# Rife

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · September 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11442597

## Case

- **Full name:** Daniel Eduardo Florez Rodriguez v. John E. Rife, Acting Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations, Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL EDUARDO FLOREZ
RODRIGUEZ, A# 241 883 891,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-01696

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

JOHN E. RIFE, Acting Field Office
Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Philadelphia
Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al.,

Respondents.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM
On June 19, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.
1. In this petition, Daniel Eduardo Florez Rodriguez, a native and citizen
of Colombia, challenges the legality of his pre-removal immigration
detention without an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). At the time of filing, Florez Rodriguez was being held in
the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) at Clinton County Correctional Facility, located in Clinton
County, Pennsylvania.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Florez Rodriguez initially entered the United States without

inspection at or near San Luis, Arizona, on or about September 2, 2022.
Florez Rodriguez was apprehended by United States Border Patrol
shortly thereafter and detained briefly. On September 3, 2022, he was

released on his own recognizance, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).1
Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. At the time of his release, Florez Rodriguez was
served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form I-862, dated September 3,

2022, which declared him to be subject to removal as an “alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”2 and which

directed him to appear for a hearing before an immigration judge in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 15, 2023. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp.
Ex. 2, Doc. 3-3.

1 At the time of his initial release, Florez Rodriguez was served with
an Order of Release on Recognizance, DHS Form I-220A, dated
September 3, 2022, and prepared by a border patrol officer, which advised
that he had been released on his own recognizance pursuant to “section
236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the applicable provisions
of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” Pet. Ex. B, Doc. 1-3. The
Order of Release on Recognizance further directed him to report in person
to a local ICE office in York, Pennsylvania, at 9:00 a.m. on September 20,
2022.
2 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring her to be an “arriving
alien” was checked. Pet. Ex. A, Doc. 1-2; Resp. Ex. 2, Doc. 3-3.
Since entering the United States, Florez Rodriguez has resided in

Pennsylvania. He has no criminal history.
On June 17, 2026, Florez Rodriguez was observed leaving the
Walmart Bloomsburg Supercenter by ICE officers working alongside

Hemlock Township police officers under a 287(g) task force agreement.
The Hemlock Township police officers conducted a vehicle stop at a
nearby intersection, where ICE officers questioned Florez Rodriguez

about his identity, nationality, and immigration status. After Florez
Rodriguez confirmed his identity and a records check confirmed his
immigration status, Florez Rodriguez was detained by ICE and

transported to a local ICE office in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, for
processing.
Florez Rodriguez was then transported to Clinton County

Correctional Facility, where he was incarcerated at the time when he
commenced this habeas proceeding. He was subsequently transferred to
the California City Immigration Processing Center, a privately owned

and operated immigration processing center operated under contract
with ICE, which is located in Kern County, California. He has been
denied any opportunity to post bond or to be released on other conditions.
II. DISCUSSION
Since the United States began restricting
immigration into this country in the late 19th century,
it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking
entry into the country and those already residing
within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”
who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do
not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded
to persons inside the United States. But once a
noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal
circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to
due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s
borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction
between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
the United States and those who have not yet entered
“runs throughout immigration law.”
, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first
quoting , 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting
, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted).
Consistent with this distinction, “[t]wo statutory sections govern
the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and 1226.” , 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2025), , No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As
concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).
Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an
‘applicant for admission.’” , 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).
Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who ( ) are arriving in the
United States, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years
without being admitted or paroled, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the
“designation provision”),3 ( ) are inadmissible either for

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of
aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of
aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security,
§ 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii), but the current scope of that designation is “the full
scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been
physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year
period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited
removal under § 1225(b)(1).
, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025);
misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to

the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based
on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of

documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited
removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien
expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have
such a fear, until removal. § 1225(b)(1)(B).

, 962 F.3d 612, 618–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing
expedited removal provisions); , 811 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 291–92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same);

, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies

, 962 F.3d 612, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview
of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)(ii));
, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62–64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).
to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the

United States.4 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); , 583 U.S. at 287.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary
(not expedited) removal proceedings. § 1225(b)(2)(A);

§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration
judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A); § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting
removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on

land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be
returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather
than be detained); , 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (“Section

1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow
humanitarian parole.”).
Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to

detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not
relevant here. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).
removal proceedings.” , 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are

already present in the United States may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).
Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for

these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a
warrant issued by the Attorney General,[5] an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that
such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain
pending. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide

that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the
alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities6 are tasked with an initial bond or
custody determination, §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the

5 This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has
been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in
the applicable regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2);
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).
6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue
arrest warrants. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).
alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

judge, §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); § 1003.19 (setting out
procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).
, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is

detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the
Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge
(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that
he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations
omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can

be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C.
§§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3).
, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)

bond procedures).
Finally, “Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of
aliens who may be released under § 1226(a).” , 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require
mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may
only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a

determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is
necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a
flight risk or a danger to the community. § 1226(c)(4);

, 583 U.S. at 289.
The petitioner in this case, Daniel Eduardo Florez Rodriguez, has
been detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination

pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.7 In his
petition, Florez Rodriguez argues that, because he was detained within
the interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory

pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that
he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that
he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Florez

Rodriguez further asserts a claim under the Administrative Procedures
Act (“APA”) based on the agency’s failure to follow its own bond
regulations.8 In addition to these statutory arguments, Florez Rodriguez

7 The parties do not dispute that the petitioner has been putatively
detained without an opportunity for release on bond pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2).
8 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary
argues that his pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be

considered for release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process
rights.
The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 1225(b)(2) does

properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory
detention.9 The respondent further argues that applying § 1225(b)(2)
here comports with due process.

The Third Circuit has recently addressed these very same legal
questions under materially identical facts in a precedential opinion.
, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223

(3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). In , the Third Circuit held that “for
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, the noncitizen must do more than be an
‘applicant for admission.’” at *3. Rather, “to fall within

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s ambit, an ‘applicant for admission’ must engage in
present or ongoing action to gain ‘admission,’ that is, ‘lawful entry . . .
into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative argument
that his detention violates the APA.
9 We note that the respondent’s answer does not engage with the
petitioner’s APA claim at all. In any event, see note 8.
immigration officer.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (ellipsis in

original). In other words, to be subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A), an “applicant
for admission” must “engage in an ongoing affirmative act to ‘seek[]
admission’ to the United States.” at *4; at *5 (“§ 1225(b)

governs noncitizens arriving to the United States whereas § 1226
governs those already within our borders.”).10

10 , 175 F.4th 61, 73, 75 (2d Cir.
2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who
are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering
the country without inspection and admission. . . . Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for
admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but
are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.’”);
, 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir. 2026) (“[T]he
text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive
practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for
admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry
and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);
, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)
(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long
history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional
purpose in passing IIRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention
generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,
and not to aliens who are simply present here.”);
, 175 F.4th 713, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens
without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were
not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention scheme); , 180 F.4th 1226,
1239 (10th Cir. 2026) (“The only time a noncitizen can be said to be
seeking admission is when he is seeking to enter the United States at the
As in , Florez Rodriguez is no longer seeking

admission into the United States. At the time of his arrest and detention,
he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border
or port of entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the

United States for an extended period of time. “Because § 1225(b)(2)(A)
does not apply to [Florez Rodriguez] as [he] [was] not detained at the

border. Since § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those seeking admission,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is likewise limited to the border.” (footnote omitted));
at 1248 (“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies at the border while § 1226(a) applies to
the interior.”); , 183 F.4th 909, 931 (7th Cir. 2026)
(holding that, “based on the INA’s text, structure, and history,” a
noncitizen, who entered the United States without inspection and was
detained after living there for several years, “is present in the United
States without admission and is not ‘seeking admission,’” and he “is
therefore not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and is eligible for a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)”); , 183 F.4th 1160, 1172 (9th Cir.
2026) (“[Section] 1225(b)(2)(A), based on its text and context, is best
construed as applying to aliens entering the United States at the border.
Section 1226, by contrast, is best understood as governing inadmissible
and deportable aliens present in the interior of the United States.”);
, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2352042, at *11 (1st
Cir. Aug. 13, 2026) (“In sum, our careful study of the disputed statutory
texts leads us to join the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits in holding that noncitizens . . . who are present in the
United States without admission are not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention provision, but rather, are governed by § 1226.”);
, ___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2661092, at *6 (4th
Cir. Sept. 10, 2026) (“Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to
noncitizens who . . . have been present in the United States for years
regardless of how they entered our country.”).
border, [his] detention[] [was] unlawful under that provision of the INA.”

at *7.
Moreover, the Third Circuit also concluded that the
petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process

Clause. at *8. As in , we assess this petitioner’s due
process claim by considering the factors: “(1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, and (3) the Government’s interest, including the function

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” at *9 (quoting
, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). First, as in , we conclude that “mandatory
detention implicates [Florez Rodriguez’s] constitutionally protected
interest in avoiding physical restraint.” (quoting ,

521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, we
too conclude that “the absence of an opportunity for a neutral
decisionmaker to assess whether [Florez Rodriguez] [is] dangerous or [a]
flight risk[] presents a high risk of erroneously depriving [Florez

Rodriguez] of [his] liberty interest.” (citations omitted). Third, on the
record before us, we likewise conclude that “the Government’s legitimate
interest in preventing the release of dangerous noncitizens and those who

might fail to appear at future hearings does not outweigh the other two
factors here, particularly when [this] non-criminal individual[] [was]
detained absent evidence that [he] is dangerous or a flight risk, and the

Government has not argued that [a] bond hearing[] [is] unduly
burdensome.” at *10 (citation omitted).
Thus, we conclude that the factors weigh in the

petitioner’s favor, and his detention without a bond hearing violated his
due process rights.
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that, because he is
not actively seeking admission and has been living in interior of the
United States for an extended period of time, the petitioner’s continued

mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful. Accordingly, we will grant the petition and
order the petitioner’s immediate release from custody.
, No. 26-603, 2026 WL 401189 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2026) (granting

immediate release), ,
___ F.4th ____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026);
, No. 25-cv-05930, 2025 WL 3296300 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2025)

(same), , ___ F.4th
____, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 15, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11442597. Public record. Not legal advice.