# Saldarriaga

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11441312

## Case

- **Full name:** Charles Saldarriaga v. The City of New York, New York City Police Department, Sergeant William J. Planeta, Detective Eric Bolger, Detective Leonardo Moscoso, and Officer Mohammad F. Hossain
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------x
CHARLES SALDARRIAGA,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
25-CV-1115 (RPK) (JRC)
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
SERGEANT WILLIAM J. PLANETA,
DETECTIVE ERIC BOLGER,
DETECTIVE LEONARDO MOSCOSO,
and OFFICER MOHAMMAD F. HOSSAIN,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------x
RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Saldarriaga, proceeding pro se, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against the City of New York and four New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers
principally alleging the officers unlawfully arrested him for possessing forged license plates.
Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the motion
is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the amended complaint and from documents
incorporated by reference in that complaint. They are assumed true for the purposes of this order.
On March 27, 2024, plaintiff was driving a green vehicle bearing license plates that said
“FOREV3R5.” Am. Compl. Ex. B. (Dkt. #35). NYPD Sergeant William J. Planeta observed what
he suspected to be forged license plates on the vehicle and pulled plaintiff over near 28-31
Steinway Street in Queens, New York. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, Ex. B.
During the traffic stop, Sergeant Planeta questioned plaintiff about his license plates. Id.
Ex. B. Plaintiff stated that he purchased them from the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”).
Ibid. Sergeant Planeta nevertheless concluded that plaintiff’s plates were “forged” based on his
“training in the detection and identification of forged instruments” and the physical appearance of

the plates. Ibid. Specifically, Sergeant Planeta observed that the plates had a black background,
“whereas an authentic New York State license plate background would not be black”; that the
plates had circular mounting holes, “whereas an authentic New York license plate would have
oblong mounting holes”; and that the lettering on the plates was raised, “whereas the lettering on
an authentic New York State license plate would be flat.” Ibid. If Sergeant Planeta had checked
New York State’s online “eJusticeNY” portal, which plaintiff alleges on information and belief
did not happen, Sergeant Planeta would have seen that the DMV previously issued plaintiff license
plates that said “FOREV3R5.” Id. ¶ 30, 31, Ex. C.
At some point during the traffic stop, NYPD Detective Leonardo Moscoso and NYPD
Officer Mohammad F. Hossain arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 27. In the presence of Detective Moscoso

and Officer Hossain, Sergeant Planeta ordered plaintiff to exit his car, handcuffed him, and
directed that he be transported to the 114th NYPD Precinct. Id. ¶ 28. Sergeant Planeta then
personally entered plaintiff’s car and drove it to the precinct, where it was damaged. Id. ¶¶ 33, 45.
At the precinct, NYPD Detective Eric Bolger questioned plaintiff and prepared a complaint
charging him under New York Penal Law § 170.20 with criminal possession of a forged instrument
in the third degree. Id. ¶ 36, Ex. B. The complaint contained Detective Bolger’s sworn testimony
as to what he was told by Sergeant Planeta. Id. Ex. B. Plaintiff was arraigned the next day. Id.
¶ 39. After the arraignment, plaintiff’s attorney contacted the District Attorney and provided her
with “DMV confirmations” as to his license plates, which appear to have included (1) an email
receipt from the DMV indicating that plaintiff previously purchased plates that said “FOREV3R5,”
and (2) a registration statement from a DMV website indicating that plates that said “FOREV3R5”
were associated with a vehicle registered by plaintiff—though with a white car rather than a green
one. Id. ¶ 41, Ex. D. The charges were dismissed four months later on speedy-trial grounds. Id.

¶ 44, Ex. F.
In this suit, plaintiff names the City of New York, Sergeant Planeta, Detectives Bolger and
Moscoso, and Officer Hossain as defendants. Id. ¶¶ 7–22. The amended complaint asserts three
causes of action against Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger: (1) false arrest, id. ¶¶ 48–55,
(2) malicious prosecution, id. ¶¶ 56–62, and (3) fabrication of evidence, id. ¶¶ 63–67. It also
asserts (4) unlawful seizure of plaintiff’s car against Sergeant Planeta alone, id. ¶¶ 68–72, and
(5) failure to intervene against Detective Moscoso and Officer Hossain, id. ¶¶ 73–77. Finally, it
asserts (6) Monell liability against the City of New York. Id. ¶¶ 78–82. All six causes of action
are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and costs.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s initial complaint. Afterward, plaintiff filed

an amended complaint, and defendants filed a new motion to dismiss that complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
(Dkt. #37); Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. #43). Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Mem.
in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. #41).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss only when it alleges “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The court may consider only (1) the complaint itself, (2) documents either attached to the
complaint or incorporated in it by reference, (3) documents the plaintiff relied on and knew of
when bringing suit, and (4) matters in the public record that are subject to judicial notice. See,
e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007); Sira v. Morton,
380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004); Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
1999). The court “accept[s] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw[s] all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Olson v. Major League Baseball, 29 F.4th 59, 71
(2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiff has attached certain documents to the complaint
and relies on them in the complaint itself and in his brief opposing dismissal. Accordingly, in
adjudicating the motion to dismiss, the Court considers both the statements in the complaint and
the statements in the attached documents, insofar as the statements therein are not contradicted by
the complaint.
A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be “liberally construed, and . . . however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). Pro se status, however, does not “exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules

of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
The motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff’s false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims
are defeated by probable cause, and plaintiff otherwise fails to state a claim for fabrication of
evidence, unlawful seizure, or failure to intervene against the officer defendants. Plaintiff’s Monell
claim against the City of New York fails because there was no underlying constitutional violation.
Accordingly, the amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
I. The amended complaint fails to state a claim.
A. False Arrest
Plaintiff’s false-arrest claim against Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger is defeated by
probable cause. To state a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “that (1) a ‘defendant
intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff
did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise

privileged.’” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). An
arrest is privileged if “the facts known by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest objectively
provided probable cause to arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). As a result, probable cause “is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Ashley
v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021).
Probable cause exists when a law enforcement officer has “knowledge of, or reasonably
trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested.” United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Although

“an officer may not disregard plainly exculpatory evidence,” “he is not required to explore
and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.” Jin v.
City of New York, 169 F.4th 373, 385 (2d Cir. 2026) (citations omitted). His “function is to
apprehend those suspected of wrongdoing, and not to finally determine guilt through a weighing
of the evidence.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
1. Sergeant Planeta
Sergeant Planeta had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for violating New York Penal Law
§ 170.20, which makes it a crime to “possess[] a forged instrument” “with knowledge that it is
forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another.” A “forged instrument” is one “which
has been falsely made, completed or altered.” N.Y. Penal Law § 170.00(7). An officer generally
has probable cause to arrest an individual whom he observes engaging in proscribed conduct “even
without specific evidence on the elements of knowledge and intent,” because the officer “has ‘no
reason to know at the time’ he observes [the] person . . . what is in the person’s mind,” and because

knowledge and intent are commonly inferred from the underlying conduct itself. McGuire v. City
of New York, 142 F. App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see Medina v. City of New York,
No. 20-CV-797 (VEC), 2021 WL 1700323, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021); Smith v. DeGirolamo,
No. 17-CV-5532 (KAM) (ST), 2020 WL 5752226, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2020). As a result,
the relevant inquiry focuses simply on whether Sergeant Planeta had probable cause to believe that
plaintiff possessed a forged instrument.
Sergeant Plaintiff had probable cause to believe plaintiff did so. The black background,
circular mounting holes, and raised lettering on plaintiff’s plates, which Sergeant Planeta’s
“training in the detection and identification of forged instruments” led him to believe were not
authentic, were sufficient to satisfy this standard. Am. Compl. Ex. B; see Ikezi v. City of New

York, No. 14-CV-5905 (MKB), 2017 WL 1233841, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (finding
probable cause under § 170.20 where officers “observed the license plate and it looked like a
sticker affixed to a metal backing”); Xu v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-1222 (RA), 2020 WL
2088301, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (finding probable cause under New York Penal Law §
170.25, a closely related provision, where officers observed “obvious alterations” and “whiteout”
on a driver’s license).
Plaintiff argues Sergeant Planeta lacked probable cause because he did not look up
plaintiff’s plates in a DMV database, using either the online “eJusticeNY” portal or a similar tool.
Mem. in Opp’n 5–6. But the probable cause standard does not require Sergeant Planeta to have
conducted additional investigation beyond his observation of the plates’ physical characteristics.
See Ikezi, 2017 WL 1233841, at *2 (“[A]n officer has probable cause if the physical characteristics
of the allegedly forged document lead the officer to believe that [it is forged].” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Xu, 2020 WL 2088301, at *5 (noting that “[t]he condition of the

[driver’s license] . . . was itself sufficient to establish probable cause”); Gerasimou v. Cillis, No.
15-CV-6892 (EK) (VMS), 2022 WL 118748, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2022) (collecting cases).
Plus, the information in the database would not have defeated probable cause. The “eJusticeNY”
portal states that the DMV previously issued plaintiff license plates that said “FOREV3R5”—
albeit for a white vehicle, not a green one. Am. Compl. ¶ 30, Ex. C. The fact that plaintiff was
issued plates bearing those digits does not establish that the plates on plaintiff’s green car were
valid. Given those plates’ nonstandard background color, mounting hole shape, and lettering
format, Sergeant Planeta would still have had reason to believe they were forged. Accordingly,
probable cause bars plaintiff’s false-arrest claim against Sergeant Planeta.
2. Detective Bolger
Assuming arguendo that Detective Bolger detained plaintiff, he too had probable cause to

do so. “Absent significant indications to the contrary, an officer is entitled to rely on his fellow
officer’s determination that an arrest was lawful.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir.
2006) (citation omitted); see Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1288 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding “no
basis for liability” on a false-arrest claim where an officer “did not witness any unlawful activity
and simply accepted [the defendant] from [a fellow officer]”). The amended complaint states that
Detective Bolger was “informed by” Sergeant Planeta about the basis for plaintiff’s arrest once
plaintiff was brought to the precinct, and it does not suggest that Detective Bolger was aware of
any indications Sergeant Planeta’s analysis was incorrect. Am. Compl. Ex. B. To the extent
plaintiff argues Detective Bolger should have looked up plaintiff’s plates in a DMV database, that
argument fails for the same reasons it fails with respect to Sergeant Planeta.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Probable cause also bars plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claim against Sergeant Planeta
and Detective Bolger. To state a malicious-prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

(1) “the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding against [him]; ([2]) the
termination of the proceeding in [his] favor; ([3]) ‘that there was no probable cause for the
proceeding’; and ([4]) ‘that the proceeding was instituted with malice.’” Mitchell v. City of New
York, 841 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2016). “Because lack of probable cause is an element of a malicious
prosecution claim, ‘the existence of probable cause is a complete defense.’” Stansbury v.
Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2013). If an officer had probable cause to conduct an arrest,
the officer also had probable cause to commence criminal proceedings “unless intervening facts
discovered between the arrest and the initiation of prosecution dissipate[d] probable cause.”
Sacaza v. City of New York, 169 F.4th 363, 370 (2d Cir. 2026); see Alberty v. Hunter, 144 F.4th
408, 418 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[E]ven when probable cause is present at the time of arrest, evidence

could later surface which would eliminate that probable cause. In order for probable cause to
dissipate, the groundless nature of the charge must be made apparent by the discovery of some
intervening fact.”).
Assuming arguendo that both Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger initiated criminal
proceedings against plaintiff by contributing to the criminal complaint that charged him, they had
probable cause to do so. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, they had probable
cause to arrest plaintiff, and the amended complaint does not state that any facts came to the
attention of the officers between the arrest and the submission of the criminal complaint that would
have caused probable cause to dissipate. The amended complaint also does not allege any acts by
the officers besides contributing to the criminal complaint that could plausibly qualify as initiating
criminal proceedings. See Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010)
(holding that, “[t]o initiate a prosecution, a defendant must . . . play an active role in” it, such as
by “fil[ing] the charges” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Plaintiff suggests that probable cause dissipated because his counsel provided the District
Attorney with an email receipt and registration statement from the DMV indicating that he
previously purchased a license plate with the same letters as the license plate on his car:
“FOREV3R5.” Mem. in Opp’n 10–11. But his counsel provided those items after his arraignment,
so they could not have caused probable cause to dissipate between his arrest and the submission
of the criminal complaint—after which responsibility for the charges would lie with the District
Attorney, not with Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger. See Dufort v. City of New York, 874
F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen a plaintiff pursues a claim of malicious prosecution against
police officers based on an unlawful arrest, the intervening exercise of independent judgment by a
prosecutor to pursue the case usually breaks the chain of causation unless the plaintiff can produce

evidence that the prosecutor was misled or pressured by the police.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Accordingly, probable cause defeats plaintiff’s malicious-prosecution claim
against Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger.
C. Fabrication of Evidence
Plaintiff has not stated a fabrication of evidence claim against Sergeant Planeta or Detective
Bolger because he has not plausibly alleged that either officer knowingly provided prosecutors
with inaccurate information. A plaintiff’s right to due process is violated when “an
(1) investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s verdict,
(4) forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property as a result.” Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir.
2016). The second element “requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant’s use of inaccurate
information was ‘knowing, as opposed to mistaken.’” Davis-Guider v. City of Troy, No. 23-589,
2024 WL 5199294, at *3 (2d Cir. 2024) (summary order) (quoting Barnes v. City of New York, 68
F.4th 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2023)). Information “that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be

treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to have been wrong.” Ibid. (quoting Halsey v.
Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Here, plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Planeta and Detective Bolger fabricated information
by telling prosecutors he was driving with forged license plates. Am. Compl. ¶ 64. But the
complaint goes on to describe why the officers drew that conclusion, stating that it was “based
upon [Sergeant Planeta’s] training in the detection and identification of forged instruments,” and
on unusual aspects of the plates’ physical appearance that plaintiff does not dispute. Id. Ex. B. In
this context, the amended complaint does not plausibly allege facts suggesting that the allegation
of forgery was anything other than a good-faith conclusion based on the physical appearance of
the plates. Nor are there facts in the amended complaint suggesting that information came to either

officer’s attention, prior to the swearing out of the criminal complaint, that cast doubt on the
accuracy of the statements in that complaint. Without more, plaintiff has failed to state a
fabrication claim. See Medina, 2021 WL 1700323, at *5 (“Plaintiff’s belief that it was
unreasonable for [defendant] not to investigate whether there was some innocent explanation in
no way leads to the conclusion that Defendant intentionally fabricated information.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
D. Unlawful Seizure
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Sergeant Planeta violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by seizing his car after his arrest.
While the Fourth Amendment does not generally permit officers to make warrantless
seizures of vehicles, the “community caretaking exception” permits them to do so when justified
“in the interests of public safety.” United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 2019). The
Second Circuit has “consistently held that officers’ decisions to seize and remove vehicles” fell

within this exception “in circumstances where, due to arrests, suspended licenses, or other reasons,
no driver would be available to remove the vehicle from its location.” United States v. Leeper, --
- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 2339544, at *15 (2d Cir. 2026). In Lyle, for example, the Court held that it
was permissible for an officer to impound a vehicle where impoundment “ensured that the . . .
vehicle was not left on a public street in a busy midtown Manhattan location where it could have
become a nuisance or been stolen or damaged and could have become illegally parked the next
day.” Lyle, 919 F.3d at 731. In Leeper, the Court came to the same conclusion where the “vehicle
had an expired registration, such that no one could lawfully drive it away.” Leeper, 2026 WL
2339544, at *15.
Given this exception, plaintiff has not set forth facts suggesting that the seizure of his car

was unlawful. The amended complaint states that plaintiff was arrested near 28-31 Steinway Street
in Queens, New York and that his car was taken from the same location, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–24,
33, and it does not indicate that anyone besides plaintiff was available to take possession of the car
after the arrest. 28-31 Steinway Street is located on a two-lane street lined with commercial
establishments. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (permitting judicial notice of facts “not subject to
reasonable dispute”); Rindfleisch v. Gentiva Health Sys., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (“Courts commonly use internet mapping tools to take judicial notice of . . . geography.”).
Moreover, New York law makes it illegal for a vehicle to be parked or driven with improper license
plates. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 402(2). Sergeant Planeta was thus faced with the decision
whether to impound a vehicle or else leave it unattended and illegally parked on a commercial
street. Under those circumstances, impounding the vehicle was lawful. See Vasquez v. Yadali,
No. 16-CV-895 (NSR), 2020 WL 1082786, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020) (concluding that it was
lawful for an officer to impound a vehicle that had broken windshield glass in violation of New

York law); Muir v. Village of Freeport, No. 23-CV-3904 (DG) (SIL), 2025 WL 4789609, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) (rejecting an unlawful seizure claim where “the driver’s violation of a
vehicle regulation prevents the driver from lawfully operating the vehicle” and “it is necessary to
remove the vehicle from a[] public location” (citation omitted)).
Plaintiff argues it was improper for Sergeant Planeta to drive the car to the precinct himself
“rather than employing standardized, least-intrusive impound procedures,” such as hiring a tow
company. Am. Compl. ¶ 69; see Mem. in Opp’n 13–14. But the Second Circuit has expressly
“decline[d] to adopt a standardized impoundment procedure requirement.” Leeper, 2026 WL
2339544, at *15 (quoting Lyle, 919 F.3d at 731). Instead, whether an impoundment satisfies the
Fourth Amendment depends on “the totality of the circumstances.” Ibid. (quoting Lyle, 919 F.3d

at 731). For the reasons outlined above, the totality of the circumstances support Sergeant
Planeta’s decision to impound plaintiff’s vehicle.
E. Failure to Intervene
Plaintiff has not stated a failure-to-intervene claim against Detective Moscoso and Officer
Hossain because he has not plausibly alleged there was unlawful action that intervention could
have prevented.
Police officers have “an affirmative duty to intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose
constitutional rights are being violated in his presence by other officers.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). As a result, “[f]ailure to intercede to
prevent an unlawful arrest,” or to prevent other unlawful action, “can be grounds for § 1983
liability.” Ibid. But if there is no underlying unlawful action, an officer’s failure to intervene is
not itself unlawful. In that way, “[f]ailure to intervene claims are contingent upon the disposition
of the primary claims underlying the failure to intervene claim.” Holland v. City of New York, 197
F. Supp. 3d 529, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citation omitted); see Lewis v. Fischer, No. 08-CV-3027,

2009 WL 689803, at *6 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (“When no constitutional violation has taken
place, bystanding officers cannot be held liable.”). Here, plaintiff argues that Detective Moscoso
and Officer Hossain should have intervened to prevent Sergeant Planeta from arresting him and
impounding his car. But as explained above, plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that either his arrest
or the impoundment of his car was unlawful. Without having stated a claim for any underlying
unlawful activity, plaintiff has not stated a claim for failure to intervene either.
F. Monell Claim
Plaintiff’s remaining claim seeks to hold the City of New York liable under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), for failing to implement certain policies and
training. But “Monell does not provide a separate cause of action for the failure by the government
to [implement policies or] train its employees; it extends liability to a municipal organization where

that organization’s failure to train, or the policies or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an
independent constitutional violation.” Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
“In other words, a Monell claim cannot succeed without an independent constitutional violation.”
Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 874 (2d Cir. 2022). Since plaintiff has not stated a claim for any
independent constitutional violation, he has not stated a claim under Monell either.
II. The amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
The amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice. While leave to amend should be
liberally granted, “[w]hen a plaintiff was aware ‘of the deficiencies in his complaint when he first
amended,’ he ‘clearly has no right to a second amendment even if the proposed second amended
complaint in fact cures the defects of the first.’” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 898 F.3d 243, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2018) (brackets and citation omitted); see, e.g., Housey v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 22-888, 2022 WL 17844403, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 22, 2022) (affirming
denial of leave to amend plaintiff’s “once-amended complaint” where plaintiff failed to establish

“proposed amendments [that] would be able to cure the defects identified by the district
court”). Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once after notice of defendants’ arguments
for dismissal, see Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. #32), and he does not propose any
amendments that would cure the deficiencies in his claims, see Mem. in Opp’n 20. A further
opportunity to amend is therefore unwarranted, and the amended complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted, and the amended complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge

Dated: September 14, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11441312. Public record. Not legal advice.