# Ezekiel

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · September 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439838

## Case

- **Full name:** Angela Dawn Ezekiel v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** September 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

ANGELA DAWN EZEKIEL PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 6:25-cv-06131

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Angela Dawn Ezekiel (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the
Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act.
The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all
proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and
conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 4. Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues
this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background
Plaintiff filed her DIB application on June 26, 2023, alleging disabilities due to “cyclic
neutropenia, lupus, fibromyalgia, epilepsy, chronic headaches, chronic pain, back issues, hand
issues, foot issues, skins issues, digestive issues, and eye issues.” (Tr. 109).1 Plaintiff alleged an
0F

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The
transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document
filed at ECF No. 6. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF
page number.
onset date of December 31, 2015. (Tr. 19). Plaintiff’s application was denied on November 17,
2023, and upon reconsideration on April 5, 2024. Id.
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on her denied application, and this hearing
was granted. (Tr. 46-85). The hearing was held on November 13, 2024. (Tr. 17). At this hearing,

Plaintiff was present and was represented by Shannon Muse Carroll. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational
Expert (“VE”) Dianne Smith testified at the hearing. Id.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) entered an unfavorable decision on January 2,
2025. (Tr. 17-31). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity (“SGA”) since December 31, 2015. (Tr. 19, Finding 2). The ALJ further
determined that Plaintiff has severe impairments of seizure disorder, vasovagal syncope, postural
orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (“POTS”), degenerative disc disease, migraines, fibromyalgia,
Raynaud’s syndrome, psoriasis, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
(Tr. 20, Finding 3). However, despite these impairments’ severity, the ALJ determined that those
impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of

Impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“Listings”). (Tr. 21, Finding 4).
The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined her residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 23-30). The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints
and found the claimed limitations were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ also determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light
work with postural and environmental restrictions. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s past relevant work (“PRW”) and determined Plaintiff
had none. (Tr. 30, Finding 6). However, the ALJ found there were jobs in significant numbers in
the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 30, Finding 10). Through the testimony
of the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the representative occupations of (1) officer
helper with approximately 43,000 jobs nationally, (2) merchandise marker with approximately
160,000 jobs nationally, and (3) subassembler with approximately 13,200 jobs nationally. Id.
Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled under the Act from

December 31, 2015, through September 30, 2021, the date last insured. (Tr. 31, Finding 11).
On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant appeal. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed her
Appeal Brief on June 30, 2026. ECF No. 10. The SSA filed its Appeal Brief on July 29, 2026.
ECF No. 11. Accordingly, the matter is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law
In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a
preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to
support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,
the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would
have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.
See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is
possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d
1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden
of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least
one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox
v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The
Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff
must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve
consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses
the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently
engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that
significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;
(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling
impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,
and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the RFC to perform his or her past relevant

work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox,
160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is
reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion
In her appeal brief, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s disability decision is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. ECF No. 10. In making this claim, Plaintiff raises the following
arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ failed to evaluate any of Plaintiff’s mental limitations as they
relate to her RFC; and (2) the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s impairments as a whole.
A. Mental Limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to consider her mental limitations when

determining her RFC. ECF No. 10. At Step Two of the SSA’s five-step sequential evaluation, the
ALJ must determine whether the claimant has “a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment,” or “a combination of impairments that is severe,” that lasted or is expected to last for
at least twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909; 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
“An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly
limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby v. Astrue, 500
F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). Here, at Step Two, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had a
medically determinable mental impairment from depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (Tr. 20). The
ALJ’s evaluation of any mental limitations found a mild limitation in Plaintiff’s “understanding,
remembering or applying information” in “interacting with others” and in “adapting or managing

oneself.” (Tr. 22). The ALJ did find a moderate limitation in concentrating and maintaining pace.
Id. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider these limitations in the formulation of
her RFC. ECF No. 10, p. 3.
The ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff’s mild and moderate impairments found in Step
Two while formulating the RFC at Step Four. (Tr. 20-30). First, the ALJ discusses Plaintiff’s
reported mental limitations when explaining the RFC formulation. (Tr. 24). The ALJ explains
why other evidence made Plaintiff’s self-reported limitations less credible and insufficient to
require including exclusions for them in the RFC, noting several instances in which Plaintiff
presented with intact memory for “recent and remote events” with normal concentration. (Tr. 23-
29).
When formulating Plaintiff’s RFC at Step Four, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s reported
mental limitations and medical records to the contrary at some length. Id. Based on this, the ALJ

determined that evidence in the record of Plaintiff’s daily activities precluded finding that any
mental limitations were significant enough to interfere with her ability to perform work, stating
that “the longitudinal record shows that the claimant was alert, oriented, had a normal mood and
affect, and had normal cognition, attention, concentration, memory, insight, and judgment.
Claimant acknowledged driving, performing as a seasonal singer, creating art, volunteering in her
community, and maintaining a public performing and volunteering social media presence.” (Tr.
28) (citations omitted).
Precedent makes clear that where an ALJ’s finding of a mental limitation at Step Two can
be “harmonized” with the Step Four determination, there is no reversable error. Chismarich v.
Berryhill, 888 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 888 n.3

(8th Cir. 2006). With an eye toward harmony, the Court finds that the ALJ determined that the
mild limitations from Step Two were contradicted by other evidence in the record to such a degree
that the RFC formulation at Step Four did not require the inclusion of any mental limitations.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit reversable error by declining to include
any additional mental limitations in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC.
B. Plaintiff’s Impairments as a Whole
Plaintiff also argues, in essence, that the ALJ’s RFC formulation is not supported by
substantial evidence. ECF No. 10, pp. 9-19. Plaintiff emphasizes that her numerous medical
conditions require numerous doctor’s visits, as indicated by her extensive medical records. Id.
Plaintiff additionally notes that her symptoms themselves are reported to cause her to be
incapacitated “three to four days per week” which, in conjunction with frequent doctor visits would
prevent her from meaningfully competing in a job market. Plaintiff concludes that viewing the
record as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ’s decision is contradicted by the overall weight of the

evidence and must be reversed and remanded for reconsideration. In response, the Commissioner
argues that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that
Plaintiff could still perform light work with some modifications and restrictions. ECF No. 11, p.
6-8. The Commissioner first notes that the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s various severe
impairments, including her migraines, seizure disorder, and fibromyalgia in his RFC
determination. Id.
The Court finds that the ALJ’s Step Four evaluation of Plaintiff’s RFC must be affirmed.
Though Plaintiff has highlighted substantial evidence supporting her assertion of disability, the
Court’s review is not an evaluation of what other conclusions the ALJ could reach or what the
Court would have determined. See Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2021); Scott v.

Berryhill, 855 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2017). While Plaintiff does cite medical records that align
with her assertion of disability, they do not overwhelm the medical evidence from the relevant
period that indicates her impairments were not so debilitating that they would preclude the light
work outlined in the RFC. Evidence in the record also weighs against Plaintiff’s allegations
regarding the severity of her pain, as she reported during multiple medical appointments in the
relevant period that her gait and range of motion was normal and had no or minimal joint
tenderness or swelling. The ALJ specifically listed contrary evidence, noting: “The longitudinal
record shows that the claimant had a normal gait, normal strength, normal balance, an intact
sensory, and a normal range of motion to her extremities (Exhibits 1F, pages 7-10, 23-26, 63-68;
2F, pages 36-39; 3F, pages 5 11; 5F, pages 44-49; 7F, pages 9-10; 9F, pages 22-27; 11F, pages
57-61; 12F, pages 24-27; and 14F, pages 39-46).” (Tr. 28).2 See Brown v. Astrue, 611 F.3d 941,
1F
955 (8th Cir. 2010) (“If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be
considered disabling.”) (quotation omitted). The ALJ’s evaluation is further supported by
Plaintiff’s self-reported ability to perform various tasks during this period including driving and
volunteering. (Tr. 28).
Accordingly, evaluating the record as a whole, the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s
RFC and corresponding denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits must affirmed.
4. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying
benefits to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence and the decision is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED this 10th day of September 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton
/s/
Honorable Spencer G. Singleton
United States Magistrate Judge

2 These exhibits cited can be found in the transcript, at the following pages: Tr. pp. 314-317; 330-
333; 370-375; 411-414; 452-458; 519-524; 619-620; 689-694; 783-787; 874-877; 1016-1023.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439838. Public record. Not legal advice.