# Cristerna

> District Court, N.D. California · September 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11440263

## Case

- **Full name:** Antjuan C. v. Bisignano, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** September 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 San Francisco Division
11 ANTJUAN C., Case No. 25-cv-08253-LB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
13 v.
Re: ECF No. 13, 15
14 BISIGNANO, et al.,
15 Defendants.
16

17
18 INTRODUCTION
19 The plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social
20 Security Administration denying his application for supplemental security income (SSI) under
21 Title XVI of the Social Security Act.1 An earlier application was denied in April 2019. On the
22 current application, the ALJ found the same severe impairments as before (degenerative disc
23 disease, sciatica, a seizure disorder, status post ischemic stroke, affective disorder with psychosis,
24 anxiety disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)) but concluded that the plaintiff had
25

26 1 Compl. – ECF No. 1. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations
are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. Citations to the administrative record
27 (AR) are to the record’s internal pagination. The plaintiff is identified by first name and last initial. Fed.
1 not established changed circumstances overcoming the presumption of continuing non-disability,
2 retained a residual-functional capacity (RFC) for light work limited to simple, routine tasks,
3 occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers, and brief, occasional contact with the
4 public, and could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.2
5 The plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) did not give clear and convincing reasons for
6 discounting his symptom testimony, (2) improperly evaluated the psychological-opinion evidence,
7 and (3) consequently assessed an RFC unsupported by substantial evidence. He asks the court to
8 remand for an award of benefits or, alternatively, for further proceedings.3 The matter is fully
9 briefed and submitted for decision without oral argument.4
10 The court reverses and remands for further administrative proceedings. The ALJ did not
11 identify the testimony she discounted or tie legally sufficient reasons to it, relied on
12 characterizations that the cited records contradict, and discounted the psychological opinions on
13 grounds (the plaintiff’s limited mental-health treatment and reliance on his self-report) that Ninth
14 Circuit law does not permit. Those errors infect the RFC and the finding of no changed
15 circumstances. Because the record contains unresolved conflicts, the court remands for further
16 proceedings rather than for an award of benefits.
17
18 STATEMENT
19 1. Procedural History
20 The plaintiff first applied for SSI in February 2017, alleging disability beginning March 1,
21 2014. An ALJ denied that application on April 2, 2019, and the Appeals Council denied review in
22 February 2020.5 The plaintiff filed the current application on July 28, 2022, alleging disability
23 beginning November 24, 2016. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. A new ALJ
24 held a hearing on August 29, 2024, and issued an unfavorable decision on November 5, 2024; she
25
26
2 AR 36–46 (severe impairments at AR 39; RFC at AR 41; step five at AR 45–46).
3 Pl.’s Br. – ECF No. 13 at 5–23; Reply – ECF No. 19 at 3–12.
27
4 Pl.’s Br. – ECF No. 13; Def.’s Br. – ECF No. 15; Reply – ECF No. 19; Civil L.R. 16-5.
1 declined to reopen the prior application.6 The Appeals Council denied review on July 31, 2025,
2 making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision, and the plaintiff timely sued.7
3
4 2. The Plaintiff’s Testimony and the Function Reports
5 The plaintiff was 42 years old when he applied, has a limited education (he left high school
6 without graduating and received special-education services), and has no past relevant work; his
7 only recent job was one week as a security guard.8
8 Physically, he testified to constant low-back pain from a herniated lumbar disc 9 (pain “24
9 hours a day”) with sciatica in both legs that requires him to shift positions frequently, and to
10 ongoing “small” seizures that he manages “with ice and time” despite an increased Keppra dose.9
11 Mentally, he testified that his depression and paranoia have become worse in recent years; that he
12 is “very paranoid of people, especially large groups”; that he has had anger outbursts with
13 coworkers, family members, and medical providers; that he hears voices (including his mother’s)
14 and sees “dark figures” in his peripheral vision; and that nightmares disturb his sleep.10 Asked at
15 the hearing whether his physical or mental impairments kept him from working, he first identified
16 his back but immediately clarified, “[t]hey’re probably side by side to be honest.”11 He testified
17 that homelessness and his difficulty talking to and trusting providers had kept him from consistent
18 mental-health treatment, that psychiatric medications caused intolerable side effects, and that he
19 nearly walked out of the hearing itself.12
20 On a 2023 function report, the plaintiff wrote that his memory was bad, that he could not pay
21 bills or handle a bank account, that he did not prepare meals or do chores (he was homeless, with
22
23
6 AR 36–37, 46.
24
7 AR 20–22; Compl. – ECF No. 1.
25 8 AR 41–42, 45, 58–59.
26
9 AR 60, 62, 66–67, 107–10.
10 AR 69–78, 81–82.
27
11 AR 59.
1 “nowhere to cook”), that he spent time with others mainly to get “help with personal items” and
2 tasks, and that he got along with authority figures “ok.”13 His godmother’s third-party report was
3 corroborating: among other things, the plaintiff could walk a block and a half before needing to
4 rest, could pay attention for only five to ten minutes, and did not finish what he started.14
5
6 3. The Psychological Opinions and Dr. Catlin’s Statement
7 Katherine Wiebe, Ph.D. examined the plaintiff by telephone for three hours in August 2022 at
8 his representative’s request, administering a clinical interview, a mental-status examination, and a
9 battery of standardized tests. She observed weeping, agitation, mood lability, guardedness and
10 initial hostility, memory deficits on formal testing, and paranoid and persecutory thinking. She
11 diagnosed PTSD, unspecified affective disorder, unspecified schizophrenia-spectrum and other
12 psychotic disorder, unspecified personality disorder, and unspecified neurocognitive disorder. She
13 assessed moderate-to-marked limitations in understanding, memory, concentration, pace, and
14 attendance, and marked limitations in every social-interaction domain (interacting with the public,
15 getting along and working with others without excessive irritability or suspiciousness, and
16 accepting instructions and criticism from supervisors, among others). She noted that the plaintiff
17 smoked cannabis during a rest break, that he had completed most tasks (including all cognitive
18 testing) before the break, that he had not used cannabis earlier that day, and that his use was likely
19 self-medication.15
20 Natasha Krikorian, Psy.D. performed a consultative psychological evaluation in December
21 2023. Her mental-status examination was largely normal, and the plaintiff scored 29/30 on the
22 Folstein mini-mental-status examination. She diagnosed unspecified schizophrenia-spectrum and
23 personality disorders and assessed mild impairment in sustaining concentration, attention, and
24 pace, and moderate impairments in maintaining effective social interaction on a consistent basis
25

26 13 AR 410–16 (specifics at AR 412–15).
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14 AR 42, 418–25 (specifics at AR 423).
15
1 and in adapting to the usual stresses and pressures of a competitive work environment.16
2 Jo McClain, Psy.D., a state-agency psychological consultant, reviewed the record in January
3 2024 and assessed mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information and
4 moderate limitations in interacting with others, in concentration, persistence, and pace, and in
5 adapting or managing oneself.17
6 Laura Catlin, Psy.D. attempted a psychological evaluation by phone in August 2024 but could
7 not complete it: she reported that the plaintiff was “hostile and resistant from the beginning,”
8 accused her of not knowing how to do her job, spoke to her in an “extremely hostile tone,” and
9 directed a profanity-laced “verbal[] assault” at her.18 (The ALJ found the physical assessments of
10 consultative examiner Dr. Han and state-agency consultant Dr. Gitlin persuasive; the plaintiff does
11 not substantively challenge those findings.)19
12
13 4. The ALJ’s Decision
14 Applying Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988), and Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9),
15 the ALJ found that the April 2019 decision created a presumption of continuing non-disability and
16 that the plaintiff had not established changed circumstances.20 At steps one through three, she
17 found no substantial gainful activity, the same severe impairments as in 2019 (and no new
18 medically determinable impairments, rejecting Dr. Wiebe’s personality-disorder and
19 neurocognitive-disorder diagnoses as unsupported by the treatment record) and no listing-level
20 impairment.21 Rating the “paragraph B” criteria, she found mild limitation in understanding,
21 remembering, or applying information; mild limitation in interacting with others; moderate
22 limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace; and mild limitation in adapting or managing
23

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16 AR 598–605 (examination at AR 600–02; opinion at AR 602–04).
25 17 AR 44, 179.
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18 AR 918.
19 AR 42–43; see AR 586–96, 180–82.
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20 AR 37, 42, 46.
1 oneself.22
2 The ALJ found that the plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
3 expected to cause some of his alleged symptoms but that his statements (and his godmother’s) about
4 their intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were “not entirely consistent with the medical
5 evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.”23 Those
6 reasons: minimal back complaints and normal examinations after November 2022, no new spinal
7 imaging, the plaintiff’s failure to follow through with physical-therapy and orthopedics referrals, the
8 apparent control of his seizures for two years, the absence of mental-health therapy or documented
9 mental-status abnormalities in the treatment records, and his activities of daily living.24
10 She found all three psychological opinions unpersuasive. Dr. Krikorian’s was “inconsistent with
11 the mental status findings at the evaluation and those in the underlying treatment record,”
12 inconsistent with the plaintiff’s failure to engage in mental-health treatment offered in 2022, and
13 “based on the claimant’s self-report rather than any objective measure.”25 Dr. McClain’s was
14 inconsistent with Dr. Krikorian’s clinical findings and the treatment record.26 Dr. Wiebe’s was
15 inconsistent with the treatment records, “which show no mental status abnormalities or mental
16 health therapy,” with Dr. Krikorian’s testing and examination, and with the plaintiff’s daily
17 activities; the ALJ added that the plaintiff was smoking cannabis during the evaluation and that Dr.
18 Wiebe “did not indicate how this influenced her assessment.”27 And the ALJ found Dr. Catlin’s
19 account inconsistent with the treatment record, “which shows no abnormal social behaviors during
20 medical visits,” with the consultative examiners’ descriptions of the plaintiff as cooperative, and
21 with her own observation of “no hostility from the claimant during the hearing.”28
22

23 22 AR 40–41. The prior ALJ rated the plaintiff’s limitations in interacting with others, in concentration,
persistence, or pace, and in adapting or managing himself as moderate. AR 40 (citing Ex. B1A/9).
24
23 AR 42.
25 24 AR 40, 42–43.
26
25 AR 43.
26 AR 44.
27
27 Id.
1 The ALJ adopted the 2019 RFC: light work with postural limits and no concentrated exposure
2 to workplace hazards; “simple and routine tasks involving simple, work-related decisions”; the
3 ability to adapt to routine workplace changes; “occasional interaction with supervisors and
4 coworkers”; and “brief, occasional contact with the public.”29 Crediting the vocational expert’s
5 testimony, she found at step five that the plaintiff could work as a cleaner, marker, or assembler,
6 and that he was not disabled.30
7 GOVERNING LAW
8 1. Standard of Review
9 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court’s review is limited to whether substantial evidence
10 supports the Commissioner’s decision and whether the decision applies the correct legal standards.
11 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
12 scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
13 a conclusion.” Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 738 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). If the evidence
14 supports both the ALJ’s conclusion and a different one, the court must defer to the ALJ. Tackett v.
15 Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). But the court reviews “only the reasons provided by
16 the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [s]he
17 did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).
18
19 2. The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation
20 The Commissioner determines disability through a five-step sequential evaluation, asking
21 whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3)
22 has an impairment that meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) can perform past relevant work
23 given his RFC; and (5) can adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
24 economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one
25 through four; at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098.
26

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29 AR 41; see AR 37, 46, 139.
1 ANALYSIS
2 The plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to provide clear, convincing, and well-
3 supported reasons for discounting the plaintiff’s symptom testimony, (2) failing to properly
4 evaluate the medical opinions of record, and (3) failing to base the plaintiff’s mental and physical
5 RFC on substantial evidence.31 The court remands for further proceedings.
6
7 1. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony
8 The ALJ did not give legally sufficient reasons for discounting the plaintiff’s symptom
9 testimony.
10 An ALJ evaluates a claimant’s symptom testimony in two steps. First, the claimant must
11 produce objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be
12 expected to produce the symptoms alleged. Second, if he does and there is no affirmative evidence
13 of malingering, the ALJ may reject his testimony about the severity of his symptoms only by
14 offering “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for doing so. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
15 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in Thomas
16 v. Saul, 830 F. App’x 196, 198 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ “must state specifically which symptom
17 testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen v. Chater,
18 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Boilerplate and general findings are not enough. Treichler v.
19 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2014); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,
20 806 F.3d 487, 493–94 (9th Cir. 2015); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014).
21 Permissible considerations include inconsistency with the objective medical evidence (though that
22 cannot be the sole ground), daily activities, effective treatment, and an unexplained or
23 inadequately explained failure to seek or follow treatment. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497–
24 99 (9th Cir. 2022); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
25 341, 345–47 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p. Before drawing an
26 adverse inference from limited treatment, the ALJ must consider possible explanations, SSR 16-
27
1 3p; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284, and “it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental
2 impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.” Nguyen v. Chater, 100
3 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).
4 The first step is satisfied: the ALJ found severe physical and mental impairments that could
5 reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.32 She made no finding of
6 malingering (and both examining psychologists noted the plaintiff’s good effort).33 The clear-and-
7 convincing standard therefore applies, and the decision does not meet it, for three reasons.
8 First, the ALJ did not connect her reasons to identified testimony. The only finding addressed
9 to the testimony as a whole is the boilerplate conclusion that the plaintiff’s statements are “not
10 entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons
11 explained in this decision.”34 That formulation does not say which statements the ALJ discounted
12 or link any reason to any statement, and it precludes meaningful review. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d
13 at 494; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103. Nor did the ALJ address material testimony at all. She
14 characterized the plaintiff as testifying “that the primary reason that he is unable to work is a back
15 impairment,” but he immediately clarified that his physical and mental impairments are “probably
16 side by side.”35 She never mentioned (much less gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting)
17 his testimony that his depression and paranoia had worsened, that he fears people and has anger
18 outbursts (including with medical providers), that he experiences auditory and peripheral visual
19 hallucinations, or that homelessness, distrust of providers, and intolerable medication side effects
20 limited his treatment.36 The omissions matter: the vocational expert testified that being irate with
21 an employer, or missing more than one day of work a month, would preclude employment.37
22 Second, some of the reasons the ALJ did give rest on characterizations that the cited records
23

24
32 AR 39, 42.
25 33 AR 494, 599; Reply – ECF No. 19 at 3.
26
34 AR 42.
35 AR 42, 59.
27
36 AR 69–78, 81–82.
1 contradict. She wrote that the plaintiff’s February 6, 2023, physical examination “showed no back-
2 related abnormalities,” but the cited note did not assess musculoskeletal function; it recorded an
3 “L5 herniated disc x 7 yrs that is causing” low back pain.38 She found that the plaintiff “regularly
4 socialized with others and had no problems getting along with authority figures,” but the function
5 report she cited says that he spent time with others to get “help with personal items” and tasks and
6 that he got along with authority figures “ok.”39 She found that he could “prepare meals” and
7 “perform household chores,” but he checked “No” for both; he was homeless, with “nowhere to
8 cook.”40 And she found his seizures “controlled for the past two years” because the treatment
9 record showed no reports after November 2022, without addressing his 2024 testimony that
10 smaller seizures continued despite an increased Keppra dose.41 An ALJ may not reach a
11 conclusion “by ignoring competent evidence in the record that suggests an opposite result,”
12 Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984), or by paraphrasing the record
13 inaccurately, Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1998), and the deference owed to
14 rational interpretations of the evidence does not extend to characterizations that the cited records
15 themselves refute.
16 Third, the treatment-based reasons fail on this record. As to mental health, the record
17 documents the plaintiff’s homelessness, his mistrust and avoidance, his reports of intolerable
18 medication side effects, and his frustration that only monthly therapy was offered (he cursed at and
19 hung up on La Clinica providers over precisely that limitation).42 SSR 16-3p required the ALJ to
20 consider those explanations before drawing an adverse inference from limited treatment, and
21 Nguyen forbids inferring from a mentally impaired claimant’s failure to pursue treatment that his
22 symptoms are overstated. Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The ALJ
23 considered none of it. As to the back impairment, the ALJ found degenerative disc disease severe
24

25 38 AR 42, 550–51.
26
39 AR 40, 414–15.
40 AR 40, 44, 412.
27
41 AR 42, 66–67.
1 yet reasoned that the absence of new imaging undercut the plaintiff’s pain testimony; prior
2 imaging had already established the degenerative condition, and a lack of corroborating objective
3 evidence cannot by itself justify discounting pain testimony.43 Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–47.
4 Because the ALJ did not tie clear and convincing reasons to identified testimony, the court
5 remands on this ground.
6
7 2. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Psychological Opinions
8 The ALJ’s evaluation of the psychological opinions is not supported by substantial evidence.
9 For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluates the persuasiveness of
10 medical opinions under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c and must articulate how she considered the two
11 most important factors: supportability and consistency. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787, 792
12 (9th Cir. 2022); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b)(2). The former hierarchy of deference to treating and
13 examining sources is gone, but “an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as
14 unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”
15 Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 739. Conclusions are not explanations. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421–
16 22 (9th Cir. 1988).
17 Two premises run through the ALJ’s rejection of every psychological assessment, and neither
18 survives scrutiny. The first is the absence of mental-health treatment and therapy. For the reasons
19 in Section 1, that reliance was improper: a claimant’s failure to seek treatment for a mental
20 disorder — explained here by homelessness, avoidance, medication side effects, and the thin
21 services offered — is not a substantial basis for concluding that a medical professional’s
22 assessment of his condition is inaccurate. Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465. The second is the assertion
23 that the treatment record “show[s] no mental status abnormalities” and “no abnormal social
24 behaviors during medical visits.”44 The record says otherwise. In September and October 2022
25 (during the period at issue), the plaintiff told a La Clinica therapist that monthly-only
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43 AR 39, 42; see AR 607–29 (2016–2017 imaging and diagnoses).
1 appointments were “wasting people’s time” and hung up on her; hung up on a case manager a
2 week later; and cursed at and hung up on another therapist.45 A neurology consultation had earlier
3 been terminated for his “verbally abusive behavior.”46 Both Dr. Wiebe and Dr. Catlin documented
4 hostility firsthand.47 The ALJ mentioned none of this. Rejecting opinions as inconsistent with a
5 record that in fact corroborates them is not an explanation supported by substantial evidence.
6 Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 739; Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456.
7 The source-specific reasons fare no better.
8 Dr. Wiebe. The daily-activities rationale rests on the mischaracterizations discussed above, and
9 the cannabis rationale (that Dr. Wiebe “did not indicate how” the plaintiff’s cannabis use
10 “influenced her assessment”) ignores that she did: she reported that the plaintiff completed most
11 tasks, including all cognitive testing, before the rest break in which he smoked, that he had not used
12 cannabis earlier that day, and that his use was likely self-medication.48 An ALJ may not disregard a
13 source’s actual explanation and then fault the source for not providing one. Gallant, 753 F.2d at
14 1456; see Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (the record must be considered as a whole). The ALJ also
15 discounted Dr. Wiebe as inconsistent with Dr. Krikorian’s evaluation while simultaneously finding
16 Dr. Krikorian unpersuasive. Dr. Krikorian’s actual conclusions (moderate social-interaction and
17 adaptation limitations) are closer to Dr. Wiebe’s than to the ALJ’s finding of mild limitation.
18 Dr. Krikorian. That her moderate limitations “were based on the claimant’s self-report rather
19 than any objective measure” is not a legitimate ground for discounting a psychological opinion.
20 Psychiatric “diagnoses will always depend in part on the patient’s self-report,” and the “clinical
21 interview and a mental status evaluation” (both of which Dr. Krikorian performed, along with the
22 Folstein test) “are objective measures” and part of the standard diagnostic technique. Buck v.
23 Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). And the assertion that her conclusions
24 were “inconsistent with the mental status findings at the evaluation” is a conclusion, not an
25
26
45 AR 539–41.
46 AR 636; see also AR 138, 143.
27
47 AR 493–94, 918.
1 explanation: the ALJ did not say why largely normal cognition-focused findings are inconsistent
2 with moderate limitations in social interaction and adaptation grounded in the plaintiff’s diagnoses,
3 history, and presentation. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421–22; Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 739.
4 Dr. Catlin. Her account of the terminated evaluation was not a medical opinion requiring a
5 persuasiveness finding, but the ALJ’s reasons for setting it aside (no abnormal social behaviors in
6 the treatment record, cooperative behavior with two consultative examiners, and no hostility at the
7 hearing) ignored the corroborating evidence just recounted, and the plaintiff’s composure in
8 structured, one-time encounters does not answer the documented pattern elsewhere.49
9 The net effect. The ALJ rejected every psychological assessment in the record (two examining
10 psychologists and the agency’s own reviewing consultant) and then rated the plaintiff’s social-
11 interaction limitation as mild, a level milder than any medical source assessed (moderate to
12 marked) and milder than the 2019 findings she purported to adopt.50 That left the mental-RFC
13 findings resting on the ALJ’s own lay assessment of the clinical evidence rather than on
14 substantial evidence. The court remands for a proper evaluation of the opinions.
15
16 3. The RFC and the Presumption of Continuing Non-Disability
17 The remaining findings fall with the first two. The RFC must rest on all the relevant evidence,
18 including the medical opinions and properly evaluated symptom testimony. 20 C.F.R. §§
19 416.945(a), 416.946(c); SSR 96-8p; Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006
20 (9th Cir. 2015). Because the ALJ’s RFC incorporated her flawed evaluations (and mirrored the
21 2019 RFC notwithstanding the later evidence) it is not supported by substantial evidence. The
22 court does not reach the plaintiff’s further arguments that the specific limitations (simple tasks,
23 occasional interaction) are inadequate on their own terms.
24 The same is true of the Chavez finding. A prior final determination of non-disability creates a
25 presumption of continuing non-disability, which the claimant may rebut by proving “changed
26

27
49 AR 44, 494, 539–41, 636, 918.
1 circumstances” (for example, a change in the severity of an impairment or the existence of an
2 impairment not previously considered). Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821,
3 827–28 (9th Cir. 1995); Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9). The ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff “failed
4 to establish changed circumstances” rested entirely on the evaluations held erroneous above: her
5 conclusions that the treatment records showed no worsening, that the plaintiff’s contrary testimony
6 was not consistent with the record, and that the psychological opinions (including Dr. Wiebe’s
7 new diagnoses of personality disorder and neurocognitive disorder) were unpersuasive.51 On
8 remand, the ALJ must reassess changed circumstances after properly evaluating the evidence —
9 including the plaintiff’s testimony that his depression and paranoia worsened, his 2022 reports of
10 worsening depression to his providers, and Dr. Wiebe’s diagnoses of impairments not considered
11 in 2019 — and may not apply the presumption on the basis of the analysis rejected here.52
12
13 4. Remand for Further Proceedings
14 The plaintiff asks the court to credit the discredited evidence as true and remand for an award of
15 benefits.53 That remedy is reserved for rare circumstances in which (1) the ALJ failed to provide
16 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, (2) the record has been fully developed and further
17 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were
18 credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled — and even then, the court
19 retains discretion to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious
20 doubt about disability. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019–21; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099–102.
21 The first condition is met; the second and third are not. The record contains unresolved
22 conflicts: Dr. Wiebe’s marked limitations against Dr. Krikorian’s largely normal examination
23 findings and more moderate assessment; documented hostility toward some providers against
24 cooperative presentations with others; and the open question whether the properly evaluated
25
26
51 AR 37, 39–45.
27
52 AR 69, 77, 81–82, 505, 538.
] evidence establishes changed circumstances and a more restrictive RFC. Further administrative
2 || proceedings would be useful to resolve those conflicts and ambiguities, Treichler, 775 F.3d at
3 1101, 1103-04, so the court remands for further proceedings, not for an award of benefits.
4
5 CONCLUSION
6 The court reverses the Commissioner’s final decision and remands for further administrative
7 || proceedings consistent with this order. On remand, the ALJ must reevaluate the plaintiff's
8 symptom testimony, the psychological-opinion evidence, whether the plaintiff has established
9 || changed circumstances under Chavez, and the plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and must
10 || proceed through the sequential evaluation as necessary.
11 This resolves ECF Nos. 13 and 15.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 Dated: September 11, 2026 LAE
eT
LAUREL BEELER
nited States Magistrate Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11440263. Public record. Not legal advice.