# Tufano

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11440150

## Case

- **Full name:** Frank Tufano v. Roman Stephen Nelson, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK TUFANO CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-542
Plaintiff,
v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)
ROMAN STEPHEN NELSON, et
al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Frank Tufano, is a “YouTuber” who promotes the “Carnivore
Diet.” In several previously filed lawsuits in this Court, all of which
have been dismissed, Tufano alleged that Paul Saladino, M.D. has

maliciously copied and used Tufano’s life work and discredited him. See
Tufano v. Saladino, et al., No. 3:25-CV-262, 2025 WL 5100589, (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:25-

00262, 2025 WL 5100590 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2025) (“Tufano I”); Tufano
v. Saladino, No. 3:25-CV-1400, 2026 WL 796584, (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3,
2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:25-CV-1400, 2026 WL

793305 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2026) (“Tufano II”); Tufano v. Saladino, No.
1
4:25-CV-1960, 2025 WL 4102909, (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 4:25-CV-01960, 2026 WL 288410 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 3, 2026) (“Tufano III”). In these previous matters, Tufano has
also alleged that several others conspired with and aided Saladino in

stealing Tufano’s work and discrediting him.1 Tufano apparently made
the same or similar accusations against Saladino in other forums as
well. On November 7, 2020, Saladino brought suit against Tufano in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346, and won a default
judgment enjoining Tufano from, inter alia, “making public statements

referencing that [Saladino] copied, plagiarized, stole or otherwise
improperly used [Tufano’s] or any other third party’s work” on January
30, 2025. See Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at *1. In his previous actions

against Saladino in this Court, Tufano also alleged that Jeffrey Davis,
Esq., who represented Tufano in the SDNY case and David D. Lin, Esq.,

1 Included in the list of alleged co-conspirators are “the Illuminati,” the
Freemasons, White Plains Lodge #473, Jeffrey Davis, Esq., and David
D. Lin, Esq. Tufano added the Honorable Karoline Mehalchick as a
defendant in Civil Number 4:25-CV-1960 because she dismissed Tufano
I.
2
who represented Saladino in the SDNY case, conspired together and

with others to fraudulently obtain the judgment against Tufano in that
case.2

In this, his fourth case along the same lines, Tufano now alleges
that two of the federal judges involved in the Southern District of New
York case, District Judge Nelson S. Roman and Chief Magistrate Judge

Judith C. McCarthy (the “Judicial Defendants”) acted outside of their
judicial capacity and conspired with the other Defendants to obtain a
fraudulent judgment against him. (Doc. 1-1). He asserts that the

Judicial Defendants are “members of Freemasonry, a secret society with
religious beliefs that, to Frank Tufano’s understanding, require them to
strongly oppose any outsider.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). Because Frank Tufano

does not belong to Freemasonry, he asserts the Defendants acted to
harm him. (Id.). Plaintiff also names White Plains Lodge #473 as a
defendant because “all decisions were placed in the hands of an

individual judge who may or may not have attended meetings at a

2 Tufano alleged that these lawyers, and all lawyers, are members of the
Freemasons and other secret societies who take loyalty oaths and
Tufano belongs to no such groups.
3
Masonic Lodge to discuss case decisions in secrecy.”3 (Doc. 1-1, p. 10).

These very claims were the subject of Tufano I, II, and III.
Currently pending are Motions to Dismiss filed by the Judicial

Defendants and the White Plains Lodge. Because Judges Nelson S.
Roman and Judith C. McCarthy are entitled to absolute judicial
immunity and because no cognizable claim has been pled against White

Plains Lodge #473, it will be recommended that the Motions to Dismiss
filed by these Defendants be granted. Additionally, the Court notes
that the claims raised herein against White Plains Lodge #473,

Saladino, Davis and Lin have been addressed on their merits and
dismissed with prejudice in Tufano II, it will therefore be recommended
that the issue of claim preclusion be raised sua sponte, and that the

claims against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice.

3 In addition to the Judicial Defendants and White Plains Lodge,
Plaintiff again names Jeffrey Davis, Davil Lin and Paul Saladino as
defendants. Davis, Lin and Saladino have not filed a responsive
pleading to the Complaint and service appears to be an issue.
4
II. Procedural Background

The Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint in the
Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County on February 6, 2026.
(Doc. 1-1). The Judicial Defendants, Roman Stephen Nelson and Judith

C. McCarthy, filed a Notice of Removal on March 4, 2026. (Doc. 1). On
March 11, 2026, the Judicial Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and
a supporting brief on March 25, 2026. (Docs. 3 and 4). Plaintiff filed an

opposing brief on March 31, 2026. (Doc. 5). On June 16, 2026, White
Plains Lodge filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a supporting brief.
(Docs. 11 and 12). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on June 29, 2026.

(Doc. 14). Both motions are ripe for disposition.
III. Factual Background

As noted above, in a trilogy of previously filed cases, Plaintiff
alleged, inter alia, that the judgment obtained against him in the

Southern District of New York in Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No.
7:20-CV-9346 was fraudulently obtained. In those three cases, Plaintiff
alleged that the lawyers involved in the SDNY case, Davis and Lin,

conspired with others consistent with their membership in secret
5
societies. Here, Plaintiff reasserts his claims against the lawyers

(although those claims have been thrice dismissed) and adds two SDNY
judges as well as a Lodge where the judges and others may have met.

The instant Complaint contains a detailed recitation of the oath
purportedly taken by members of the Freemasons, but only conclusory
allegations against the moving Defendants. With regard to the Judicial

Defendants, Plaintiff alleges:
Judicial officials have acted outside their judicial
capacity and have violated Frank Tufanos civil rights[.]
All defendants are members of Freemasonry, a secret
society with religious beliefs that, to Frank Tufano's
understanding, require them to strongly oppose any
outsider.
Because Frank Tufano chooses not to believe in
Freemasonry, he is being discriminated against for his
personal and religious beliefs. These defendant
individuals acted as Religious Freemasons to
intentionally harm Frank Tufano for not belonging to
Freemasonry himself.
These defendant individuals achieved a fraudulent
judgment against Frank Tufano, in a lawsuit that should
be considered a hate campaign against Frank Tufano, by
conspiring together as freemasons to violate his civil
rights.
(Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-5).
6
The Complaint then described, in detail, various oaths

purportedly taken by Freemasons. (Id. at pp. 5-6). Plaintiff asserts
that the Defendants “conspired together to commit fraud against Frank
Tufano filing perjured documents and submitting fraudulent financial

statements to find Frank Tufano ‘guilty’ of civil statutes he did not
commit. Judicial officials knowingly acknowledged perjured service
documents to enter a default against Frank Tufano, resulting in no

trial, and a fraudulent judgement against Frank Tufano.” (Id. at p. 8).
Plaintiff avers that “judicial officials knew that all of the documents and
actions committed by Paul Saladino and his attorney were fraudulent,

however refused to acknowledge this fraud to harm Frank Tufano by
finding him guilty of crimes he did not commit.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts
that the Judicial Defendants ignored the malpractice and legal fraud

committed against him.” (Id. at p. 9). He avers that the Defendants
“involved in ‘Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.7 :2020cv09346’
conspired against Frank Tufano oppressing him of his First and

Seventh Amendment Rights.” (Id.). The only reference, although
tangential, to Defendant White Plains Lodge is that: “The members of
this case had no intention of giving Frank Tufano a fair trial as it is
7
irrelevant to their sworn oaths to defend their fellow freemason

members, all decisions were placed in the hands of an individual judge
who may or may not have attended meetings at a Masonic Lodge to
discuss case decisions in secrecy.” (Id. at p. 10).

IV. Discussion

The claims raised in the instant Complaint mirror those raised in
Tufano I, II, and III, only here, the Judicial Defendants are added.
After setting forth the applicable legal standards, each claim will be

addressed seriatim after which judicial immunity and claim preclusion
will be discussed.

A. Standard Applicable in Deciding a 12(b)(6) Motion
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a

defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This means
that a complaint may be dismissed if it does not present sufficient facts

to support a plausible claim: “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss
may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the
8
plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”

Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen, Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

The court must accept both the plaintiff’s allegations and any
reasonable inferences that can be drawn as true and construe them in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Monroe v. Beard, 536

F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). However, it need not accept “‘unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.’” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.

2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
Reciting the elements that make up a cause of action and supporting
them with “mere conclusory statements” is insufficient to give those

statements the presumption of truth. McNeilly v. City of Pittsburgh, 40
F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).

When faced with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court
should conduct a two-part analysis: 1) separate the factual and legal

elements of a claim; and 2) “determine whether the facts alleged in the
9
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim

for relief.” Id. (internal citation removed). The court may consider facts
alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take

judicial notice.” Tellab, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007). This analysis requires the court to look at the claims
on a case-by-case basis and rely both “on its judicial experience and

common sense.” McNeilly, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 650. The court will not be
reaching legal conclusions, but instead will merely determine “whether
the plaintiff should be permitted to offer evidence in support of the

allegations.” Id. (citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.
2000)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims
i. Fraud

Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim for the tort of Fraud. In support,
he alleges the Defendants: “conspired together to commit fraud against
Frank Tufano filing perjured documents and submitting fraudulent

financial statements to find Frank Tufano ‘guilty’ of civil statutes he did
10
not commit. Judicial officials knowingly acknowledged perjured service

documents to enter a default against Frank Tufano, resulting in no
trial, and a fraudulent judgement against Frank Tufano.” (Id. at p. 8).
As explained in Tufano II:

In Pennsylvania, “[f]raud is actionable in tort.” V-Tech
Servs., Inc. v. St., 72 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa. Super. 2013). “The
elements of fraud, or intentional misrepresentation, are
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the
transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of
its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false;
(4) with intent of misleading another into relying on it;
(5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6)
the resulting injury was proximately caused by the
reliance.” Miller v. Daly, No. 14 EDA 2025, 2025 WL
3765442, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 2025) (quoting
Presbyterian Med. Ctr. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1072 (Pa.
Super. 2003)). “The essence of fraud is a
misrepresentation fraudulently uttered with the intent to
induce the action undertaken in reliance upon it, to the
damage of its victim.” Id. “Additionally, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there is a heightened
pleading standard for fraud, as required by Rule 9(b),
which provides that ‘a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud.’” DCD Nucar Alni
LLC v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., No. 5:25-CV-4327,
2025 WL 3516667, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)) (emphasis in the original).
“Consequently, it is necessary to plead or allege the date,
time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject
precision or some measure of substantiation into a fraud
allegation and must allege who made a
misrepresentation to whom and the general content of
the misrepresentation. The purpose of the heightened
11
standard is to provide a defendant with notice of the
precise misconduct with which he or she is charged and
to prevent false or unsubstantiated charges.” Id. (cleaned
up).
Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 4. Here, as in Tufano II, Plaintiff has
failed to allege a viable cause of action under Pennsylvania law for the
tort of fraud. His allegations of fraud are conclusory. Beyond broad
and sweeping allegations, Plaintiff has not made any particular

allegations to support his claim. He has not alleged that any of the
Defendants knowingly made a false statement to him, intending that he
rely on it, that he relied on it and was therefore damaged. See Tufano

II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 4. The Court need not accept “unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.

2013) (quotation omitted). Because the Complaint fails to plead the
necessary elements of the tort of fraud and simply makes a bare-boned
legal conclusion, it has not stated a cognizable claim for fraud.

ii. Tortious Interference

Plaintiff asserts a claim for tortious interference alleging that the
Defendants’ actions “caused Frank Tufano to lose his business, be
12
removed from his childhood home, and permanently damage his

physical and mental health.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 8). Plaintiff continues that
“[a]ctions which were filed to address this in the previous case were
ignored by the corrupt judicial officials Nelson Stephen Roman and

Judith C. Mc[C]arthy.” (Id.). This claim fails for the same reasons that
Plaintiff’s similar claim for Tortious Interference failed in Tufano II:

To the extent that a claim for Tortious Interference is
brought, it must fail because the essential elements of the
tort are not alleged. “A claim for tortious interference
with a business relationship requires the plaintiff to
plead the following elements: ‘(1) a prospective
contractual relationship; (2) the purpose or intent to
harm the plaintiff by preventing the relation from
occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or justification on
the part of the defendant; and (4) the occasioning of
actual damage resulting from the defendant's conduct.’ ”
Smart Commc'ns Holding, Inc. v. Glob. Tel-Link Corp.,
No. 1:21-CV-01708, 2024 WL 2158676, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
May 13, 2024)(quoting Brokerage Concepts v. United
States Healthcare, 140 F.3d 494, 529–30 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants
intended, without justification, to interfere with a
contractual or potential contractual relationship.
Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 at * 5. Because Plaintiff has not even
alleged the existence of a business relationship or prospective
contractual relationship that was interfered with, but rather asserts
general allegations of damages not remotely related to an existing or
13
prospective business relationship, a cognizable claim has not been

stated.
iii. Fraudulent Concealment

Plaintiff next alleges that “judicial officials knew that all of the
documents and actions committed by Paul Saladino and his attorney

were fraudulent, however refused to acknowledge this fraud to harm
Frank Tufano by finding him guilty of crimes he did not commit.” (Doc.
1-1, p. 8). “‘The tort of intentional non-disclosure has the same elements

as intentional misrepresentation except in the case of intentional non-
disclosure, the party intentionally conceals a material fact rather than
making an affirmative misrepresentation.’” Tufano II, 2026 WL

796584, at *6 (quoting Bortz v. Noon, 556 Pa. 489, 499, 729 A.2d 555,
560 (1999) (cleaned up)). Plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim fails
for the reasons similar to those outlined above in connection with

Plaintiff's claim of intentional misrepresentation (fraud). Plaintiff does
not allege that any of the named Defendants withheld material
information that was “material to the transaction at hand; (3) made

falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is
14
true or false; (4) with intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5)

justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting
injury was proximately caused by the reliance.” Miller v. Daly, supra at
*4. Accordingly, this claim is subject to dismissal.

iv. Civil Conspiracy

As in Tufano I, II, and III, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants
conspired to obtain an illegal judgment against him. But as in Tufano
I, II, and III, the instant Complaint makes only speculative and

conclusory allegations. Indeed, the Plaintiff asserts that he “believes
that Defendant parties conspired with court officials to have an
agreement to conduct a lawful act accomplished through unlawful

means.” (Doc. 1-1, p. 8, ¶ 18) (emphasis added). As previously stated in
Plaintiff’s prior cases:

To the extent Tufano is asserting a state law claim of civil
conspiracy, under Pennsylvania law, he must allege “(1)
a combination of two or more persons acting with a
common purpose to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful
act by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose; (2) an
overt act done in pursuance of the common purpose; and
(3) actual legal damage.” Tegg Corp. v. Beckstrom Elec.
Co., 650 F. Supp. 2d 413,426 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing
Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 987–88
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
15
Tufano II, 2026 WL 796584 t * 7; Tufano I, 2025 WL 5100589. Plaintiff

again has made only vague and conclusory allegations which do not
support a claim of civil conspiracy.

v. Plaintiff's Claim Under 18 U.S.C. § 241
Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants involved in his SDNY case

“conspired against Frank Tufano oppressing him of his First and
Seventh Amendment Right.” This claim too was addressed in Tufano I,
II and III. In Tufano II and III, the undersigned quoted Judge Bloom,

who issued the Report and Recommendation in Tufano I, as follows:
As we explained in a prior case Tufano brought
before this court, “criminal statutes, such as [18
U.S.C.] § 241, do not provide for a private right of
action.” Tufano v. Frankie’s Free Range Meat
Conspirators, Civ. No. 3:24-CV-846, 2024 WL
5318269, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2024) (citing
Walthour v. Herron, 2010 WL 1877704, at *3
(E.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (collecting cases and
concluding that § 241 does not provide a private
right of action)). Accordingly, Tufano’s claim for
criminal conspiracy fail as a matter of law.

2025 WL 4102909, at *4 and 2026 WL 796584, at *7 (quoting Tufano v.
Saladino, et al., No. 3:25-CV-262, 2025 WL 5100589, *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
28, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:25-00262,
16
2025 WL 5100590 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2025). Because, as explained to

Plaintiff now for the fifth time, a federal criminal statute does not
provide the basis to form a private cause of action. Accordingly, this
claim is frivolous and fails to state a cognizable claim.

C. Judicial Immunity
As fully described above, the Complaint contains no concrete
allegations against the Judicial Defendants. The Complaint speculates,
in equivocal terms, that the Judicial Defendants may belong to secret

societies and may have taken oaths which would require them to make
decisions against Tufano. However, the actions complained of deal with
the adjudication of “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.7 :2020cv09346.”

(See Doc. 1-1, p. 9, ¶ 23). Although the Complaint makes a bald
assertion that the Judicial Defendants “acted outside their judicial
capacity and have violated Frank Tufanos civil rights,” (doc. 1-1. p. 4),

the Complaint makes no allegations against either Judge Nelson or
Judge McCarthy to support that conclusion.

“It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him or her, shall be free to act upon his or her own
17
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences.” Crisdon v

City of Camden, No. CV 26-482, 2026 WL 2225494, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3,
2026) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) (quoting Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)). “Accordingly, judges are

‘absolutely immune’ from suits arising out of acts performed in their
judicial capacity, even where those acts are alleged to have been
erroneous, malicious, or in excess of authority.” Id. (quoting Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 354 (1978).
“Both judges of general and limited jurisdiction, including

magisterial district judges, are entitled to judicial immunity.”
McClinton v. Colon, No. 3:25CV1482, 2025 WL 2618774, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 10, 2025) (citing Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir.

2000) (emphasis added). “Generally, where a court has some subject
matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient justification for immunity
purposes.” Id. (cleaned up). The Court must “engage in a two-part

inquiry to determine whether judicial immunity is applicable. First, a
judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not

18
immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete

absence of all jurisdiction.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768.
Because Defendants Judge Nelson S. Roman and Judge Judith C.

McCarthy “enjoy[] absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in
[their] judicial capacity, we must decide whether the Complaint set
forth allegations that, taken as true, establish that the application of an

exception to the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is above the
speculative level.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App'x 111, 114 (3d Cir.
2014) (cleaned up). The actions complained of on the part the Judicial

Defendants involve the adjudication of Saladino’s case against Tufano
in the Southern District of New York in Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ.
No. 7:20-CV-9346. “A judge is immune from all liability for actions

taken in his or her judicial capacity, even those alleged to have been
done maliciously or corruptly, unless such action is taken in the absence
of all jurisdiction.” Reid v. Munley, No. 25-3028, 2026 WL 1972180, at

*1 (3d Cir. July 8, 2026). Here both judges sit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. Their actions in
adjudicating Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346 clearly

fall within the scope of their judicial duties and they acted within their
19
proper jurisdiction. Accordingly, they are absolutely immune from the

claims brought in this suit.
D. Claim Preclusion

1. Claim Preclusion Can be Raised Sua Sponte
“Though res judicata is an affirmative defense, it is appropriate

for a court to raise the issue sua sponte if the court is on notice that it
has decided the issue previously. Curbison v. United States, No. 25-
2893, 2026 WL 788901, at *1, n. 2 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (citing

Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)). See also Garcia v.
Dauphin Cnty. for Childen & Youth, No. 1:25-CV-00693, 2026 WL
453116, at *5, n. 2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2026), report and recommendation

adopted, 2026 WL 450397 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2026) (“The Third Circuit
has advised that in certain circumstances, sua sponte consideration of
claim preclusion is appropriate.”); 47th & 7th LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A.,

No. CV 25-1930, 2025 WL 1400410 (D.N.J. May 14, 2025) (dismissing
complaint with prejudice based on claim preclusion raised sua sponte);
Guerrero v. United States, No. 1:23-CV-01490, 2023 WL 8456122, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2023) (“courts may raise the issue of claim preclusion
20
sua sponte”) (citing King v. East Lampeter Twp., 69 F. App’x 94, 95–96

(3d Cir. 2003); Cook v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 17-00331, 2019 WL
3233154, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2019), aff'd, 846 F. App'x 161 (3d Cir.
2021) (same). Accordingly, “if a court is on notice that it has previously

decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua
sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully
consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based

solely on the defendant's interest in avoiding the burdens of twice
defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary
judicial waste.” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (cleaned

up).
2. The Claims Raised Here Were Previously Adjudicated

Tufano I, II and III raise nearly identical claims as those

presented here. Tufano I, 3:25-CV-262, named Paul Saladino, M.D.,
Jeffery Davis, Esq., White Plains Lodge #473, and The Illuminati as
defendants. In that case, Tufano alleged that Saladino stole his life’s

work and that Saladino, Davis and the Illuminati conspired against him
to obtain the judgment in “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.
21
7:2020cv09346.” He alleged that White Plains Lodge #473 was the

likely place of the secret meetings. Tufano I was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim by Order dated April 29, 2025, and
Plaintiff was given leave to file an Amended Complaint. (3:25-CV-262,

Doc. 7). On June 11, 2025, the case was dismissed without prejudice
because Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint. (Id. Doc. 9).

Tufano II followed. Tufano II named Paul Saladino, M.D., Jeffrey
Davis, Esq., David Lin, Esq., White Plains Lodge #473 and The
Illuminati as defendants. Tufano II raised the identical claims raised

here, viz., Fraud, Tortious Interference, Fraudulent Concealment, Civil
Conspiracy and 18 U.S.C. § 241. (25-1400, Doc. 1). The factual
allegations in Tufano II and the instant case are similar in that

Plaintiff alleged there, as he does here, that the Defendants are secret
society members who conspired against him to fraudulently obtain a
judgment against him in the SDNY case. While Judge Nelson is not

named as a Defendant in Tufano II, Plaintiff alleged there, as he does
here, “Judge Roman Stephen Nelson ignored the blatant legal
malpractice being committed against Frank Tufano by both his own

lawyer and Paul Saladino's counsel.” (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 52). Plaintiff also
22
made the same allegations against White Plains Lodge # 473 as being

the place “where conversations pertaining this case likely occurred.”
(Id. at p. 6, ¶ 34). The gravamen of the instant Complaint was raised in
Tufano II. There, Plaintiff alleged:

Associates of the case "Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No.
:2020cv09346," agreed in secrecy to plan all decisions
against Frank Tufano in favor of Paul Saladino, MD.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Paul Saladino and Frank Tufano's
own attorney, likely met in secret meetings, held to their
Freemason, Illuminati, or Secret Society Oaths, loyalty to
a greater cause than the court to collude against Frank
Tufano and strip him of his right to fair judicial process.
(25-CV-1400, Doc. 1, p. 8, ¶ 45). As relief, Plaintiff also sought a stay in
the SDNY case. All of the claims raised in Tufano II – including the
identical claims raised here – were addressed on the merits and
dismissed with prejudice by Order dated March 20, 2026. (Id. Doc. 9).
Tufano III, 4:25-CV-1960, was filed while Tufano II was still
pending. In Tufano III, Plaintiff again sued Paul Saladino, M.D.,
Jeffery Davis, Esq., David Lin. Esq., White Plains Lodge #473 and The
Illuminati and added Judge Mehalchick and Union Lodge #291 as

defendants. Plaintiff again claimed, inter alia, that Saladino stole
Tufano’s life work and that the Defendants conspired against him in the
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SDNY case. Tufano alleged there, as he does here, that “Judge Roman

Stephen Nelson ignored the blatant legal malpractice being committed
against Frank Tufano by both is lawyer and Paul Saladino’s counsel.”
(25-CV-1960, Doc.1, p. 11, ¶ 60). He also sought a stay of the SDNY

civil case, “Saladino, MD v. Frank Tufano No. 7:2020cv09346.” Judge
Mehalchick, was sued because she dismissed Tufano I. Because Judge
Mehalchick is a resident of Pennsylvania, complete diversity

jurisdiction did not exist, and therefore Tufano III was dismissed
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. (Id., Doc. 7).

3. Claim Preclusion Applies
Claim preclusion, also referred to as res judicata, protects
defendants from the risk of “repetitious suits involving the same cause

of action once a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final
judgment on the merits.” Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir.
2021) (quoting United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307,

315 (2011) (internal citations omitted)). But in addition to protecting
the interests of defendants, claim preclusion also promotes public
interest and conserves scares judicial resources. See B & B Hardware,

Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 147 (2015) (“The idea is
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straightforward: Once a court has decided an issue, it is forever settled

as between the parties thereby protecting against the expense and
vexation attending multiple lawsuits conserving judicial resources, and
fostering reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of

inconsistent verdicts.”) (cleaned up).
The prior judgment's preclusive effect extends not only to the
claims that the plaintiff brought in the first action, but also to any

claims the plaintiff could have asserted in the previous lawsuit. See In
re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). This is because a party
may not split a cause of action into separate grounds of recovery and

raise the separate grounds in successive lawsuits; a party must raise in
a single lawsuit all the grounds of recovery arising from a single
transaction or series of transactions that can be brought together.

Mars, Inc. v. Nippon Conlux Kabushiki–Kaisha, 58 F.3d 616, 619–620
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2)
(1984) and Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Claim preclusion consists of three elements: (1) a final judgment
on the merits in a prior suit; (2) a subsequent suit based on the same

25
cause of action; and (3) involvement of the same parties or their privies

in both suits. Ndungu v. Att'y Gen., 126 F.4th 150, 165 (3d Cir. 2025).
Here, all of the elements for claim preclusion to apply are met. In
Tufano II the same claims raised here were addressed on their merits

and they were dismissed with prejudice. The claims raised in Tufano II
are identical to those presented here. Paul Saladini, Jeffrey Davis,
David D. Lin and White Plains Lodge #473 were also defendants in

Tufano II. In Tufano II, the Plaintiff alleged that Saladino, Davis and
Lin conspired with each other and court officials to obtain a fraudulent
judgment against him in the Southern District of New York in the case

of Saladino v. Tufano, et al., Civ. No. 7:20-CV-9346. Tufano II alleged
that the conspirators—secret society members acting in according with
secret society beliefs—likely met at White Plains Lodge #473. The

claims and Defendants in Tufano II are identical to those raised here.
The only difference here is that the Plaintiff named the judges involved
in the SDNY case as defendants, whereas in Tufano II allegations

against Judge Nelson were made but he was not a party to that action.
Plaintiff may not avoid the preclusive effect of Tufano II by bringing the
exact claim against Saladino, Davis, Lin and the Lodge by simply
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naming other members of the alleged conspiracy that was the subject of

Tufano II.
Accordingly, the claims against Defendants Saladino, Davis, Lin

and White Plains Lodge #473 should also be dismissed with prejudice.
E. Leave to Amend

The Third Circuit has voiced a strong preference for allowing the
filing of an amended complaint in cases where the original complaint is

subject to dismissal. In Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 153 (3d Cir.
2025), the Court instructed:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directs
courts to grant motions for leave to amend “when
justice so requires.” So leave to amend should be
liberally given unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,
400 (3d Cir. 2004); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. And
because courts have a special obligation to be
“more forgiving of pro se litigants,” Garrett v.
Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019), this
Circuit has a “longstanding policy of allowing pro
se plaintiffs to amend their complaints before the
court rules upon defendants' motions to dismiss,”
Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 196 n.8 (3d Cir.
1990) (collecting cases).

Leave to amend in this case, however, would be futile for numerous
reasons. The Judicial Defendants, as subjects to absolute immunity
27
and amendment, would not alter that conclusion. Similarly, because

the Plaintiff seeks to bring a cause of action based on a criminal statute
that does not provide for a private remedy, amendment would not alter
that outcome. Moreover, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Saladino,

Davis, Line and White Plains Lodge have already been adjudicated on
the merits and dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may not assert
them yet again. Accordingly, it is recommended that leave to amend

not be granted.
V. Conclusion

Frank Tufano believes that Paul Saladino stole Tufano’s life’s
work and conspired against him along with fellow members of secret

societies. He maintains that part of the conspiracy against him was the
obtaining of a fraudulent judgment in the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiff has now brought the identical claim in this Court four

times. However, these claims have previously decided and the latest
attempt to recharacterize the same claims must fail. As previously
explained to Plaintiff, if he is dissatisfied with outcome of his case in the

Southern District of New York, his remedy is in that Court of in the
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Attempts to revive the claims

here are futile.
VI. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that:

1) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Judith C. McCarthy
and Roman Stephen Nelson (Doc. 3) be GRANTED and the
claims against them dismissed with prejudice;

2) The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant White Plains Lodge
#473 be GRANTED and claims against it be dismissed with
prejudice;

3) The claims against Defendant Saladino, Davis and Lin be
DISMISSED with prejudice based on claim preclusion;

4) Leave to amend not be granted, and;

5) The Clerk of Court directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: August 12, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella
Leo A. Latella
United States Magistrate Judge

29
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANK TUFANO CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-542
Plaintiff,
v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)
ROMAN STEPHEN NELSON, et
al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered
the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 12, 2026.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and
Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s
proposed findings, recommendations or report
addressing a motion or matter described in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner
case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and
serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify
the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections. The
30
briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2
shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made and may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing
only in his or her discretion or where required by
law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her
own determination on the basis of that record.
The judge may also receive further evidence,
recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

Dated: August 12, 2026 s/ Leo A. Latella
LEO A. LATELLA
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11440150. Public record. Not legal advice.