# Maher

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · September 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11441128

## Case

- **Full name:** Peter Maher v. Haywood County, Tennessee
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION
PETER MAHER, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) 1:25-cv-02842-STA-jay
)
HAYWOOD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Peter Maher filed suit against Haywood County, Tennessee, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, for the alleged violation of his First Amendment rights, as well as a supplemental state law
claim under the Tennessee Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-101, et seq. (Amd. Cmplt.
ECF No. 40.) Defendant Haywood County has filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 41); Plaintiff
has filed a response to the motion (ECF No. 45); and Defendant has filed a reply to the response.
(ECF No. 46.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
Standard of Review
A complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” it does require more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court must treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the pleadings as true and construe
all of the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Saylor v. Parker Seal Co., 975 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1992). Under Twombly
and Iqbal, Rule 8(a)’s liberal “notice pleading” standard requires a complaint to contain more than
allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Background/Analysis

The complaint alleges as follows. In February 2025, Plaintiff asked Haywood County
Mayor David Livingston, Haywood County Attorney Sarah Levy, and “other designated officials”
to be allowed to speak at a meeting of the Haywood County Commission. (Amd. Cmplt. at ¶ 5).
According to Plaintiff, he informed “officials that his comments would be limited to a 60-to-80-
second response to a matter germane to the items on the agenda for the meeting or germane to
matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission.” (Id.)
On February 27, 2025, Mayor Livingston responded via email, stating that “‘the public is
always welcome to speak…[but] must be addressing the business on the agenda’ and only after
‘proper procedures are complied with by the proper committees’ and further that a motion or
resolution is before the County Commission.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Livingston’s email “failed to provide any confirmation of
whether Plaintiff would be permitted to speak.” (Id.). Instead, the email restricted Plaintiff’s

“public comments strictly to agenda items and only after internal governmental processes – without
providing any mechanism for Plaintiff to be placed on the agenda.” (Id.). While Mayor Livingston
did not tell Plaintiff he could not speak, Plaintiff alleges that his request to speak at a County
Commission meeting was denied “by omission.” (Id.) “The response therefore denied the request
by omission and substituted a general policy statement for a decision based on the specific request.”
(Id.)
Despite the alleged denial, Plaintiff was placed on the Haywood County Public Records
(“PRC”) agenda. (Id. at ¶ 7.) On March 5, 2025, the PRC Chair Linda Hayes emailed Plaintiff that
he would be placed on the agenda. (Id.) However, she informed him that his public comments were
limited to three minutes and must “adhere to the agenda topics.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff,
Hayes’s directive that he limit his comments to the agenda topics for a limited amount of time
constituted “a content-based restriction on public comment . . . [that] places substantive control
over the permissible subject matter of the speech in the hands of the governing body.” (Id.)
Plaintiff further alleges that the action of denying him “a meaningful opportunity to present

public comment to the Haywood County Commission” and subjecting him “to unconstitutional
restrictions on protected speech” violated his First Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution and the Tennessee Open Meetings Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.) The alleged unconstitutional
restrictions were Plaintiff’s having to limit his comments to agenda items (rather than those
“germane” to the jurisdiction of the County) and being allowed to speak for only three minutes.
Plaintiff alleges that his allegations “establish a consistent pattern” of (1) permitting public
comment “only after “internal governmental processes;” (2) limiting public participation to
“agenda approved topics”; and (3) failing to provide a “clear or independent mechanism for
member of the public to obtain agenda placement.” (Id. at ¶ 8). Plaintiff does not allege that he
actually attended a Haywood County meeting and was prevented from offering public comment.

Section 1983
Section 1983 authorizes an individual to bring suit against state and local officials who
deprive the individual of a federal right under color of state law. In Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the United States Supreme Court extended § 1983 liability to
municipalities such as Haywood County for alleged constitutional violations in a narrow set of
circumstances. “A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory – in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d
378, 388-89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original)). Instead, a
plaintiff must show that “through its deliberate conduct” the entity was the “moving force” behind
the injury alleged. Allman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). That is, the plaintiff must prove that the entity had
a “policy or custom” that caused a violation of his or her rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
In Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit identified
four ways in which a plaintiff may prove the existence of an illegal policy or custom. The plaintiff

can point to (1) the government’s legislative enactments or official policies; (2) actions by officials
with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a
custom or practice of tolerating the violation of federal rights by its officers or agents. Id. at 429.
In this case, Plaintiff acknowledges that Haywood County “may impose reasonable
restrictions on the content of speech as long” with the proviso that “the restrictions do not result in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in light of the purpose of the County Commission.” (Resp.
p. 4, ECF No. 45.) However, he contends that Mayor Livingston, as an official with final decision-
making authority, violated the First Amendment by instructing him that he must confine his
comments to “business on the agenda” – which he equates with “viewpoint discrimination.” He
argues that Haywood County (via Mayor Livingston) cannot “selectively deny [him] the right to

speak based on [his] opinion, [his] critical tone, or [his] political view.” (Id.)
“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive
content or the message it conveys.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 828 (1995) (citing Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). “The principle that has
emerged from [Supreme Court] cases ‘is that the First Amendment forbids the government to
regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.’” Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (citing City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). “Discrimination against speech
because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828. “When
the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.” Id. at 829.
In order to preserve the limits of a limited public forum, however, the State may
legitimately exclude speech based on subject matter when the subject matter is outside the
designated scope of the forum. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 109 (2001);

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30. “The necessities of confining a [limited public] forum to the
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
Thus, while it is true that a governmental entity in a limited public forum may not
discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and any restrictions must be “reasonable in
light of the purposes served by the forum,” Good News Club., 533 U.S. at 106–07, there is nothing
in the amended complaint that alleges that Plaintiff intended to express critical or political views
at the County Commission meeting. In fact, the only description of Plaintiff’s intended speech is
that his comments “would be limited to a 60-to-80-second response to a matter germane to matters
on the agenda or germane to matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission.” (Amd. Cmplt. ¶

5.) There are no allegations that Haywood County (or Mayor Livingston) engaged in viewpoint
discrimination. Moreover, there are no allegations that Plaintiff was ever denied the right to speak
at the County Commission. Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that his First Amendment
rights were violated by the restrictions imposed on his intended speech at the County Commission,
and his §1983 claim must be dismissed. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Warren,
Mich., 873 F. Supp. 2d 850, 863 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d, 707 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (“[A] speaker may properly be excluded
from a limited public forum because he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the
purpose of the forum.”); Youkhanna v. City of Sterling Heights, 934 F.3d 508, 519 (6th Cir. 2019)
(“In a limited public forum, the government can impose reasonable restrictions based on speech
content, but it cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination.”)
Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that Defendant’s policy for allowing
comment at the County Commission meeting was content-based or in any way impermissibly
restricted his right to free speech under the First Amendment sufficient to establish liability under

Monell. Instead, Defendant’s policy allowed comments to be made on agenda items, and Plaintiff
was even told that he could speak for three minutes on an agenda item. Plaintiff has cited no cases
in which a court held that an individual must be given unfettered access to speak at a County
Commission meeting. Neither has Plaintiff alleged facts showing an unconstitutional custom or
pattern of impermissibly restricting speech. “A broad assertion that an unconstitutional policy
exists is nothing more than a bare recitation of legal standards.” Osberry v. Slusher, 750 F. App’x
385, 398 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). See also Cunningham v. Cleveland Police Dep’t., 2010
WL 5636778, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2010), rep. & rec. adopted sub nom. Cunningham v.
Cleveland Police Dep’t, 2011 WL 234050 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2011) (“Although Plaintiff suggests
that he will provide convincing proof of the City’s unconstitutional policy at trial, that proffer does

not negate Plaintiff’s duty pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 to plead facts plausibly showing that the
City acted unlawfully at the pleading stage. There are no facts in the Amended Complaint that
reasonably describe a specific policy or custom of the City of Cleveland that violated
Cunningham’s rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not suffice to satisfy the
pleading standard announced in Iqbal and Twombly.”); Williams v. City of Cleveland, 2009 WL
2151778, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2009) (“Plaintiff must allege facts, which if true, demonstrate
the City’s policy, such as examples of past situations where law enforcement officials have been
instructed to ignore evidence.”).
Because the amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts, which if accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557), the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
Tennessee Open Meetings Act
Plaintiff has also brought a claim under the Tennessee Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code.
Ann. § 8–44–101. This Act provides that “[a]ll meetings of any governing body are declared to be

public meetings open to the public at all times, except as provided by the Constitution of
Tennessee.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8–44–102(a). At the time of the relevant events (2025), the Act
provided that a “governing body . . . [must] reserve a period for public comment . . . to comment
on matters that are germane to the items on the agenda for the meeting.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-
44-112(a) (emphasis added). That section was revised in 2026 to mandate that:
(a)(1) A governing body shall, for each public meeting, reserve a period for public
comment to provide the public with the opportunity to comment on matters that are
germane to the items on the agenda for the meeting.

(2)(A) A local governing body shall, for each public meeting, reserve a period for
public comment to provide the public with the opportunity to comment:

(i) On matters that are germane to the items on the agenda for the meeting;
and

(ii) On any matter that is germane to the jurisdiction of the local
governing body, regardless of whether such matter is an item on the agenda
for the meeting.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-112 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff attempts to rely on the 2026 revision to establish his state law claim. However, the
amendment to the Act does not apply retroactively because doing so would attach new legal
consequences to past events, and the amendment contains no language indicating that the
Tennessee Legislature intended the amendment to apply retroactively. See Nutt v. Champion Int’l
Corp., 980 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Tenn. 1998) (“Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively unless
the legislature clearly indicates otherwise.”). Because the amended version does not apply
retroactively, the current version of the Act has no bearing on the scope of public comments
required before the Act’s revision. Haywood County was under no obligation to allow public
comment on any topics outside those included in its agenda at the time Plaintiff allegedly intended
to offer public comment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-112(a) (2025). Consequently, Plaintiff’s state
law claim must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. Thomas Anderson
United States District Judge

Date: September 14, 2026.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11441128. Public record. Not legal advice.