# Sibley v. Lemaire

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · August 24, 1999 · 184 F.3d 481

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/18503

## Case

- **Full name:** James J. SIBLEY, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. Raywood J. LEMAIRE, Sheriff; Hubert P. Trahan; Freddie Nolan, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 24, 1999
- **Citations:** 184 F.3d 481; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20158; 1999 WL 595200
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Jolly
- **Judges:** Reavley, Jolly, Garza
- **Cited by:** 94 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/18503

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding summary judgment proper on the basis of qualified immunity when the evidence did not show that the appellees were aware of an “unjustifiably high risk” to a detainee
- discussing the rights of a pretrial detainee and concluding that the prison had the duty to provide reasonable medical care

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-30301
_____________________

JAMES J. SIBLEY, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant-Cross-Appellee,

versus

RAYWOOD J. LEMAIRE, Sheriff;
HUBERT P. TRAHAN; FREDDIE NOLAN,

Defendants - Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________

August 24, 1999

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

James J. Sibley appeals the dismissal of his claims that

officers operating the Vermillion Parish Correctional Center

(“prison”) were liable for horrible injuries he inflicted on

himself while a pretrial detainee. Sibley was arrested for assault

and battery. He underwent a psychotic episode while being detained

in an isolation cell. During this psychotic episode he physically

blinded himself by plucking out his eyes. For this injury, he sued

the sheriff, chief deputy, and a deputy under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Louisiana negligence claims. He won a jury verdict. The

defendants then moved for a judgment as a matter of law (“JML”) or

new trial. The district court initially denied the motions, but

then reconsidered in the light of two newly released opinions and
granted a new trial. The defendants then moved for summary

judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary

judgment on the § 1983 claims and dismissed without prejudice the

remaining state claims. Sibley appeals the district court’s

rulings and the judgment dismissing his complaint. The defendants

cross-appeal, arguing that the district court should have granted

a JML instead of a new trial and that they were entitled to a JML

on the state negligence claims. Finding no error on the part of

the district court, we affirm.

I

As we have indicated, this case involves the particularly

bizarre and shocking injuries Sibley inflicted upon himself during

a psychotic episode while detained at the Vermillion Parish

Correctional Center. Sibley was arrested on November 22, 1990,

when the sheriff’s department responded to a complaint made by

Sibley’s father-in-law. At the time he was arrested, his relatives

pressed charges but requested that the charges be dropped as soon

as he received medical attention. At that point, Sibley had

developed severe psychological problems, which were exacerbated by

his not taking prescribed medication. It is unclear the extent to

which the sheriff’s department was informed of his history of

mental problems.

At the correctional center, Sibley was placed in a holding

cell and then, after erratic behavior, he was placed in an

isolation cell. Sibley could only be observed by looking through

2
a slot in the door. There was no closed circuit camera in the

room. The district court concluded at trial that there was

evidence that Sheriff Lemaire, who was in charge of the

correctional center, had a policy of placing violent prisoners in

the isolation cell and, if necessary, placing them in shackles.

There was also evidence that prisoners with mental problems who

exhibited violent behavior were not treated differently from other

violent prisoners. The evidence at trial further shows that

Lemaire instituted a policy whereby prisoners in isolation cells

were to be checked every ten to fifteen minutes.

The Parish Coroner, Dr. Ardley Hebert, examined Sibley on

November 23, and concluded that he should be transferred to

Acadiana Mental Health (“AMH”). Because AMH did not have any

available beds, Dr. Hebert put Sibley on the waiting list and left

him at the correctional institute.

On November 24, Deputy Nolan notified the correctional

center’s nurse that Sibley needed to see a doctor. Dr. Brian Amy,

who was taking calls for Dr. Hebert, examined Sibley and also

concluded that he should be transferred to AMH. Again, there were

no beds available and Dr. Amy therefore left Sibley on the waiting

list. During his visit, Dr. Amy filled out a Physician’s Emergency

Commitment form (“PEC”).

Dr. Amy’s notes on the PEC are telling. He noted that Sibley

could be having delusions. In the section querying whether the

patient is homicidal, suicidal, or violent, Dr. Amy wrote, “patient

3
not violent on exam, did get arrested for battery.” In dictated

notes from his visit, Dr. Amy further noted: “I was called to see

patient at the jail for grossly bizarre behavior. On arrival,

patient was pacing around his cell reading an upside down Bible

with photographs lined up on the bed like he was holding services.

Patient had a very bizarre affect.” In a handwritten note at the

bottom of the copy of Dr. Amy’s typewritten, dictated notes, he

wrote in hand: “He is on the list at Acadiana Mental Health &

really needs to go there.”

Dr. Amy left with instructions that he should be called if

necessary. Sibley concedes that, up to that point, “[a]lthough

[his] conduct was strange and indecorous, there was no suggestion

of any potentially self-harming behavior prior to or during Dr.

Amy’s visit.”

Throughout this time period, Sibley’s behavior was erratic--he

was observed holding his Bible upside down while appearing to read

from it, cleaning the walls of his cell with toilet paper, and

lying next to his toilet and staring into it. On Sunday,

November 26, Sibley was found kicking the door to his cell. There

is a factual dispute about what happened after that. Because of

the procedural posture of this case, we present the facts in the

light most favorable to Sibley’s arguments. The testimony provides

the basis for concluding that Sibley was placed in leg shackles and

that the shackles were left on him until the evening of Monday,

4
November 27.1 The reason for placing Sibley in shackles was either

to punish him for disruptive behavior or to prevent him from

hurting himself.

On Monday, November 27, a deputy discovered that Sibley had

urinated on himself and his mattress, thrown his food around, and

thrown his Bible and family pictures into the toilet. He was

removed to another cell while his cell was cleaned. He was offered

a shower but declined one because he apparently believed the devil

would come up through the drain. He was then placed back in his

cell and left there shackled and nude. A deputy testified that he

checked on him at 9:15 p.m. and observed him sitting on his bed

chanting. At 9:30 p.m. that evening, the same deputy discovered

him plucking his eyes out with his fingers.

There was a delay of approximately an hour before Sibley was

transported to a hospital. Deputy Nolan indicated that he believed

he needed to speak to Dr. Amy before Sibley was moved and that his

efforts to reach him were the cause for the delay. When Sibley was

admitted to the hospital, his left eye was completely ruined and

his right eye was severely damaged. He has not recovered any sight

in his right eye.

The evidence at trial did not link either Lemaire or Trahan to

any actions taken with respect to Sibley. Furthermore, there is no

evidence in the record that anyone communicated to Lemaire

1
Sibley has not alleged a constitutional violation based on
being kept in shackles. Nor is there any evidence that Sibley
suffered any injury because of the use of shackles.

5
information that might lead them to think that Sibley posed a risk

to himself. Nor did Lemaire issue any orders with respect to how

Sibley should be treated. Lemaire can therefore only be held

responsible for policies that may have led to Sibley’s self-

mutilation. Similarly, Trahan can only be held responsible for

either a policy or his failure to properly supervise the deputies

handling Sibley.

With respect to Nolan, there is no evidence that he did

anything that physically exacerbated Sibley’s condition. Although

he did put Sibley in shackles, there is no evidence that the

shackles, in and of themselves, brought about Sibley’s psychotic

episode. Besides applying the shackles to Sibley, Nolan did

nothing else that could have had any physical effect on Sibley.

There is, however, evidence that he observed Sibley’s apparently

worsening condition without calling Dr. Amy for additional medical

consultation. He therefore can only be liable for neglecting to

seek additional medical help for Sibley, in the light of Sibley’s

increasingly erratic conduct--conduct which arguably led Nolan to

shackle Sibley to protect himself from himself.

II

Sibley first filed a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Sheriff Lemaire in federal district court in 1990. He

asserted that Sheriff Lemaire was responsible for the Vermillion

Parish Jail and that Sibley had been denied psychiatric care in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also filed claims in

6
state court asserting negligence claims under Louisiana Civil Code

articles 2315, 2316, and 2320 against Sheriff Lemaire and others,

including Dr. Hebert, Dr. Amy, and the Vermillion Parish Police

Jury.2 The trial in district court was held in abeyance pending

the state court proceedings. By late 1994, all state court actions

against Dr. Hebert, Dr. Amy, and the Police Jury had been dismissed

with prejudice.3

In 1996, Sibley amended his complaint in district court. In

part, the amended complaint alleged that there was a persistent,

widespread practice that amounted to a policy of using isolation

cells and shackles against patients with mental problems.

According to the amended complaint, that policy violated Sibley’s

right to substantive due process. The complaint also alleged that

Lemaire failed to provide constant observation of mental patients

or to train the prison staff to recognize symptoms of serious

mental illness. Sibley’s amended complaint also added Chief Deputy

Hubert Trahan and Deputy Nolan as defendants. Sibley also

successfully moved to consolidate the Louisiana state claims with

the § 1983 claims. The case was tried to a jury in September 1996.

Thus, the federal trial proceeded against Sheriff Lemaire and

his two deputies Trahan and Nolan. At the close of Sibley’s

2
In the state court there were a number of medical review
panels that were convened pursuant to Louisiana’s Medical
Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq.
3
Dr. Hebert was removed from the suit because he was bankrupt,
Dr. Amy prevailed on the merits, and the Vermilion Parish Police
Jury settled.

7
evidence, Lemaire moved for a JML under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(a), in

part requesting dismissal of the policymaker claims. The district

court held that the written and/or customary policy of using the

isolation cell for disruptive inmates, including mentally ill

inmates, was not unconstitutional on its face but could nonetheless

be unconstitutional as applied. The district court concluded that

whether there was a policy that was unconstitutional as applied was

a matter for the jury to decide and deferred ruling on the motion.

At the close of testimony, Lemaire again renewed his motion and the

district court again deferred ruling. At that time, Trahan and

Nolan moved for a determination of qualified immunity. The

district court deferred ruling on the motion.4

The jury decided in Sibley’s favor with respect to Chief

Trahan and Sheriff Lemaire on the § 1983 claims. The jury found

that Nolan was not liable under the § 1983 claims. The jury

further decided in Sibley’s favor with respect to all of the

defendants on the Louisiana negligence claims. The jury found that

Lemaire helped “develop a governmental custom, policy, ordinance,

regulation or decision that violated . . . Sibley’s constitutional

rights.” The district court entered judgment on March 7, 1997. On

June 19, 1997, the district court denied Lemaire, Trahan, and

Nolan’s rule 50 and rule 59 motions.

4
On November 27, 1996, the trial judge denied Trahan’s motion
for a JML on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that a
jury could reasonably conclude that Trahan reacted with deliberate
indifference to Sibley’s worsening condition.

8
On March 17, 1997, the defendants filed a post-trial motion

for a JML or for new a new trial or remittitur. On June 19, 1997,

the district court granted a new trial based on our en banc

decision in Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997), and on a

recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Keith v. United States

Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 694 So.2d 180 (La. 1997). The defendants

then moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims in the

subsequent proceedings, and the district court granted the motion,

dismissing the state claims without prejudice.

III

At the outset, we note that resolving this appeal is greatly

complicated by the quite unusual procedural posture of the case.

The case went through a complete trial at the end of which the

district court granted a motion for a new trial (denying a motion

for a judgment as a matter of law in the process) only to then

grant summary judgment. Both sides now take full advantage of the

lengthy procedural history of the case to point out numerous

perceived errors along the way. Sibley argues that the district

court erred by granting a new trial or, failing that, by granting

the motion for summary judgment that finally terminated the case.

The defendants argue that the district court erred in failing to

grant its various motions for judgment as a matter of law, for

permitting various errors during the course of the trial, and in

not also granting summary judgment on grounds other than those the

district court did rely on in disposing of the case.

9
We address only those issues necessary to resolve this case as

expediently as possible. Those issues are: (1) whether the

district court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for a new

trial; (2) whether the district court erred in granting summary

judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claims; and (3) whether

the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the

remaining state claims without prejudice. We hold that the

district court did not err in granting a new trial. A Fifth

Circuit en banc opinion and a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion

mandated a new trial with respect to the § 1983 and state

negligence claims. We also find that, although a new trial was

mandated, the district court did not err when it denied the

defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. We further

hold that the district court did not err in granting summary

judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claim. Finally, having

concluded that a new jury trial was necessary and that no federal

questions remained, the district court did not err in electing not

to exercise pendent jurisdiction.

IV

The first issue we address is whether the district court erred

in granting a new trial. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), the district

court has authority to grant a new trial “to all or any of the

parties and on all or part of the issues . . . for any of the

reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in

10
actions at law in the courts of the United States.” We review the

district court’s decision for abuse of discretion:

Courts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably
clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or
that substantial justice has not been done, and the
burden of showing harmful error rests on the party
seeking the new trial. Ultimately the motion invokes the
sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate review
of its ruling is quite limited.

Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179

n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice

& Procedure § 2803, at 31-33 (3d ed. 1973)).

To determine whether the district court abused its discretion,

we must address whether it was error to grant a new trial with

respect to each of Sibley’s principal claims--the § 1983 claim and

the state negligence claims. With respect to the state negligence

claims, we assess first whether there is any basis for disturbing

the jury verdict and, then, if we find such a basis, whether it was

more appropriate to grant a new trial or simply grant the

defendants’ motion for a JML. We thus turn to our analysis of

these issues.

A

Sibley asserted a somewhat confusing § 1983 claim at a time

when our law on the subject was less than clear. Sibley’s claim

was that the defendants were responsible for perpetuating a policy

that denied mentally disturbed patients reasonable medical care.

After a lengthy review of the record, our best formulation of their

claim is as follows: There was evidence that the officers in the

11
prison routinely used the isolation cell and shackles to restrain

violent prisoners. As a result, the guards did not distinguish

between sane and mentally ill prisoners. By failing to do so, the

guards hampered their ability to assess whether the condition of a

prisoner who was mentally ill was worsening. According to Sibley,

this policy--uniform treatment of all violent prisoners--is not

reasonably related to a legitimate government goal.

The district court expressed considerable skepticism about

whether Sibley’s theory amounted to a constitutional violation.

However, holding that it was bound by a recent Fifth Circuit

opinion, Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1996), the district

court concluded that the question of whether a prison policy was

reasonably related to a legitimate government objective was a

factual question for the jury to decide.

After the district court entered judgment, we issued our en

banc opinion in Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). In

that opinion, we made it clear that in a case such as Sibley’s, the

appropriate analysis was not whether the conditions of confinement

were responsible for Sibley’s injuries. Rather, his case should be

examined as an “episodic act or omission” case:

In an “episodic act or omission” case, an actor usually
is interposed between the detainee and the municipality,
such that the detainee complains first of a particular
act of, or omission by, the actor and then points
derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack
thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the
act or omission.

12
Id. at 53. With respect to an “episodic act or omission” case, we

had previously established that the plaintiff must show that an

official acted with subjective deliberate indifference. To hold

superiors liable, the plaintiff must then show that “the employee’s

act resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or

maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s

constitutional rights.” Id. at 54 (quoting Hare v. City of

Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)).

In the light of our en banc decision, the district court

therefore correctly concluded that, in this case, it was error to

submit the amorphous question of whether the prison’s policy was

reasonably related to a legitimate government objective to a jury.

Instead, the court first had to determine that, based on the record

before it, a specific employee had acted with deliberate

indifference to Sibley’s medical condition. We therefore find no

error in the district’s court’s conclusion that this error required

a new trial on the § 1983 claim.5

B

5
Because we find that the district court did not err in
subsequently granting summary judgment, the issue of whether the
district court erred when it denied the defendants’ various motions
for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the § 1983 claims
is mooted. Regardless, given the unique facts of this case, the
judge’s decision to grant a new trial was reasonable. Our en banc
opinion in Scott reshaped the court’s analysis of the case, and it
is understandable why the judge would choose to provide the parties
a further opportunity to brief the issues in the light of Scott
prior to ultimately ruling on them.

13
The district court granted a new trial with respect to the

state negligence claims because it concluded that, under

La.Civ.Code art. 2323, as amended, it had erred when it did not

instruct the jury to quantify the fault of the doctors (who were

not defendants in the federal case but who were sued, along with

the defendants here in the state case). In its earlier ruling on

the issue, the court relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s

holding in Cavalier v. Cain Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So.2d

975 (La. 1995), to conclude that the jury need not quantify fault

to non-parties.

After the decision in Cavalier was announced, the Louisiana

legislature passed an amendment to art. 2323 in the 1996

Extraordinary Legislative Session of the Legislature requiring a

determination of “the degree or percentage of fault of all persons

causing or contributing to the injury, death or loss.” In Keith v.

United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 694 So.2d 180 (La. 1997),

which was issued after the final judgment was entered in this case,

the court held that the amendment to art. 2323 is procedural in

nature and therefore should be applied retroactively.

In the light of Keith, it is apparent that the district court,

through no fault of its own, incorrectly refused to permit the

quantification of fault among the doctors. On appeal, Sibley

argues that actions involving the doctors have already been tried

and absolved of fault in state court and that the district court

should therefore be collaterally estopped from assigning fault to

14
the doctors in this lawsuit. Sibley is correct that Dr. Amy has

been absolved of any wrongdoing in this matter and it would

therefore be inappropriate for the jury to assess whether he is at

fault. With respect to Dr. Hebert, however, there was no

determination that Dr. Hebert was not in part responsible for

Sibley’s injuries. It was therefore not error on the part of the

court to grant a new trial.

The defendants argue that instead of granting its motion for

a new trial, the district court should have granted their motion

for a JML, because there is no legal cause in fact. Their argument

is essentially that, given the extreme nature of the injuries

suffered here, there is no way that the result could be legally

caused by the guards neglecting a duty. This conclusion is not

altogether clear. The relevant duties here are the duty to provide

reasonable medical care and the duty protect the detainee from

foreseeable harm.6 In this case, the defendants arguably failed in

that duty when they did not make a follow-up call to either Dr.

Hebert or Dr. Amy, despite Sibley’s apparent worsening condition.

If, in those circumstances, they breached either duty, the harm

6
A corollary to the defendants’ argument that the defendants’
action did not proximately cause Sibley’s injuries is that the harm
was not foreseeable. However, unlike the fact pattern in the now
famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y.
1928), where the type of harm that occurred was completely
unforeseeable, in this case, it was not the type of harm--self-
inflicted injuries--which was unforeseeable but rather the extent
of the harm. It is a well established principle of tort law that,
if a defendant has breached a duty of care, the defendant must
“take his victim where he finds him.” E.g. Perniciaro v. Brinch,
384 So.2d 392, 395-96 (La. 1980).

15
that resulted, although perhaps unexpected and far more damaging

than usual, would fall within the kind of harm from which the

defendants would have had a duty to protect Sibley.

V

We turn next to the issue of whether the district court erred

in granting summary judgment. As we explained in our en banc

opinion in Scott, in order to make out a § 1983 claim, Sibley must

first show that the deputies (Nolan and Trahan) acted with

deliberate indifference. It is well settled that “negligent

inaction by a jail officer does not violate the due process rights

of a person lawfully held in custody of the State.” Hare v. City

of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996). Instead, a

plaintiff must establish that an official acted with deliberate

indifference. In Hare, id. at 648, we adopted the same deliberate

indifference standard for pretrial detainees as the one articulated

by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), for

convicted prisoners:

It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
recklessly disregarding that risk.
That does not, however, fully answer the pending
question about the level of culpability deliberate
indifference entails, for the term recklessness is not
self-defining. The civil law generally calls a person
reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act)
fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of
harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be
known.

Id. at 836. Under our deliberate indifference standard, then, it

is not enough to demonstrate that Nolan and Trahan were negligent

16
in not calling Dr. Amy when Sibley’s condition appeared to worsen.

Instead, Sibley must show that Nolan and Trahan were either aware

or should have been aware of an unjustifiably high risk that Sibley

would hurt himself and failed to act.

Having reviewed the record, we find that, although it is

possible that Nolan and Trahan’s activity could amount to

negligence, there is no evidence that their actions were so

reckless as to amount to deliberate indifference. Nolan and the

other deputies under Trahan’s care monitored Sibley and attempted

to care for him when he started kicking the door. Although

Sibley’s actions seem to have become increasingly erratic, nothing

he did so clearly indicated an intent to harm himself that the

deputies caring for him could have only concluded that he posed a

serious risk of harm to himself.7 The record does clearly

establish that Sibley’s actions in blinding himself are highly

unusual and unpredictable, even for someone suffering a psychotic

episode. The district court did not err in concluding that none of

the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference with

respect to Sibley. Having concluded that none of the guards acted

with deliberate indifference, their actions are objectively

7
We note here the difference between negligence and deliberate
indifference. A reasonably prudent man may well have deemed it
necessary to call Dr. Amy in the light of Sibley’s worsening
condition. To be deliberately indifferent, however, the deputies
would have had to have chosen not to call Dr. Amy with the
expectation that some harm would result to Sibley.

17
reasonable and the prison officials are entitled to qualified

immunity. Sibley’s § 1983 claim therefore fails.

VI

We turn finally to whether the district court erred in

dismissing the state claims without prejudice. A district court

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has

dismissed all claims over which it had pendent jurisdiction. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We review such decisions for abuse of

discretion. Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989).

In this case, both federal and state courts had engaged in lengthy

proceedings regarding the alleged facts of this case. At the point

that the district court granted summary judgment on the § 1983

claims, there remained the need for a full-blown jury trial on the

state negligence claims. We find no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s decision not to conduct that trial in federal

court.

VII

This case presents a particularly contorted procedural

history. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that

the district court correctly recognized that new case law mandated

a new trial and acted accordingly. Having reached that decision,

the district court provided both sides an opportunity to argue the

applicability of the law as set forth in our opinion in Scott to

the case at hand, before finally ruling that the defendants were

entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, and that the

18
remaining state negligence claims should be dismissed without

prejudice. Finding no error on the part of the district court, we

A F F I R M.

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/18503. Public record. Not legal advice.