# Jordan

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439983

## Case

- **Full name:** Tracy Jordan, Sr. v. City of Philadelphia et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439983

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRACY JORDAN, SR., :
Plaintiff, :
vy. CIVIL NO. 25-3651
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al.,
Defendants. :

Scott, J. September 10, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Tracy Jordan, Sr., a Marine Corps veteran and former Philadelphia Housing
Authority police officer, spent twenty years in custody for a murder he did not commit. While he
was unjustly imprisoned, Jordan endured personal hardships and missed out on moments that make
life meaningful: his mother’s health deteriorated significantly and she passed away within months
of his release; his marriage ended in divorce; his three children grew up largely without his
presence; and he missed the birth of six grandchildren.
Jordan’s wrongful conviction was, he alleges, the result of a shoddy and one-sided police
investigation that sought to convict him from the outset. In 2023, the Conviction Integrity Unit of
the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office reviewed his case, confirmed the improprieties in his
conviction, and exonerated him. Jordan now brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City
of Philadelphia, the District Attorney’s Office of Philadelphia (“DAO”), the Philadelphia Police
Department, Detective James Griffin, Detective Dennis Dusak, Lieutenant Joseph Maum, Sergeant
Robert Kuhlmeier, Officer Robert Stott, and the estate of Assistant District Attorney Edward
Cameron.
Jordan brings the following claims: malicious prosecution, unlawful seizure, and false
imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Griffin,

]

Kuhlmeier, and Maum (Counts [-IJJ); deliberate deception in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment against Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Maum, Kuhlmeier, and Cameron (Count IV);
deliberate deception in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Stott
(Count V); withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against
Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Maum, and Kuhlmeier (Count VI); fabrication of evidence in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Griffin (Count VID; destruction of evidence in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Griffin (Count VIII); reckless conduct
of a police investigation and intentional failure to investigate against Defendants Griffin, Dusak,
Maum, and Kuhlmeier (Count [X); failure to intervene against Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Maum,
and Kuhlmeier (Count X); civil rights conspiracy against Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Maum,
Kuhlmeier, Stott, and Cameron (Count XI); municipal liability against the City of Philadelphia
(Count XID; and municipal liability against the District Attorney’s Office of Philadelphia (Count
XID.
Defendants have filed two Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 23, 40. For the reasons discussed
below, the Motions to Dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
I. Factual Background!
A. The Murder of Harold Wexler
On November 15, 2004 at approximately 8:45 a.m., Harold Wexler was shot and killed
inside a check-cashing store located at 8000 Ogontz Avenue in Philadelphia, which he owned and
operated. Complaint, ECF No. 1, {28 (hereinafter “Compl.”). Terrance Crawford, who worked
at this store, was the sole eyewitness to the murder. /d. J 29-30. In his statement to Detective
Dusak, Crawford described the shooter as an older black male, about 5’8 or 5°9, weighing roughly

For purposes of these motions, the Court construes all well-pleaded allegations as true.

210 pounds with a trimmed but full beard. Jd § 36. At the scene, officers lifted a set of fingerprints
from an interior handle in the store and a latent thumbprint from a white Sneaker City bag. □□□
"37. The officers also recovered a black plastic bag at the scene. /d 9124. Crawford stated
during his initial interview that the shooter “had a dark-colored bag over his shoulder that he had
the gunin....” fd. ¥ 122.
Harold Wexler was not merely the owner of a check-cashing store. As the investigating
detectives learned from an FBI agent, an IRS agent, and Wexler’s attorney within hours of his
murder, Wexler was also an FBI cooperating witness who had pleaded guilty to federal money-
laundering charges related to a scheme that ran out of his store and who was scheduled to report
to prison two months after his murder. /d. □□ 38,45. Two weeks after Wexler’s murder, apparently
in an effort to assist Philadelphia detectives in their homicide investigation, the Government
successfully moved to unseal Wexler’s sentencing memorandum and the motion for a downward
departure, so that Defendants Maum, Kuhlmeier, and Griffin could use the information contained
therein. ld. JJ 46-49.
On November 15, 2004, Defendant Dusak made two notes that memorialized conversations
Dusak had with Juanette Williams (a former employee of Wexler) and with Wexler’s family. /d.
452-54. Both notes identified another former employee of Wexler, referred to as “K,” as an
individual with knowledge of Wexler’s money-laundering crimes and whom Wexler had fired for
cooperating with federal authorities against him. /d. J 53-56.
Jordan alleges that Wexler’s status as a cooperating witness with the federal government
(which Jordan alleges to be an alternative motive for Wexler’s murder) was never disclosed to his
defense counsel during his trial. /d@ 951. Jordan also alleges that Philadelphia police officers

never physically interviewed Juanette Williams nor “K,” and that the notes of Dusak’s phone
conversations were never disclosed prior to Jordan’s trial.
Additionally, the black plastic bag at the scene was discarded after a Crime Scene Unit
officer failed to find any fingerprints on it. /d@. [ 125. Jordan also alleges that Harold Wexler had
security cameras that were taping his store on the day of Wexler’s murder, but Defendant Griffin
and “other Philadelphia police personnel destroyed these tapes.” Jd. § 317.
B. The Targeted Investigation of Tracy Jordan, Sr.
Tracy Jordan’s fingerprints matched those on the Sneaker City bag that officers collected.
Compl. 457. Jordan’s fingerprints were in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System not
because he had a criminal record but because he had worked as a Philadelphia Housing Authority
police officer. Ld. 4 59.
Because of this match, Defendant Griffin and another detective interviewed Jordan, who
voluntarily stated to the detectives that he would visit Wexler’s store to purchase lottery tickets
and to pay bills via Western Union. Jordan also told the detectives that he was not at the store the
day Wexler was murdered but rather was at home with his family. /d. {[ 60-61. Jordan further
volunteered to the detectives that Nannette Jordan, his then-wife, kept a stainless-steel .40-caliber
Smith & Wesson Model 4043 firearm at their home, which she possessed pursuant to her
employment as a Philadelphia Housing Authority Police Officer. /d. 62-63. Nannette Jordan
stored her weapon, which also had a trigger lock, on the top shelf of her bedroom closet when she
was off duty. /d. 967. At the time of Wexler’s murder on November 15, 2004, Nannette Jordan
had last fired her weapon in May 2004, as part of her annual firearms certification traming as a
police officer, after which she cleaned her weapon. /d. {| 68-69. After the May 2004 training
and up until November 20, 2004, Jordan alleges that Nannette Jordan’s firearm had not been fired,
was clean, and was free of gunpowder fouling. Jd. { 80.

On November 20, 2004, two days after Jordan’s voluntary statement, officers obtained a
warrant to seize Nannette Jordan’s weapon. /d@ 463. In compliance with that warrant, Nannette
Jordan delivered her service weapon to the Philadelphia Police headquarters on November 20,
2004 at 12:15 pm. Jd 986. The 12:15 p.m. delivery is confirmed by a Philadelphia Police
Department property receipt, which states that Defendant Griffin received the weapon at 12:15.
Id. § 89. At 1:00 p.m. on that same day, Defendant Griffin submitted Nannette Jordan’s firearm
to the Firearms Investigation Unit (“FIU”), which determined that the weapon contained gunshot
residue in the barrel and slight damage to the weapon’s rear sight. Id. {] 90-94. Jordan alleges
that, during the forty-five-minute gap between receiving the weapon and delivering it to the FIU,
Griffin fired the weapon and damaged the rear sight for the express purpose of incriminating
Jordan. fd. J 94-95.
C. Ballistics Evidence and Bunter Mark Comparisons
On November 24, 2004, an FIU officer compared the ballistics recovered from the murder
scene to test-fired ballistics from Nannette Jordan’s service weapon, concluding that both bullets
were fired from the same gun. Compl. 997. The officer arrived at this conclusion through a
“bunter mark comparison,” which determines whether two bullets share common marks by
comparing the microscopic characteristics of an indentation on the head of a cartridge case left by
a bunter stamp. Jd. 99. Because bunters degrade over time, the same bunter marking appears on
approximately 120,000 to 150,000 cartridges before a bullet manufacturer must replace the bunter.
Id, § 102. Comparing bunter marks can determine whether two bullets were manufactured from
the same set of 120,000 to 150,000 cartridges but cannot determine whether two bullets were fired
by the same weapon. /d. § 103; see also id. § 252 (“At best, a bunter mark match only provides
evidence that two bullets are from the same batch of bullets stamped by the same bunter. It conveys
no information about a weapon itself... .”). Despite this limitation, the FIU officer still concluded

that Nannette Jordan’s weapon fired the bullet found at the murder scene and transmitted this
conclusion to the homicide detectives on the same day. Jd. J] 103-04.
Two years later, on February 23, 2006, the FIU reexamined the bunter marks comparison
analysis. /d. 107. The FIU’s conclusion changed to a determination that the results were
inconclusive as to whether Nannette Jordan’s weapon fired the bullet found at the murder scene.
Id. ¥ 108.
On February 27, 2006, another FIU examiner conducted a second reexamination, and the
results were again determined to be inconclusive. /d. | 110. After this second reexamination, the
FIU uploaded images of the ballistics evidence recovered from the murder scene and from the test-
fire of Nannette Jordan’s weapon to the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network
(“NIBIN”). /d@ 9112. The NIBIN system did not return a match between Nannette Jordan’s
service weapon and “any other entry in the database, including the bullets from the scene of Harold
Wexler’s murder.” /d. § 113. More recent retesting, using higher quality images, has “exclud[ed]
Ms. Jordan’s weapon [as the firearm used to murder Wexler] and squarely refuted] the
Commonwealth's case against Tracy Jordan, Sr.” /d. 9117. The negative ballistics NIBIN result
was never disclosed to Plaintiff Jordan’s counsel. fd. {| 114, 198, 202.
Nor was this bunter mark comparison an isolated anomaly. Jordan alleges that, at least
until 2010, the Philadelphia Police Department customarily relied on bunter mark matches as
positive ballistic evidence to support the inference that a weapon could be matched to a bullet
uncovered from a crime scene. Jd. f§ 244-45. This practice of using bunter mark comparisons
entails, on Jordan’s view, that police officers often presented false ballistics matches as evidence
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and of conviction. Jd. 4 254.

D. Defendant Griffin's Specious Affidavit of Probable Cause
Jordan alleges that Detective Griffin’s affidavit of probable cause in support of Jordan’s
arrest contained material falsehoods and material omissions. /d 9118. The falsehoods and
omissions are legion, and, although the Court need not be exhaustive at this stage, a summary of
some alleged improprieties with the affidavit suffices for present purposes. First, Detective Griffin
grossly mischaracterized in the affidavit what Terrance Crawford told police.2 Second, the
affidavit omitted that police recovered a fingerprint from the interior door handle of Wexlet’s store
that matched Frank Bagley, who had prior convictions for forgery, drug possession, and other
offenses. fd. § 136. Third, the affidavit omitted any mention of Wexler’s conviction, pending
incarceration, and his extensive cooperation with federal authorities, all of which would suggest
an alternative motive for Wexler’s murder. /d. § 145. Fourth, the affidavit misleadingly described
the bunter mark analysis as a “positive comparison” without acknowledging the limitations of this
analysis. /d. 9137. Fifth, and finally, the affidavit omitted that a police dive team had recovered
Wexler’s briefcase, laptop, and hard drives from the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia, which may
have indicated that Wexler was murdered to destroy potential evidence on the computer. Z/d.
146, 162.
E. Detectives Fail to Investigate Other Suspects and an Alternative Motive
There were at least two alternative suspects in the murder of Harold Wexler: Frank Bagley
and Warren Wright. Frank Bagley’s fingerprints were found on the interior door handle of the
check-cashing store, and Bagley had been convicted of forgery and drug possession. Compl.

? Whereas Crawford told officers that the shooter stored the gun in a dark-colored bag, the affidavit claimed that
Crawford told officers that the gunman dropped a white plastic bag and a brown bag; whereas Crawford told officers
that the shooter was around 5’9 with a full beard, the affidavit omitted that Tracy Jordan, Sr. was 6’1 and was not able
to grow a full beard due to a skin condition; whereas Jordan told officers that he was a customer at Wexler’s store, the
affidavit states that Jordan told officers he “had no knowledge or reason why his fingerprint was on the white ‘Sneaker
City’ bag found at the scene.” Compl. 4 120, 122, 126-28, 133-34.

“7 163-65. Police questioned Bagley on November 22, 2004 and interviewed his girlfriend; during
the questioning of Bagley, police did not ask Bagley or his girlfriend about his alibi on the day of
Wexler’s murder. /d 166-67. Police also declined to include Bagley’s photo among those
shown to Terrance Crawford when they asked Crawford to identify the shooter. Id. J 168.
An anonymous tip identified Warren Wright as the shooter. /d. 9169. The tip included
information that Wright kept the murder weapon in a black bag, which was consistent with the
nonpublic account that Terrance Crawford gave to police. /d. 171. Additionally, Warren Wright
matched the physical description that Crawford gave of the shooter, and Wright had a criminal
history that included burglary and theft. /d. J] 172-73. On December 1, 2004, police officers
searched Wright’s vehicle and found a loaded weapon with obliterated serial numbers. Jd. § 174.
Police did not arrest Wright and apparently did not show his photo to Crawford for identification.
Id. 176, 180. Police also obtained information that Wright frequented the area close to Wexler’s
store. Id § 178. Despite this evidence, there was no further investigation of Wright and none of
this information was disclosed to Jordan’s defense counsel. /d@. □□□ 181-83.
Harold Wexler’s impending imprisonment, cooperation with federal authorities, prior
criminal activity, and the discovery of his briefcase in the Schuylkill River provide an “obvious
motive for [Wexler’s] murder--silencing Wexler before he could testify against his co-
conspirators.” Jd. 9§ 154-62. And yet the Defendants, per Jordan’s allegations, refused to
investigate any further this potential explanation of Wexler’s murder. Jd. J 160.
F. H-Files and H-Binders
The Philadelphia Police Department’s Homicide Unit maintained an “H-File” (also known
as a “homicide file,” “murder file,” or “M-File”) for each murder that its officers investigated.
Compl. Jf 184-86, 241. The H-File contained evidence and information that the officers collected
during a murder investigation. ld. § 186.

Jordan alleges that the Philadelphia Police Department and the District Attorney’s Office
had a widespread policy or custom of permitting officers—at their sole discretion—to curate a
subset of information contained in the H-file into “H-Binders.” Jd. J] 241-42. These “H-Binders”
were given to trial prosecutors and often did not include potentially exculpatory evidence. □□□
{| 242-43. The net effect of this practice would be to deprive criminal defendants from being
aware of potentially exculpatory evidence, even though Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) obligate the disclosure of such evidence to
criminal defendants. /d. 4 243.
Jordan further alleges that the DAO was a struthious participant, willingly burying its head
in the sand by failing to verify whether the H-Binders provided by the detectives matched the more
comprehensive H-Files. /d. 267-68. Two facts clearly support this allegation. First, Defendant
(and then Assistant District Attorney) Ed Cameron stated in an email, disclosed in 2021, that
“better detectives don’t take notes or write down the obvious lies,” that he was aware that the
Homicide Unit “never advise[d] defense attorneys about this [practice],” and that the DAO
Homicide Unit prosecutors “advise[d] detectives to take separate statements on other cases” in an
effort to compartmentalize disclosures made to criminal defendants. Jd §§ 269-71. Second,
Jordan cites at least ten other cases of individuals who were wrongfully convicted due in part to
the withholding of exculpatory evidence. See id. □□ 264-66.
In Jordan’s case, the H-File and H-Binder practice resulted in several key pieces of
evidence being withheld from him, including information about Wexler’s criminal history and
cooperation agreement, information about Warren Wright as a potential suspect, information about
Terrance Crawford’s potential unreliability as a witness, and the 2006 NIBIN report that stated

Nannette Jordan’s weapon was not a match to the bullet recovered at the murder scene. /d. §'§ 189—
203.
I. Legal Standards
A. Motion to Dismiss
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Plausibility
means ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Tatis v. Allied
Interstate, LEC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting lgbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 7d In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and interpreted in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 Gd Cir. 2009) (quoting Schrob v. Catterson, 948
F.2d 1402, 1408 (Gd Cir. 1991)).
B. Qualified Immunity
Because qualified immunity arguments apply to almost every Count, the Court considers
it more efficient to explain the standard once, at the outset.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow y. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important

Wh

interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Jd.
The test to determine whether qualified immunity applies is a two-pronged inquiry. Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655 (2014). “The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” Jd.
at 656 (citation modified). “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether
the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Jd (quoting Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). “The salient question is whether the state of the law at the time
of the incident provided ‘fair warning’ to the defendants ‘that their alleged conduct was
unconstitutional.’” Jd. (citation modified). “‘Clearly established’ for purposes of qualified
immunity means that ‘the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614—
15 (1999) (citation modified). “Thus, qualified immunity does not apply when the facts, taken in
the light most favorable to the party claiming injury, show that the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right, and, as an additional condition, when the right at issue—‘defined at the
appropriate level of specificity’—was ‘clearly established.’” Rivera-Guadalupe v. City of
Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295, 299 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 245
(3d Cir. 2021)) (citation modified). The “ultimate question is whether the state of the law when
the offense occurred ... [provided defendants] ‘fair warning’ that their conduct violated [a
plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights].” Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 181 (Gd Cir. 2022)
(quoting L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2016)).

11

The Court may choose which prong of the qualified immunity inquiry to engage with first
because both must be satisfied.
If. Discussion
A. Count I for Malicious Prosecution
To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable
cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cr.
2003) (citing Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379-80 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Defendants’ first argument is that they had probable cause to arrest Jordan, so Plaintiff
cannot make plausible allegations concerning the third element of a malicious prosecution claim.
Probable cause is a “reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to
warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the
offense.” Thomas v. EJ. Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Miller v. Pa.
RR. Co., 89 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. 1952)). But Defendants’ argument asks the Court to do too much
at this stage. As the Parties know well, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs well-pleaded
allegations when deciding a motion to dismiss. Under this posture, Plaintiff's allegations make
plausible that the criminal proceeding against him was initiated without probable cause.
Determining whether probable cause existed requires the Court to “measure the cumulative
weight of all the evidence and account for reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.” Halsey
v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 302 (3d Cir. 2014). Under the Court’s measurement, the Defendants’
material omissions and false statements are sufficient to cast doubt on whether probable cause

existed. See, e.g., Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690, 697 Gd Cir. 2017) (finding that courts may
discount the existence of probable cause when an “affiant willingly and ‘affirmatively distorted
the truth’” or when “an officer withholds a fact in his ken that ‘any reasonable person would have
known... was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.””) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212
F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)) (citation modified).
Under the facts alleged, Defendant Griffin omitted, among other things, in the affidavit of
probable cause that (1) the sole eyewitness to Wexler’s murder, Terrance Crawford, did not identify
Jordan in a photo lineup, (11) Jordan did not match the eyewitness’s description of the suspect, □□□□□
the ballistics testing gave the false impression that Nannette Jordan’s service weapon fired the
bullets that killed Wexler, and (iv) Wexler was a cooperating witness for a federal investigation
and had been convicted of money laundering. See generally supra Section I. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the proceeding against Jordan was initiated
without probable cause.
Defendants’ second argument is that the Officer Defendants enjoy qualified immunity
because, on their view, there was no clearly established due process right against malicious
prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment when Plaintiff was convicted of Wexler’s murder
in 2006. Defendants’ argument requires the Court to wade into a divide in this Circuit about the
viability of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Crosland
v. City of Phila., 676 F. Supp.3d 364, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (observing that, “as of today, the status
of a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution is murky.”). Because
Defendants’ argument concentrates on whether there was a “clearly established due process right
against malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth Amendment in 2006,” the Court will focus on
that prong of the qualified immunity inquiry first. ECF No. 40 at 41.

42

The Court is persuaded by the Crosland court’s well-reasoned decision. The murkiness
that Defendants have identified pertains more to changes in the doctrinal landscape after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) than it does to the existence
of the legal right to be free from malicious prosecution. As Judge Brody stated in Crosland,
“though Albright may have altered the underlying legal analysis, the right’s existence was never
in doubt.” Crosland, 676 F. Supp.3d at 378. Other cases confirm that a right to be free from
malicious prosecution predates Jordan’s arrest and conviction. See, e.g., Gallo v. City of Phila.,
161 F.3d 217, 220 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that, prior to 1994, officer defendants were “not
entitled to qualified immunity because the pre-A/bright law of this circuit clearly provided that
malicious prosecution violated federal law’); see also Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173
(3d Cir. 1998) (observing that a § 1983 claim may “include police conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment, the procedural Due Process clause, or other explicit text of the Constitution”).
Because the Court finds that the Officer Defendants’ conduct, as alleged, violated a federal
right that was clearly established at the time of Jordan’s arrest and conviction, the Court declines
to find that the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the
proceedings.
B. Counts H and Lil for Unlawful Seizure and False Imprisonment
Defendants argue that Counts II and III are time-barred under the operative statute of
limitations. ECF No. 40 at 17-20. The limitations period for a § 1983 action is the limitations
period for personal injury torts in the state where the cause of action arose. Wallace v. Kato, 549
U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Pennsylvania has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts.
42 Pa. Cons, Stat. § 5524(2), Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully seized and falsely imprisoned
on November 24, 2004, when he was arrested. Compl. 151. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's
unlawful seizure and false imprisonment claims must have been asserted, at the latest, by April 6,

14

2007 to satisfy the operative statute of limitations; Jordan’s Complaint was filed in 2025, almost
two decades after the April 6, 2007 deadline. Accordingly, Defendants argue that these claims are
time-barred.
Jordan does not contest Defendants’ argument that Counts II and HI are time-barred. ECF
No. 50 at 41 n.6. Accordingly, and pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Court grants this portion of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as uncontested and
therefore dismisses with prejudice Counts I and III. See also Celestial Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. City
of Phila., 901 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting cases and holding that a court may
grant as uncontested any unopposed portions of a motion to dismiss).
C. Counts IV and V for Deliberate Deception
To state a deliberate deception claim, Jordan must allege that his imprisonment resulted
from “the knowing use of false testimony, other fabricated evidence, or from concealing evidence
to create false testimony to secure a conviction.” Dennis v. City of Phila., 19 F.4th 279, 291 Gd
Cir. 2021) (citation modified). A deliberate deception claim must go beyond “the failure to
disclose evidence” under Brady. Id. In Count IV, Jordan alleges that Officer Defendants Griffin,
Dusak, Maum, Kuhlmeier, and ADA Cameron committed deliberate deception in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by presenting false or misleading testimony, failing to
correct false testimony presented by others, fabricating evidence, concealing and withholding
exculpatory evidence, and deceiving the Court that Tracy Jordan, Sr. murdered Harold Wexler.
Compl. 4294. In Count V, Jordan alleges that Officer Defendant Stott committed deliberate
deception by presenting false testimony that he “co-examined” the faulty ballistics examinations,
which also denied Jordan his Sixth Amendment right to confront and to cross-examine the actual
technician that performed the ballistics analysis. /d. 1299.

Defendants point to the sound rule that “allegations of false testimony, in isolation, cannot
sustain a deliberate deception claim.” Gainey v. City of Phila., 704 F. Supp.3d 589, 600 (E.D. Pa.
2023). It necessarily follows from this rule that Jordan cannot rely solely on allegations of false
testimony to ground a deliberate deception claim; the penalty for false testimony is a potential
perjury charge, not a § 1983 civil lability claim. See, e.g., Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“Witnesses, including public officials and private citizens, are immune from civil
damages based upon their testimony.”). The DAO Defendants make a related point: Defendant
Cameron is absolutely immune from suit for conduct related to his prosecutorial advocacy. ECF
No. 23-1 at 12-13; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (We hold only that in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil
suit for damages under § 1983”) (citation modified).
Jordan counters by arguing that his deliberate deception claims are “based on out-of-court
misconduct that led to the introduction of false and misleading testimony at trial,” thereby evading
the immunity issues related to false testimony at trial and to prosecutorial advocacy. ECF No. 50
at 36 (original emphasis); ECF No. 47 at 16 (“Mr. Cameron’s actions were out of the bounds of
prosecutorial advocacy and solely aimed towards investigative and administrative strategies to
circumvent the production of Brady disclosures ....”). With respect to Defendant Cameron,
Jordan relies on authoritative caselaw that stands for the proposition that prosecutors do not enjoy
absolute immunity when they perform work outside the advocacy function, such as investigatory
work or when prosecutors destroy exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148,
160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[A] prosecutor’s ‘investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute
immunity.’”) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)); Yarris v. Cnty. of

14

Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We believe that destroying exculpatory evidence is
not related to a prosecutor’s prosecutorial function.”).
The specificity of Jordan’s allegations concerning out-of-court conduct varies widely
among Defendants. Jordan alleges that Defendant Griffin fired and damaged Nannette Jordan’s
service weapon and that this misconduct created false testimony that was used to convict him.
Compl. §/ 85-91. Jordan also alleges that Defendant Stott, together with Defendant Griffin,
concealed the 2006 NIBIN report that led to the creation of false testimony concerning the strength
of the ballistics evidence against him. See, e.g., id. 9] 114, 198, 202. Accordingly, Jordan has
sufficiently alleged out-of-court conduct against Defendants Griffin and Stott to state claims for
deliberate deception.
The Court agrees with Defendants that Jordan may not rely on any of Defendant Cameron’s
in-court statements to ground the deliberate deception claim against him. See, e.g., id. 209-17
(alleging facts concerning Cameron’s in-court, prosecutorial actions). But the Court agrees with
Jordan that there are sufficient allegations about Cameron’s non-prosecutorial conduct to state a
claim for deliberate deception against him and his estate. According to the allegations, which the
Court must accept as true at this stage, Cameron’s advising the police about how to conduct
investigations sounds more in the investigative realm than it does in the prosecutorial one. /d.
269-72. It is a tougher call to determine whether Cameron is absolutely immune concerning
his participation in the H-Binder scheme. After all, “[iJt is well settled that prosecutors are entitled
to absolute immunity from claims based on their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long
as they did so while functioning in their prosecutorial capacity.” Yarris, 465 F.3d at 137. But
because, under Plaintiff's allegations, Cameron’s participation in the H-Binder scheme amounts
to a “knowing failure to stop the removal of exculpatory material,” that conduct is not within the

17

ambit of “presenting the State’s case” and therefore not subject to absolute immunity. Henderson
y, Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1120 (3d Cir. 1980). Defendant Cameron may renew this argument at
summary judgment if discovery provides a basis to assert that such conduct was properly within
his prosecutorial function.
The allegations against Defendants Dusak, Maum, and Kuhlmeier are either impermissible
group pleading or too threadbare to credit as true for purposes of this motion. See, e.g., ECF No.
50 at 35; Compl. § 38 (alleging vaguely that “Wexler’s attorney alerted homicide detectives,
including Defendants Detective Griffin, Detective Dusak, and Lieutenant Maum ....”); id.
193-94 (alleging generally that “Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Kuhlmeier, and Maum were aware
of Harold Wexler’s criminal activities . . . [but] withheld this information from prosecutors”). The
Court’s review suggests that there are not sufficient factual allegations concerning the out-of-court
conduct of Defendants Dusak, Kuhlmeier, and Maum to state deliberate deception claims against
them. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed against them without prejudice.
The Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this Count. By
1942, “the [Supreme] Court extended the] right [to not be convicted on peryured testimony] by
recognizing as a due process violation the conviction of a defendant through perjured testimony
and the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 289-90
(citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942)). Accordingly, because the right in question was
clearly established at the time of Jordan’s conviction and because Jordan’s allegations entail that
Defendants Griffin, Stott, and Cameron violated this right, qualified immunity does not attach
here.
D. Count VI for Withholding Exculpatory Evidence
Defendants move to dismiss Jordan’s claim that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights by withholding and suppressing exculpatory and impeachment evidence against him. Their

1°

sole argument ts that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the “constitutional obligation
to turn over evidence was not clearly established until the Third Circuit’s ruling in Gibson v.
Superintendent of N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 443 (d Cir. 2005).” ECF No.
40 at 44; see also Gibson, 411 F.3d at 444 (“[P]olice officers and other state actors may be liable
under § 1983 for failing to disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor.”).
The 2005 date of Gibson is material to determining whether Jordan had the right to not be
convicted without having exculpatory evidence suppressed. Jordan was arrested in 2004 and his
trial started on November 1, 2006. So, the Court must decide whether it is the date of trial (and
conviction), the date of arrest, or some other relevant date that anchors when Jordan’s Gibson-
established right was allegedly violated. The Defendants’ view is that the relevant time is when
“the allegedly withheld documents were obtained by Defendant Officers.” ECF No. 40 at 45.
Jordan’s view is that the violation occurs at any point during which his right to a fair trial, including
his right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, remains live.
The Court’s view, at this stage of the proceedings, is that Jordan’s position is more sensible.
Because the “affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to an accused” is an ongoing one
and because Defendants failed discharge it through November 1, 2006, the Court holds that the
right was clearly established at the time of the violation and that Jordan sufficiently alleges that
Defendants violated that right by failing to discharge their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
up to and during his trial. Accordingly, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on
this claim.
E. Count VI for Fabrication of Evidence
To state a fabricated evidence claim, Jordan’s allegations must make plausible that “there
is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of th[e] [fabricated] evidence, the defendant would
not have been convicted.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294. Jordan alleges that Defendant Griffin

10

fabricated evidence by tampering with and discharging Nannette Jordan’s weapon to generate a
misleading ballistics report and to ultimately incriminate him. Compl. {7 66—96.
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because the allegations are
“threadbare and speculative.” ECF No. 40 at 31. The Court disagrees. Jordan alleges in detail
that Nannette Jordan’s weapon had not been fired for several months, that Defendant Griffin
possessed the weapon for forty-five minutes before it was submitted to ballistics, that Defendant

Griffin intentionally damaged the weapon to make it seem like it had been involved in a scuffle,
and that Defendant Griffin discharged the weapon prior to a ballistics test to misleadingly suggest
that Tracy Jordan had used this gun to murder Harold Wexler. See supra Section 1. Those
allegations are presumed to be true for this motion, and they suffice to state a fabricated evidence
claim. To the extent that Defendants dispute the facts, summary judgment is the appropriate
avenue to resolve those disputes.
The Court also finds that Defendant Griffin is not entitled to qualified immunity because,
in addition to the sufficient factual allegations, Halsey states clearly that “by fabricating evidence
for use in a criminal prosecution, a state actor would violate a defendant’s constitutional rights.”
750 F.3d at 295. And that right was established as early as 1942 in Pyle v. Kansas but certainly
well before Jordan’s arrest and conviction. Jd. Therefore, qualified immunity does not attach here.
EF. Count VIII for Destruction of Evidence
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Griffin violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
destroying and aiding in the destruction of exculpatory evidence. The destroyed evidence includes
bags, fingerprints, security camera tapes from the day of the murder, and other evidence found at
the murder scene. See supra Section J. To state a destruction of evidence claim, Jordan must
allege that Defendants “fail[ed] to preserve ‘evidentiary material of which no more can be said
than it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the

Ian

defendant.”” Yarris, 465 F.3d at 142 (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56 (1988)).
Youngblood additionally requires a showing of “bad faith on the part of the police ... [which]
necessarily turn]s] on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time
it was lost or destroyed.” 488 U.S. at 58, 56 n.*.
Defendant Griffin argues that Jordan fails to plead Griffin was acting in bad faith when he
allegedly destroyed the black bag, certain police activity sheets, and the security camera tapes from
the day of Wexler’s murder. ECF No. 40 at 34. The failure, on Griffin’s view, is that Jordan does
not allege that Griffin Anew the exculpatory value of this evidence at the time it was destroyed. /d.
Jordan responds by arguing that, under Yarris and Youngblood, bad faith and knowledge of
exculpatory value may be inferred when “the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the
evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.” ECF No. 50 at 33 (quoting Yarris,
465 F.3d at 142 and Younghlood, 488 U.S. at 58).
At this stage of the proceedings, it is improper to resolve factual disputes. The Court
assumes the truth of well-pleaded allegations, of which there are several concerning the destruction
of evidence and what Defendant Griffin knew about the exculpatory value of such evidence. See,
Compl. § 186 (Griffin was the lead investigator of the Wexler murder and maintained the
case’s H-File), 4 316 (Griffin destroyed Police Activity Sheets); 9317 (Griffin destroyed security
camera tapes). Defendants may renew their arguments about the factual insufficiency of this claim
at summary judgment if a proper evidentiary basis to do so exists.
Additionally, Defendant Griffin is not entitled to qualified immunity on this Count because,
in addition to the factual sufficiency of the allegations, the Supreme Court clearly established the
due process right at issue here in Youngblood in 1988. See also Yarris, 465 F.3d at 143.

G. Count IX for Reckless Investigation
The Third Circuit has not recognized a claim for reckless investigation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We have never
recognized an independent due process right to be free from a reckless investigation.”); see also
Johnson v, Logan, 721 F. App’x. 205, 208 n.9 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have significant doubts about
whether there is an independent substantive due process right to be free from reckless
investigation.”); Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 354 n.5 (3d Cir. 2018). One reason for the Third
Circuit’s doubts is that a malicious prosecution claim—which the Court has declined to dismiss—
captures much of the same misconduct that a reckless investigation claim would capture. Because
reckless investigation is not a standalone claim, the Court grants this portion of the motion to
dismiss. And, even if it were a standalone claim, it is clear from Third Circuit jurisprudence that
the right at issue was not clearly established before 2006, meaning that the Defendants would be
entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the dismissal of Count CX is with prejudice.
H. Count X for Failure to Intervene
As Plaintiff himself concedes, “the Third Circuit has not yet had an opportunity to
recognize a failure-to-intervene claim in the malicious prosecution context.” ECF No. 50 at 42;
see also Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 285 (3d Cir. 2023) (recognizing a failure to
intervene claim solely in the excessive force or sexual assault context); Ogrod v. City of Phila.,
598 F. Supp. 3d 253, 273 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (no obligation to intervene when another officer
fabricates and withholds evidence); Onyiah v. City of Phila., 660 F. Supp. 3d 407, 416 (E.D. Pa.
2023) (no obligation to intervene to prevent a coerced confession or malicious prosecution).
Because this claim is not recognized as a standalone claim for purposes of this § 1983 action, the
Court dismisses it with prejudice. And, just like for Count IX, even if it were tenable as a
standalone claim, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not

99

clearly established at the time of Jordan’s arrest and conviction. The dismissal of Count X is
therefore with prejudice.
I. Count XI for Civil Rights Conspiracy
To state a claim for civil rights conspiracy, Jordan must allege that “persons acting under
color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” Juérowski
v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293-94 (Gd Cir. 2018). A conspiracy also requires an
agreement among the conspirators, and such agreement or “meeting of the minds or understanding
... to conspire can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Jd. at 295 (citation modified); see
also Watson v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 436 F. App’x. 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) ([To] prevail
conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state
law conspired to deprive him of a federally protected right.) (citations omitted).
In § 1983 actions, conspiracy claims typically depend on the underlying constitutional
claims, such that conspiracy claims survive to whatever extent the underlying constitutional claims
survive. See Maldonado v. City of Phila., 2023 WL 4685967, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2023) CCivil
rights conspiracy claims normally survive a motion to dismiss where the constitutional claims do
too.”). But conspiracy claims are not wholly parasitic on the underlying constitutional claims:
they also require Plaintiff to “provide some factual basis to support the existence of the elements
of a conspiracy: agreement and concerted action.” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 295. Defendants argue
that Plaintiff's claims fall short on this front.
The conspiracy that Plaintiff alleges involves Defendants Griffin, Dusak, Maum,
Kuhlmeier, Stott, and Cameron. According to Jordan, Defendant Cameron stated in an email that
“better detectives don’t take notes or write down the obvious lies,” that the District Attorney’s
Office “selectively disclos[ed| a witness’s cooperation history so as to prevent defendants’ counsel
from learning of potential impeachment evidence,” and that the DAO “advise[d] detectives to take

42

separate statements on other cases” involving a single cooperating witness to improperly limit
disclosure. Compl. 269-72. At the motion to dismiss stage, these allegations are sufficient to
make plausible that there was an agreement among the Officer Defendants and the Defendant
attorneys to conspire to deprive Jordan of his constitutional rights. The civil rights conspiracy
claim therefore survives insofar as the constitutional claims upon which it is premised have also
survived the motion to dismiss because there are allegations sufficient to infer a conspiratorial
agreement among Defendants.
J. Count XH for Monell Liability against the City of Philadelphia
Jordan brings a Monel claim in reliance on three municipal policies or customs. To state
a Monell claim under this theory, Jordan must allege that “a widespread municipal practice,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-
settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “A plaintiff presenting an unconstitutional policy must
point to an official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker possessing final authority to
establish municipal policy on the relevant subject... [aJnd if alleging a custom, the plaintiff must
evince a given course of conduct so well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute law.”
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2019). Generally, Monell claims are “not amenable
to resolution at the pleading stage, as [they] require[] a plaintiff to plead facts outside his or her
personal knowledge.” 3909 Realty LLC vy. City of Phila., 2021 WL 2342929, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June
8, 2021).
The first custom on which Plaintiff relies concerns how City of Philadelphia police officers
curated a set of materials from their homicide files into H-Binders, so that prosecutors could then
conceal potential impeachment and exculpatory evidence from defendants. Compl. 4/333. The
second custom is the practice of using bunter mark comparisons as a basis to conclude there was

yA

a positive ballistics match between a weapon and crime scene evidence. /d. 334. The third is
the “widespread custom of conducting deceptive and malicious investigations of suspects, through
illegal and unconstitutional methods.” Jd. { 335.
Because Defendants did not substantively oppose the first custom, the Court agrees with
Plaintiff that the Defendants have forfeited any opposition to this portion of the Count. See
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 178 (Gd Cir. 1997) (“As a threshold matter, an argument
consisting of no more than a conclusory assertion .. . will be deemed waived.”).
Defendants argue that the second and third customs are insufficiently pleaded. ECF No.
40 at 49-58. The Court disagrees. For the second custom concerning the bunter mark
comparisons, it is reasonable to infer from the Commanding Officer of the Firearms Investigation
statement that the FIU stopped relying on bunter marks in early 2010 that, prior to 2010,
there was a custom or policy of using bunter marks and that such custom or policy was in force
during the investigation of Tracy Jordan. See Compl. § 103-15, 253. The Defendants will have
the opportunity to challenge Jordan’s ability to prove this claim at summary judgment, but it is
sufficiently pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.
For the third custom concerning the City of Philadelphia’s alleged “widespread practice of
conducting deceptive and malicious investigations,” id § 335, Defendants argue that the
allegations do not sufficiently establish a custom because the other instances of misconduct are
“temporally remote and vaguely pled.” ECF No. 40 at 53-54. But Jordan’s allegations concerning
the misconduct inherent in the H-Binder practice and concerning the concealment and withholding
of exculpatory evidence that led to the wrongful convictions of at least 49 other Philadelphians are
sufficient to make out a plausible claim for Monel? liability. See Compl. □□ 255—66.

VS

K. Count XII for Monell Liability against the District Attorney's Office
The DAO Defendants argue that Jordan fails to state a Monell claim because the allegations
are vague and boilerplate, because Jordan fails to allege conduct by a municipal decisionmaker,
and because Jordan has not alleged that the putative policy caused the constitutional violations that
he suffered. ECF No. 23-1 at 8-12.
The Court understands this Monell claim to be one concerning widespread customs, not an
explicit and publicized policy. See ECF No. 47 at 8 (describing the Monell claim against the DAO
as based on “four unconstitutional customs”). Accordingly, if Jordan sufficiently alleges that the
four customs were “so widespread as to have the force of law,” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facil., 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003), then those customs and practices are “ascribable to
municipal decisionmakers.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation
modified).
Jordan sufficiently alleges four DAO customs that can anchor his Monel! claim. The first
is the practice of relying on H-Binders curated by Philadelphia homicide officers so that
prosecutors could effectively withhold documents from criminal defendants. Compl. 340. The
second and third customs concern selectively documenting witness interviews and not disclosing
witnesses’ cooperation history to minimize impeachment evidence available to criminal
defendants. /d. 341-42. The fourth involves the refusal to disclose Police Activity Sheets. /d.
£343. Jordan alleges in sufficient detail how the customs operate, the pervasive nature of the
customs in both the police department and the DAO, and how these customs resulted in his
constitutional violations. See, e.g., id. [J 185-207, 269-74, 316; see also id. § 267 (discussing the
New York University School of Law’s 2024 report, “Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office,” that “documents a decades-long culture within the DAO of prioritizing

VL

winning over justice [and] leading to dozens of documented wrongful convictions.”).
Accordingly, the Court rejects the DAO’s arguments and denies the motion to dismiss this Count.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 23, 40). An Order follows.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439983. Public record. Not legal advice.