# Solow v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (In Re Midway Airlines, Inc.)

> United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois · March 10, 1995 · 180 B.R. 851

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1876535

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re MIDWAY AIRLINES, INC., Midway Airlines (1987), Inc., Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc., Debtors. Sheldon L. SOLOW, Trustee of Midway Airlines, Inc., Midway Airlines (1987), Inc., and Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc., Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Counterplaintiff
- **Court:** United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** March 10, 1995
- **Citations:** 180 B.R. 851; 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 342; 1995 WL 122076
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Squires
- **Judges:** John H. Squires
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHN H. SQUIRES, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the amended complaint filed by Sheldon L. So-low, trustee (the “Trustee”) of the estates of the debtors, Midway Airlines, Inc., Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc., and Midway Airlines (1987), Inc. (collectively referred to as “Midway”) against Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Northwest”), and on the counterclaim of Northwest. For the reasons set forth here
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in, the Court, having considered all of the evidence adduced at trial, hereby grants judgment in favor of Northwest and against the Trustee on Counts I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII of the Complaint. The Court grants judgment in favor of the Trustee and against Northwest on Count IX of the Complaint. As to the Counterclaim, the Court grants judgment in favor of the Trustee and against Northwest on Counts I and II of the Counterclaim.
Had this matter been tried before Sir Walter Scott, he may have described it as follows: “Oh, what a tangled web parties create, when oral contracts they try to make!” With that paraphrase in mind, the Court summarizes its decision and makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
SUMMARY OF DECISION
Midway brought this lawsuit against Northwest after the parties failed to consummate a proposed purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets. Northwest filed a two-count counterclaim against Midway. The following recitation constitutes a summary of the Court’s decision in this adversary proceeding. Pursuant to Count I of its Complaint, Midway filed a breach of contract claim against Northwest for an alleged agreement formed on October 8,1991 for the purchase and sale of substantially all of Midway’s non-gate assets. The Court holds that no such agreement was made between the parties. The only binding agreement reached by the parties on October 8 with respect to Midway’s non-gate assets was to negotiate in good faith consistent with their representations to the Court and to use their best efforts to close the transaction within thirty days.
Under Count III of its Complaint, Midway claims that Northwest breached a covenant set forth in the parties’ Asset Purchase Agreement to negotiate in good faith for the non-gate assets. The Court holds that Northwest did negotiate in good faith for the purchase of Midway’s non-gate assets and therefore did not breach the covenant.
In Count IV of the Complaint, Midway asserts a claim for promissory estoppel against Northwest. Midway argues that Northwest promised to purchase the non-gate assets from Midway and to fund Midway’s operating losses. The Court holds that Northwest did not make an unambiguous promise to purchase substantially all of Midway’s assets or to fund Midway’s operating losses, and thus Northwest is not promissorily estopped from claiming there was no binding and enforceable agreement for the non-gate assets.
Pursuant to Count V of the Complaint, Midway alleges that Northwest committed fraudulent misrepresentation by making several misrepresentations of material fact at the October 8, 1991 court hearing and subsequently thereafter. The Court holds that Midway failed to prove all of the requisite elements of fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to each alleged instance.
In Count VI of the Complaint, Midway asserts a claim for equitable estoppel. Midway makes substantially the same allegations with respect to this claim as it does with respect to the fraudulent misrepresentation claim in Count V. The Court holds that Midway failed to prove all of the requisite elements of equitable estoppel, and thus Northwest is not equitably estopped from asserting there was no binding and enforceable agreement for the non-gate assets.
Under Count VII, Midway alleges that Northwest committed negligently misrepresentation with respect to several material facts in connection with the proposed purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets. The same alleged misrepresentations that form the basis of Counts V and VI are asserted in this count. The Court holds that Northwest is not in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions. Accordingly, Midway may not recover its alleged economic losses under this theory.
Pursuant to Count VIII, Midway asserts a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Midway claims that Northwest interfered with a prospective business relationship it had with Southwest Airlines Co. The Court holds that Midway failed to sustain its burden of proving that Northwest tortiously interfered with
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Midway’s prospective business relationship with Southwest Airlines. The Court holds that even if Northwest did interfere with a prospective economic advantage, Northwest’s conduct was justified under a competitor’s privilege.
Finally, in Count IX of the Complaint, Midway asserts that Northwest breached a covenant set forth in the Gate Sale Agreement to reimburse Midway for the October 1991 lease arrearage payment Midway made to the City of Chicago and for the October 1991 and November 1991 security deposit payments Midway made to the City of Chicago. The Court holds that there is no agreement requiring Northwest to assume the security deposit payments Midway owed to the City of Chicago. Thus, Northwest’s refusal to reimburse Midway’s security deposit payments is justified. However, pursuant to the. Gate Sale Agreement, Northwest’s failure to pay the October 1991 lease arrearage payment constitutes a breach of that separate agreement. As a result of that breach, Midway is entitled to damages in the sum of $190,345.49 plus $31,602.57 as pre-judgment, interest, as well as post-judgment interest.
In Count I of Northwest’s Counterclaim, Northwest alleges that Midway fraudulently misrepresented that its data submitted to the United States Department of Transportation was accurate and that Northwest could rely on that data; Midway gave Northwest an incomplete and misleading explanation regarding the data on October 4, 1991; and Midway failed to disclose to Northwest on October 7, 1991 that the data submitted was inaccurate and unreliable. The Court holds that Northwest failed to prove that Midway made the representations in the first allegation, failed to prove that Midway made the alleged misrepresentations in the second allegation, and failed to prove all the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation in the third allegation.
In Count II, Northwest alleges that Midway breached a confidentiality agreement executed by the parties by filing and prosecuting this adversary proceeding. The Court holds that the confidentiality agreement does not bar Midway from filing-this lawsuit.
THE UNDERLYING MATERIAL BACKGROUND FOR ALL COUNTS OF THE COMPLAINT
1. This adversary proceeding is related to
In re Midway Airlines, Inc.,
91 B 06449,
In re Midway Airlines (1987), Inc.,
91 B 06450, and
In re Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc.,
91 B 06451.
2. Midway Airlines, Inc., Midway Airlines (1987), Inc., and Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc. are corporations organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. Their principal place of business was located in Chicago, Illinois. Midway operated a domestic airline carrier.
3. Northwest is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its principal place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota. Northwest is in the business of operating an international airline commonly known as Northwest Airlines.
4. On March 25, 1991, Midway Airlines, Inc., Midway Airlines (1987), Inc., and Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc. filed their petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
5. On March 26, 1991, the Court consolidated the cases for administrative purposes.
6. Midway Airlines, Inc. and Midway Aircraft Engineering, Inc. were Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession until November 27, 1991, when those cases were voluntarily converted to Chapter 7. Sheldon L. Solow was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee of those cases. Midway Airlines (1987), Inc. converted its case to Chapter 7 on March 9, 1992. Solow was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee of that, case as well.
7. Midway filed this adversary proceeding on November 18, 1991. The Trustee has continued to prosecute this action as successor-in-interest to Midway.
8. On February 12, 1992, the Trustee filed a first amended complaint (hereinafter the “Complaint”), which contained nine counts against Northwest. Each of the nine counts relates to the failure of Midway and Northwest to consummate a proposed purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets (the “Back-End transaction”) and the events
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surrounding a hearing held before this Court on October 8,1991 (the “October 8 hearing”). Midway has made the following claims: breach of a contract, allegedly formed at the October 8 hearing, for the Back-End transaction (Count I); breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II); breach of a covenant, set forth in Section 5.7 of the parties’ Asset Purchase Agreement dated October 10, 1991, to negotiate in good faith for the Back-End transaction (Count III); promissory estoppel (Count IV); fraudulent misrepresentation (Count V); equitable estoppel (Count VI); negligent misrepresentation (Count VII); intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage (Count VIII); and breach of a covenant in the Gate Sale Agreement to assume certain lease arrearage and security deposit liabilities of Midway (Count IX).
9. On February 18,1992, Northwest filed an answer to the Complaint and a two-count counterclaim (hereinafter the “Counterclaim”) against Midway. In its answer, Northwest denied the material allegations of wrongdoing in the Complaint and raised several affirmative defenses. In its Counterclaim, Northwest asserts claims against Midway for fraudulent misrepresentation (Count I) and breach of a confidentiality agreement executed by the parties (Count II). On May 6, 1992, Northwest filed an amendment to its answer and Counterclaim.
10. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b). Northwest has consented to the Court’s entry of a final order or judgment in this adversary proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7008(a). Accordingly, the Court may enter a final order and judgment.
11. This action is properly before this Court pursuant to Rule 2.33(A) of the Local General Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
12. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409 .'
13. All findings of fact contained herein that are deemed to be conclusions of law shall be additional conclusions of law, and all conclusions of law herein that are deemed to be findings of fact shall be additional findings of fact.
See In re Piper's Alley Co.,
69 B.R. 382 (N.D.Ill.1987).
14. The function of the Court in a bench trial such as this, where the Court acts as the fact finder, is to resolve conflicting evidence by determining the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be attached to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
S.T.S. Int’l, Ltd. v. Laurel Sea Transport, Ltd.,
932 F.2d 437, 440 (5th Cir.1991);
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc.,
772 F.2d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir.1985),
cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1147 , 106 S.Ct. 1801 , 90 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986).
15. Based on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Midway and Northwest, the testimony of the witnesses at trial, and the exhibits entered into evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the claims in Midway’s Complaint and Northwest’s Counterclaim.
16. This Court previously granted Northwest’s motion for summary judgment as to Count II of the Complaint, but denied that motion as to the remaining counts.
See Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
No. 91 A 01176, 1993 WL 65673 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1993).
17. The Court conducted a bench trial on the remaining counts of Midway’s Complaint and on Northwest’s Counterclaim between May 3, 1993 and September 2, 1993. The parties requested extensions to submit post-trial papers to April 29, 1994, when the matter was taken under advisement. The parties have submitted their prospective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Parenthetical references are made to the trial record and exhibits admitted into evidence.
18. With the Court’s approval, Midway retained The First Boston Corporation (“First Boston”) as its investment advisor on May 24, 1991. (Tr. (Hinson) 110-11, 212, 214; DX 2).
19. First Boston was retained to assist Midway in analyzing and evaluating Midway’s current and prospective financial condition, developing financial forecasts, evaluating Midway’s assets and operations under
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assumptions including liquidation, maximizing asset values, communicating with potential investors, and negotiating and implementing the plan of reorganization. (Koe-neke Dep. 19-20; DX 2).
20. On May 24, 1991, Midway also issued a business plan for the period May 1, 1991 through April 30, 1992. (Tr. (Hinson) 214; DX 49). Midway’s plan projected that by April 1992, Midway would have repaid its post-petition loan borrowed with Court approval from Continental Bank, N.A., and accumulated a $2.5 million cash surplus. (DX 49, p. 16; Tr. (Hinson) 216).
21. In July, First Boston completed a prospectus (the “Book”) describing Midway as a potential investment opportunity. (PX 93). First Boston also prepared an agreement covering confidentiality and other issues (the “Confidentiality Agreement”), which Midway required interested parties, including Northwest, to sign as a precondition to receiving the Book. (Tr. (Cronin) 2215, 2051-54; (Hinson) 114; Koeneke Dep. 21-22). Northwest signed the Confidentiality Agreement in late July to obtain the Book.. First Boston then sent the Book to Northwest. (DX 501; PX 35, PX 93; Tr. (Steen-land) 3758-59; (Cronin) 2052-53, 2215).
22. Paragraph 7 of the Confidentiality Agreement states:
You [Northwest] also understand and agree that
no contract or agreement concerning the possible transaction shall be deemed to exist between you and the Company [Midway] unless and until a definitive agreement has been executed and delivered,
and we and you hereby waive, in advance, any claims (including without limitation, breach of contract) in connection with the transaction unless and until we and you shall have entered into, executed and delivered a
definitive agreement
between the Company and you. In the absence of such definitive agreement being executed and delivered, neither you nor the Company has any legal obligation of any kind whatsoever with respect to any such transaction by virtue of this Agreement or any other written or oral expression with respect to such transaction except, in the case of this Agreement, for the matters specifically agreed to herein. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “definitive agreement” does not include an executed letter of intent or any other preliminary written agreement, nor does it include any other preliminary written agreement, nor does it include any written or verbal acceptance of an offer on our part....
Neither this paragraph nor any other provision in this Agreement can be waived
or amended
except by written consent
of the Company
which
consent
shall specifically refer to this paragraph
(or such other provision)
and explicitly make such waiver
or amendment.
(PX 35, ¶7, emphasis supplied).
23. As of mid-September 1991, no potential investor had made any offer to recapitalize, acquire, or otherwise invest in Midway. (Tr. (Hinson) 120-22; PX 664/DX 5, p. 5).
24. By mid-September 1991, Midway’s cash problems were very serious. Midway was experiencing a negative cash flow and had drawn down most of its $40 million debt- or in possession (“DIP”) credit line from Continental Bank, N.A. (“Continental”). (Tr. (Hinson) 116; (Hanson) 460; (Burgess) 836; Schick Dep. 16-17; Jenkins Dep. 21-23, 82-83).
25. At its September 17, 1991 meeting, Midway’s Board of Directors instructed Midway’s management and First Boston to inform potential investors that Midway was running out of time and, therefore, potential investors needed to make their proposals for a Midway transaction promptly. (Tr. (Hin-son) 119-21; (Hanson) 460; (Burgess) 837-38; Jenkins Dep. 24-25; PX 665/DX 87, pp. 5-6, 8; DX 7).
26. In response to this directive from Midway’s Board, First Boston contacted the six most likely prospective investors, which included Northwest, and requested in writing that they submit offers by Thursday, September 19, 1991. (Tr. (Hinson) 120; Jenkins Dep. 24-25; DX 4).
27. Northwest submitted a proposed letter agreement, dated September 19, 1991, to Midway whereby Northwest offered to purchase Midway’s gates at Midway Airport at Chicago, Illinois, for $20 million and lease
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them back to Midway for a one-year period, and to negotiate in good faith to acquire the remainder of Midway’s assets at a later date. (DX 234).
28. James Cronin (a consultant for Chec-chi and Associates, and Northwest’s lead negotiator in the Midway transaction) and Douglas Steenland (Northwest’s Vice-President, Deputy General Counsel, and Secretary) were Northwest’s primary negotiators regarding the letter agreement. (Tr. (Cronin) 2033-34; (Steenland) 3755).
29. Midway’s and Northwest’s lawyers further negotiated the terms of the proposed letter of intent on September 20 and 21, 1991. (Tr. (Steenland) 3761; (Burgess) 956; DX 85 (9/20-9/21 entries)). Northwest’s draft contained a variety of conditions to Northwest’s obligation to consummate the sale of Midway’s gates including the execution of definitive documents (DX 234, ¶ 5(a)) and the approval of Northwest’s Board of Directors. (DX 234, ¶ 5(h)). The only change requested by Midway to the proposed board approval condition was to add the approval of Midway’s Board as a condition to any obligation to close the sale of the gates. (Tr. (Burgess) 955; (Steenland) 3770, 3765-66). Northwest made it clear to Midway during the negotiations over the letter of intent that Northwest did not just want to buy Midway’s gates, but, rather, was also interested in purchasing Midway as a going concern. (Tr. (Burgess) 956-57; DX 89, p. 3).
30. On September 23, 1991, Midway’s Board of Directors met and approved Midway’s execution of the letter agreement (the “Letter of Intent”). (Tr. (Hinson) 121-23; PX 4; PX 669/DX 89).
31. On September 23, 1991, Midway and Northwest signed the Letter of Intent. The Letter of Intent provided that Northwest would purchase Midway’s interest in 21 gates at Midway Airport for $20 million, lease the gates back to Midway for a period of one year, assist Midway in marketing and other activities, and enter into good faith negotiations with Midway for the acquisition by Northwest of all or substantially all of Midway’s assets. (PX 4). The Letter of Intent also provided Midway an option to re-purchase the gates from Northwest at a premium price. (PX 4, ¶ 1(c)). This transaction will be referred to as the “Gate Sale.”
32. In addition, the Letter of Intent expressly provided that Northwest’s and Midway’s obligations to close the transaction contemplated by the Letter of Intent were subject to various conditions precedent. Among the conditions were the execution of definitive documentation (¶ 5(a)), approval of the Board of Directors of both Northwest and Midway (¶ 5(h)), Bankruptcy Court approval (¶ 5(c)), and a due diligence review with results reasonably satisfactory to Northwest (¶5(6)). (PX 4; Tr. (Steenland) 3766-69).
33. On September 24, 1991, Midway filed an “Emergency Motion to Approve Sale-Leaseback of Midway’s Leasehold Interests at Chicago Midway Airport,” asking the Court to approve the sale-leaseback of Midway’s 21 gates and related facilities at Midway Airport to Northwest pursuant to the Letter of Intent. (Tr. (Hinson) 122; (Hanson) 478-79; PX 697).
34. By order dated September 26, 1991, the Court scheduled a hearing on Midway’s motion, pursuant to Sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, for October 8, 1991. (DX 243, p. 3).
35. Southwest Airlines Co. (“Southwest”) submitted a competing offer for Midway’s gates at Midway Airport on September 28, 1991, four days after Midway filed its Emergency Motion. (Tr. (Hinson) 123; PX 670).
36. After consideration, Midway determined that this initial Southwest offer was inferior to Northwest’s offer. (Tr. (Hinson) 123-24).
37. On Friday, October 4, 1991, Southwest submitted a revised offer which was much more attractive to Midway than Southwest’s initial offer. (Tr. (Hinson) 124; (Hanson) 479; (Burgess) 1239-41; PX 77).
38. Unlike Northwest’s offer, the revised Southwest offer firmly encompassed assets in addition to Midway’s gates at Midway Airport. (Tr. (Hanson) 478-79; PX 77, p. 3).
39. In light of the improved Southwest offer, Ronald Hanson (an attorney with La-tham & Watkins and one of Midway’s bank
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ruptcy counsel) contacted Steenland and told him that Northwest might not prevail at the October 8 hearing. Hanson encouraged Northwest to expand its offer to include assets in addition to Midway’s 21 gates at Midway Airport. (Tr. (Hanson) 455-56, 478-79; (Steenland) 3773, 4066-67).
40. Cronin apprised John Dasburg (President and Chief Executive Officer of Northwest), Gary Wilson (Co-Chair of Northwest’s Board and a capital partner of Cheechi and Associates (Cronin’s employer)), and Northwest’s legal counsel of the revised Southwest offer. (Tr. (Cronin) 2030, 2082; Dasburg Dep. 7).
41. To prepare for the special meeting of Northwest’s Board of Directors scheduled for October 7, 1991 to discuss a Midway acquisition, Dasburg called a meeting of senior Northwest officials and Northwest’s outside bankruptcy counsel on Sunday, October 6, 1991 at Dasburg’s house. (Tr. (Steenland) 3775; Parkins Dep. 55-56; Dasburg Dep. 36-37).
42. The participants at the October 6, 1991 meeting included, among others, Das-burg, Steenland, Robert Fomaro (Northwest’s Senior Vice President of Marketing and Planning), John Garel (Northwest’s Vice President of Financial Planning and Analysis), Elliott Seiden (Northwest’s Counsel and head of its Government Affairs Department), Joe Leonard (Northwest’s Executive Vice President of Customer Service), Lenard Par-kins (an attorney with Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay, P.C. one of Northwest’s outside bankruptcy counsel), and Cronin by telephone. (Tr. (Jehn) 2644; (Fornaro) 2975; (Garel) 3472; (Steenland) 3775; .Dasburg Dep. 36-37; Parkins Dep. 5-6, 14-15, 55-56; Leonard Dep. 7).
43. The participants at the October 6 meeting discussed whether Northwest should counter Southwest’s offer with a proposal to acquire substantially all of Midway’s assets. (Parkins Dep. 56).
44. Among the subjects discussed at the October 6 meeting was an acquisition analysis. (Dasburg Dep. 39-40; PX 53).
45. At the end of the October 6 meeting, Northwest’s management was still divided about whether Northwest should go forward with the acquisition of Midway. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3776; Dasburg Dep. 41; Parkins Dep. 75).
46. Dasburg concluded after the meeting that the direct economic benefits of the transaction were sufficiently positive for Northwest to risk advancing $20 million for the gates to keep Midway afloat while Northwest considered the acquisition of Midway as a going concern. (Dasburg Dep. 39^2). Consequently, Dasburg decided to recommend an acquisition of all of Midway’s assets to Northwest’s Board, subject to a due diligence examination of Midway by Northwest. (Dasburg Dep. 41, 84).
47. On Monday morning, October 7, Northwest’s management called a special telephonic meeting of its Board of Directors for 1:00 p.m. that afternoon to consider Midway’s request for a specific proposal to acquire all of Midway’s assets. (PX 109; DX 429; PX 10; Tr. (Steenland) 3779).
48. Approximately two to three hours before the meeting, Joseph Francht (Northwest’s Senior Vice President of Finance and Treasurer) sent the members of Northwest’s Board of Directors a memorandum “seeking approval for the acquisition of substantially all of the assets of Midway Airlines.” (Francht Dep. 7; PX 40, p. 1).
49. Northwest’s Board of Directors discussed a wide variety of issues at the meeting relating to an acquisition of Midway, including its risks and benefits. (Dasburg Dep. 48-57). Management explained its view that the acquisition of Midway was attractive for Northwest because there were projected substantial direct benefits and indirect benefits. (PX 10, p. 3; Tr. (Steenland) 3783; Dasburg Dep. 53-56; Aziz Dep. 43). Das-burg also informed the Board, however, that Northwest still needed to perform due diligence on Midway. (Dasburg Dep. 83-84, 90-91, 94; Van Wijk Dep. 37, 47). The Board also discussed whether Northwest could recover its $20 million if Northwest bought the Midway gates but did not complete an acquisition of Midway’s remaining assets. The consensus was that the $20 million was secure because Northwest would be able to sell
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the gates to Southwest if the Back-End transaction did not occur. (Dasburg Dep. 48-49).
50. At the conclusion of the October 7 board meeting, Northwest’s Board passed an oral resolution, proposed by Dasburg, authorizing the company’s management: (1) to acquire Midway’s gates pursuant to the Letter of Intent for $20 million; and (2) to “submit a bid for the remainder of Midway’s assets
subject to final approval by the Board."
(PX 10, p. 5, emphasis supplied; Tr. (Steenland) 3785-86, 3787-88; Bouw Dep. 35; Aziz Dep. 54, 56; Van Wijk Dep. 47, 73, 86; Dasburg Dep. 83-84, 90-91). The vote on this oral resolution was eleven in favor, none opposed, with three abstentions. (PX 10, p. 5; Tr. (Steenland) 3786).
51. Northwest’s Board included three representatives from KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (“KLM”). KLM, an investor in Northwest, owned twenty percent of Northwest’s voting equity. (Tr. (Steenland) 3778; Leonard Dep. 125).
52. The three KLM representatives on the Northwest Board — Pieter Bouw (President of KLM), Leo Van Wijk (Managing Director of KLM), and Sharyar Aziz (Executive Vice President and Managing Director of Smith Barney, which provided financial advisory services to KLM) — cast the votes to abstain (collectively referred to as the “KLM directors”). (Tr. (Steenland) 3778-79; Das-burg Dep. 67-68).
53. Although the KLM directors had expressed reservations over the strategic merits of the proposed acquisition, they voted to abstain because they felt they did not have adequate time or information to give proper consideration to the proposed Midway transactions. (Bouw Dep. 34-36; Van Wijk Dep. 63-64, '27, 40; Aziz Dep. 61; Tr. (Steenland) 4094r-95).
54. The evidence was uncontroverted that at the October 7 meeting, Northwest’s Board did not approve the purchase of any Midway assets other than the gates. (Tr. (Steenland) 3786; Van Wijk Dep. 47, 73; Bouw Dep. 34^-35; Aziz Dep. 56; Dasburg Dep. 87-88, 91).
55. The minutes from the October 7 meeting indicate that “it was decided that the officers would be granted authority to acquire Midway’s gates on the terms as they deemed appropriate and to submit a bid for the remainder of Midway’s assets subject to final approval by the Board.” (PX 10, p. 5).
56. On the evening of October 7, Dasburg and Steenland briefed Cronin on the special Northwest Board meeting that they had attended, which Cronin had not attended. (Tr. (Cronin) 2085-86).
57. In this briefing, Dasburg and Steen-land did not inform Cronin that the three KLM directors had abstained from the vote on the acquisition. (Tr. (Cronin) 2247-48).
58. Parkins had not attended the October 7 Board meeting. Thus, Dasburg and Steen-land also briefed Parkins on October 8 with regard to what had occurred at the meeting. (Parkins Dep. 104-06).
59. No one told Parkins that the three KLM directors had abstained from the vote on the acquisition neither prior to nor during the October 8 hearing. (Parkins Dep. 102-04).
60. On the morning of October 8, a meeting was held in Dasburg’s office to decide whether management would make a proposal for Midway in court later that day, and, if so, to formulate that proposal. In addition to Dasburg, the participants in the meeting included Gary Wilson, Steenland, and Cronin. (Tr. (Steenland) 3793-95; (Cronin) 2090-91, 2288; Dasburg Dep. 307-08).
61. The testimony about that meeting was consistent and unrebutted. The participants decided that Cronin and Steenland would attend the court hearing that afternoon and present a two-part proposal: (1) Northwest would offer to purchase the gates for $20 million pursuant to the Letter of Intent and the definitive agreements that had been negotiated, and (2) Northwest would offer to negotiate in good faith to acquire all or substantially all of Midway’s remaining assets consistent with the following terms: (a) the hiring of substantially all of Midway’s operating employees; (b) the assumption of Midway’s leases with Fidelcor (also known as Aeron) for 17 aircraft; and (c) a total of $95 million in additional value, comprised of the assumption of Midway’s air
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traffic liability (“ATL”) and its DIP loan, and a combination of cash and notes in the amount of the difference between $95 million and the total value of the assumption of the ATL and DIP. (Tr. (Steenland) 3794-96; (Cronin) 2090-93, 2288; Dasburg Dep. 307-OS).
62. In addition, Dasburg and Gary Wilson instructed Steenland and Cronin to make Northwest’s proposal for Midway’s remaining assets contingent on the approval of Northwest’s Board of Directors. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3798-99; Dasburg Dep. 232-33, 309-10; Tr. (Cronin) 2095-96, 2090). This instruction was expressly based on the fact that the Northwest Board itself had imposed the board approval condition at its October 7 meeting. (Tr. (Steenland) 3798; (Cronin) 2095-96).
63. After Northwest’s senior management decided upon Northwest’s revised offer, Steenland called Northwest’s outside legal counsel at Dorsey & Whitney, William Hibbs, who was in Chicago, and directed him to prepare a written offer which could be presented in court that afternoon. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3804-05, 4128-29; Hibbs Dep. 5).
64. Parkins also received instructions over the phone from Steenland, detailing the offer which Northwest was to make in Court that afternoon. (Parkins Dep. 86-88).
65. Cronin and Steenland flew to Chicago from Minneapolis after the morning meeting on October 8 in order to attend the hearing that afternoon and present Northwest’s acquisition offer. (Tr. (Steenland) 3803-04).
66. At 11:00 a.m. on the morning of October 8, shortly after the meeting in Dasburg’s office, Cronin spoke by telephone to a number of Midway representatives, including James Jenkins of First Boston. Cronin informed them of the terms and conditions of Northwest’s proposal that had just been formulated in Dasburg’s office. (Tr. (Cronin) 2096-98, 2293; Jenkins Dep. 39-40, 112-134; DX 9 at FB81). Jenkins, who took extensive notes of the conversation, testified that Cronin said Northwest’s proposal for Midway’s non-gate assets was subject to conditions: Northwest “had to complete their due diligence and documentation and then they had to get board approval.” (Jenkins Dep. 39-40; DX 9 at FB81; Tr. (Cronin) 2096-98).
67. Midway’s Board of Directors met at 11:30 a.m. on October 8 to discuss the existing Northwest and Southwest proposals. (DX 98). At approximately 11:55 a.m., Jenkins reported his conversation with Cronin to Midway’s Board. Jenkins advised the Board of Northwest’s terms and conditions, stating that “Northwest needed to do more due diligence, get Board approval and document the second part of the transaction.” (DX 98, p. 4; Tr. (Hinson) 223; Jenkins Dep. 137-38; Tr. (Altschul) 3588-89; (Burgess) 978; Schick Dep. 176-77). Midway Board’s was also told that Northwest’s Back-End proposal was a “$95 million” offer, which included the assumption of Midway’s DIP loan and ATL. (DX 98, pp. 3, 4; Tr. (Burgess) 975; DX 9 at FB81; Tr. (Hanson) 620). There was no discussion of Northwest’s willingness to assume any other Midway liabilities. (Tr. (Burgess) 977).
68. Under Southwest’s proposal, Midway would cease operations immediately, and Midway’s employees would lose their jobs. (Tr. (Burgess) 997; DX 98, pp. 4-5). Although Midway’s Board had been advised that Northwest’s proposal was subject to conditions, the Board believed that Northwest’s existing proposal was superior to Southwest’s proposal. (DX 98, pp. 4-5; Schick Dep. 31; (Tr. (Burgess) 982-83). Midway’s Board directed its management to support Northwest over Southwest if the proposals turned out to be equal in value after further modifications because of Northwest’s willingness — and Southwest’s unwillingness — to hire Midway’s employees. (DX 98, pp. 4-5; Tr. (Burgess) 979, 982). As Hinson (Chairman of Midway’s Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer) termed it, the possibility that Midway’s employees would keep their jobs under Northwest’s proposal, but not Southwest’s, “was a very important factor.” (Tr. (Hinson) 224-25; (Burgess) 977-80). This factor was so important that Hinson even suggested that the Board meet again if Southwest made an offer that was superior to Northwest’s, rather than having Midway’s officers simply accept the superior Southwest offer. (DX 98, p. 4).
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69. When the Board was polled, several of Midway’s directors stressed that Midway needed to take the best financial offer. (Tr. (Hinson) 224; DX 98, pp. 4-5).
70. Because of the possibility that the best offer might not emerge until the court hearing, Midway’s Board refrained from making a decision regarding which offer Midway should accept. (Tr. (Hinson) 224; DX 98, p. 4).
71. Instead, the Board gave Midway’s management the general instruction that if the Northwest and Southwest offers were equal, management should select the Northwest offer because it offered more benefits for Midway’s employees. (DX 98, pp. 4-5).
72. The purpose of the October 8 hearing was to approve the sale of Midway’s gates to Northwest under the terms of the most recent draft of the definitive agreement (PX 612), which Midway had delivered to the Court on October 7, 1991. (Tr. (Hanson) 484).
73. Midway was represented at the October 8 hearing by a team which included, among others, senior officers Hinson, Schick, and Altschul, outside legal counsel (including Burgess, John Henneman, and bankruptcy counsel Ronald Hanson and John Costello), and several investment bankers from First Boston (including James Jenkins, Michael Koeneke, Randy Hazelton, and others). Northwest was represented at the start of the hearing by its outside bankruptcy counsel, Lenard Parkins, its outside corporate counsel from Dorsey & Whitney, William Hibbs, and its Treasurer, Joseph Francht. Due to the length of the meeting in Das-burg’s office that morning, Steenland and Cronin missed their flight to Chicago, and did not arrive in court until after the first recess of the hearing was underway. (Tr. (Steenland) 3803, 3805; (Cronin) 2098-99, 2294; Hibbs Dep. 92). Steenland communicated the terms and conditions of Northwest’s proposal (including the Back-End offer) to be presented in court (which had just been determined at the meeting in Dasburg’s office) by. telephone from the Minneapolis Airport to Francht and Parkins, who were waiting for instructions in Chicago. (Tr. (Steenland) 3803-04, 4127; Parkins Dep. 86-87).
74. At the outset of the October 8 hearing, Midway requested, and the Court set, the ground rules for the hearing. (PX 13). Midway’s counsel and the Court stressed that the parties should state both the terms and the conditions of the competing offers on the record in open court, and that only those statements on the record would be the bases for the Court’s decision. (PX 13; Tr. (Burgess) 1021; (Hanson) 622, 521).
75. Northwest’s counsel, Parkins, presented Northwest’s two-part proposal. He divided his presentation into separate parts, discussing the terms and conditions of each part separately. The first part dealt with Northwest’s offer to purchase Midway’s gates for $20 million as set forth in the Letter of Intent and the draft definitive agreement provided to the Court on October 7 (the Gate Sale). With respect to that transaction, Parkins reported that the conditions had been satisfied, and that Northwest was prepared to close. (PX 13, pp. 16-17).
76. Parkins next presented the second part of Northwest’s proposal, which he termed the “Back-End,” dealing "with the terms which Northwest would include in the negotiations for Midway’s remaining assets, as well as the conditions to those terms. Parkins expressly noted that Northwest’s Back-End offer was for the “balance” and “a11” of Midway’s assets, and specified the following consideration which Northwest would include in the negotiations for those assets: (1) the hiring of substantially all of Midway’s employees (except “spoke” employees); (2) the assumption by Northwest of Midway’s leases with Fidelcor for 17 DC-930 aircraft (the “Fidelcor leases”); (3) Northwest would enter into negotiations to assume Midway’s leases with other lessors for an additional 28 aircraft (the “non-Fidelcor” leases); and (4) “$95 million of consideration,” in the form of the assumption of Midway’s ATL, the assumption of Midway’s DIP loan from Continental Bank, cash, and notes. (PX 13, pp. 18-20).
77. Parkins also responded to the request of Midway and the Court, for a statement of the conditions to Northwest’s proposal. In
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contrast to Northwest’s offer for the gates— which Parkins stated was no longer conditional — Parkins expressly stated, on the record, that the Back-End transaction was conditioned upon the approval of Northwest’s Board and due diligence:
Now, relative to the second or what has come to be known as the back-end portion of the Northwest transaction,
conditions mil be board approval, due diligence,
there is obviously a lot of negotiation to go on with the various creditors relative to the $95 million of consideration to be afforded the estate, in addition to attempting to negotiate and reheve the estate of the liability for the additional DC-930s and MD-80s.
(PX 13, p. 20, emphasis supplied; Parkins Dep. 146-48). The notes that the Midway representatives took during Parkins’ presentation reflect the conditions. (DX 96 at L2368 (Hanson); PX 726 (Burgess); DX 9 at FB80 (Jenkins)).
78. As part of his presentation of Northwest’s offer, Parkins described the administrative liabilities remaining against the estate under Northwest’s offer as follows: “[T]here is a $30 million current liability of the estate, [and] approximately $28 million of other administrative claims...-.” (PX 13, p. 19).
79. Northwest’s assessment of the administrative liabilities remaining under its offer was based on First Boston’s claims analysis, which Northwest had earlier requested and received from Midway. (Tr. (Steenland) 4151; PX 125).
80. At the beginning of the hearing, Southwest submitted a revised written offer to Midway. (DX 94; PX 13, pp. 10, 38; Tr. (Hanson) 486). Southwest’s counsel, David Heroy, detailed its offer on the record after Parkins’ initial presentation. (PX 13, pp. 21-26). In contrast to Northwest’s offer, Southwest stated that its offer was not subject to any conditions except verification of the existence of Midway’s assets. (PX 13, pp. 22, 24). The notes taken by Jenkins during the Southwest presentation reflect that Southwest’s offer did not have a board approval condition. (DX 9 at FB86, FB79; Jenkins Dep. 41^42). Jenkins testified that Northwest’s board approval and due diligence conditions made it “weak” compared to Southwest’s unconditional offer. (Jenkins Dep. 33-34).
81. Under its initial offer, Southwest would:
a. purchase 21 of Midway’s Midway Airport gates for a total of $28 million;
b. purchase certain of Midway’s remaining assets for $25.15 million;
c. assume $35 million of Midway’s ATL liability;
d. allow Midway to retain $11.7 million in ATL deposits and $13.5 million in accounts receivable; and
e. pay the $1 million security deposit owed by Midway to the City of Chicago.
(PX 13, pp. 21-25).
82. At Midway’s request (PX 13, pp. 6, 11), the Court called a recess after Southwest’s presentation to allow Midway to meet with Southwest and Northwest and to further consider the competing proposals. (PX 13, p. 29). During the recess, Midway held separate meetings with Northwest and Southwest in conference rooms near the courtroom. (Tr. (Hinson) 128-29).
83. Hanson took contemporaneous notes of the October 8 hearing which are embodied in PX 676/DX 96. (Tr. (Hanson) 489-90; PX 676/DX 96).
84. He divided his notes between those he took during the hearing (the right side of PX 676/DX 96) and those he wrote to himself based on the questions and issues that arose during the hearing and recesses (the left side of PX 676/DX 96). (Tr. (Hanson) 489-90; PX 676/DX 96).
85. Burgess also took contemporaneous notes during the October 8 hearing. (Tr. (Burgess) 845-47, 1252; PX 674/DX 82, pp. 1-2; PX 726).
86. Burgess used the body of the notes in PX 726 to outline the issues which he wanted to discuss with Northwest during the recesses. The margin notes and certain of the parentheticals in PX 726 record these discussions with Northwest. (Tr. (Burgess) 847).
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87. Midway’s and Northwest’s representatives met for 15-20 minutes during the first recess in a conference room outside the courtroom. (Tr. (Hanson) 498; (Burgess) 852-53).
88. Burgess, Hanson, Hinson, and Thomas Schick (Midway’s President and Chief Operating Officer) attended the recess meeting on behalf of Midway. (Tr. (Burgess) 853; (Cronin) 2100; Schick Dep. 7).
89. Cronin and Steenland were the representatives most actively involved on behalf of Northwest in the first recess discussions. (Tr. (Burgess) 853; (Cronin) 2101; Schick Dep. 31-32).
90. Midway’s representatives began the recess meeting by asking Northwest’s representatives to go through Northwest’s proposal. (Tr. (Hinson) 130; (Burgess) 855).
91. Parkins described Northwest’s offer. (Tr. (Burgess) 855).
92. The meeting then “very quickly evolved into Midway representatives asking specific questions about ... the individual parts of the Northwest proposal and eliciting answers from Northwest to provide either further clarification or understanding....” (Tr. (Burgess) 855).
93. “Bob Burgess and Ron Hanson made a checklist of points and questions they wanted clarification on or to request changes to and they were methodically going through those points that they wanted to understand or have changes made to.” (Tr. (Cronin) 2103).
94. During the first recess meeting one of the subjects discussed was the economics of the Northwest offer. Northwest indicated that the Back-End portion of the Northwest offer would provide the Midway estate with approximately $22 million or $23 million of value in the form of cash and notes. This was in addition to the $20 million Midway would receive from the sale of its Midway Airport gates to Northwest in the Gate Sale. (Tr. (Burgess) 856-57, 1252, 1255-56; PX 726).
95. Northwest informed Midway that its analysis showed that the Midway estate would be left with approximately $58 million in administrative claims under the Northwest offer. (Tr. (Burgess) 858).
96. Either Alfred Altsehul (Midway’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer) or a First Boston representative confirmed that Northwest’s estimate of the amount of administrative claims remaining under the Northwest offer was comparable to the figure Midway had estimated. (Tr. (Burgess) 858; (Altsehul) 3586).
97. Midway was “focused primarily on getting administrative claims satisfied because it had appeared from what [it had] done thus far in the claims analysis that ... [it] had a potentially administratively insolvent estate, and consequently the focus was what was the value that would be available to satisfy the priority claims.” (Tr. (Hanson) 1394).
98. Another issue the parties discussed during the first recess meeting was the composition of the cash and notes portion of the $95 million of consideration that Northwest would pay for the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Hanson) 508-09; (Burgess) 859).
99. Northwest agreed to put a $10 million cap on the notes portion of the consideration and provide Midway with a minimum of $10 million in cash. (Tr. (Hanson) 508-09; (Burgess) 859; (Steenland) 3814).
100. Northwest also agreed that First Boston and Northwest’s investment banker would fix the terms of the notes so that the actual value equalled their face value. (Tr. (Hanson) 508-09; (Burgess) 859-60; (Steen-land) 3814).
101. The parties also discussed Midway’s ATL. Northwest’s proposal provided that Northwest would satisfy Midway’s ATL either by flying the customers holding Midway tickets on Northwest flights or by making refunds to those customers. (Tr. (Steenland) 4171).
102. During the first recess, Burgess also questioned Northwest about the due diligence and board approval conditions mentioned by Parkins during the first court session. (Tr. (Burgess) 862; Schick Dep. 40; Parkins Dep. 160).
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103. Burgess asked Cronin whether he viewed due diligence as an “out” or “walk right” or whether he viewed it as an “identification and verification issue.” (Tr. (Burgess) 863).
104. Cronin declined to eliminate or limit the scope of Northwest’s due diligence. (Tr. (Cronin) 2104-05, 2107, 2112; (Steenland) 3816-18; (Burgess) 1020-21; Jenkins Dep. 208-09; Parkins Dep. 160-61; Steenland Dep. 113-14, 324, 326).
105. Burgess then asked Northwest’s representatives about board approval. (Tr. (Hanson) 499; (Burgess) 869).
106. Cronin’s response to Burgess’ question was that he did not think that board approval would be a problem. (Tr. (Hinson) 130-31; (Hanson) 498-99, 528, 631; (Burgess) 870, 999; (Cronin) 2297-98; Schick Dep. 36-39; Parkins Dep. 158; Jenkins Dep. 146).
107. Cronin had not attended the October 7 Northwest Board meeting, he had no firsthand knowledge of the positions taken by the Northwest directors with respect to the Midway acquisition, and he had not seen any resolution — either proposed or adopted by Northwest’s Board — with respect to an acquisition of Midway. (Tr. (Cronin) 2299-2300).
108. Steenland, who was aware of KLM’s position on the Midway acquisition, did not offer anything or add to Cronin’s response. (Tr. (Burgess) 873).
109. At the first recess, no Northwest representative indicated any disagreement with Cronin’s statement.
110. Northwest did not withdraw, modify, or waive any of its conditions during the first recess, or at any other time on October 8. (Tr. (Steenland) 3836, 3828, 3896-97; (Alt-schul) 3592; Parkins Dep. 159-60). Neither Cronin nor Steenland had any authority to do so. (Tr. (Steenland) 3818, 3836-37, 3895-97; (Cronin) 2117, 2112-13, 2107, 2123-24).
111. After the first recess meeting with Northwest, Midway’s representatives met with Southwest’s representatives. (Tr. (Hanson) 514-15; (Burgess) 880).
112. At the recess meeting with Southwest, Midway questioned Southwest’s representatives about the elements of the Southwest offer. (Tr. (Burgess) 881).
113. At the conclusion of these first recess meetings with Northwest and Southwest, Midway’s representatives met privately to assess the situation and determine which offer Midway favored. (Tr. (Hanson) 519).
114. Based on the statements of the participants to this point of the October 8 hearing, Midway’s representatives decided that Northwest’s offer was still preferable to Southwest’s offer (Tr. (Hanson) 519).
115. Midway opened the second session of the October 8 hearing with an offer of proof as to Midway’s precarious financial condition and its need for the Court to promptly approve Midway’s acceptance of the superior offer in order to avoid a shutdown. (PX 13, pp. 31-35).
116. Hanson then summarized both Northwest’s and Southwest’s offers for the record. (PX 13, pp. 37-43).
117. In summarizing Northwest’s offer, Hanson initially requested “Northwest to correct me if I’m wrong on any of these statements.” (PX 13, p. 40).
118. Reiterating his understanding of Northwest’s position following the recess meeting, Hanson stated that the Back-End offer was subject to conditions:
Very important to us on that as well, Judge, is the Northwest statement that
subject to reaching agreement on documentation, board approval,
which we understand they don’t expect to be a problem, they are ready to ... move ahead.
(PX 13, p. 42, emphasis supplied). Northwest’s representatives agreed with this representation: the Back-End offer was subject to these conditions, as they had stated, and they did not expect that obtaining the approval of Northwest’s Board or reaching agreement on documentation would be a problem. (Tr. (Steenland) 3830-31; (Cronin) 2114-15).
119. In the first portion of his remarks, Hanson indicated that Northwest was willing to close the asset purchase agreement for the
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Gate Sale as drafted and previously submitted to the Court, and that Northwest was now also willing to assume Midway’s $4.7 million City of Chicago lease arrearages in the Back-End transaction. (PX 13, pp. 38-39).
120. Hanson advised the Court that, because Midway was losing $2 million per week, the value of the Northwest offer depended upon how quickly the Back-End transaction closed. (PX 13, pp. 39-40).
121. In this regard, Hanson advised the Court that while the draft asset purchase agreement gave Northwest 60 days to reach final agreement on the Back-End transaction:
They have told us today and they have told us in court that they are ready to move much more quickly. I think I can safely say that we believe that the — and I’d ask Northwest to correct me if I’m wrong on any of these statements — the transaction can safely close and be concluded in three to four weeks at the outside for [the Back-End transaction].
(PX 13, p. 40).
122. Hanson then set forth the following points with regard to Northwest’s offer:
a.
Due Diligence:
“What we need to do is verify the assets to their satisfaction as stated on the balance sheet....” (PX 13, p. 40);
b.
Board Approval:
“Very important to [Midway] ... is the Northwest statement that subject to reaching agreement on documentation, board approval, which we understand they don’t expect to be a problem ... they’re ready to move ahead.” (PX 13, p. 42);
c.
Satisfaction of Conditions:
“The Southwest offer also has some conditions attached to it including board approval, arrangements with the City, environmental due diligence, two of which have already been satisfied by Northwest.” (PX 13, p. 42);
d.
Other Conditions:
“We have passed the hurdle of the two big conditions, which have been the City of Chicago and Continental Bank.” (PX 13, p. 40);
Non-Fidelcor Leases:
In valuing Northwest’s offer, Midway did not credit Northwest’s promise to negotiate the assumption of the non-Fidelcor leases, but did note that such assumption might eliminate $7-8 million of post-petition arrearages. (PX 13, p. 41); e.
f.
Amount of Administrative Claims:
Northwest’s offer would leave the estates with $50 to 58 million in administrative claims. (PX 13, p. 41; PX 676/DX 96 at L2370).
123. Hanson went on to describe Southwest’s offer and the reasons why Midway concluded that Northwest’s offer was superi- or to the Southwest offer. (PX 13, pp. 42-43).
124. Even though Steenland admitted that he was puzzled by Hanson’s statement that two of the three conditions in Southwest’s offer had already been satisfied by Northwest, Steenland never asked Parkins to clarify Hanson’s statements. (Tr. (Steen-land) 4149, 4153).
125. Costello followed Hanson’s presentation with an offer of proof relating to the Gate Sale transaction. (PX 13, pp. 44-47).
126. The Court then stated that it wanted “a statement on the record right now from the representatives of the offerors whether the statements they made before the last recess have changed in any way as to the terms of what their respective bidders are offering.” (PX 13, p. 49).
127. In response to the Court’s directive, Parkins stated that “Hanson eloquently went through the [Northwest] proposal, and he accurately stated the Northwest proposal, which I think restated what I said earlier in court.” (PX 13, p. 49).
128. Parkins reiterated that Northwest was willing to assume the $4.7 million City of Chicago lease arrearage. (PX 13, p. 49).
129. Parkins told the Court that Northwest had chosen a date for Midway to close and that Northwest had additionally agreed to fund Midway’s operating losses if Midway “[hadn’t] finished the documents....” (PX 13, pp. 49-50).
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130. Despite the Court’s request for a statement of any changes to the offer made by Northwest before the recess, Parkins never withdrew, limited, or modified in any way the board approval, definitive documentation, or due diligence conditions which Northwest and Midway had previously stated on the record. (PX 13).
131. Midway understood that Northwest’s Back-End offer was conditioned upon due diligence, board approval, and the execution of definitive documentation. (Jenkins Dep. 41-42; DX 9/PX 671 at FB80; Tr. (Altschul) 3589-90; DX 12; DX 251). No one from Midway ever said on the record that due diligence, board approval, or definitive documentation were not conditions of Northwest’s Back-End offer as Midway understood it, or that those conditions had been withdrawn, limited, modified, or satisfied by Northwest. (PX 13).
132. Southwest then presented its response to the Court. (PX 13, pp. 50-52). Contrasting its offer with Northwest’s, Southwest advised that its offer did not have conditions and that its offer was not subject to board approval. (PX 13, p. 52).
133. Heroy stated that Southwest was improving its offer by: (1) increasing from $35 million to $40 million the amount of Midway’s ATL that Southwest would assume; (2) assuming Midway’s ATL amount on a confirmed rather than a standby basis; and (3) assuming the $4.7 million City of Chicago lease arrearage. (PX 13, pp. 50-51).
134. Heroy then turned to the “aspects of our offer that were described by ... Hanson, we think a bit erroneously....” and made the following clarifications:
a.
Due Diligence:
the Southwest offer was not contingent on due diligence or approval of the City of Chicago;
b.
Environmental Due Diligence:
the Southwest offer was not contingent upon environmental due diligence; and
c.
Board Approval:
“board approval is not a condition of any part of our offer.”
(PX 13, pp. 51-52).
135. On the board approval issue, Heroy emphasized that “as may have been suggested, and as was contained in the documents [DX 94/PX 678], it [board approval] no longer is a condition of the asset purchase itself. In other words, the assets that we’re purchasing ... are essentially without contingencies, except for, of course, the existence of the assets.” (PX 13, p. 52).
136. In Hanson’s opinion, with these changes and clarifications, Southwest put its offer on par with Northwest’s offer. (Tr. (Hanson) 533).
137. After a short recess (PX 13, p. 54), Midway called Jenkins of First Boston to testify as Midway’s valuation expert in support of its decision to recommend Northwest’s proposal. (PX 13, pp. 55-57; Jenkins Dep. 72, 14(M1).
138. Jenkins testified that Northwest’s proposal was superior to Southwest’s because it provided $125 million in value to the estate, while the Southwest offer provided only $114 million. (PX 13, p. 55; Jenkins Dep. 181, 154-56). Moreover, as Jenkins testified, the $114 million valuation of the Southwest offer overstated its real value because it gave full credit to Southwest’s offer to assume up to $40 million of Midway’s ATL, even though Midway fully expected that it would retain much of that liability due to the fact that Southwest’s limited service would be unattractive to persons who had bought Midway tickets. (PX 13, pp. 55-56, 42-43, 64-65; DX 98/PX 677, p. 3; Tr. (Burgess) 882, 992-94; (Hanson) 570, 651-52).
139. In addition to viewing the Northwest proposal as financially superior, Midway also believed that the Northwest proposal was superior because Northwest said it would hire substantially all of Midway’s operating employees if the transaction closed, while Southwest agreed only to provide preferential interviews. (PX 13, pp. 39, 57; DX 98/PX 677, p. 3).
140. Schick then took the stand. He testified that the two competing offers were “equal in nature,” but that Midway preferred the Northwest offer because of Northwest’s commitment to retain Midway’s employees. (PX 13, pp. 58-59).
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141. Based on the record before it, the Court determined that Northwest’s proposal was in the better interest of the Midway estate than the Southwest proposal. The Court expressly based its decision on what occurred on the record, stating that it relied on “the modified Northwest offer as
represented in open court today
” (PX 13, p. 75); “the transaction
as modified and restated today on the record
” (PX 13, p. 75); and the offer stated
“on the record
by counsel for Northwest” (PX 13, p. 76, emphasis supplied). The Court also observed that “everything has been done in open court....” (PX 13, p. 76).
142. In its oral findings, the Court expressly found that Northwest and Southwest were proceeding in good faith: “There’s no question in my mind that both parties who made offers, Mr. Heroy’s client [Southwest] and Mr. Parkins’ client [Northwest], were in good faith.... So there’s no question in my mind that the [11 U.S.C. §] 363(m) good faith has been complied with here.” (PX 13, pp. 75-76).
143. This Court entered its Order and Judgment (the “Order”) on October 8, 1991. (DX 244). The Order authorized the sale of Midway’s leasehold interest in Midway’s gates to Northwest, the entry by Midway into a one-year sublease for its gates, and the entry by Midway into a one-year exclusive option with Northwest for the repurchase of its gates. (DX 244). The Order, however, is silent regarding the Back-End transaction. Nothing in the Order, which had been approved by Midway’s counsel before submission to the Court, states or suggests that the parties had entered into a binding agreement on the Back-End transaction, or that the Court had approved such a transaction.
144. The Court also entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the “Findings”). (DX 243). The Findings do not include any statement that the parties had entered into a binding agreement on the Back-End transaction. To the contrary, the Court found only that the parties had agreed to negotiate for the Back-End transaction:
In addition, upon approval of the Letter [of Intent] and Definitive Agreements, Northwest has agreed to enter into good faith negotiations for the acquisition by Northwest of all or substantially all of Debtors’ assets and to use its best efforts to conclude such an agreement within 60 days. Finally, while these negotiations proceed,
the Northwest Transaction will allow the Debtors to operate in the normal course through Northwest’s leaseback of the Midway Leasehold and Assets to the Debtors and by providing the Debtors an exclusive purchase option on those assets for a one year period.
(DX 243, p. 5, emphasis supplied).
145. Midway informed Northwest that its liquidity crisis was so severe that if the sale of Midway’s gates did not close by Friday, October 11, Midway would have to shut down its operations that weekend. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3851, 3820; Hibbs Dep. 123, 132). Accordingly, Northwest had a team of lawyers in Chicago from October 9 through October 11, working with Midway’s counsel on the myriad of activities necessary to close the Gate Sale, including finalizing the definitive agreement for that transaction and the exhibits to it, and working out agreements with Continental Bank. (Tr. (Burgess) 1013, 1045; Hibbs Dep. 85, 123, 132-33, 139-141, 150; Tr. (Steenland) 3851-55; Jenkins Dep. 60; PX 408 (10/9-10/11 entries); DX 85 (10/9-10/11 entries)). During this week in Chicago, there was no discussion of the terms of the Back-End transaction. (Jenkins Dep. 60; Hibbs Dep. 88, 249; Tr. (Hen-neman) 4392).
146. Section 5.7 of the draft definitive agreement for the Gate Sale approved by the Court on October 8 (PX 612) contained the parties’ agreement, referred to in the Findings, to negotiate in good faith for Midway’s remaining assets. Between October 9 and October 11, the parties negotiated certain revisions to that section as it existed on October 7 to reflect the events of October 8. (Tr. (Steenland) 3860-62; (Henneman) 4290-92; (Burgess) 1099; Hibbs Dep. 125-29). The parties amended Section 5.7 to include a reference to a “definitive agreement” to reflect that the Back-End transaction was subject to the execution of definitive documentation. (Hibbs Dep. 128-29; Tr. (Steenland) 3860). The parties further amended Section
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5.7 to clarify that Northwest’s October 8 proposal was to negotiate for “all” of Midway’s assets, but to assume only “certain” of Midway’s liabilities. (Tr. (Steenland) 3860-62; (Henneman) 4292-93). Finally, the parties agreed to insert language to the effect that the subsequent negotiations were to be “consistent with representations of Buyer and Seller made to the Bankruptcy Court on October 8.” This language was added because the parties did not have a written letter of intent or draft agreement for the Back-End transaction, and they wanted to make sure there was a reference point for their negotiations to avoid subsequent attempts at re-negotiation. (Tr. (Steenland) 3862-64; (Burgess) 890-91; Hibbs Dep. 126). After these negotiations, Section 5.7 of the executed Gate Sale Agreement provided:
After the Closing Date Buyer [Northwest] and Seller [Midway] will enter into good faith negotiation of a definitive agreement for the acquisition by Buyer of all of Seller’s assets and the assumption of certain of Seller’s liabilities by Buyer, consistent with representations of Buyer and Seller made to the Bankruptcy Court on October 8, 1991. Buyer and Seller agree to use their best efforts to execute such definitive agreement and close such acquisition within thirty (30) days of the date hereof.
(PX 19, ¶ 5.7).
147. On the morning of Friday, October 11, Northwest and Midway executed the Gate Sale Agreement and closed the sale of the Midway gates. (PX 19; Tr. (Henneman) 4293; (Steenland) 3872; (Burgess) 1014). There is nothing in the executed Gate Sale Agreement which states or suggests that the parties had entered into a binding agreement for the sale of Midway’s non-gate assets on October 8, or that Northwest’s conditions to its Back-End offer had been withdrawn or satisfied. (PX 19).
148. In connection with the Gate Sale closing, Northwest and Midway also executed an Option Agreement (DX 433G), which gave Midway the right to re-purchase the gates from Northwest. (Tr. (Burgess) 971-72; (Steenland) 3865; (Cronin) 2131-32, 2324). They also executed a Consent and Forbearance Agreement with Continental Bank. (DX 304).
149. On October 8, following the hearing, Northwest announced its acquisition of Midway through a press release headlined “Northwest Airlines Reaches Agreement to Purchase Midway Airlines for $174.7 Million.” (PX 55) (hereinafter the “October 8 press release”).
150. After the October 8 hearing concluded, Northwest’s representatives assembled in a conference room at the offices of Mayer, Brown & Platt, where, among other things, they saw a copy of the October 8 press release. (Tr. (Steenland) 3849).
151. Steenland reviewed the October 8 press release and concluded that it was inaccurate and “not suitable for issuance.” (Tr. (Steenland) 3849-50, 4174).
152. Mark Abels (Northwest’s Vice President of Corporate Communications), who had attended the October 8 hearing, directed the preparation of the October 8 press release. (Tr. (Steenland) 3849; Abels Dep. 5, 71).
153. Although Steenland knew that the October 8 press release had been issued, Steenland did not raise with Abels the possibility of Northwest issuing a correction. “Once [the press release] was out the door I had a lot more important things in my mind to spend my time on than tracking down this press release.” (Tr. (Steenland) 4174-75, 4179).
154. Franeht gave Cronin a copy of the October 8 press release soon after the hearing. (Tr. (Cronin) 2127-28).
155. Cronin reviewed the October 8 press release and concluded that “[i]t misstated what had actually happened, what had been agreed to and the terms and conditions of Northwest’s proposal.” (Tr. (Cronin) 2128).
156. Cronin told Franeht “that we couldn’t release it [the October 8 press release] because it didn’t reflect the transaction. ...” (Tr. (Cronin) 2128).
157. Although Cronin realized that an erroneous press release had gone out, he did not order, then or at any time, that a correction be issued. (Tr. (Cronin) 2329).
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■ 158. Northwest circulated a copy of the October 8 press release to its Executive Management Team (“EMT”) on October 8. (Clouser Dep. 54; PX 15).
159. Sometime after the October 8 hearing, Richard B. Hirst (Northwest’s Senior Vice President and General Counsel) and a member of its EMT, told Clouser (Northwest’s Senior Vice President of Corporate Communications and Advertising) that the October 8 press release misstated the October 8 agreement. (Tr. (Steenland) 8783-84; Clouser Dep. 48-51, 56-57).
160. Parkins testified that he reviewed the October 8 press release and concluded that it was incorrect because it overstated the purchase price and did not include the conditions stated in the hearing. (Parkins Dep. 115-24).
161. Parkins told Steenland or Richard Anderson (Northwest’s Vice President and Deputy General Counsel) that the October 8 press release did not include the conditions stated at the hearing, misstated the purchase price, and misused the term “agreement.” (Tr. (Cronin) 2063; Parkins Dep. 116-17, 119-21).
162. Hibbs likewise testified that he believed that the October 8 press release had “some inaccuracies,” including the $174.7 million purchase price and where, in the first paragraph of the release, “it just says accept the offer to purchase.” (Hibbs Dep. 113-14).
163. Hibbs discussed the October 8 press release with Steenland. (Hibbs Dep. 116-17).
164. Clouser saw the October 8 press release after it was issued and concluded that it was inaccurate. (Clouser Dep. 48).
165. Clouser directed Abels to issue a corrected press release and to ensure that he was working with Steenland in that regard. (Clouser Dep. 49-51).
166. Northwest never issued a correction to the October 8 press release. (Clouser Dep. 51).
167. At no time between the October 8 hearing and the closing of the Gate Sale transaction on October 11 did Steenland, Hibbs, or any other Northwest representative tell Midway that Northwest’s October 8 press release was inaccurate. (Tr. (Burgess) 1260; (Henneman) 4354-55).
168. Northwest commenced its due diligence investigation and review of Midway’s operations immediately after the October 8 hearing. (Tr. (Steenland) 3874r-75, 3877-80; (Fornaro) 3026-29; (Garel) 3490-96; DX 523). Midway was aware that Northwest was conducting a due diligence review of Midway after October 8, and cooperated in that process.
(E.g.,
DX 432, DX 431; PX 601-1, PX 632; Tr. (Steenland) 3878-80, 3882; (Hinson) 249; Schick Dep. 210-11, 213-14).
169. The due diligence review of Midway’s operations, which Northwest undertook after October 8, revealed two problems. First, Northwest learned that Midway’s 1990 United States Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) data that was on file was inaccurate. After the acquisition was analyzed on the basis of Midway’s internal Passenger Origin-Destination data (“O & D data”), rather than the data Midway had filed with the DOT, the economics of the proposed acquisition of Midway changed. Second, Northwest’s environmental due diligence revealed the risk of liability relating to possible subsurface contamination problems at Midway Airport.
170. After learning of the inaccuracies in Midway’s DOT data, Northwest ran new revenue projections, substituting Midway’s internal O & D data for the DOT data that Northwest had previously relied upon. The results from using the internal data showed a highly material, negative impact on the economics of the proposed acquisition, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
171. Quantitatively, Northwest discovered that the substitution of Midway’s internal financial information for Midway’s DOT data resulted in a revenue shortfall of more than $35 million per year in Northwest’s financial analysis, which would increase in each succeeding year of the forecast. Midway itself conceded this $35 million discrepancy between its internal data and its DOT data. (Tr. (Morris) 2466, 2876; DX 36 at ML1252; Tr. (Phillips) 2930). The ten-year impact of
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the $35 million per year discrepancy exceeded $435 million, with a net present value of over $220 million. (DX 521).
172. On'October 11, Northwest formally retained an independent environmental consultant to conduct a Phase I environmental due diligence review at Midway Airport in connection with the Back-End transaction. (PX 182). The due diligence review resulted in reports identifying several environmental concerns, primarily a “moderate to high potential for a significant subsurface contamination problem,” at the property near Midway’s hangars. (DX 436 at ENSR543; DX 226 at ENSR427).
173. While the due diligence and integration projects were proceeding, the parties prepared for the upcoming negotiations for the Back-End transaction contemplated by Section 5.7 of the Gate Sale Agreement. On October 16, Jenkins of First Boston drafted a memorandum and term sheet, which he sent to Midway’s top management and outside counsel. (DX 12, DX 246). All of the recipients of the memorandum were present at the October 8 hearing. (Tr. (Burgess) 1030-31). The memorandum stated:
Please find attached a working draft of the summary terms for the proposed Northwest transaction for the acquisition of substantially all of the assets of Midway. Since the first phase of the Northwest transaction closed on Friday, October 11,1 think it would be beneficial to reach a mutual consensus, within the Midway reorganization working group, as to the proposed terms for the overall Northwest transaction before the negotiating process begins for the second phase of the transaction. I would appreciate if you would pass along any comments or suggested changes you may have to this term sheet to either Randy Hazelton ... Tom Groves ... or me....
(DX 12, DX 246).
174. Attached to Jenkins’ October 16 memorandum was a term sheet, entitled “Summary Terms of the Transaction,” which stated that it was “[bjased on NWA offer presented on Tuesday, October 8, 1991 in bankruptcy court and discussions between parties during the proceedings.” (DX 12 at FB33 n. 1). As this statement reflects, the term sheet set forth First Boston’s understanding of the Back-End transaction developed from statements made both on-the-record and off-the-record on October 8. The term sheet listed three separate “Closing Conditions”:
a. Final due diligence
b. Negotiations and documentation
c. Approval by NWA [Northwest] Board of Directors
(DX 12, DX 246). Jenkins testified that he included the closing conditions in the term sheet because the. conditions were part of Northwest’s offer as stated on October 8. (Jenkins Dep. 49-50). Even though Jenkins requested feedback, no one ever contacted Jenkins and said that anything in the term sheet was wrong. (Jenkins Dep. 64; Koe-neke Dep. 87-88).
175. Between October 11 and October 21, Northwest’s outside law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, was preparing a draft of the definitive agreement required for the Back-End transaction. (Hibbs Dep. 253; Tr. (Steen-land) 3887; PX 408 (10/14-10/21 entries)). On Monday, October 21, six business days after the Gate Sale was closed, Northwest faxed a comprehensive 44-page first draft to Midway’s counsel. (DX 248; PX 43; Tr. (Steenland) 3889; Hibbs Dep. 252-53). Article 6 of Northwest’s October 21 draft, entitled “Conditions to Obligations of Buyer,” listed Northwest’s closing conditions, including board approval and due diligence “reasonably satisfactory to Buyer [Northwest].” (PX 43, pp. 33-35).
176. On October 22, three of Midway’s attorneys called Steenland to complain about Northwest’s October 21 draft. (Tr. (Hanson) 551-53; (Burgess) 1040, 1049-50, 896; (Steenland) 3897-98; DX 100). This conversation lasted approximately one to one-and-a-half hours. (DX 86 (10/22 entry); Tr. (Hanson) 1052-53, 575; (Steenland) 3897). In this conversation, Midway’s counsel made demands for terms that had never been discussed at the October 8 hearing. One such demand was that Northwest assume the cost of curing liens on Midway’s assets and defaults on its executory contracts as a condi
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tion to Northwest receiving those assets and contracts. As Hanson acknowledged, Northwest had never agreed to assume this liability, which had never before been proposed by Midway or even discussed. (Tr. (Hanson) 1328, 1342-44; (Steenland) 3897-3910; (Burgess) 1106-07). Steenland responded that Midway was trying to increase Northwest’s purchase price. (Tr. (Steenland) 3906). When Steenland did not acquiesce in their demands for new terms, the Midway lawyers threatened litigation. (Tr. (Steenland) 3909; (Hanson) 1342, 555; (Burgess) 1073-74).
177. On October 24, Midway’s in-house counsel, Michael Osajda, prepared a term sheet for internal Midway use. (DX 251; Tr. (Henneman) 4304-05; Schick Dep. 186). Osajda had been present at the October 8 hearing. (Tr. (Hinson) 129, 243). Like First Boston’s October 16 term sheet (DX 12), the October 24 Midway term sheet listed the following “closing conditions” for the Back-End transaction:
a. NWAL [Northwest] board approval
b. due diligence
c. negotiations with creditors
d. documentation
The October 24 term sheet also listed 13 “open issues,” and noted that this list of “open issues” was not complete. (DX 251).
178. The Midway team held a five-hour meeting to discuss its upcoming negotiating strategy on October 23, and held another four-hour meeting for the same purpose on October 25. (DX 86 (10/23, 10/25 entries); DX 419, App. C, p. 1 (10/25 entries); Tr. (Burgess) 1083-84; (Hanson) 1355-56; (Hen-neman) 4302-04; Jenkins Dep. 188-89). Osajda’s October 24 term sheet (DX 251) was distributed to the participants at the October 25 meeting. (Tr. (Henneman) 4303-04).
179. After its October 25 strategy meeting, Midway sent Northwest a letter setting forth Midway’s view of the terms of the proposed Back-End transaction (PX 44B), a term sheet (PX 44C), and a mark-up of Northwest’s October 21 draft agreement (PX 44A/DX 101). The packet was the collective effort of the Midway team. (Tr. (Burgess) 1084; (Henneman) 4306). In preparing these materials, Midway understood that agreement on definitive documentation was a condition to the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Burgess) 1290, 1262-63).
180. In its October 25 cover letter, Midway observed that “there are significant business terms that remain unresolved....” (PX 44B, p. 1). The letter also stated that the enclosed term sheet (PX 44C) detailed what Midway considered to be “certain essential” business terms for the deal. (PX 44B, p. 1) The letter acknowledged that Midway was requiring business terms which it had not raised on October 8, describing them as “natural extensions of the structure and intent of this transaction.” (PX 44B, p. 1; Tr. (Burgess) 1087-88).
181. Midway’s mark-up of Northwest’s October 21 draft (PX 44A) also reflected the major disagreements between the parties. The mark-up deleted large sections of the text and changed certain business terms. One of the sections that Midway did not propose to delete or change in its mark-up was Section 6.9 of the Northwest draft — the section that set forth due diligence “reasonably satisfactory to Buyer [Northwest]” as a condition to Northwest’s obligation to close. (Tr. (Burgess) 1043^14; PX 44A, p. 35).
182. Steenland and Northwest’s outside counsel spent the weekend of October 26 and 27 preparing a response to Midway’s October 25 term sheet. (Tr. (Steenland) 3917-18; (Cronin) 2155-56; PX 408 (10/26-10/28 entries)).
183. On October 28, Northwest faxed its response to Midway’s term sheet. (PX 45). Northwest’s cover letter stated that the October 25 term sheet was “unacceptable” and did “not reflect the terms of Northwest’s offer for all of Midway’s assets presented to and accepted by Midway and [the] Bankruptcy Court on October 8, 1991.” (PX 45 at ML14291). The letter contained a point-by-point response to the various terms in Midway’s term sheet that were “in direct conflict with several fundamental provisions of Northwest’s offer that were clearly articulated to Midway and reflected in the transcript of the October 8, 1991 Bankruptcy Court hearing.” (PX 45 at ML14291; Tr. (Steen-land) 3920-28). In summarizing its position, Northwest stated that it was “prepared to
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negotiate and enter into definitive agreements based on the terms and conditions of Northwest’s October 8, 1991 offer,” but was “unwilling to modify or renegotiate [its] offer.” (PX 45 at ML14291; Tr. (Steenland) 3918-20). Northwest also enclosed a redraft of Midway’s October 25 term sheet “to make it consistent with Northwest’s offer.” (PX 45). Northwest’s letter suggested that the parties meet in Chicago on Wednesday, October 30, to attempt to resolve their differences and negotiate definitive agreements. (PX 45 at.ML14293).
184. On October 29, Midway’s counsel prepared a comparison of the key differences between Midway’s position, as reflected in its October 25 term sheet, and Northwest’s position, as reflected in its October 28 re-draft of Midway’s term sheet. (DX 186; Tr. (Henne-man) 4322-23; (Burgess) 1132-33). Midway’s comparison shows that the parties disagreed about virtually every business issue material to the proposed transaction. All of the key participants agreed that these disagreements involved millions of dollars of economic value. (Tr. (Burgess) 1133; (Hen-neman) 4323; (Cronin) 2149; (Steenland) 3916).
185. On October 30, representatives of Midway, Northwest, and the Creditors Committee met in Chicago to discuss their many disputes over the terms of the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Steenland) 3937-39; (Cronin) 2165-66; Parkins Dep. 50-51). As Schick testified, “it was obvious that both sides were not close to resolving the is-sues_” (Schick Dep. 69). Schick also noted that “we were so many miles apart on so many different things_” (Tr. (Burgess) 907).
186. By the end of the day on October 30, few issues had been resolved. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3948). The open issues included, among others:
• which party would bear the cost of curing liens on Midway’s assets and the arrearages on Midway’s executory contracts (Tr. (Henneman) 4329-30, 4334; (Cronin) 2181-82, 2194; DX 252; Tr. (Burgess) 1145), which Midway estimated to be in the $12-20 million range. (Tr. (Steenland) -4208, 3952; (Cronin) 2180-81; (Burgess) 1145);
• whether Northwest was required to provide an additional $30 million in value to Midway in connection with its October 8 offer to negotiate with the lessors of Midway’s non-Fidelcor aircraft. (Tr. (Steenland) 3954-55; (Cronin) 2184);
• whether Northwest was required to cover Midway’s operating losses commencing November 8. (Tr. (Steenland) 3959; (Henneman) 4333; Hibbs Dep. 309; Tr. (Cronin) 2189; (Burgess) 1152; DX 252 (Burgess));
• the amount of ATL deposits to which Northwest was entitled. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3949-50; (Cronin) 2178; (Henne-man) 4328; (Burgess) 1147);
• which party was responsible for Midway’s excise tax liability. (Tr. (Burgess) 1146; (Henneman) 4330; (Cronin) 2185); and
• which party would bear any WARN Act liability to Midway employees and indemnify the other party. (Tr. (Cronin) 2185; (Steenland) 3956; (Henneman) 4330; (Burgess) 1147-48).
187. At the October 30 negotiating meeting, Burgess stated that Midway could not convey its assets and contracts to Northwest free and clear of liens and claims. (Tr. (Cronin) 2181; (Burgess) 1144). After the meeting, Cronin and Koeneke, an investment banker from First Boston, discussed the estimated $12-20 million cost of curing Midway’s liens and defaults. Koeneke confirmed Burgess’ statement that there was not much Midway could do financially to resolve this problem. (Tr. (Cronin) 2181, 2192-93).
188. The negotiations resumed in Chicago on October 31. (Tr. (Burgess) 918; Hibbs Dep. 320-21; Tr. (Steenland) 3964). Steen-land began the meeting by stating that Northwest would stand behind the terms of its October 8 offer, but would not renegotiate the transaction or pay more than $95 million in value, as he believed Midway was asking Northwest to do. (Tr. (Burgess) 1162-63, 919-20; DX 254 (Burgess) at L6; Tr. (Steen-land) 3964-65; (Altschul) 3598; DX 306 (Alt-schul); Tr. (Henneman) 4335-36; DX 253 at L1923 (Henneman); Hibbs Dep. 199; PX 87
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(Hibbs) at DW5533). Steenland then re-stated the terms of Northwest’s $95 million October 8 proposal.
Id.
In addition, he offered a number of compromises, including a $3 million credit to Midway to resolve the parties’ dispute over the funding of Midway’s operating losses. (DX 253 at L1923; Tr. (Steen-land) 3965-67; DX 254 at L6; DX 306; Tr. (Burgess) 1163-64, 920-21; (Henneman) 4337, 4401). After this presentation, the parties resumed their negotiations, discussing their positions on several of the disputed issues. (Tr. (Henneman) 4339; (Steenland) 3969).
189. By the end of the October 31 meeting, there were still many unresolved issues, including responsibility for the cost of removing liens on Midway’s assets and curing defaults on Midway’s contracts, the funding of Midway’s operating losses as of November 8, and the WARN Act liability. (Tr. (Steen-land) 3971-73,4209-10; (Altschul) 3599-3600, 3612; Koeneke Dep. 105; Tr. (Burgess) 1169-71; (Henneman) 4340; Hibbs Dep. 309). Steenland made clear that Northwest’s October 31 proposal was as far as Northwest was prepared to go, and that it would not make additional economic concessions. (Tr. (Steenland) 3969, 3973, 4278-79). Midway did not agree with Northwest’s proposal, and no one present at the meeting said that the parties had a deal. (Tr. (Steenland) 3972-73; (Altschul) 3600; (Henneman) 4340).
190. At the conclusion of the October 31 meeting, Midway agreed to provide Northwest with an accurate list of assets. (Hibbs Dep. 323). Midway asked Northwest to submit new documentation memorializing its position on the terms for the Back-End transaction, along with a list of which of its assets Northwest would require in the transaction, so that Midway could consider the value of the Northwest offer as a whole — as Schick put it, determine “the nut” — and then decide whether it was able to, and whether it wanted to, complete the transaction with Northwest. (Tr. (Henneman) 4340, 4342; (Steen-land) 3969-70, 3973-74; (Burgess) 1171-72, 1177, 924; Hibbs Dep. 205; PX 87 at DW5537). Northwest agreed to provide this information as Northwest’s “final and absolutely best offer” for Midway’s acceptance or rejection. (Tr. (Steenland) 3973-74). Midway gave Northwest no assurances that it would agree to the terms Northwest discussed at the meeting.
Id.
191. The Northwest Board of Directors held its regular quarterly meeting on November 5. (Tr. (Steenland) 3977-79; PX 29, PX 50). In anticipation of that meeting, Dasburg sent the board members a short memorandum summarizing the status of the Midway transaction. (PX 28).
192. The proposed Midway acquisition was one of many items on the Board’s agenda, and was discussed extensively. (PX 50, PX 29, p. 6; Tr. (Steenland) 3980-81). Among the topics considered were Midway’s DOT data discrepancy and the resulting $35 million annual revenue shortfall in Northwest’s analysis; the risk of potentially significant environmental liabilities at Midway Airport discovered during Northwest’s environmental due diligence; and the unresolved business terms, particularly the dispute over liens and cure costs. (Tr. (Steenland) 3981-85, 4277; Dasburg Dep. 236-37, 247, 145-49, 168-69; Bouw Dep. 56-58; Tr. (Fornaro) 3056).
193. The focal point of the Board’s discussion was the material change to the economies of the proposed Midway transaction resulting from a substitution of Midway’s internal traffic and revenue data for Midway’s DOT data. (Dasburg Dep. 143-44, 146-49; Tr. (Steenland) 3981-82; Bouw Dep. 56-57; Aziz Dep. 99-100; Tr. (Fornaro) 3056; Francht Dep. 184-86; PX 29, p. 6). As reflected in PX 28 (the November 5 analysis that substituted Midway’s internal revenue information for the DOT data), the expected direct benefits to Northwest from the Midway acquisition were now zero or negative. (Tr. (Thayer) 4735-36; (Fornaro) 3045-46, 3050; (Garel) 3505-08; (Steenland) 3982; Dasburg Dep. 143-44). Nonetheless, management did not make a recommendation at that meeting as to how to proceed because it had not finalized its analysis. (Tr. (Forna-ro) 3056).
194. At the end of its discussion, the Board took no formal action. It “directed management to report back to the Board on further developments and for the approvals
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necessary to consummate the transaction.” (PX 29, p. 6; Aziz Dep. 105).
195. On the evening of November 6, Das-burg called Hinson to discuss the problems with the transaction. (Tr. (Hinson) 158-59; Dasburg Dep. 165-66; Tr. (Steenland) 4023-24). Dasburg told Hinson about the November 5 meeting of the Northwest Board. Das-burg stated that there were three principal obstacles to the Back-End transaction that would have to be resolved if the deal were to go forward: (1) the major revenue shortfall to Northwest resulting from its reliance on Midway’s DOT data; (2) the potential environmental problems; and (3) the costs of curing liens and arrearages. Hinson asked Dasburg for a day or two to consider Northwest’s position. (Dasburg Dep. 165-66; Tr. (Steenland) 4023-24; DX 113/PX 635; DX 114/PX 640 at ML14382).
196. On November 7, Northwest wrote to Midway in response to Midway’s October 31 request for Northwest’s written position as well as a list of assets and to follow up on Dasburg’s November 6 and 7 conversations with Hinson and Schick. (PX 47; Tr. (Steen-land) 4023, 4279; Schick Dep. 148). In its November 7 cover letter, Northwest discussed the $35 million per year shortfall caused by the DOT data discrepancy, the environmental due diligence issues raised by Cronin at the October 30 negotiating meeting, and the open issues relating to the cure costs. (PX 47).
197. In a final attempt to resolve the dispute over business terms, Northwest included several financial concessions in its November 7 term sheet, including an offer to pay more than the $95 million in total value it offered in court on October 8 (PX 47, App. A, ¶¶ 3 and 4), a $3 million credit to resolve the operating losses dispute (PX 47, App. A, ¶ 8), and a covenant to use its best efforts to induce Midway’s non-Fidelcor aircraft lessors to forgive or reduce their post-petition claims against Midway (PX 47, App. A., ¶ 9). (Tr. (Steenland) 4032-33; (Burgess) 1184).
198. After receiving Northwest’s list of assets on November 7, Midway and First Boston calculated the cost to cure the liens and defaults on those assets and contracts. They determined that the cure costs were approximately $13.6 million. (DX 263, DX 203/PX 683 at ML48602; Schick Dep. 104-06, 143).
199. Although Northwest’s November 7 package provided the specific information which Midway had said it needed in order to decide whether to accept the Northwest proposal, Midway did not disclose its position on Northwest’s modified proposal. On November 8, Midway wrote to Northwest. (PX 63). Midway’s letter did not state that Midway was prepared to accept any of the terms in Northwest’s November 7 term sheet. (Schick Dep. 149; Tr. (Henneman) 4349). Instead, the letter called for yet more negotiating sessions, but specifically noted that the parties still needed to resolve their “differences” over the terms of the transaction. (PX 63).
200. On November 11, Northwest’s executives met to discuss whether the proposed Midway transaction could be salvaged. (Tr. (Steenland) 4039; Dasburg Dep. 196; Leonard Dep. 168-69). Steenland reported that the dispute over due diligence and the business terms remained unrésolved. (Tr. (Steenland) 4039-40). The discussion then focused on the November 11 analysis, with its new, aggressive revenue assumptions. Northwest’s executives concluded that the “yield gap closure” assumptions on which the new analysis was based were unrealistic and involved too much risk to justify the transaction. (Tr. (Fornaro) 3060-61; (Garel) 3517-18, 3520; (Steenland) 4040-41; Dasburg Dep. 195-96). When Northwest’s senior executives refused to commit themselves to revenue budgets based on the new assumptions, Dasburg concluded that the forecast was unrealistic, and refused to accept the analysis. (Dasburg Dep. 196-97).
201. On November 12, Midway faxed another letter to Northwest. (PX 67). The letter again invited further negotiating sessions, but expressed no willingness to accept the terms in Northwest’s November 7 term sheet, and did not delineate which terms were acceptable and which were not.
202. On November 12, Northwest’s management convened a special telephonic meeting of its Board of Directors for late that
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afternoon. (Tr. (Steenland) 4041^2). During the meeting, Dasburg informed the Board that there had been no resolution of the three principal issues — the DOT data discrepancy issue, the environmental issue, and the liens and cure cost issues — since the November 5 Board meeting. Dasburg also reviewed the revenue shortfall problem stemming from Midway’s DOT filings, and reported that there was no solution to the fundamental problems with the Midway transaction uncovered during Northwest’s due diligence. (PX S3; Dasburg Dep. 178-79; Bouw Dep. 66; Van Wijk Dep. 100; Franeht Dep. 199-200; Tr. (Steenland) 4043-44). Accordingly, he recommended that the Board disapprove any further transaction with Midway. (Tr. (Steenland) 4043-44; Bouw Dep. 66).
203. The Board voted unanimously to disapprove “the acquisition by Northwest Airlines, Inc. of the remaining assets of Midway Airlines, Inc.” (PX 33; Tr. (Steenland) 4044 — 45, 4264).
204. On November 13, Northwest communicated the decision of its Board to Midway. (PX 68; Tr. (Steenland) 4045-46; (Hinson) 165).
205. In March 1992, Northwest sold the gates it had purchased from Midway on October 11 to Southwest which, at the time of trial, was the dominant air carrier at Midway Airport. (Tr. (Steenland) 4047 — 48; (Cronin) 2355).
COUNT I
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. In Count I, Midway claims that Northwest breached a valid and binding contract formed at the October 8 hearing for the purchase and sale of substantially all of Midway’s non-gate assets (the Back-End transaction).
2. In response, Northwest contends that Midway failed to prove that the parties entered into a binding agreement for the purchase by Northwest of Midway’s non-gate assets at the October 8 hearing, because the evidence showed that the parties agreed only to the purchase and sale of Midway’s gates and to negotiate in good faith towards the purchase and sale of Midway’s remaining assets consistent with the terms and conditions stated in Court on October 8.
3. Northwest also contends that Midway failed to prove that the parties entered into a binding and enforceable agreement on October 8 because the evidence showed that they did not reach a “meeting of the minds” on material business issues, involving tens of millions of dollars, which had not even been discussed, much less agreed upon, as of October 8.
4. Northwest argues alternatively that even if an otherwise binding agreement was formed for the Back-End transaction on October 8, Midway is not entitled to enforce that agreement because:
a. the Back-End transaction was expressly subject to the conditions precedent of (1) the approval of Northwest’s Board of Directors, (2) the execution of definitive documentation, and (3) the completion of a due diligence review with results reasonably satisfactory to Northwest, and these conditions were never satisfied;
b. Paragraph 7 of the Confidentiality Agreement that Northwest and Midway executed bars Midway’s claim for breach of contract;
c. Northwest was induced to enter into an agreement on October 8 by Midway’s misrepresentations and omissions regarding its DOT data;
d. the agreement was based on mutual mistake relating to the data filed by Midway with the DOT, or, in the alternative, the agreement was based on Northwest’s mistaken belief that the data was reasonably accurate; and
e. Midway repudiated that agreement during the ensuing negotiations for the Back-End transaction by insisting on terms materially different than those contained in Northwest’s Back-End offer, which Midway claims it accepted. -
5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Midway and Northwest did not enter into a binding and enforceable agreement regarding the Back-End transaction on October 8. This finding is based on,
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inter alia,
the parties’ conduct prior to October 8, the documents actually executed by the parties, the parties’ conduct during and surrounding the October 8 hearing, the Court’s Findings and Order regarding that hearing, and the parties’ post-hearing conduct.
6. The Court finds that the only binding agreement reached by the parties on October 8 with respect to the Back-End transaction was to negotiate in good faith consistent with their representations to the Court. While the Court approved the Gate Sale, it did not approve the terms of the Back-End transaction, which was to be a matter for further good faith negotiations subject both to the terms and conditions represented to the Court on October 8 as well as subsequent Court approval.
7. The Court finds that the evidence further demonstrates that the parties did not then agree to the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets and were well aware that the Back-End transaction was not a “done deal” on October 8.
' 8. Events prior to the execution of the Gate Sale Agreement reflect that the parties did not intend to bind themselves on October 8 to the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets, and did not do so.
9.Midway recognized in its emergency motion that it was not submitting, for the Court’s approval, a binding agreement regarding the non-gate assets. The motion before the Court on October 8 was Midway’s “Emergency Motion to Approve Sale-Leaseback of Midway’s Leasehold Interests at Chicago Midway Airport.” (DX 455/PX 697; Tr. (Hanson) 484). The motion requested the Court’s approval of the Gate Sale as agreed upon by the parties in their Letter of Intent of September 23, and only required the parties to negotiate the Back-End transaction in good faith:
Upon Court approval of the Letter Agreement [the Gate Sale],
Northwest has agreed to enter into good faith negotiations
for the acquisition by Northwest of all or substantially all of Midway’s assets and to use its best efforts to conclude such an agreement within 90 days.
(DX 455/PX 697, p. 4, emphasis supplied). Midway’s motion also stated that the approval of the Gate Sale would provide Midway the resources to negotiate the structure of a plan of reorganization “which may
or may not
include a sale of the remaining assets to Northwest.” (DX 455/PX 697, p. 8, emphasis supplied).
10. The draft documents provided to the Court on October 7 consisted of the contracts and related materials pertaining to the Gate Sale. The sole reference in the documents to a Back-End transaction appeared in Section 5.7 of the draft asset purchase agreement, which provided: “After the Closing Date [for the Gate Sale,] Buyer [Northwest] will enter into good faith negotiations with Seller [Midway] for the acquisition by Buyer of all or substantially all of Seller’s assets.” (PX 42, p. 13).
11. The documents actually executed by the parties indicate that the parties did not enter into a binding and enforceable agreement on October 8 regarding the Back-End transaction. These documents include,
inter alia,
the Gate Sale Agreement (PX 19), the Option Agreement (DX 433G), and the Consent and Forbearance Agreement (DX 304).
12. The Gate Sale Agreement (PX 19) contradicts Midway’s claim that the parties entered into a binding agreement for the Back-End transaction on October 8. The Gate Sale Agreement, executed as modified on October 11, does not state anywhere that the parties had reached a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets.
13. The only reference to the Back-End transaction in the Gate Sale Agreement appears in Section 5.7 therein. Following the October 8 hearing, the parties negotiated significant changes to the language of Section 5.7 as it existed in the draft before the Court on October 8 (PX 612). Rather than stating that the parties had reached an agreement for the Back-End transaction, the parties chose to state in Section 5.7 that:
After the Closing Date Buyer [Northwest] and Seller [Midway] will enter into
good faith negotiation of a definitive agreement
for the acquisition by Buyer of all of Seller’s assets and the assumption of certain of
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Seller’s liabilities by Buyer,
consistent with representations of Buyer and Seller
mode
to the Bankruptcy Court on October 8, 1991. ■
(PX 19, § 5.7, emphasis supplied).
14. The Court finds that the Gate Sale Agreement, particularly Section 5.7, shows that the parties did not enter into any binding agreement relating to the Back-End transaction other than to negotiate in good faith within the parameters of the representations made to the Court on October 8.
15. Midway contends that the Back-End transaction was a “done deal” as of the end of the hearing on October 8, with only minor details of the transaction remaining to be negotiated, and that the parties had no “outs” after Northwest’s proposal was accepted by this Court on October 8.
16. However, the Court finds that these contentions are not supported by the Gate Sale Agreement, and they are rebutted by other documents which the parties executed at the closing of the Gate Sale on October 11.
17. The Option Agreement (DX 433G), which the parties agreed to execute in Section 8.1(e) of the Gate Sale Agreement (PX 19, ¶ 8.1(e)), is another of the documents for the Gate Sale which shows that the Back-End transaction was not a “done deal” on October 8. (Tr. (Hanson) 1338-39; (Steen-land) 3865).
18. The Order and Findings specifically authorized Midway to enter into the Option Agreement. (DX 243, ¶7; DX 244, ¶11). Northwest and Midway signed the Option Agreement in connection with the October 11 closing of the Gate Sale.
19. The Option Agreement granted Midway an exclusive option to repurchase the gates from Northwest for a period of one year. (Tr. (Burgess) 1077-78; (Steenland) 3865).
20. Even before the Gate Sale was closed, Midway recognized the possibility that the Back-End transaction might not be consummated. Midway’s counsel acknowledged that the Option Agreement was in full force and effect following its execution on October 11, and that Midway wanted the Option Agreement to permit it to reacquire the gates in the event that Northwest did not perform the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Hanson) 1340-41; (Burgess) 971-72, 1077-78).
21. The Option Agreement was to Midway’s advantage because it gave Midway the right to negotiate with other potential buyers and reacquire the gates even if Northwest had been prepared to consummate the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Hanson) 1341; (Burgess) 1076-78, 972; (Cronin) 2069). Northwest agreed that Midway had this right. (Tr. (Cronin) 2324, 2131-32, 2069; (Steen-land) 3865).
22. The Court finds that Midway’s position that there was a binding obligation to proceed with the Back-End transaction is inconsistent with the Option Agreement.
23. The Option Agreement gave Midway the right to reacquire the gates irrespective of Northwest’s willingness to proceed with the Back-End transaction. If Midway elected to exercise the option before the Back-End transaction was closed, which was its clear right, the Back-End transaction would not have occurred even if Northwest was prepared to proceed with it, for, as Midway knew, without the gates, Northwest had no use for Midway’s non-gate assets,
ie.,
the assets that were the subject of the Back-End transaction. (Tr. (Burgess) 879; Leonard Dep. 74-75).
24. Accordingly, in its October 21 and November 8 drafts of a definitive agreement for the Back-End transaction, Northwest expressly provided that the Option Agreement was canceled and became ineffective upon the consummation of the Back-End transaction; otherwise, Midway would have retained the right to reacquire the gates until October 1992, even after the Back-End transaction had been consummated. (PX 43 at ¶ 5.11(e); PX 46 at ¶ 5.10(c); Tr. (Cronin) 2131-32).
25. Midway did not delete or amend this portion of the draft definitive agreement in .its October 25 mark-up. (PX 44A, ¶ 5.11(c)).
26. The Court finds that Midway’s execution of the Option Agreement refutes Midway’s position that the parties had reached a binding agreement with respect to the Back-End transaction on October 8, as well as
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Midway’s contention that it reasonably relied on the existence of a binding agreement in conducting itself after October 8.
27. The Consent and Forbearance Agreement (DX 304), which Midway, Northwest, and Continental Bank, Midway’s DIP lender, negotiated between October 9 and October 11, is another of the documents for the Gate Sale which shows that the Back-End transaction was not a “done deal” on October 8. (Tr. (Altschul) 3596-97; (Steenland) 3852, 3866).
28. Because Midway’s gates had served as collateral for Continental Bank’s loan to Midway, the Consent and Forbearance Agreement was required to enable Midway to transfer its interest in the gates to Northwest. (Tr. (Steenland) 3853-55).
29. The parties executed the Consent and Forbearance Agreement on October 11 in connection with the closing of the Gate Sale. (Tr. (Steenland) 3866).
30. The Consent and Forbearance Agreement included provisions which show that Northwest had not bound itself to buy Midway’s remaining assets, that Northwest and Midway instead had bound themselves only to negotiate in good faith, and that there was uncertainty as to whether the negotiations would result in a binding agreement. Section 5 of that agreement provides:
The agreements of Continental under Section 3 of this Agreement to forbear and under Section 4 of this Agreement to make Loans to Midway shall expire on the first to occur (“Forbearance Termination Date”) of ... (c) written notification to Continental from Northwest that negotiations between Northwest and Midway with respect to the Second Phase Purchase have terminated. The Forbearance Termination Date, as determined by clause (a) herein, shall be extended 21 days
if 'prior thereto Northwest and Midway enter into a definitive agreement for the Second Phase Purchase.
In addition, Section 6 provides:
Northwest shall notify Continental in writing promptly
upon the termination,
as determined in good faith by Northwest,
of negotiations between Midway and Northwest with respect to the Second Phase Purchase.
(DX 304, emphasis supplied).
31. The language of Sections 5 and 6 of the Consent and Forbearance Agreement, which provided for an unwinding of Northwest’s Consent and Forbearance Agreement obligations in the event that the Back-End negotiations proved unsuccessful, was included due to the uncertainty as to whether the Back-End transaction would occur. (Tr. (Steenland) 3867).
32. The Court finds that these provisions in the Consent and Forbearance Agreement reflect that subsequent to the October 8 hearing, Midway, Northwest, and Continental Bank did not believe that there was a final, binding agreement for the Back-End transaction.
33. The Court finds, therefore, that the Consent and Forbearance Agreement demonstrates that the parties did not enter into any binding agreement relating to the Back-End transaction other than to negotiate in good faith within the parameters of their statements to the Court on October 8.
34. The Court finds that the parties’ conduct during and surrounding the October 8 hearing also demonstrates that the parties did not enter into a binding and enforceable agreement regarding the Back-End transaction on October 8.
35. Midway’s lawyers recognized that the focus of the October 8 hearing was the Gate Sale. At the outset of the hearing, one of Midway’s counsel, Costello, stated: “Judge, we have a motion up to approve on an emergency basis the Northwest Airlines transaction. Basically it involves the sale of 21 gates at Midway Airport and certain related property for $20 million. It involves a one-year option to reacquire it at various prices-” (PX 13, p. 5). One of Midway’s other counsel, Hanson, testified that the purpose of the hearing was “to approve the gate sale to Northwest under the terms of the definitive documentation that was filed with the Court on Monday, October 7th. That’s what we were there for.” (Tr. (Hanson) 484). Another of Midway’s lawyers, Burgess, concurred that the matter before the
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Court on October 8 was Midway’s motion to approve the draft definitive contract for the Gate Sale. (Tr. (Burgess) 985).
36. As shown by their statements at the October 8 hearing, the Court finds that the parties understood that they were not agreeing to the purchase and sale of the non-gate assets, which was a matter for further good faith negotiation consistent with the terms and conditions stated on the record.
37. For example, Parkins prefaced his recitation of the Back-End offer by specifically referring to the requirement of further negotiations, which was set forth in Section 5.7 of the draft Gate Sale Agreement pending before the Court (PX 612):
Now, with respect to the change or the update as to the subsequent negotiations between Northwest and Midway reflected
and embodied, in fact, your Honor, in the definitive agreement which provides [in Section 5.7] that there will be subsequent negotiations for the acquisition of the balance of the assets,
those negotiations have proceeded, and the proposal by Northwest as it presently stands embodies these salient points....
(PX 13, pp. 18-19, emphasis supplied). In his remarks, Parkins also noted that “a lot” of negotiations remained. (PX 13, p. 20).
38. Hanson’s statements on the record also demonstrate that only the Gate Sale had been finalized, that the Back-End transaction was still a matter for negotiation as set forth in Section 5.7 of the draft agreement (PX 612) before the Court, and that the parties were not at that time agreeing to the purchase and sale of the non-gate assets. For example:
a. Following the first recess, Hanson advised the Court that Northwest had agreed to assume the $4.7 million City of Chicago lease arrearage
“if
their offer is accepted and
Midway Airlines proceeds to conclude and negotiate Phase II [the Backr-End transaction] with
them_” (PX 13, p. 38, emphasis supplied).
b. In summarizing Midway’s position, Hanson informed the Court that “Midway wishes to pursue the Northwest offer ... and it wishes to proceed
for approval of the transaction, the documents that are before the Court.”
(PX 13, p. 39, emphasis supplied). The only transaction and documents before the Court related to the Gate Sale, and nothing in those documents purported to bind Midway and Northwest to a purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets.
c. Hanson then explained his analysis, stating: “The $20 million Phase I [Gate Sale], the extent to which that’s available to ultimately satisfy unpaid administrative expenses in this case is going to be a function of
how quickly we can negotiate and conclude the Phase II [Back-End] transaction....
There is nothing in the documents before the Court that requires Midway to continue running until that $20 million is consumed.” (PX 13, pp. 39-40, emphasis supplied).
d. In concluding his post-recess remarks, Hanson said, “For those reasons ... Midway would like to move ahead with the Northwest offer as modified
and obtain approval of the Phase I [Gate Sale] transaction,
close that transaction promptly, get the' $20 million in,
and proceed to conclude the negotiations for Phase II [Backr-End transaction].”
(PX 13, p. 43, emphasis supplied).
39. The following exchange on the record among Midway’s lawyers demonstrates that the parties were not agreeing to bind themselves to a Back-End transaction, and that Midway realized this. Referring to Midway’s obligations regarding Hangar No. 2 at Midway Airport, Costello advised the Court, “We do not have a fixed deal
until we have the rear-end deal.”
(PX 13, p. 47, emphasis supplied). After Hanson agreed that was the case, Costello added: ‘Yes, that’s the back-end portion. We don’t have a fixed deal for that.” (PX 13, p. 48).
40. The Court finds that the parties’ off-the-record discussions during the first recess show that they had not bound themselves, and that much of the Back-End transaction remained to be negotiated.
41. For example, Burgess asked whether Northwest would consider paying all cash for the cash/note portion of the $95 million of consideration which Northwest had said it
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would include in the Back-End negotiations. Cronin responded on behalf of Northwest. As Burgess testified, “Mr. Cronin indicated that they were giving us the rough idea of what they perceived as a back-end of the deal for the remaining assets and that certainly that [sic] was up for consideration.” (Tr. (Burgess) 859).
42. Significantly, the Court finds that no one stated on the record by the end of the October 8 hearing that Midway and Northwest had reached a binding agreement for the Back-End transaction.
43. Both Northwest and Midway understood that the Court was approving only the Gate Sale on October 8, and that Bankruptcy Court approval would be required before a Back-End transaction could be effective. (Tr. (Henneman) 4320; (Steenland) 3848, 3868; (Burgess) 909).
44. For example, Hanson acknowledged to the Court on October 8 that Midway was seeking Court approval only of the Gate Sale, stating “Midway would like to move ahead with the Northwest offer as modified and
obtain approval of the [Gate Sale] transac-
tion_” (PX 13, p. 43, emphasis supplied).
45. The Court finds that the parties’ conduct during and surrounding the October 8 hearing demonstrates that the parties did not enter into a binding and enforceable agreement for the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets on October 8.
46. The Court also finds that the Order (DX 244) and Findings (DX 243) entered by the Court demonstrate that on October 8, the Court approved only the Gate Sale Agreement.
47. The Order, shows that the Gate Sale was the only transaction approved by the Court. The Order makes no reference whatsoever to a Back-End transaction. (DX 244).
48. The Findings also make clear that the Court granted only Midway’s emergency motion, which included an obligation on both parties to negotiate in good faith for the purchase and sale of Midway’s remaining assets, and that the Court did not purport to find or approve a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of Midway’s remaining assets. The Court found that:
The sale, assignment, and assumption and assignment by the Debtors to Northwest of the Midway Leasehold and Assets (the “Northwest Transaction”) is an integral part of the Debtors’ efforts to increase their cash position and to avoid a shutdown of their operations and the consequent liquidation of their estates. The Northwest Transaction provides the Debtors with a possibility of entering into certain marketing and services programs with Northwest in order to support the Debtors in generating revenue and eliminating expenses.
In addition, upon approval of the Letter and Definitive Agreements, Northwest has agreed to enter into good faith negotiations for the acquisition by Northwest of all or substantially all of the Debtors’ assets and to use its best efforts to conclude such an agreement within 60 days. Finally, while these negotiations proceed,
the Northwest Transaction will allow the Debtors to operate in the normal course through Northwest’s leaseback of the Midway Leasehold and Assets to the Debtors and by providing the Debtors an exclusive purchase option on those assets for a one year period.
(DX 243, ¶ 7, emphasis supplied).
49. As reflected by the Order and Findings, the Court finds that the Gate Sale Agreement, as supplemented by the parties’ representations in open court, did not purport to bind the parties to anything more than good faith negotiations consistent with the terms and conditions of the Back-End offer.
50. The Court finds that Midway’s post-hearing conduct also reflects that it knew that it had not entered into a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of its remaining non-gate assets on October 8.
51. Hinson wrote a memo to Midway’s Board of Directors on October 17 stating that he would not schedule another Board meeting “until we know the certain closing on the second stage with Northwest.” (DX 118).
52. On October 21, Marvin Pollack (Midway’s Director of Marketing Programs and
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Advertisement) drafted a letter agreement to Northwest outlining a working agreement for a frequent flyer partnership. Pollack wrote in Paragraph 3:
This partnership will survive even if the merger between Midway Airlines and Northwest Airlines falls through for any reason.
[[Image here]]
If the merger of the two programs and the two airlines does not take place, the two programs will settle up....
(DX 312 at ML3309; Tr. (Pollack) 428-29).
53. Pollack gave the draft letter agreement (DX 312) for review to Michael Osajda (Midway’s in-house counsel) who was present at the October 8 hearing. (Tr. (Pollack) 432; (Hinson) 129, 204-05). As reflected on the marked-up draft (DX 313A), Osajda changed these paragraphs to read:
This partnership will survive
even if the proposed sale of assets
by Midway to Northwest does not occur for any reason.
[[Image here]]
If the merger of the two programs and the two airlines does not occur, the two programs will settle up....
(DX 313, DX 313A, emphasis supplied; Tr. • (Pollack) 434).
54. Pollack implemented Osajda’s changes and sent Northwest the letter outlining the proposed working agreement on October 24. (DX 314; Tr. (Pollack) 434-35). Pollack also sent copies of the letter to David Kunstler (a senior Midway officer) and Osaj-da. (Tr. (Pollack) 435). On October 28, Lois Gallo of Midway sent Schick a summary of the proposed letter agreement, which stated: “Agreement will survive through 12-31-92
regardless of outcome
of acquisition. Conversion of credits to World Perks is
contingent upon acquisition
by NW.” (DX 275 at ML14279, emphasis supplied).
55. Based on Midway’s references in the letter outlining the proposed working agreement to the possibility that “the proposed sale of assets by Midway” (DX 314) might not occur, the Court finds that Midway knew that Northwest and Midway had not bound themselves on the Back-End transaction on October 8.
56. Northwest included a court approval condition for the Back-End transaction in Section 6.2 of its October 21 draft of a proposed agreement. (PX 43; Tr. (Steenland) 3868).
57. Midway’s counsel did not delete Section 6.2 in its October 25 mark-up. (PX 44A; Tr. (Henneman) 4321).
58. Midway did not otherwise challenge the inclusion of the court approval condition. (Tr. (Steenland) 3868).
59. Midway also expressly recognized the need for court approval of a Back-End transaction at the October 30-31 negotiating sessions. On October 30, Burgess made Midway’s point “very clear that our [Midway’s] position was that in the end it [the Back-End transaction] had to be approved by the Court.” (Tr. (Burgess) 909). Burgess again pointed out the need for Court approval at the October 31 meeting. (Tr. (Burgess) 922-23).
60. The Court further finds that the Court could not have approved a Back-End transaction on October 8 based on the representations made to it even if the parties had reached agreement.
61. Before it could approve a Back-End transaction, the Court would have had to make findings about whether the proceeds of the transaction were sufficient to enable Midway to convey its assets free and clear of liens and encumbrances, but nonetheless leave some value for the benefit of Midway’s estate. Midway even raised this point at the October 30 meeting, stating that, “in the end, the only deal that
would get approved
by the Court and that we could with a straight face recommend is a deal that got the estate a dollar more than liquidation value.” (Tr. (Burgess) 909, emphasis supplied).
62. The Court did not make these findings on October 8 (DX 243; PX 13), and was not in a position to make them then because Midway had not yet quantified the amounts of its liens and encumbrances (Tr. (Hanson) 1365), and because the precise amount of cash that the Midway estate would receive
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from Northwest had not yet been quantified. (Tr. (Hanson) 527).
63. It is undisputed that at no point did Midway ever present a motion to this Court to approve a Back-End transaction, nor did the Court ever enter an order approving an agreement for the Back-End transaction.
64. The Court finds that the parties’ recognition of a need for court approval of a Back-End transaction, coupled with the absence of any request for the Court to approve a Back-End transaction on October 8, further demonstrates that the parties did not agree to the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets on October 8.
65. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the parties did not enter into a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets on October 8.
66. In addition, the Court finds that Midway has failed to prove that the parties entered into a binding and enforceable agreement for the purchase and sale of Midway’s non-gate assets for a second and independent reason: the evidence shows that the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds on October 8 concerning material terms of any such agreement.
67. On October 8, Northwest outlined the terms and conditions it would include in the negotiations for the Back-End transaction. Midway subsequently expressed a materially different understanding of Northwest’s proposal, interpreting it to include business terms which Midway and Northwest had not agreed upon on October 8, and, in virtually every instance, had not even discussed. Midway’s position that the agreement included new and different terms than those stated on the record by Northwest demonstrates that the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds on material business terms on October 8.
68. The issues subject to misunderstanding or disagreement were so significant and material that the Court is unable to determine or ascertain the terms of the Back-End transaction.
69. The existence of different understandings about the Back-End transaction became apparent during the October 22 telephone call from Midway’s attorneys to Steen-land. Midway’s counsel complained that Northwest’s October 21 first draft of a definitive agreement failed to comport with Midway’s understanding of the terms for the Back-End transaction. Hanson’s notes of the conversation show that Burgess and Hanson told Steenland that Midway had “some very serious problems with the contract,” and that the parties must “deal with fundamental conceptual issues.” (DX 100). The parties then discussed the

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/1876535. Public record. Not legal advice.
