site in 1978, Hateo has undertaken four remediation projects: (a) Project 50; (b) Project 51; (c) the removal of PCB-contaminated liquid, including lagoon skimmings, from the site; and (d) the excavation of material from the PA Residue Area. The latter two remediation activities were required by Exxon as conditions precedent to its potential purchase of the facility. (1852:19-23, 1854:17-1855:18 (Chryss); E1365 at Exxon 00135) Hateo itself created the PCB-liquid problem through its lagoon skimming project.
342. At least as early as 1979, the DEP required Hateo to remove contaminated sediments from t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1949204. Public record. Not legal advice.
