# Nuc Engy Inst Inc v. EPA > Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · July 9, 2004 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/186276 ## Case - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit - **Decided:** July 9, 2004 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/186276 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that requiring a party to participate in further administrative or judicial proceedings is not a hardship sufficient to outweigh 98 a determination that an issue is unfit for review - concluding that the agency acted reasonably in declining to promulgate uniform stan- dards because risk variations in virtually all cases were confined to the acceptable range - stating that administering a congressionally created program requires ‘‘the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress’’ ## Opinion text Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued January 14, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004 No. 01-1258 NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC., PETITIONER v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT Consolidated with 01-1268, 01-1295, 01-1425, 01-1426, 01-1516, 02-1036, 02-1077, 02-1116, 02-1179, 02-1196, 03-1009, 03-1058 On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission –———— Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time. 2 Antonio Rossmann, Geoffrey Fettus, Martin G. Malsch, and Charles J. Cooper argued the causes for petitioners State of Nevada and Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. With them on the briefs were Joseph R. Egan, Charles J. Fitzpatrick, Howard K. Shapar, Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, Attorney General’s Office of the State of Nevada, Marta A. Adams, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Robert J. Cynkar, Brian S. Koukoutchos, Vincent J. Colatriano, and William H. Briggs Jr. John C. Martin argued the cause for petitioner Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. With him on the briefs were Jean V. MacHarg, Susan M. Mathiascheck, Robert W. Bishop, and Michael A. Bauser. Christopher S. Vaden, Michele L. Walter, and Ronald M. Spritzer, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, and Steven F. Crockett, Special Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission, argued the causes for respondents. With them on the briefs were Jeffrey B. Clark, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, G. Scott Williams, John A. Bryson, and Greer S. Goldman, Attorneys, Karen D. Cyr, General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, John F. Cordes Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo Slaggie, Deputy Solicitor, and Marc Johnson, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, and Elizabeth A. Peterson, Attorney, entered an appearance. Michael A. Bauser argued the cause for intervenor Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. With him on the briefs of interve- nor/amicus Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. and amicus Na- tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners were Robert W. Bishop, James Bradford Ramsay, and Sharla M. Barklind. Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and TATEL, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.* * Judge Tatel wrote Parts I and II. Judge Edwards wrote Part IV. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Background II. The EPA Cases A. The EPA Rule: 40 C.F.R. part 197 B. Challenges Brought by Nevada and Environmental Petitioners 1. Jurisdiction 2. The 10,000-Year Compliance Period 3. The Controlled Area 4. The Definition of ‘‘Disposal’’ C. NEI’s Challenge to the Ground-Water Standard 1. Standing 2. Alleged Conflicts with the Energy Policy Act 3. Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge III. The NRC Cases A. Jurisdiction and Timeliness B. Nevada’s Merits Claims 1. Primary Barrier and Multiple Barriers Claims a. The Primary Barrier Claim b. The Multiple Barriers Claims 2. Compliance with EPA’s Part 197 in Construc- tion Authorization 3. 10,000-Year Compliance Period 4. Reviewability of DOE’s Peak Dose Calculations 5. NRC’s ‘‘Reasonable Expectation’’ Standard IV. The Site-Designation Cases A. The Constitutional Case 1. Issue Preclusion 2. Merits of the Constitutional Challenge 4 B. The DOE Case 1. DOE Criteria, Secretary’s Alleged Failure To Take Mandatory Actions, and Site Recommen- dations 2. The Final Environmental Impact Statement V. Conclusion PER CURIAM: Having the capacity to outlast human civiliza- tion as we know it and the potential to devastate public health and the environment, nuclear waste has vexed scientists, Congress, and regulatory agencies for the last half-century. After rejecting disposal options ranging from burying nuclear waste in polar ice caps to rocketing it to the sun, the scientific consensus has settled on deep geologic burial as the safest way to isolate this toxic material in perpetuity. Following years of legislative wrangling and agency deliberation, the political consensus has now selected Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the nation’s nuclear waste disposal site. In this case, we consider challenges by the State of Nevada, local communities, several environmental organizations, and the nuclear energy industry to the statutory and regulatory scheme devised to establish and govern a Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository. Petitioners challenge regulations issued by the three agencies with responsibility for the site: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), and the De- partment of Energy (DOE). Petitioners also challenge the constitutionality of the joint resolution through which Con- gress selected Yucca Mountain as the repository site, as well as certain actions of the President and Energy Secretary leading to approval of the Yucca site. We conclude: (1) The 10,000-year compliance period select- ed by EPA violates section 801 of the Energy Policy Act (EnPA) because it is not, as EnPA requires, ‘‘based upon and 5 consistent with’’ the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. The remaining challenges to the EPA regulation are without merit. (2) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s licensing requirements are neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious except to the extent that they incorporate EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period. (3) The congressional resolution selecting the Yucca site for development represents an appropriate exercise of Congress’s Article IV, section 3 authority over federal property. (4) The Department of Energy’s and the President’s actions leading to the selection of the Yucca Mountain site are unreviewable. All but one of Nevada’s challenges to these actions are moot, and the remaining challenge is unripe. Accordingly, we vacate the EPA and NRC regulations insofar as they include a 10,000-year compliance period. We deny or dismiss the remaining petitions for review. I. BACKGROUND Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States has used nuclear fission to generate electricity. Today, approxi- mately twenty percent of the nation’s electricity comes from nuclear power. See Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the Suitability of the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 at 1 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ocrwm. doe.gov/ymp/sr/sar.pdf [hereinafter ‘‘Secretary’s Recommen- dation’’]. Although nuclear power burns without emitting harmful greenhouse gases, it produces a potentially deadly and long-lasting byproduct: highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. At massive levels, radiation exposure can cause sudden death. National Institutes of Health, Fact Sheet: What We Know About Radiation, at http://www.nih.gov/health/ chip/od/radiation (last visited May 28, 2004). At lower doses, radiation can have devastating health effects, including in- creased cancer risks and serious birth defects such as mental 6 retardation, eye malformations, and small brain or head size. See Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 64 Fed. Reg. 46,976, 46,978 (Aug. 27, 1999). Radioactive waste and its harmful consequences persist for time spans seemingly beyond human comprehension. For example, iodine-129, one of the radionuclides expected to be buried at Yucca Mountain, has a half-life of seventeen million years. See COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN STANDARDS 18-19 (1995) [hereinafter ‘‘NAS REPORT’’]. Neptunium-237, also expected to be deposited in Yucca Mountain, has a half-life of over two million years. Id. at 19. As of 2003, nuclear reactors in the United States had generated approximately 49,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Fact Sheet, Nuclear Waste Explained: How Much Nuclear Waste is in the United States, at http://www. ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/about/howmuch/shtml (last visited June 1, 2004) [hereinafter ‘‘How Much Nuclear Waste Is in the United States’’]. Most of this waste is currently stored at reactor sites across the country. See United States Environ- mental Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Final Background Information Document for Final 40 CFR 197 at 5-2 (June 2001) [hereinafter ‘‘Final Background Infor- mation Document’’]. With more than 100 interim storage locations sprinkled across thirty-nine states, over 161 million people reside within seventy-five miles of a nuclear waste storage facility. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Fact Sheet, Nuclear Storage Explained: Cur- rent Storage Methods For Radioactive Waste, at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/about/storage.shtml (last visit- ed June 1, 2004). By the year 2035, the United States will have produced 105,000 metric tons of nuclear waste – approxi- 7 mately twice the current inventory. See How Much Nuclear Waste Is in the United States. In 1982, responding to growing quantities of radioactive waste and their potentially deadly health risks, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), directing the federal government to assume responsibility for permanently disposing of the nation’s nuclear waste. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2000)). The NWPA put the United States on course to using geologic repositories buried deep below the earth’s surface to house its nuclear waste. To finance the creation and operation of such repositories, the NWPA estab- lished the Nuclear Waste Fund to ensure that ‘‘the costs of carrying out activities relating to the disposal of [radioactive] waste and spent fuel will be borne by the persons responsible for generating such waste and spent fuel.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(4) (2000). Accordingly, the NWPA required nu- clear energy producers to pay assessments into the Fund based on the amount of electricity they generate. See id. § 10222(a), (c) (2000). The NWPA assigned distinct regulatory roles to the De- partment of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Congress charged DOE with selecting, designing, and ultimately operating the repository. See id. §§ 10132-10134 (2000). It required EPA to establish generally applicable standards for protecting the environment from releases of radioactive materials, id. § 10141(a) (2000), and directed NRC to assume responsibility for licensing a DOE-proposed repository, id. § 10141(b). The NWPA also established a multi-stage process for DOE to select an appropriate host site. The Act required the Secretary of Energy to begin by issuing general site-selection guidelines, id. § 10132(a), that DOE would then use to deter- mine which candidate sites to recommend for intensive inves- tigation, known as ‘‘site characterization,’’ id. § 10132(b). Based on these guidelines, the Secretary was directed to nominate at least five sites, id. § 10132(b)(1)(A), and then to 8 narrow the field to three for the President’s consideration, id. § 10132(b)(1)(B). Once the President approved the nominated sites, the Secretary was required to undertake site-characterization activities at each location. NWPA § 113(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a)). The NWPA also directed DOE, as part of its site-characterization program, to issue ‘‘criteria’’ for determining whether the candidate sites were ‘‘suitab[le]’’ for housing a waste repository. 42 U.S.C. § 10133(b)(1)(A)(iv). After completing the intensive site- characterization process, the Secretary was authorized to submit to the President, together with a final environmental impact statement, a recommendation that he approve one of the suitable sites for development. NWPA § 114(a)(1) (codi- fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1)). Under the NWPA, once the President approved a site, he would then transmit his recommendation to Congress. Id. § 114(a)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(2)). The state within which the recommended site was located could then submit a ‘‘notice of disapproval’’ to Congress, an action that would effectively end the development process with respect to that site unless Congress passed a joint resolution overriding the state’s disapproval and approving the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 10136(b)(2) (2000). Pursuant to this statutory regime, DOE promulgated site- selection guidelines in 1984 and applied them to nominate five candidate sites for characterization. Based on these guide- lines, the Energy Secretary then recommended three sites to the President: Deaf Smith County, Texas; Hanford, Wash- ington; and Yucca Mountain, Nevada. See Nevada v. Wat- kins, 939 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1991). The President then approved each for characterization. Id. In 1985, EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. part 191, general health and safety standards to govern an eventual waste repository. EPA later revised these standards in response to a First Circuit decision remanding aspects of the regulation. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States EPA, 9 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987) (NRDC v. EPA). NRC then issued generic licensing standards in 10 C.F.R. part 60. In 1987, however, because characterizing three separate sites was becoming both costly and time-consuming, Congress departed from the NWPA’s original site-selection scheme and directed, through the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA), that the nation’s nuclear waste program focus exclusively on Yucca Mountain, Nevada. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 5001-5065, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-227 to 1330-255 (1987) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Located in the arid Nevada desert approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Yucca Mountain sits on the Nevada Test Site, the nation’s former nuclear bomb testing range. Under the NWPAA, Yucca became the only site that DOE could lawfully characterize. See 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a) (requiring the Energy Secretary to ‘‘carry out TTT appropriate site characterization activities at the Yucca Mountain site’’); id. § 10172(a)(1)-(2) (2000) (‘‘The Secretary shall provide for an orderly phase-out of site specific activities at all candidate sites other than the Yucca Mountain site TTT [and] shall terminate all site specific activities (other than reclamation activities) at all candidate sites, other than the Yucca Mountain siteTTTT’’). In 1992, Congress directed DOE’s sister agencies, EPA and NRC, to focus their regulatory attention on Yucca Mountain as well. Through the Energy Policy Act, Congress required EPA to promulgate, based on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, site-specific standards for Yucca Mountain, and ordered NRC to modify its generic technical requirements and criteria to bring them into con- formity with EPA’s Yucca-specific rule. Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776, 2921-23 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10141 note (2000)). At about the same time, Congress exempted the Yucca Mountain site from EPA’s part 191 generally applicable environmental regulations. See Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act, Pub. L. No. 102- 579, § 8, 106 Stat. 4777, 4786-88 (1992). With the enactment of the NWPA, the NWPAA, and EnPA, the stage was set for 10 the promulgation of the regulations and the adoption of the joint resolution challenged in this case. Acting pursuant to EnPA, both EPA and NRC promulgat- ed standards to govern the Yucca Mountain repository. EPA issued 40 C.F.R. part 197, establishing health and safety standards that require DOE to limit radiation releases from the repository for 10,000 years. See Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074 (June 13, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2004)). Shortly thereafter, NRC issued Yucca-specific licensing standards in 10 C.F.R. part 63. See Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732 (Nov. 2, 2001) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2004)). DOE also focused its attention on the Nevada site, issuing new site-suitability criteria specific to Yucca Mountain. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 963 (2004). Pursuant to these criteria and a final environmental impact statement, the Energy Secretary found Yucca Mountain suitable for a repository, concluding that a Yucca facility is ‘‘likely to meet applicable radiation protection standards.’’ Secretary’s Recommendation at 26. Based on that finding, the Energy Secretary recommended Yucca Mountain to the President for development as the nation’s underground nuclear waste repository. Id. at 6. Pursuant to NWPA procedures, the President then recom- mended Yucca to Congress. Objecting, Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval, to which Congress responded by pass- ing a joint resolution approving the development of a reposi- tory at Yucca Mountain. See Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10135 note (Supp. IV 2004)). As currently designed, the Yucca Mountain waste reposito- ry will house up to 70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste deep underground. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,081. DOE pro- jects that ninety percent of the waste destined for Yucca Mountain will be spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants. See id. The remaining ten percent will be 11 high-level radioactive waste left over from the nation’s nucle- ar weapons program. See id. To isolate this waste for the epochal years required – by comparison, human history has been recorded for only 5000 years, see id. at 32,099 – the disposal system’s overall design contemplates two types of barriers. First, ‘‘engineered’’ bar- riers, which include waste packages consisting of metal cylin- ders protected by drip shields, will surround the waste and protect it from water infiltration. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Yucca Mountain Project, Repository Concept: Engineered Barriers, at http:// www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/about/ebarriers.shtml (last visited June 1, 2004). These packages will sit in a complex of over fifty horizontal tunnels, each over sixteen feet wide, 2000 feet long, and reinforced with steel sets, rock bolts, and wire mesh. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Yucca Mountain Project, Repository Concept: Tunnel Layout and Design, at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymp/about/tunnels. shtml (last visited June 1, 2004). These tunnels are designed not only to keep water and falling rocks from reaching the waste canisters, but also to manage the heat the waste will generate. See id. Second, the disposal system’s ‘‘natural’’ barriers, i.e., the characteristics of the rock formations under Yucca Mountain, are intended to protect the waste from water infiltration and to dilute radiation releases expected to occur from leakage of the engineered barriers or from their failure thousands of years from now. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Fact Sheet, Nature and engineering working together for a safe repository, at http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/doeymp0203.shtml (last visited June 1, 2004). DOE plans to construct the repository tunnels in a thick layer of rock 1000 feet below the surface and 1000 feet above the water table. See id. The Energy Department expects that this surrounding rock will both limit water from seeping into the waste packages and delay radio- active particles from migrating into the human environment. See id.; 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,087. Decades or even centuries after beginning to bury waste at Yucca Mountain, DOE will 12 permanently close the repository by sealing off all openings to the surface. See Secretary’s Recommendation at 7. Before us now are challenges to four aspects of the statuto- ry and regulatory regime governing the Yucca Mountain repository. First, the State of Nevada and various environ- mental groups (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Public Citizen, Citizen Alert, Nevada Nuclear Waste Task Force, Nevada Desert Experience, Citizen Action Coalition of Indiana, and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service) challenge EPA’s radiation-protection regulation as insuffi- ciently protective of public health and safety. The Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. (NEI), a trade association representing the nuclear energy industry, challenges EPA’s ground-water standard, claiming it to be both unnecessary and unlawful. Second, Nevada, Clark County, and the City of Las Vegas attack NRC’s licensing-criteria rule as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. Third, Nevada, Clark County, and the City of Las Vegas challenge the constitutionality of the congressional resolution selecting the Yucca Mountain site, arguing that Congress impermissibly singled out the State to bear the unique burden of housing the nation’s nuclear waste. Fourth, Nevada, Clark County, and the City of Las Vegas attack DOE’s part 963 site-suitability criteria, the Energy Secretary’s and President’s decisions to recommend Yucca Mountain for development as the nation’s waste repository, and the Energy Department’s Final Environmental Impact Statement. We consider each challenge in turn. II. THE EPA CASES A. The EPA Rule: 40 C.F.R. part 197 Through the 1992 Energy Policy Act, Congress required EPA to establish site-specific standards for a repository at Yucca Mountain. The statute provides: [T]he [EPA] Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protec- tion of the public from releases from radioactive 13 materials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Such standards shall pre- scribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public from releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materi- als stored or disposed of in the repository. The standards shall be promulgated not later than 1 year after the Administrator receives the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sci- ences TTT and shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site. EnPA § 801(a)(1). Acting pursuant to this authority, EPA promulgated a rule, codified at 40 C.F.R. part 197, establishing a trio of public health and safety standards to govern DOE’s nuclear waste disposal activities at Yucca Mountain. Together, these stan- dards are designed to protect both individuals living near the disposal site and local ground-water supplies from excessive radiation contamination. The rule begins by prescribing an ‘‘individual-protection standard’’ that requires the Energy Department, as a condi- tion of receiving an NRC license, to show that the Yucca Mountain disposal system will sufficiently contain radiation to protect a hypothetical person living adjacent to the site from excessive exposure to radiation releases. The standard pro- vides: The DOE must demonstrate, using performance as- sessment, that there is a reasonable expectation that, for 10,000 years following disposal, the reason- ably maximally exposed individual receives no more than an annual committed effective dose equivalent of 150 microsieverts (15 millirems) from releases from the undisturbed Yucca Mountain disposal sys- tem. The DOE’s analysis must include all potential pathways of radionuclide transport and exposure. 40 C.F.R. § 197.20 (2004). This ‘‘reasonably maximally ex- posed individual’’ (RMEI) represents a theoretical person 14 living in the ‘‘accessible environment,’’ id. § 197.21 (2004), i.e., any point outside the ‘‘controlled area,’’ an area no greater than 300 square kilometers around the repository, id. § 197.12 (2004). The RMEI is designed to have lifestyle characteristics (such as water and food consumption habits) that would expose him or her to ‘‘reasonably maximal’’ expo- sure levels. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,092. The individual- protection standard expresses the maximum doses the RMEI may incur in terms of an ‘‘annual committed effective dose equivalent,’’ a methodology that calculates an overall expo- sure dose by assigning weighting factors to account for organs’ relative sensitivities to radiation. See 40 C.F.R. § 197.2 (2004) (defining ‘‘effective dose equivalent’’ as ‘‘the sum of the products of the dose equivalent received by specified [human body] tissues following an exposure of, or an intake of radionuclides into, specified tissues of the body, multiplied by appropriate weighting factors’’). The rule’s second standard, the ‘‘human-intrusion stan- dard,’’ requires DOE to show, among other things, a reason- able expectation that the RMEI will receive no more than a specified dose of radiation even if humans drill, intentionally or otherwise, into a waste package during the 10,000-year period immediately following disposal. Id. § 197.25(a) (2004). The third standard, the ‘‘ground-water-protection stan- dard,’’ requires DOE to demonstrate that the Yucca Mountain disposal system will contain radiation sufficiently well to protect ground water outside the controlled area from exces- sive contamination. Specifically, the rule provides: The DOE must demonstrate that there is a rea- sonable expectation that, for 10,000 years of un- disturbed performance after disposal, releases of radionuclides from waste in the Yucca Mountain disposal system into the accessible environment will not cause the level of radioactivity in the rep- resentative volume of ground water to exceed the limits in TTT Table 1. Id. § 197.30 (2004). Table 1, in turn, specifies maximum permitted contamination levels for three different types of 15 radionuclides, which correspond to the maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) that EPA established under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000). See 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,106. For example, DOE must demon- strate that ‘‘[c]ombined beta and photon emitting radionu- clides’’ will not exceed four millirems per year. 40 C.F.R. § 197.30 (Table 1). Measured according to ‘‘critical organ dose’’ methodology, these MCLs establish maximum radiation doses by reference to the part of the body most sensitive to the regulated radionuclide. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radionuclides; Notice of Data Availabili- ty, 65 Fed. Reg. 21,576, 21,603 (Apr. 21, 2000); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radionuclides, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,708, 76,716 (Dec. 7, 2000); United States Environ- mental Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada (40 CFR Part 197) – Final Rule, Response to Comments Document 6-21 (June 2001) [hereinafter ‘‘Response to Com- ments’’]. The ‘‘representative volume’’ referred to in the ground-water standard must include the highest concentra- tion of radiation in the ‘‘plume of contamination’’ outside the controlled area. 40 C.F.R. § 197.31(a)(1) (2004). To obtain a license to dispose of waste at Yucca Mountain, the Energy Department ‘‘must demonstrate to NRC that there is a reasonable expectation of compliance’’ with each of these three protection standards. Id. § 197.13 (2004). To account for changing conditions during the 10,000 years fol- lowing disposal, EPA requires DOE to ‘‘vary factors related to geology, hydrology, and climate based upon cautious, but reasonable assumptions.’’ Id. § 197.15 (2004). In contrast, the Energy Department must hold constant ‘‘changes in society, the biosphere (other than climate), human biology, or increases or decreases in human knowledge or technology.’’ Id. As to the period beyond the first 10,000 years, the rule requires DOE to calculate the maximum radiation exposures the RMEI will incur and then include the results of this calculation in its environmental impact statement as an indi- cator of long-term disposal system performance. Id. § 197.35 16 (2004). ‘‘No regulatory standard,’’ however, ‘‘applies to the results of this analysis.’’ Id. In their petition for review, the State of Nevada, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and the other environmental groups (throughout section II of this opinion, we shall refer to this set of petitioners as either ‘‘Nevada’’ or ‘‘the State’’) first challenge part 197’s 10,000-year compliance period, claiming that it both conflicts with EnPA and is arbitrary and capricious. They also argue that EPA arbi- trarily and capriciously drew the controlled area’s boundaries, that the size of the controlled area violates the Safe Drinking Water Act, and that the rule impermissibly defines the term ‘‘disposal.’’ For its part, the Nuclear Energy Institute chal- lenges EPA’s decision to add a separate ground-water stan- dard to part 197, arguing that the standard contravenes EnPA and that it is arbitrary and capricious. B. Challenges Brought by Nevada and Environmental Petitioners 1. Jurisdiction Before addressing the merits of Nevada’s petition, we must consider two jurisdictional issues. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 101-02 (1998) (holding that federal courts must ensure that they have jurisdiction before considering the merits of a case). The first, relating to subject matter jurisdiction, arises because although the Hobbs Act, the jurisdictional statute invoked by all parties, gives courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review orders issued by a host of federal agencies – including the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Maritime Commission – the Act nowhere mentions the Environmental Protection Agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (2000). Even so, we believe that the Act’s conferral of jurisdiction over rules issued by the now- defunct AEC gives us jurisdiction to entertain the petitions in this case. The Hobbs Act authorizes courts of appeals to review ‘‘all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewa- 17 ble by section 2239 of title 42.’’ Id. § 2342(4). In turn, section 2239 makes reviewable ‘‘[a]ny final order [of the Atomic Energy Commission],’’ 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b) (2000), that is entered in ‘‘any proceeding for the issuance or modifi- cation of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees,’’ id. § 2239(a)(1)(A). The AEC’s authority to estab- lish environmental standards to protect the public from radia- tion exposure, however, has since been transferred to EPA, and the AEC has been abolished. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(6), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. 1 (2000) (transferring to the EPA Administrator the ‘‘functions of the Atomic Energy Commission TTT administered through its Division of Radiation Protection Standards, to the extent that such functions of the Commission consist of establishing generally applicable environmental standards for the protec- tion of the general environment from radioactive material’’); 42 U.S.C. § 5814(a) (2000) (abolishing the AEC). Given this transfer of authority, at least three circuits have held that EPA action undertaken pursuant to EPA’s AEC-transferred authority is reviewable under the Hobbs Act as if undertaken by the AEC itself. See Watkins, 939 F.2d at 712 n.4 (stating that EPA’s generic health and safety standards for nuclear waste repositories are reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 2239(b)); NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1267 n.7 (same); Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 728 F.2d 477, 481-84 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding Hobbs Act jurisdiction over EPA regulations addressing radiation releases from uranium fuel cycle opera- tions). Going one step further, this circuit has held that agency action that ‘‘derives’’ from transferred authority is also reviewable under the Hobbs Act. See Aulenbeck, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 103 F.3d 156, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the court had Hobbs Act jurisdiction to review Transportation Department rules addressing certain safety requirements because the agency’s power to issue those requirements ‘‘derive[d] in part’’ from its transferred authori- ty and because actions taken pursuant to that transferred authority were subject to Hobbs Act review). This is just such a case. 18 In issuing its Yucca Mountain standards, EPA acted pursu- ant to authority derived from its AEC-transferred powers. When Congress, acting through EnPA section 801, required EPA to issue Yucca-specific, radiation-protection standards, it built on EPA authority – transferred from the AEC – to promulgate generally applicable standards to protect the public from radiation. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-1018, at 390 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2472, 2481 (‘‘Sec- tion 801 [of EnPA] builds upon [the] existing authority of the [EPA] Administrator to set generally applicable [radiation- protection] standardsTTTT’’). Because EPA’s authority to promulgate its Yucca rule thus ‘‘derives’’ from its AEC- transferred powers, we may consider petitioners’ challenge to part 197 under our Hobbs Act jurisdiction. See Aulenbeck, 103 F.3d at 165. The second jurisdictional issue concerns EPA’s claim that neither Nevada’s nor the environmental petitioners’ constitu- tional standing is ‘‘self-evident.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 21. To establish Article III standing to sue on behalf of their mem- bers, NRDC and the other environmental petitioners must show that ‘‘(a) [their] members would otherwise have stand- ing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests [they] seek[ ] to protect are germane to [their] purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the partic- ipation of individual members in the lawsuit.’’ Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Under the first element of this test, the environmental petitioners must show that at least one of their members meets the ‘‘irreducible constitutional minimum’’ of standing, i.e., injury- in-fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). ‘‘The burden on a party challenging an administrative decision in the court of appeals is to show a substantial probability that it has been injured, that the [respondent] caused its injury, and that the court could redress that injury.’’ Rainbow/PUSH Coalition v. FCC, 330 F.3d 539, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the asserted injury must be both ‘‘concrete and particularized’’ as well as ‘‘actual or imminent.’’ Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 19 To demonstrate standing, the environmental petitioners rely on declarations by several of their members, including one by Ed Goedhart, a member of petitioners Citizen Alert and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service. See Decl. of Ed Goedhart ¶ 1. Goedhart states that he lives and works in Amargosa Valley, Nevada, eighteen miles from Yucca Mountain. Id. ¶ 2. He alleges that EPA’s failure to adopt more stringent radiation-protection standards will per- mit hazardous radionuclides from the buried waste to contam- inate his community’s ground-water supplies, causing adverse health effects. See id. ¶¶ 2-7. These allegations are more than sufficient to give Goedhart standing to sue in his own right. The claimed injury to his ground-water supply is neither hypothetical nor conjectural. Indeed, EPA itself acknowledges that ‘‘[t]he boundaries of the town [of Amargosa Valley] include all of the area where the highest potential doses from a repository at Yucca Mountain are anticipatedTTTT’’ Final Background Information Docu- ment at 8-13. Although radionuclides escaping from the Yucca repository may not reach Goedhart’s community for thousands of years, his injury is ‘‘actual or imminent,’’ for he lives adjacent to the land where the Government plans to bury 70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste – a sufficient harm in and of itself. See La. Envtl. Action Network v. United States EPA, 172 F.3d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that an environmental group established constitu- tional standing where its members lived near a landfill into which an EPA regulation allegedly would permit certain hazardous wastes to be deposited). In addition, this harm is ‘‘fairly traceable,’’ Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted), to EPA’s allegedly lax radiation-protection standards, and favorable relief, i.e., requiring EPA to make more stringent each aspect of the rule that petitioners chal- lenge, would likely redress his harm. Nor have we any doubt that Goedhart has prudential standing. To establish prudential standing, a party’s ‘‘griev- ance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guar- antee invoked in the suit.’’ Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 20 162 (1997). Goedhart’s grievance clearly falls within the Energy Policy Act’s ‘‘zone of interests,’’ for that Act seeks to ensure that DOE operates the Yucca repository safely, i.e., without endangering the lives or health of the surrounding population. See EnPA § 801(a)(1) (directing EPA to promul- gate ‘‘public health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials’’). Because the Government does not argue that the environ- mental petitioners fail either the germaneness or the individu- al-participation element of associational standing, and because ‘‘we [too] have [no] reason to believe that [they] fail[ ] to satisfy [these] latter two requirements,’’ Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we conclude that the environmental petitioners have established standing to bring their petition for review. And since only one petitioner requires standing, we need not consider the Government’s separate challenge to Nevada’s standing. See Military Tox- ics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We thus turn to the merits of Nevada’s petition. 2. The 10,000-Year Compliance Period Nevada first challenges EPA’s decision to establish a com- pliance period that extends only 10,000 years into the future. According to Nevada, the 10,000-year marker violates EnPA section 801(a) and is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). We begin and end with Nevada’s EnPA challenge. Section 801(a) of the Energy Policy Act requires EPA to promulgate public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain ‘‘based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.’’ Chartered by Congress during the Civil War, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS or Academy) serves as the federal government’s scientific adviser, convening distinguished scholars to address scientific and technical issues confronting society. See NAS REPORT at vi. EnPA directs EPA to contract with NAS to conduct a study to provide ‘‘findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for protection of the public health and safety’’ from the potential hazards 21 posed by a Yucca Mountain repository. EnPA § 801(a)(2). To undertake the necessary study, NAS convened a commit- tee organized under the auspices of its principal operating arm, the National Research Council. NAS REPORT at vi-vii. That committee retained two consultants, conducted five open meetings to which it invited over fifty scientists and engi- neers, and reviewed publicly available research compiled by federal, state, and local agencies, among others. Id. at vii- viii. The Academy’s work culminated in a 1995 report entitled ‘‘Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards.’’ With re- spect to the length of the compliance period, NAS found ‘‘no scientific basis for limiting the time period of the individual- risk standard to 10,000 years or any other value.’’ Id. at 55. According to the Academy, ‘‘compliance assessment is feasible for most physical and geologic aspects of repository perform- ance on the time scale of the long-term stability of the fundamental geologic regime – a time scale that is on the order of 106 [one million] years at Yucca Mountain.’’ Id. at 6. NAS also explained that humans may not face peak radiation risks until tens to hundreds of thousands of years after disposal, ‘‘or even farther into the future.’’ Id. at 2. Given these findings – and central to the issue before us – NAS ‘‘recommend[ed] that compliance assessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs, within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic environ- ment.’’ Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). That said, NAS ex- plained that ‘‘although the selection of a time period of applicability has scientific elements, it also has policy aspects that we have not addressed,’’ such as the goal of establishing consistent policies for managing various kinds of long-lived, hazardous materials. Id. at 56. Following issuance of the NAS Report, EPA promulgated its draft part 197 standards in which it proposed a 10,000-year compliance period. In so doing, EPA ‘‘request[ed] comments upon the reasonableness of adopting the NAS-recommended compliance period or some other approach in lieu of the 10,000-year compliance period which we favorTTTT’’ 64 Fed. Reg. at 46,995. DOE, responding to EPA’s request, sup- 22 ported the 10,000-year compliance period, claiming that a ‘‘significantly longer time period for assessing compliance would be unprecedented, unworkable, and probably unimple- mentable.’’ Letter from Lake H. Barrett, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, to United States Environmental Protection Agency 2 (Nov. 1999). By contrast, Nevada submitted comments opposing the 10,000- year marker, urging that EPA adopt a period of compliance covering the time of projected peak doses, as NAS had recommended. See Letter from Robert R. Loux, Executive Director, Office of the Governor, Agency for Nuclear Pro- jects, to United States Environmental Protection Agency 8 (Nov. 23, 1999). After the comment period closed, EPA promulgated its final rule, in which it adopted a 10,000-year compliance peri- od. Expressly acknowledging that NAS had recommended that the compliance period cover the time when the greatest risk of radiation exposure occurs and that the Academy had found it scientifically possible to predict repository perform- ance for approximately one million years, EPA nevertheless concluded that ‘‘such an approach is not practical for regula- tory decisionmaking.’’ 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,097. The agency explained: Despite NAS’s recommendation, we conclude that there is still considerable uncertainty as to whether current modeling capability allows development of computer models that will provide sufficiently mean- ingful and reliable projections over a time frame up to tens-of-thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of years. Simply because such models can provide projections for those time periods does not mean those projections are meaningful and reliable enough to establish a rational basis for regulatory decision- making. Id. Moreover, EPA maintained that selecting a compliance period for the individual-protection standard ‘‘involves both technical and policy considerationsTTTT In addition to the technical guidance provided in the NAS Report, we consid- 23 ered several policy and technical factors that NAS did not fully address, as well as the experience of other EPA and international programs.’’ Id. at 32,098. According to EPA, five considerations guided its decision: (1) the agency uses 10,000 years for programs involving the disposal of other long-lived, hazardous materials, (2) the individual-protection requirements in 40 C.F.R. part 191, EPA’s generally applica- ble nuclear waste disposal standards, use such a time frame, and ‘‘consistency [is] appropriate because both sets of stan- dards apply to the same types of waste,’’ (3) many interna- tional geologic disposal programs use 10,000 years, (4) setting the standard to peak dose times ‘‘could lead to a period of regulation that has never been implemented in a national or international radiation regulatory program,’’ and focusing on 10,000 years forces more emphasis on features that humans can control such as repository design, and (5) projecting human exposure levels over long periods of time involves great uncertainty. Id. at 32,098-99. On this last point, EPA stated that ‘‘we believe that NAS might not have fully ad- dressed two aspects of uncertainty,’’ specifically (1) ‘‘the impact of long-term natural changes in climate and its effect upon choosing an appropriate RMEI,’’ and (2) ‘‘the range of possible biosphere conditions and human behavior.’’ Id. In the final rule’s preamble, EPA also explained why it believed that part 197 complied with EnPA’s requirement that the rule be ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ NAS’s findings and recommendations. Id. at 32,082-84. That man- date, EPA stated, ‘‘does not bind us absolutely to follow the NAS Report. Instead, we used it as a starting point for this rulemakingTTTT [W]e do not believe the statute forces our rulemaking to adopt mechanically NAS’s recommendations as standards.’’ Id. at 32,083. Thus, because part 197 was ‘‘guided by the [Academy’s] findings and recommendations [in light] of the special role Congress gave it,’’ id., EPA conclud- ed that it had acted in accordance with EnPA’s directive. Challenging EPA’s determination, Nevada contends that part 197’s 10,000-year compliance period deviates from the NAS Report and that EPA therefore failed to promulgate a 24 rule ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ NAS’s findings and recommendations, as required by EnPA section 801(a). Be- cause Congress has charged EPA with implementing section 801(a) of the Energy Policy Act, we analyze this claim under the two-part test of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re- sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Under Chevron’s first step, we ask ‘‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,’’ for if ‘‘the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matterTTTT [T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’’ Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. If the statute is ‘‘silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,’’ we proceed to Chevron’s second step, asking whether the agency’s interpretation ‘‘is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’’ Id. at 843. At this stage, although we defer to agency statutory interpreta- tions, ‘‘our judicial function is neither rote nor meaningless,’’ Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and we will reject an interpretation ‘‘that diverges from any realistic meaning of the statute,’’ id. at 753 (quoting Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Beginning at Chevron Step One, then, we ask whether Congress’s directive that EPA issue standards ‘‘based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences’’ is clear and unambiguous. In considering this question, we do not write on a clean slate. In a recent case interpreting the Clean Air Act, we observed that ‘‘[t]here is no question that the phrase ‘based on’ is ambiguous.’’ Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296, 305-06 (D.C. Cir. 2004), amended by No. 03-1084, 2004 WL 877850 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 16, 2004). Although the words ‘‘based on’’ do not necessarily mean ‘‘rest solely on,’’ we concluded, they prohibit actions that ‘‘abandon[ ]’’ or ‘‘supplant[ ].’’ Id. at 306. In another Clean Air Act case, we reached a similar conclusion about the phrase ‘‘consistent with,’’ explaining that this ‘‘flexi- ble statutory language’’ requires not ‘‘exact correspondence TTT but only congruity or compatibility.’’ Envtl. Def. Fund, 25 Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (describing the phrase ‘‘consistent with’’ as requiring the court to defer to reasonable agency determinations), amended by 92 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Likewise, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Daley, we held that a statute requiring fishing quotas to be (among other things) ‘‘consistent with’’ a fishery management plan was ambiguous. 209 F.3d at 754. Because ‘‘[t]he statute does not prescribe a precise quota figure,’’ we reasoned, ‘‘there is no plain meaning on this point.’’ Id. (‘‘[W]e TTT view this case as governed by Chevron Step Two.’’). Given this case law, we are not free to conclude that section 801(a) clearly and unambiguously an- swers the precise question before us. Nor can we discern an unambiguous congressional com- mand from EnPA’s legislative history. See id. at 752 (‘‘Under the first step of Chevron, the reviewing court must exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Conference Report explains: The Conferees do not intend for the National Acade- my of Sciences, in making its recommendations, to establish specific standards for protection of the public but rather to provide expert scientific guid- ance on the issues involved in establishing those standards. Under the provisions of section 801, the authority and responsibility to establish the stan- dards, pursuant to a rulemaking, would remain with the [EPA] Administrator, as is the case under exist- ing law. The provisions of section 801 are not intended to limit the Administrator’s discretion in the exercise of his authority related to public health and safety issues. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-1018, at 391, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2482. Rather than answering the specific question at hand, this discretion-conferring language supports our view that nothing in section 801(a) specifies precisely how EPA must use the NAS Report. 26 For its part, EPA insists that Congress actually intended it to adopt a 10,000-year compliance period. In support of this argument, EPA relies on EnPA section 801(a)(2)(C), which directed the agency to engage NAS to examine whether it is possible to predict the probability that humans will breach Yucca Mountain’s engineered or geologic barriers over a 10,000-year period. EPA also points out that at the time Congress enacted EnPA, the First Circuit had upheld a 10,000-year compliance period contained in EPA’s generic part 191 standards. See NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1292-93. By failing to specify an alternate time frame in the Energy Policy Act, EPA argues, Congress tacitly endorsed 10,000 years. EPA misreads EnPA’s contextual clues. Although EnPA mentions 10,000 years in section 801(a)(2), section 801(a)(1) – the provision that requires EPA to issue a Yucca-specific rule – tells the agency exactly how to set any compliance period, i.e., it must be ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ NAS’s recommendations. In view of this express directive, moreover, Congress’s failure to establish a compliance period cannot be viewed as tacit approval of the part 191 time frame. Given section 801’s ambiguity, Nevada’s challenge turns on whether EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period can be reason- ably described as ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ NAS’s findings and recommendations. We think it cannot. It would have been one thing had EPA taken the Academy’s recom- mendations into account and then tailored a standard that accommodated the agency’s policy concerns. But that is not what EPA did. Instead, it unabashedly rejected NAS’s find- ings, and then went on to promulgate a dramatically different standard, one that the Academy had expressly rejected. Al- though section 801’s ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ stan- dard does not require EPA to walk in lock-step with the Academy, we think it entirely unreasonable for EPA to have acted inconsistently with NAS findings and recommenda- tions. As in Daley, ‘‘[t]his case presents a situation in which the [agency’s action] so completely diverges from any realistic 27 meaning of the [statute] that it cannot survive scrutiny under Chevron Step Two.’’ 209 F.3d at 753. To begin with, there is little question that EPA’s 10,000- year compliance period deviates dramatically from the Acade- my’s findings. Most important, NAS unequivocally recom- mended a standard pegged to the time when radiation doses reach their peak: We believe that compliance assessment is feasible for most physical and geologic aspects of repository performance on the time scale of the long-term stability of the fundamental geologic regime – a time scale that is on the order of 106 [one million] years at Yucca Mountain – and that at least some potentially important exposures might not occur until after several hundred thousand years. For these reasons, we recommend that compliance assessment be con- ducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs, within the limits imposed by long-term stability of the geologic environment. NAS REPORT at 6-7. NAS reiterated this conclusion through- out its report: ‘‘[W]e recommend TTT [t]hat compliance with the standard be measured at the time of peak risk, whenever it occurs,’’ id. at 2 (footnote omitted); ‘‘we have recommended that the standard for individual risk should apply at times when the peak potential risks might occur,’’ id. at 55-56; ‘‘we see no technical basis for limiting the period of concern to a period that is short compared to the time of peak risk or the anticipated travel time,’’ id. at 56; ‘‘[t]he period over which this level of protection should be assessed should extend over the period of duration of hazard potential of the repository, that is, until the time at which the highest critical group risk is calculated to occur, within the limits imposed by the long- term stability of the geologic environment at Yucca Mountain, which is on the order of [one million] years,’’ id. at 67. Not only did NAS recommend that EPA set its compliance period based on peak risk, but it expressly rejected 10,000 years as a proper benchmark: ‘‘The current EPA standard [in part 191] contains a time limit of 10,000 years for the 28 purpose of assessing compliance. We find that there is no scientific basis for limiting the time period of an individual- risk standard in this way.’’ Id. at 6; see also id. at 55 (‘‘[W]e believe that there is no scientific basis for limiting the time period of the individual-risk standard to 10,000 years or any other value.’’). A 10,000-year limitation, NAS explained, ‘‘might be inconsistent with protection of public health.’’ Id. at 55. NAS continued: [A]s noted in a previous National Research Council study, EPA’s 10,000-year time limit TTT makes com- pliance rather easy. This we do not support because TTT we see no valid justification for this time lim- itTTTT Th[is] TTT calculational approach may seem to simplify licensing, but we do not understand how such an exercise can support the finding, required in licensing, that there be no unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (second and third omissions in original). Describing its recommendation as differing from a 10,000- year standard, NAS went on to state: Perhaps the most significant difference between our recommendations and 40 CFR 191 concerns the time period over which the standard is applicable. In 40 CFR 191, the standard applies for a period of 10,000 years. In our proposal, we have specified that the basis for the standard should be the peak risk, whenever it occurs [within the limits imposed by the long-term stability of the geologic environment]. Based on performance assessment calculations pro- vided to us, it appears that for some reasonable combinations of parameters, peak risks are likely to occur after 10,000 years. Id. at 119 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2 (same). EPA’s own explanation of its treatment of the NAS Report also reveals that the agency consciously and outrightly reject- 29 ed the Academy’s findings and recommendations. For exam- ple, in the final rule’s preamble, EPA acknowledged that NAS had found ‘‘no scientific basis for limiting the time period of the individual-risk standard to 10,000 years or any other value,’’ but ‘‘[d]espite NAS’s recommendation,’’ it concluded that a 10,000-year standard was appropriate. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,097 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. (concluding that NAS’s recommended peak dose standard is ‘‘not practical for regulatory decisionmaking, which involves more than scientific performance projections using computer models’’). This case is quite similar to Daley, where, as we explained above, see supra at 25, we held that a statute directing that agency fishing quotas be ‘‘consistent with’’ applicable fishery management plans was not free from ambiguity. See 209 F.3d at 753-54. Because the agency’s quota in that case had only an eighteen percent likelihood of achieving its conserva- tion target, we held that it failed Chevron’s Step-Two reason- ableness test. Id. ‘‘Only in Superman Comics’ Bizarro world, where reality is turned upside down,’’ we explained, ‘‘could the [agency] reasonably conclude that a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as to succeed offers [the requisite degree of] confidence.’’ Id. at 754 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). So too here. Only in a world where ‘‘based upon’’ means ‘‘in disregard of’’ and ‘‘consistent with’’ means ‘‘inconsistent with’’ could EPA’s adoption of a 10,000- year compliance period be considered a permissible construc- tion of section 801. EPA nevertheless insists that it acted consistently with the Academy’s conclusions because it based the 10,000-year com- pliance period on several policy concerns beyond the ken of NAS’s technical expertise. In support of this argument, EPA relies on NAS’s acknowledgment that agency standard- setting implicates policy considerations: ‘‘[W]e note that al- though the selection of a time period of applicability has scientific elements,’’ NAS stated, ‘‘it also has policy aspects that we have not addressed. For example, EPA might choose to establish consistent policies for managing risks from disposal of both long-lived hazardous nonradioactive 30 materials and radioactive materials.’’ NAS REPORT at 56 (citations omitted). We think the Academy’s statement far too thin a reed on which to find that EPA reasonably interpreted EnPA’s ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ command. Simply stating that standard-setting has ‘‘policy aspects’’ cannot transform NAS’s statement that ‘‘we recommend that compliance as- sessment be conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs, within the limits imposed by long-term stability of the geologic environment,’’ id. at 6-7 (emphasis omitted), into, as EPA would seemingly have it, ‘‘we recommend that compli- ance assessment be conducted for the period that lacks scientific basis but that best meets EPA’s policy goals.’’ Furthermore, NAS’s conclusion that EPA ‘‘might choose to establish consistent policies’’ is of little importance here, given that this court – not the Academy – is charged with determin- ing whether EPA has exercised its rulemaking discretion in compliance with EnPA. And although our case law makes clear that a phrase like ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ does not require EPA to hew rigidly to NAS’s findings, EnPA section 801(a) cannot reasonably be read to allow a regulation wholly inconsistent with NAS recommendations. EPA also claims that it complied with EnPA because it based the 10,000-year compliance period on the Academy’s finding that ‘‘there is no scientific basis for prediction of future states [of human activity], and the limit of our ability to extrapolate with reasonable confidence is measured in decades, or at most, a few hundreds of years.’’ Id. at 55. This statement helps EPA not at all, for NAS nonetheless concluded that despite this uncertainty, limiting the compli- ance period to 10,000 years was inappropriate. Id. Finally, at oral argument, EPA counsel insisted that part 197 is consistent with NAS’s findings because it requires DOE to ‘‘calculate the peak dose of the reasonably maximally exposed individual that would occur after 10,000 years follow- ing disposal but within the period of geologic stability’’ and to ‘‘include [those] results and their bases in the environmental impact statement for Yucca Mountain as an indicator of long- 31 term disposal system performance.’’ 40 C.F.R. § 197.35; see also Oral Argument Tr. at 32 (‘‘[W]e certainly think that the ultimate result was consistent with the NAS recommenda- tions insofar as the projections out to time of peak dose are required to be performed and submitted in the [Environmen- tal Impact Statement].’’). Although EPA’s addition of this provision might well represent a nod to NAS, it hardly makes the agency’s regulation consistent with the Academy’s find- ings. NAS recommended that the compliance period extend to the time of peak risk, yet EPA’s rule requires only that DOE calculate peak doses and expressly provides that ‘‘[n]o regulatory standard applies to the results of this analysis.’’ 40 C.F.R. § 197.35; see also 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,096 (‘‘The rule does not TTT require that DOE meet a specific dose limit after 10,000 years.’’). In sum, because EPA’s chosen compliance period sharply differs from NAS’s findings and recommendations, it repre- sents an unreasonable construction of section 801(a) of the Energy Policy Act. Although EnPA’s ‘‘based upon and con- sistent with’’ mandate leaves EPA with some flexibility in crafting standards in light of NAS’s findings, EPA may not stretch this flexibility to cover standards that are inconsistent with the NAS Report. Had EPA begun with the Academy’s recommendation to base the compliance period on peak dos- age and then made adjustments to accommodate policy con- siderations not considered by NAS, this might be a very different case. But as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, EPA wholly rejected the Academy’s recommendations. We will thus vacate part 197 to the extent that it requires DOE to show compliance for only 10,000 years following disposal. On remand, EPA must either issue a revised standard that is ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ NAS’s findings and recom- mendations or return to Congress and seek legislative author- ity to deviate from the NAS Report. It was Congress that required EPA to rely on NAS’s expert scientific judgment, and given the serious risks nuclear waste disposal poses for the health and welfare of the American people, it is up to Congress – not EPA and not this court – to authorize departures from the prevailing statutory scheme. 32 Because EPA’s 10,000-year compliance period violates EnPA section 801, we have no need to consider Nevada’s alternative argument that the standard is arbitrary and capri- cious under the APA. 3. The Controlled Area Nevada next attacks part 197’s controlled area. Part 197 contemplates that the Yucca Mountain disposal system will include not just a repository in which the waste packages are placed, but also a controlled area surrounding the repository. Under the rule, the controlled area may extend five kilome- ters from the repository in every direction, except that to- ward the south – the direction in which ground water flows – the area may extend to a specified geographic coordinate that is roughly eighteen kilometers away. See 40 C.F.R. § 197.12; 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,094. The controlled area serves three distinct functions. First, it operates as the natural barrier portion of the disposal system, the land dedicated to isolating and diluting radionu- clides released from the waste packages. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,117. Second, it designates the area that EPA will make off-limits to human settlement through ‘‘institutional controls’’ such as signs or guards. Id. Third, and central to Nevada’s challenge here, the controlled area’s borders establish the maximum distance from the repository that the Energy De- partment may locate the reasonably maximally exposed indi- vidual for purposes of demonstrating compliance with the individual-protection standard, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 197.20- 197.21, as well as the greatest distance from the repository that DOE may place the point of compliance for the ground- water-protection standard, see id. §§ 197.30, 197.31(a)(1). Under the individual-protection standard, DOE must show that the RMEI living in the ‘‘accessible environment,’’ defined as any point outside the controlled area, id. § 197.12, and specifically, ‘‘above the highest concentration of radionuclides in the plume of contamination,’’ id. 197.21(a), will incur radia- tion doses no greater than prescribed by the rule, id. § 197.20. Under the ground-water-protection standard, DOE must show that radiation levels in the representative volume 33 of water, including ‘‘the highest concentration level in the plume of contamination’’ outside the controlled area, id. § 197.31(a)(1), do not exceed maximum contaminant limits, id. § 197.30. In the final Yucca rule, EPA selected a point approximately eighteen kilometers south of the repository as the presumed location of the RMEI and the ground-water standard’s point of compliance. EPA explained that after considering loca- tions ranging from a few kilometers to roughly thirty kilome- ters from the repository, it selected the eighteen-kilometer point as the RMEI’s location for two primary reasons. First, after warning signs and other institutional controls lapse with the passage of time (the Academy was unable to predict how long such controls would last, see NAS REPORT at 106), rural residents – those with the lifestyle traits upon which EPA chose to model its RMEI, see 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,090 – are unlikely to settle farther north because living conditions become less hospitable the closer one gets to the repository. In particular, terrain becomes rougher, and depth to ground water increases. See id. at 32,094. Second, EPA concluded that even if individuals, notwithstanding these conditions, chose to live closer to Yucca Mountain, they would incur less overall exposure than rural residents at eighteen kilometers away, so placing the RMEI at the eighteen-kilometer point would provide greater overall protection than a more norther- ly location. Id. ‘‘[E]ven though the ground water nearer the repository could contain higher concentrations of radionu- clides,’’ EPA explained, if individuals lived closer to the repository, they would incur lower overall doses. Id. at 32,093. According to the agency: [Such individuals] would be unlikely to withdraw water from the significantly greater depth for other than domestic use, and in the much larger quantities needed for gardening or farming activities because of the significant cost of finding and withdrawing the ground water. It is possible, therefore, for an indi- vidual located closer to the repository to incur expo- 34 sures from contaminated drinking water, but not from ingestion of contaminated food. Id. Based on these findings, EPA concluded, ‘‘the exposure for an RMEI located approximately 18 [kilometers] south of the repository (where ingestion of locally grown contaminated food is a reasonable assumption) actually would be more conservative than an RMEI located much closer to the reposi- tory who is exposed primarily through drinking water.’’ Id. With respect to the ground-water standard’s point of com- pliance, EPA explained: [A]s one gets closer than about 18 [kilometers] to the repository footprint, the depth to water begins to increase dramatically from about 100 [meters] at a distance of 20 [kilometers] to a few hundred meters at a distance of 5 [kilometers]. Given the expecta- tion of future population growth and the precious nature of ground water resources in the area, it is reasonable to assume that a small group may annu- ally extract the representative volume of ground water at a distance slightly closer than 20 [kilome- ters]TTTT This approach is protective of the ground water resources reasonably anticipated to be ac- cessed in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain. Id. at 32,119-20. Nevada contends that EPA’s factual assumptions lack rec- ord support and that the agency therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously in allowing the controlled area’s southern boundary to extend eighteen kilometers from the repository. In particular, Nevada argues that the record shows that humans are likely to settle and grow food at locations much closer to the repository and that individuals living nearer to the buried waste will incur greater radiation exposure than those a full eighteen kilometers away. Based on this view of the record, Nevada claims that EPA’s controlled area is both irrational and insufficiently protective of public health and safety. We disagree. 35 To begin with, contrary to Nevada’s assertion, record evi- dence supports EPA’s finding that humans are unlikely to cultivate crops within the controlled area. The Final Back- ground Information Document, which explains much of the technical basis for EPA’s rule, shows not only that costs for drilling water increase as depth to water increases, but also that drilling and pumping water for irrigation purposes at depths exceeding 300 feet is economically infeasible, i.e., that when ‘‘[c]ombining TTT pumping cost estimates TTT with TTT capital cost estimates TTT, the marginal value of water for irrigation is exceeded at depths to water greater than 300 feet.’’ Final Background Information Document at IV-12; see also id. at IV-10, IV-12 (estimating the costs of drilling wells and pumping water for irrigation purposes at various depth-to-water levels). EPA therefore concluded that access- ing water for irrigation is cost-prohibitive at locations closer than eighteen kilometers. In reaching this conclusion, EPA, relying on the Academy’s recommendation, found that since it was ‘‘impossible to predict either human activities or econom- ic imperatives,’’ it would assume ‘‘current conditions’’ would persist indefinitely. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,094 (‘‘[W]e followed NAS’s recommendation to use current conditions to avoid highly speculative scenarios.’’). Because Nevada does not challenge this odd aspect of EPA’s reasoning and because depth to water generally surpasses 300 feet at points closer to the repository than the eighteen-kilometer mark, see Final Background Information Document at 8-33, EPA’s conclusion that humans would be unlikely to pursue agricultural activi- ties in such unfavorable terrain seems reasonable to us. We also think it reasonable for the agency to have found that humans will likely choose to settle outside the controlled area. Although the record does show that a community could feasibly settle within the controlled area and use local water for domestic (as opposed to agricultural) purposes, see id. at IV-11 to IV-12, and that institutional controls cannot deter settlement within the controlled area for the entire compli- ance period, see id. at 8-89, EPA’s Final Background Infor- mation Document demonstrates that the costs of settling nearer to the repository are substantially higher than estab- 36 lishing a community farther away, see id. at IV-8 to IV-9. In any event, to satisfy the APA’s rational-decisionmaking stan- dard, EPA need not prove that humans will never settle within the controlled area; the agency needs only a reason- able basis for believing that they are unlikely to do so. See City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (‘‘[W]e will give an extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). In- deed, deciding where to locate the RMEI and the ground- water standard’s point of compliance involves a complex line- drawing judgment to which we owe great deference. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (‘‘Where issues involve elusive and not easily defined areas TTT, our review is considerably more deferen- tial, according broad leeway to the [agency’s] line-drawing determinations.’’ (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted)). EPA’s conclusion that individuals who could settle closer to the repository will incur less radiation exposure than those living eighteen kilometers away, though seemingly counterin- tuitive, also finds support in the record. Although ground water nearer to the repository could contain higher radiation concentrations than ground water farther away, see 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,093, well-drilling data in the record and the Energy Department’s analysis of relative radiation-exposure levels support EPA’s ultimate RMEI-location decision. As discussed above, EPA’s well-drilling cost estimates show that individuals who may settle closer to the repository are unlike- ly to extract water for agricultural purposes. Record data also demonstrate that individuals living closer to the reposito- ry who consume smaller quantities of more highly contami- nated water (water for drinking alone) will experience less overall exposure than those living farther from the repository who consume greater amounts of less contaminated water (water for both drinking and agriculture). DOE’s draft envi- ronmental impact statement projects that the mean peak dose rate for an individual at five kilometers, whose radiation intake is through drinking contaminated water alone, will be lower than that for a person at twenty kilometers who 37 consumes contaminated drinking water and contaminated food. See United States Department of Energy, Draft Envi- ronmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioac- tive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada 5-26 to 5-36 (July 1999). Nevada’s remaining challenges to EPA’s well-drilling data are without merit. Although it is true that EPA found it ‘‘difficult to reconcile’’ cost figures in a particular set of well- construction cost estimates, Final Background Information Document at IV-2, the agency did not rely on those analyses, resting its conclusions instead on calculations that estimated the overall cost of water based on construction and pumping costs for wells of various depths, see id. (stating that the agency estimated ‘‘the significance of drilling costs on the overall cost of water TTT by estimating the costs of various wells (different uses and depths) from the data available and then calculating the capital cost per acre-foot’’); see also id. at IV-11 (describing the mathematical equation used to com- pute water-pumping costs). And despite the State’s claim to the contrary, the fact that DOE itself uses two wells within the proposed controlled area to support its Yucca site- investigation activities, see id. at 8-80; 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,123, provides no basis for questioning EPA’s reasoning, for how a government agency chooses to allocate public funds tells us little (if anything) about how individuals, motivated by eco- nomic and personal considerations, decide where to live. Finally, Nevada contends that the rule’s controlled area boundaries violate what the State describes as the ‘‘non- endangerment’’ provision of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(3)(C) (2000) (‘‘Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect the duty to assure that underground sources of drinking water will not be endan- gered by any underground injection.’’). Although conceding both that EPA need not apply the SDWA to ground water within the controlled area and that EPA has imported its SDWA-based, maximum-contaminant-level standards to regu- late ground water outside the controlled area, Nevada never- theless insists that the SDWA compels EPA to draw a 38 smaller controlled area. This argument fails for a simple reason: SDWA standards do not apply to the Yucca Moun- tain repository. On this score, EnPA could not be clearer: ‘‘[EPA’s Yucca standards] shall be the only [public health and safety] standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.’’ EnPA § 801(a)(1); see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 102-1018, at 390, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2481 (‘‘[T]he standards established by the authority in this section would be the only such standards for protection of the public from releases of radioactive materials as a result of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste in a repository at the Yucca Mountain site.’’). Thus, even assuming that the SDWA applies to nuclear waste disposal at Yucca Mountain, Congress, acting through EnPA, exempted the Nevada repos- itory from that statute. Therefore, the SDWA cannot limit the size of Yucca’s controlled area, and because ‘‘the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.’’ Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 4. The Definition of ‘‘Disposal’’ For its final challenge to part 197, Nevada claims that EPA exceeded its statutory authority by adopting a definition of the term ‘‘disposal’’ that deviates from the one contained in the NWPA. While the NWPA defines ‘‘disposal’’ as ‘‘the emplacement in a repository of high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or other highly radioactive material with no foreseeable intent of recovery, whether or not such em- placement permits the recovery of such waste,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10101(9) (2000), EPA’s rule adds a ‘‘for as long as reason- ably possible’’ qualifier, 40 C.F.R. § 197.12. The rule defines ‘‘disposal’’ as ‘‘the emplacement of radioactive material into the Yucca Mountain disposal system with the intent of isolat- ing it for as long as reasonably possible and with no intent of recovery, whether or not the design of the disposal system permits the ready recovery of the material.’’ Id. According to Nevada, the additional ‘‘for as long as reasonably possible’’ language ‘‘could be read as requiring only temporary delay of radiation releases with engineered barriers to qualify as ‘disposal,’ mark[ing] a departure from the [c]ongressional 39 objective in the NWPA to base repository siting primarily on the principle of long-term geologic isolation.’’ Nev. Br. at 2. Nevada’s claim fails, again for a simple reason: EnPA, the statute pursuant to which EPA promulgated part 197, does not require the agency to use NWPA definitions. See EnPA § 801(a)(1) (requiring EPA to promulgate standards to gov- ern Yucca Mountain ‘‘[n]otwithstanding’’ other authority of the agency to issue generally applicable standards); see also id. § 801(a)(3) (stating that only EnPA, ‘‘rather than any other authority of the Administrator to set generally applica- ble standards for radiation protection,’’ applies to the Yucca Mountain site). Rather, EnPA is silent as to the meaning of ‘‘disposal,’’ and Nevada has failed to show that in filling that statutory gap, EPA acted unreasonably. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (stating that administering a congressionally created program requires ‘‘the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress’’). C. NEI’s Challenge to the Ground-Water Standard The Nuclear Energy Institute, a trade association repre- senting the nuclear energy industry, also takes issue with part 197. Specifically, it challenges EPA’s inclusion of a separate ground-water-protection standard. See 40 C.F.R. § 197.30. As NEI sees it, requiring DOE to demonstrate compliance with a distinct ground-water standard is unneces- sary because the rule’s individual-protection standard already limits overall radiation exposure, including exposure received through contaminated ground water. 1. Standing Before addressing the merits of NEI’s challenge, we must consider EPA’s claim that the organization lacks standing. To maintain its petition for review, NEI, like the environmen- tal petitioners, must demonstrate that it satisfies both associ- ational and prudential standing requirements. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343 (articulating the standing requirements for associ- ations); Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the Hobbs Act, which authorizes ‘‘[a]ny party aggrieved’’ to chal- 40 lenge final agency orders, 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2000), requires parties to demonstrate both constitutional and prudential standing). NEI claims that it has associational standing because part 197’s ground-water standard will complicate and delay the completion of the Yucca Mountain repository. According to NEI, EPA’s addition of a separate ground-water requirement will force the Energy Department to expend additional re- sources – both time and money – which will in turn inflict concrete harm on NEI members who, under the NWPA, not only bear the cost of storing their spent nuclear fuel until the Yucca Mountain repository is constructed, but also foot the repository’s bill through fee assessments paid into the Nucle- ar Waste Fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(5) (stating that nuclear waste generators ‘‘have the primary responsibility to provide for, and the responsibility to pay the costs of, the interim storage of [nuclear] waste TTT until [it] is accepted by the Secretary of Energy’’ for disposal); id. § 10222 (requiring nuclear waste generators to pay fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund to finance the building and operation of the Govern- ment’s underground repository). Affidavits submitted by NEI state (1) that nuclear power plants spend millions of dollars constructing and operating storage facilities, see Decl. of Eileen M. Supko ¶¶ 16, 18-21, and (2) that imposition of a ground-water standard will require DOE to undertake addi- tional work at the characterization, design, and licensing stages – which will both delay the date on which the Energy Department will take stored waste off NEI members’ hands and increase repository costs, see Decl. of Steven P. Kraft ¶¶ 8-11. Disputing these contentions, EPA argues that the separate ground-water standard imposes no additional cost on the repository program because the data and analysis required to assess compliance with the ground-water standard are the same as those required for the individual-protection standard. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada – Final 40 CFR 197: Evaluation of Potential Economic Impacts of 40 CFR Part 197 (Economic 41 Impact Assessment) at ES-1 to ES-2, 6-5, 7-1 (June 2001); see also Decl. of Ronald A. Milner ¶ 10 (‘‘[I]t is speculative whether compliance with the final EPA groundwater stan- dard would increase costs to the [Nuclear Waste] Fund so as to require an increase to the TTT per kilowatt-hour fee in the future or whether compliance with the standard would cause delays in the construction of a repositoryTTTT’’). Moreover, the agency argues that NEI’s requested relief – striking the ground-water standard from part 197 – will not redress the organization’s alleged injury because, with or without a sepa- rate ground-water standard, DOE will retain the same reposi- tory design. Based on the record before us, we conclude that NEI has standing to bring its petition for review. As to injury-in-fact, we have no doubt that delaying the opening of the Yucca Mountain repository would inflict concrete harm on NEI members, for as NEI’s affidavit explains, NEI members expend substantial sums to operate their own storage facili- ties. See Supko Decl. ¶¶ 16, 19. We likewise think NEI has shown a ‘‘substantial probability,’’ Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, 330 F.3d at 542, that the addition of a separate ground-water standard will cause these delays and that the organization’s requested relief will likely redress this harm. As NEI points out, part 197 requires DOE to demonstrate compliance with a separate ground-water standard in NRC licensing proceed- ings, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 197.13, 197.30 – a requirement that both DOE and NAS found could complicate the licensing process, see Letter from Lake H. Barrett, to United States Environmental Protection Agency at B-4 (‘‘[T]he proposed separate, single-pathway, groundwater standard could, de- pending on how it was implemented, prohibitively complicate licensingTTTT’’); Letter from Michael Kavanaugh, Chair and John Ahearne, Vice Chair, Board on Radioactive Waste Man- agement, National Research Council, to Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency 11 (Nov. 26, 1999) [hereinafter ‘‘NAS Comments’’] (‘‘Such separate [ground-water] limits may greatly complicate the licensing processTTTT’’); see also Kraft Decl. ¶ 10 (asserting that dur- 42 ing the NRC licensing process, DOE and NRC will have to spend time and resources ensuring that the repository com- plies with the separate ground-water standard). Moreover, although EPA vigorously disputes NEI’s claim that the ground-water standard will increase the cost of repository design and construction, the agency says virtually nothing about possible delays in the licensing process. Given this record, NEI has carried its burden of satisfying Article III’s ‘‘irreducible constitutional minimum.’’ Finally, pursuing liti- gation to speed the licensing of a permanent repository is ‘‘germane to the organization’s purpose[,] and TTT neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the partic- ipation of individual members in the lawsuit.’’ Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. EPA never suggests otherwise. To demonstrate prudential standing, NEI must show that its members’ ‘‘grievance[s] TTT arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision TTT invoked in the suit.’’ Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. This test is ‘‘not meant to be especially demanding. Indeed, a petition- er is outside the statute’s zone of interests only if [the petitioner’s] interests are so marginally related to or inconsis- tent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’’ Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, ‘‘there does not have to be an indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be [petitioner].’’ Nat’l Credit Union Ad- min. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 492 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). To analyze prudential standing, we look ‘‘to the particular provision of law upon which the [petitioner] relies,’’ Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76; ‘‘Congress’s purposes in enacting the overall statutory scheme are relevant only insofar as they may help reveal its purpose in enacting the particular provision,’’ Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2000). EPA contends that NEI falls outside the ‘‘zone of inter- ests’’ that EnPA section 801(a) protects or regulates because that provision was designed to safeguard public health and 43 safety, not to minimize regulatory burdens. Although EPA is correct that Congress enacted section 801(a) to protect the public from radiation releases at Yucca Mountain, we think it equally obvious that Congress intended section 801(a) to facilitate construction of a permanent nuclear waste reposito- ry – the very interest that NEI advances here. As evinced in the NWPA and later in EnPA, Congress viewed EPA stan- dards as a basic prerequisite for developing an underground repository. Indeed, because section 801(a) focuses exclusive- ly on a disposal facility at Yucca Mountain – the statute regulates no preexisting environmental or health threat – the required EPA standards would have no purpose whatsoever were repository construction not to move forward. Finally, section 801’s requirement that EPA promulgate health and safety standards no later than one year after receiving NAS’s recommendations further demonstrates Congress’s intent to move the federal government expeditiously toward licensing and operating a repository at Yucca Mountain. In light of this congressional purpose, NEI’s interests ‘‘arguably’’ fall within section 801(a)’s zone of interests, thus giving the organization prudential standing to pursue its petition for review. We therefore turn to the merits. 2. Alleged Conflicts with the Energy Policy Act NEI argues that EPA’s inclusion of a separate ground- water standard conflicts with EnPA’s plain language in three ways. First, NEI claims that by relying on the ‘‘critical organ dose’’ methodology, EPA’s ground-water standard vio- lates EnPA section 801(a) because, according to the associa- tion, that section authorizes EPA to promulgate only stan- dards that protect individual members of the public based on the ‘‘effective dose equivalent’’ (EDE) methodology. EnPA section 801(a)(1) contains three sentences: The first states that ‘‘the Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site’’; the second sentence, empha- sized by NEI, then says, ‘‘[s]uch standards shall prescribe the 44 maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual mem- bers of the public from releases to the accessible environment from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the reposi- tory’’; the third sentence concludes, ‘‘[t]he standards shall be promulgated not later than 1 year after the Administrator receives the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences TTT and shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site.’’ Parsing this language, NEI argues that the provision’s second sentence – ‘‘[s]uch standards shall prescribe the maxi- mum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public’’ – defines the scope of the ‘‘public health and safety standards’’ that the first sentence requires EPA to promulgate. Therefore, NEI argues, in executing Congress’s mandate to issue public health standards, the agency may promulgate only EDE-based safety rules that protect the public, not rules using a different methodology that protect ground water. If Congress had thought of EDE standards as merely a subset of EPA’s overall public health standards, NEI continues, then it would have used the word ‘‘include’’ in section 801(a)(1)’s second sentence, not ‘‘prescribe.’’ NEI also claims that the third sentence’s phrase, ‘‘shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site,’’ limits EPA’s authority to promulgation of the EDE-based standards referenced in the preceding sentence. In other words, each time Congress used the term ‘‘standards,’’ NEI argues, it meant only the EDE standards described in section 801(a)(1)’s second sentence. In Chevron terms, the ‘‘precise question’’ presented by NEI’s challenge is this: Did Congress clearly authorize EPA to promulgate more than just individual-protection, EDE- based standards? Unlike NEI, we think it did. To begin with, section 801(a)(1)’s first sentence expressly requires EPA to develop ‘‘public health and safety standards’’ – not just ‘‘EDE-based standards.’’ The second sentence’s directive – that EPA’s standards ‘‘shall prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the pub- lic’’ – neither restates nor defines the first sentence’s di- rective that the agency promulgate ‘‘public health and safety 45 standards for protection of the public.’’ Rather, the two sentences, read together, require EPA to establish a set of health and safety standards, at least one of which must include an EDE-based, individual-protection standard. In- deed, NEI’s reading of section 801(a)(1) would render much of that provision’s first sentence superfluous, for if Congress had intended to delegate to EPA authority to adopt an EDE standard only, it would not have directed the agency to promulgate ‘‘public health and safety standards for protection of the public.’’ For essentially the same reason, section 801(a)(1)’s third sentence, which provides that ‘‘[t]he stan- dards TTT shall be the only such standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site,’’ offers no support for NEI’s position. As we have explained, Congress required EPA to promulgate ‘‘public health and safety standards,’’ not just EDE-based standards. Therefore, the limitation contained in section 801(a)(1)’s third sentence cannot plausibly be read as refer- ring to the second sentence’s EDE-based standards. NEI also calls our attention to EnPA section 801(a)(3), which provides that ‘‘[t]he provisions of this section shall apply to the Yucca Mountain site, rather than any other authority of the Administrator to set generally applicable standards for radiation protection.’’ According to NEI, this section ‘‘precludes the Government’s interpretation of the first sentence of (a)(1) as giving [it] general authority to prescribe any health and safety standards.’’ Oral Argument Tr. at 73. This argument begs the question: Precisely what authority does section 801(a)(1) delegate to the agency? The answer, as we just explained, is that section 801 authorizes EPA to promulgate not merely EDE-based standards, but rather ‘‘public health and safety standards for protection of the public.’’ For its second statutory argument, NEI, echoing Nevada’s challenge to the 10,000-year compliance period, contends that part 197’s ground-water standard violates EnPA’s require- ment that EPA’s rule be ‘‘based upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.’’ EnPA § 801(a)(1). As NEI sees it, EPA imper- missibly promulgated a separate ground-water standard, like 46 the one in the generic part 191 standards, despite what NEI regards as NAS’s conclusion that adding such a standard to regulate Yucca Mountain waste disposal is unnecessary and lacks scientific foundation. Although we concluded earlier in this opinion that EPA violated section 801’s ‘‘based upon and consistent with’’ re- quirement by adopting a 10,000-year compliance period, see supra at 20-31, we reach the opposite conclusion here because NAS treated the compliance-period and ground-water issues quite differently. Whereas NAS expressly rejected a 10,000- year compliance period, it said nothing at all about the need to add a separate ground-water standard. The NAS Report states: 40 CFR 191 includes a provision to protect ground water from contamination with radioactive materials that is separate from the 40 CFR 191 individual-dose limits. These provisions have been added to 40 CFR 191 to bring it into conformity with the Safe Drinking Water Act, and have the goal of protecting ground water as a resource. We make no such recommendation, and have based our recommenda- tions on those requirements necessary to limit risks to individuals. NAS REPORT at 121. In other words, the Academy never even considered a ground-water standard. As EPA ex- plained: In its report, NAS did not recommend specifically that we include a separate ground water protection provision in our environmental protection standards for Yucca Mountain. Neither, however, did NAS state that we should not include such a provi- sionTTTT Our decision to include separate ground water standards is a policy decision that we make pursuant to our statutory authority under the Ener- gy Policy Act. 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,107; see also Response to Comments at 6- 16 (stating that the ground-water standard is not inconsistent with NAS’s findings because ‘‘NAS clearly identified the 47 ground-water pathway as one of the significant pathways of exposure’’ and because the Academy did not ‘‘make a specific recommendation that EPA either include or not include a separate ground-water protection provision’’). Put another way, NAS made no ‘‘finding’’ or ‘‘recommendation’’ that EPA’s regulation could fail to be ‘‘based upon and consistent with.’’ We thus agree with EPA that section 801 left it free to add a ground-water standard. NEI points out that the Academy sharply criticized EPA’s ground-water standard in a letter submitted during part 197’s notice-and-comment period. See NAS Comments at 10-12. But EnPA does not require EPA to conform its rule to comments that NAS submits during the rulemaking process. Instead, EnPA section 801(a)(1) requires EPA to base its standards on the Academy’s ‘‘findings and recommendations.’’ EnPA section 801(a)(2), in turn, requires EPA to obtain those findings through a formal study conducted by the Academy: ‘‘[T]he [EPA] Administrator shall contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to provide TTT findings and recommendations on reasonable standards for protection of the public health and safetyTTTT’’ EnPA § 801(a)(2) (emphasis added). Reading these provisions to- gether, we think it clear that Congress directed EPA to conform its rule to those ‘‘findings and recommendations’’ that appear in the NAS Report. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (‘‘[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’’). Indeed, NAS itself stated that its ‘‘[f]indings and recommendations to EPA on the technical bases for Yucca Mountain standards were provided in the [NAS Report].’’ NAS Comments at 2. Given that report’s silence on the need for a separate ground-water standard, EPA’s decision to add distinct ground-water protections rests on ‘‘a permissible construction’’ of EnPA section 801. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. NEI’s final statutory argument requires little discussion. Pointing out that EnPA directs EPA to protect ‘‘the public from releases from radioactive materials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site,’’ EnPA 48 § 801(a)(1), NEI argues that the regulation impermissibly applies not just to ‘‘releases,’’ but to preexisting background radiation as well. It is true, as NEI observes, that the ground-water standard caps the permissible level of radiation contamination by requiring inclusion of ‘‘natural background’’ radiation in the calculation of ‘‘[c]ombined radium-226 and radium-228’’ as well as ‘‘[g]ross alpha activity.’’ 40 C.F.R. § 197.30 (Table 1); see also 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,114 (requiring that ‘‘DOE combine certain estimated releases from the Yuc- ca Mountain disposal system with the pre-existing naturally occurring or man-made radionuclides to determine the con- centration in the representative volume [of ground water]’’). Part 197, however, does not regulate background radiation. See 40 C.F.R. § 197.30 (requiring DOE to demonstrate that ‘‘releases of radionuclides from waste in the Yucca Mountain disposal system into the accessible environment will not cause the level of radioactivity TTT to exceed the limits in TTT Table 1.’’ (emphasis added)). As EPA explains, the rule requires only that DOE take background levels into account when measuring permissible releases of radionuclides from the repository. See id. (Table 1). Therefore, part 197 could not possibly run afoul of EnPA’s focus on released radiation. 3. Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge NEI also attacks EPA’s ground-water standard as arbi- trary and capricious. Part 197 requires DOE to show that the level of radioactivity in the ground water outside the designated controlled area will not exceed the maximum contaminant levels for radionuclides that the agency estab- lished under the Safe Drinking Water Act. See id.; 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,106. Challenging these MCL limits, NEI claims that their underlying ‘‘critical organ dose’’ methodology rests on obsolete science, yields erratic health risks beyond the high and low limits of EPA’s risk range, and conflicts with other federal radiation-protection standards. NEI advances a number of highly complex scientific arguments in support of these attacks, but we need not address them here because we rejected the same arguments last year in City of Waukesha v. EPA. 49 In City of Waukesha, we denied NEI’s challenge to EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act regulations, finding the agency’s chosen methodology for its beta/photon MCLs consistent with the SDWA’s ‘‘best available science’’ requirement and reason- able under the APA. See 320 F.3d at 255-57. Specifically, we saw ‘‘nothing unreasonable about EPA’s assertion that [its] approach was consistent with the ‘best available science,’ and nothing arbitrary about its decision to [use older MCL standards] under these circumstances.’’ Id. at 256. NEI’s ‘‘obsolete science’’ claim therefore cannot prevail here. Nor can we accept NEI’s second argument – that EPA acted arbitrarily by failing to choose a methodology for the Yucca Mountain site that would yield consistent risk levels – be- cause City of Waukesha upheld EPA’s decision to use the selected MCLs despite their failure to provide uniform pro- tection levels. See id. at 256-57 (concluding that the agency acted reasonably in declining to promulgate uniform stan- dards because risk variations in virtually all cases were confined to the acceptable range). NEI’s third argument – that EPA’s Yucca rule conflicts with other federal radiation- protection standards – likewise founders in light of City of Waukesha, which concluded that EPA’s MCL standards re- lied on prevailing federal radiation guidance. See id. at 255- 56. Finally, even if City of Waukesha had not disposed of this issue and even were there some inconsistency between part 197’s ground-water standard and other official radiation- protection guidance, NEI has nonetheless failed to show why any such inconsistency would make EPA’s use of these stan- dards at Yucca unreasonable. See id. at 248 (‘‘We may reject an agency’s choice of scientific model only when the model bears no rational relationship to the characteristics of the data to which it is applied.’’ (internal quotation marks omit- ted)). NEI also contends that EPA acted arbitrarily by justifying its decision to adopt a ground-water standard on cost grounds without first conducting a cost-benefit analysis. The pream- ble to part 197’s final version states that ‘‘[b]ecause of the expenses and difficulties associated with remediation of con- taminated ground water, it is prudent and cost-effective to 50 prevent the occurrence of such contamination.’’ 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,106. In our view, however, EPA adequately explained its reasons for adopting the ground-water standard: Not only did the agency conclude (unremarkably) that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, but it explained that adding a ground-water standard would produce other salu- tary effects, i.e., ‘‘encourag[ing] a robust containment and isolation design that will not result in unacceptable contami- nation during the regulatory time frame.’’ Id. at 32,108; see also Response to Comments at 6-12 (‘‘We believe that ground-water protection standards will confer greater protec- tion to aquatic or biological communities [than an individual- protection standard alone] by limiting the contamination of ground water that would discharge to the surface, such as springs or seep areas.’’). Finally, NEI contends that EPA acted unreasonably by regulating ground water with MCLs that were designed to apply ‘‘at the tap,’’ i.e., after treatment. But even if the MCLs were intended to apply ‘‘at the tap’’ in the SDWA context, NEI gives us no basis for second-guessing EPA’s decision to import these standards to the Yucca Mountain site. As we have explained, EPA has offered an entirely rational reason for protecting water resources while they remain underground: Preventing ground water contamina- tion is more cost-effective and environmentally protective, and applying MCL standards will encourage a robust contain- ment and isolation design. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 32,106-08. By contrast, if the repository contaminates local ground wa- ter, ‘‘future generations will have to decide whether to forego use of the ground-water resource or to expend substantial resources to clean [it] upTTTT This would violate one of the primary principles in radioactive waste management TTT that radioactive waste disposal should place no undue burdens upon future generations.’’ Response to Comments at 6-13. III. THE NRC CASES Nevada and two of its political subdivisions – Clark County and the City of Las Vegas (collectively, Nevada or the 51 State) – challenge two NRC actions in separate cases which we have consolidated for review. In case number 02-1116, Nevada petitions for review of the requirements and criteria promulgated by NRC in part 63 of its regulations for licens- ing the Department of Energy’s planned repository at Yucca Mountain for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. See Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Moun- tain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732 (final rule Nov. 2, 2001) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter part 63]. In a related case, number 03-1058, Nevada petitions for review of NRC’s denial of its petition for rulemaking (submitted eight months after NRC published part 63 in the Federal Register) seeking various amendments to NRC’s requirements and criteria, all of which were directed at ensuring that DOE, as part of the anticipated licensing process, demonstrate that Yucca Mountain’s geologic makeup provides the ‘‘primary’’ barrier for isolating radioactive waste from the human envi- ronment. See State of Nevada; Denial of a Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 9023 (Feb. 27, 2003). Although Nevada’s two cases take different tacks, both essentially challenge NRC’s requirements and criteria for licensing a radioactive waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Nevada challenges part 63 on multiple grounds. First, Nevada claims that NRC violated the NWPA by permitting the licensing of a repository that does not isolate waste primarily by geologic means and does not provide multiple, independent barriers to prevent the escape of radionuclides from the repository. As part of this claim Nevada further maintains that, by abandoning the so-called multiple-barrier approach, NRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Second, Nevada claims that NRC violated EnPA by failing to require that DOE’s planned repository comply with EPA’s part 197. See Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, NV, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074 (June 13, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 197) [hereinafter part 197]. Next, Nevada claims that NRC violated the NWPA, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (2000), and the 52 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (2000), by precluding challenges to DOE’s peak radiation dose calculations required by part 63 and violated the APA by limiting the period for evaluating the repository’s performance to 10,000 years following the place- ment of waste there. Finally, Nevada claims that NRC violated the APA by adopting a ‘‘lax’’ ‘‘reasonable expecta- tion’’ standard of proof for assessing the repository’s ultimate performance. See Petitioners’ Br. at 66-75. For the reasons set forth below, we grant Nevada’s petition for review in part and deny it in part. Before we turn to the merits of Nevada’s claims, however, we must address NRC’s assertion that, for the most part, we lack jurisdiction to do so. A. Jurisdiction and Timeliness NRC contends that we lack jurisdiction to entertain Neva- da’s petition for review of the part 63 licensing requirements and criteria (case No. 02-1116) because it was untimely filed under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342, which allows 60 days for filing a petition for review of final agency action, id. § 2344. See Respondent’s Br. at 18-25. NRC argues that Nevada is not entitled to the benefit of the NWPA’s longer, 180-day window for commencing a civil action challenging agency action taken ‘‘under’’ subtitle A of the Act provided in section 119,1 42 U.S.C. § 10139(c), because in promulgating part 63 NRC did not take action ‘‘under’’ the NWPA. 1 Section 119 of the NWPA provides in pertinent part: [T]he United States courts of appeals shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action – (A) for review of any final decision or action of the Secretary, the President, or the Commission under this part; (B) alleging the failure of the Secretary, the Presi- dent, or the Commission to make any decision, or take any action, required under this part; [or] (C) challenging the constitutionality of any decision made, or action taken, under any provision of this partTTTT 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A)-(C) (emphases added). 53 NRC first observes that, while the NWPA requires NRC to promulgate ‘‘technical requirements and criteria,’’ it directs NRC to do so ‘‘pursuant to authority under other provisions of law.’’2 42 U.S.C. § 10141(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). NRC next points out that the NWPA manifests that NRC’s author- ity under ‘‘other provisions of law’’ refers to the AEA and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq. (2000). Because the NWPA directs NRC to promul- gate ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ under preexisting authority conferred by the AEA, NRC did not promulgate part 63 ‘‘under’’ the NWPA but ‘‘under’’ the AEA. Therefore, as NRC regulations issued under the AEA are reviewable under the Hobbs Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)-(b), which requires a petition for review to be filed within sixty days following issuance of the agency’s final rule, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344, Nevada’s petition – filed 160 days after NRC issued its final licensing criteria – is untimely. NRC does concede that we retain jurisdiction to address the sole claim made in Nevada’s second petition for review (case No. 03-1058) – i.e., that the NWPA requires Yucca Mountain’s geology to serve as the repository’s primary mechanism for isolating radioac- tive waste from the human environment – because ‘‘in the 2 Section 121 of the NWPA provides in pertinent part: [T]he Commission, pursuant to authority under other pro- visions of law, shall, by rule, promulgate technical require- ments and criteria that it will apply, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.), in approving or disapproving – (i) applications for authorization to construct reposito- ries; (ii) applications for licenses to receive and possess spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in such repositories; and (iii) applications for authorization for closure and de- commissioning of such repositories. 42 U.S.C. § 10141(b)(1)(A). 54 Hobbs Act context this [c]ourt has approved the petition for rulemaking device to trigger a new opportunity to seek substantive judicial review of agency rules.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 28; see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. DOI, 70 F.3d 1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (‘‘[O]ur cases TTT have permitted chal- lenges to rules beyond the statutory period. We have re- peatedly recognized that such challenges may be brought as petitions for a new rule and thereafter as petitions for review of an agency denial.’’). We do not accept NRC’s theory and, as set forth below, hold that Nevada’s petition for review of NRC’s part 63 – case No. 02-1116 – was timely filed under section 119 of the NWPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 10139(c). Statutes providing for judicial review, including section 119 of the NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10139, ‘‘are jurisdictional in nature and must be construed with strict fidelity to their terms.’’ Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995); accord Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 237 F.3d 681, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001). While the NWPA’s judicial review provisions admittedly are far from a ‘‘model of clarity,’’ Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 244 F.3d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Tennes- see v. Herrington, 806 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1986) (‘‘NWPA’s provisions on judicial review are unclear.’’), we conclude that NRC issued part 63 ‘‘under’’ section 121 of the NWPA as we understand that section’s use of this critical term. See 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A)-(C). NRC, relying on the Ninth Cir- cuit’s decision in Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 244 F.3d at 746-47, maintains that ‘‘the sine qua non of NWPA jurisdiction is that the agency action come ‘at least under the Act.’ ’’ Respondent’s Br. at 20 (emphasis in original (citing and quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 244 F.3d at 747)). We have no quarrel with the commonsensical proposition that section 119 brings within judicial purview only those final agency actions embraced by the express language of the NWPA. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 244 F.3d at 747 (‘‘NWPA’s provision for judicial review is limited to decisions ‘under’ the part, or at least under the Act when the decision is pursuant to a part of the Act and relates to the purposes of the part in which the 55 judicial review provision is placed.’’ (emphases in original)); Herrington, 806 F.2d at 647 (section 119 provides for review of ‘‘certain actions arising under the Act’’ (emphasis added)); Gen. Elec. Uranium Mgmt. Corp. v. DOE, 764 F.2d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (section 119 provides for review of ‘‘any final decision or action ‘under’ ’’ the NWPA (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A))). We do, however, part company with NRC when it asserts that NRC’s challenged actions ‘‘implicated’’ the NWPA but were not taken ‘‘under’’ it. Respondent’s Br. at 19-20. Section 121 of the NWPA provides that NRC pursuant to authority under other provisions of law, shall, by rule, promulgate technical requirements and criteria that it will apply, under the [AEA] TTT and the [ERA] TTT, in approving or disapproving – (i) applications for authorization to construct repositories; (ii) applications for licenses to receive and pos- sess spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioac- tive waste in such repositories; and (iii) applications for authorization for closure and decommissioning of such repositories. 42 U.S.C. § 10141(b)(1)(A). NRC seizes on section 121’s instruction that NRC use authority granted ‘‘under other provisions of law’’ – as well as its explicit reference to those authorities (the AEA and the ERA) – to accomplish what the section commands it to do: promulgate ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ to apply to the three types of listed applications. In focusing on section 121’s reference to ‘‘authority under other provisions of law,’’ however, NRC overlooks the fact that section 121 itself – and not any of NRC’s preexisting authori- ty under the AEA and the ERA – specifically directs NRC to adopt ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ to review the specified applications. See id. § 10141(b). NRC likewise ignores that, in addition to directing NRC to adopt ‘‘requirements and criteria,’’ section 121 imposes con- straints on the form the ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ may take. Id. § 10141(b)(1)(B)-(C). Section 121 provides, for example, that the ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ promulgated by 56 NRC ‘‘shall provide for the use of a system of multiple barriers in the design of the repository and shall include such restrictions on the retrievability of the solidified high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel emplaced in the repository as the Commission deems appropriate.’’ Id. § 10141(b)(1)(B). Section 121 also requires that NRC’s ‘‘requirements and criteria shall not be inconsistent with any comparable stan- dards promulgated by’’ EPA. Id. § 10141(b)(1)(C). Our conclusion that NRC promulgated its licensing criteria, at least in part, ‘‘under’’ the NWPA is buttressed by section 801 of EnPA. See EnPA § 801(b)(1). That section, in the plainest of language, directs NRC to ‘‘modify its technical requirements and criteria under section 121(b) of the [NWPA], as necessary, to be consistent with [EPA’s] stan- dards.’’ Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, it is simply impos- sible for us to say, as NRC would have us do, that NRC did not act ‘‘under’’ the NWPA, at least in part, when it promul- gated part 63. NRC insists that NRC’s authority to regulate the DOE’s disposal of high-level radioactive wastes predated the passage of the NWPA and therefore NRC had no need to, and did not, act ‘‘under’’ the NWPA in promulgating part 63. Specifi- cally, NRC alleges that section 202 of the ERA, 42 U.S.C. § 5842, (not the NWPA) ‘‘gave the NRC the power (and the obligation) to regulate DOE’s proposed Yucca Mountain re- pository.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 22. NRC’s argument, howev- er, is somewhat beside the point. That Congress may have authorized NRC to regulate DOE’s disposal of radioactive waste before it enacted the NWPA, compare 42 U.S.C. § 5842(3) (providing for licensing and related regulatory au- thority over ‘‘[f]acilities used primarily for the receipt and storage of high-level radioactive wastes resulting from activi- ties licensed under such Act’’); Disposal of High-Level Radio- active Wastes in Geologic Repositories: Licensing Proce- dures, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,971 n.1 (final rule Feb. 25, 1981) (‘‘The Commission interprets ‘storage’ as used in the [ERA] to include disposal.’’), with 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (under the NWPA ‘‘[t]he Commission shall consider an application for a construction authorization for all or part of a repository in 57 accordance with the laws applicable to such applications’’), hardly negates the fact that in the NWPA Congress specifi- cally directed NRC to issue ‘‘requirements and criteria’’ for evaluating repository-related applications and, not insignifi- cantly, how to do so. We also think that NRC’s reliance on the First Circuit’s decision in NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987), is misplaced. There, the First Circuit decided to exercise Hobbs Act jurisdiction regarding a petition for review of standards promulgated by EPA ‘‘pursuant to the directive of the NWPA’’ because the Hobbs Act authorizes ‘‘judicial re- view of final orders under the [AEA].’’ Id. at 1263, 1267 n.7. NRC says a similar result should occur here because the First Circuit based the exercise of Hobbs Act jurisdiction on Congress’s instruction to EPA to promulgate its standards ‘‘pursuant to authority under other provisions of law,’’ which is the precise instruction it gave NRC in section 121 of the NWPA. See Respondent’s Br. at 20. But the First Circuit did not confront the issue we confront; section 119 expressly authorizes judicial review of actions taken by NRC under the NWPA but does not do so for those taken by EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A)-(B). Thus, the First Circuit in NRDC v. EPA had no occasion to, and in fact did not, choose between NWPA and Hobbs Act jurisdiction. See 824 F.2d at 1267 n.7. Nor has any other court addressed precisely this issue so far as the parties or we can tell. Section 119 requires that ‘‘any civil action’’ seeking review of a final NRC ‘‘decision or action’’ under the NWPA, as well as any action challenging NRC’s failure to make a decision or take an action under the Act, must be filed ‘‘not later than the 180th day’’ following the challenged decision, action or failure to act. 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a), (c). Nevada filed its petition for review of part 63 on April 11, 2002, 160 days after NRC published part 63 in the Federal Register. See 66 Fed. Reg. 55,732. Because Nevada filed its petition for review of NRC’s action in promulgating part 63 – an action it took ‘‘under’’ the NWPA – well within the time allowed by section 119, see 42 U.S. [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/186276. Public record. Not legal advice.