# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439244

## Case

- **Full name:** Golden Bridge LLC d/b/a Golden Bridge Funding LLC v. 150-30 Ave Realty LLC and Andy Weihan Ho
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------- X
GOLDEN BRIDGE LLC d/b/a GOLDEN BRIDGE :
FUNDING LLC, :
:
Plaintiff, :
: REPORT AND
– against – : RECOMMENDATION
:
150-30 AVE REALTY LLC and ANDY WEIHAN : 23-cv-9045 (NCM) (PK)
HO, :
:
Defendants. :
--------------------------------------------------------------------- X
Peggy Kuo, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Golden Bridge LLC d/b/a Golden Bridge Funding LLC (“Golden Bridge”) brought
this action against Defendants 150-30 Ave Realty LLC (“Borrower”) and Andy Weihan Ho
(“Guarantor”) seeking foreclosure on the property located at 150-30 12th Avenue, Whitestone, NY
11357 (the “Property”). (Compl., Dkt. 1.) Before the Court on referral from the Honorable Natasha
C. Merle is Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Judgment of Foreclosure (the “Motion,” Dkt. 39). For the
reasons stated herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Motion be granted, except
as noted below.
BACKGROUND
On May 30, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment for foreclosure
of the Property and judgment against Guarantor, as well as Plaintiff’s request to appoint a referee to
compute the amounts owed as a result of the foreclosure. (Summ. J. Order (“SJ Order”) at 17, Dkt.
32.) On July 8, 2025, the Court confirmed Anthony Vaughn as the Referee.

1
The Motion, as supplemented,1 requests:
(1) That the Referee’s Report, dated September 15, 2025 (Dkt. 39-7) be
confirmed, with additional interest calculated from May 31, 2025 in the per diem
amount of $1,533.33 through the date of entry of judgment;

(2) That the Amended Proposed Order and Final Judgment of Foreclosure and
Sale (Dkt. 43-1) be entered;

(3) That Plaintiff be awarded $97,158.26 in attorneys’ fees, which includes
“estimated legal fees and expenses of $8,000” not yet incurred; and

(4) That Plaintiff be awarded costs of $909.25.
(See Decl. of Regularity ¶ 44, Dkt. 40.) No opposition to the Motion was filed.
I. Confirmation of the Referee’s Report
The Referee’s Report calculates a total amount of $3,344,200 based on following: $2,300,000
as the unpaid principal balance, $929,200 in default interest, and $115,000 in late charges. (Dkt. 39-7
at 5.)2
After a court grants summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a foreclosure action, “the
trial court has the authority to compute the amount owed or appoint a referee to do the same.” U.S.
Bank Tr. Co. v. Jericho Plaza Portfolio LLC, No. 24-CV-917 (PAE) (RFT), 2026 WL 476134, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 475059 (Feb. 1, 2026) (citing U.S.
Bank Tr. v. Dingman, No. 16-CV-1384 (CS), 2016 WL 6902480, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016)); see
also R.P.A.P.L. § 1321 (McKinney 2026). “A district court should confirm a referee’s report where its
findings are ‘substantially supported’ by the record.” 1077 Madison St., LLC v. March, No. 14-CV-4253
(JMA) (PK), 2017 WL 6383839, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing Kaplan v. Einy, 618 N.Y.S.2d
777, 780 (App. Div. 1994)). “Generally, New York courts will look with favor upon a Referee’s report,

1 (See July 20, 2026 Suppl. Decl., Dkt. 42; Aug. 3, 2026 Suppl. Decl., Dkt. 43; Aug. 10, 2026 Suppl. Decl., Dkt.
45.)
2 All references are to ECF paginations.
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inasmuch as the Referee, as trier of fact, is considered to be in the best position to determine the issues
presented.” Id. (citing Namer v. 152-54 56 W. 15th St. Realty Corp., 485 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div.
1985)). “A referee’s report may be based solely on documentary evidence and sworn affidavits.” Id.
(citing RCB Equities No. 3, LLC v. Skyline Woods Realty, LLC, No. 10-CV-1182, 2013 WL 935785, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2013)).
“An evidentiary hearing on the amount owed is not required, so long as there is a basis for the

damages awarded, detailed affidavits, and other documentary evidence can provide this basis.” Jericho
Plaza, 2026 WL 476134, at *5 (citation modified). “The amount owed should be determined based
on the terms of the Notes and Mortgages.” Id.

The principal amount of the loan originally was $2,400,000, which the Borrower was required
to pay by October 1, 2021. (See Consolidation, Extension, and Modification Agreement (“CEMA”)
at 4, Dkt. 1-3; Note at 3, Dkt. 1-2.) The Modification Agreement (Dkt. 1-5) and Extension Agreement
(Dkt. 1-6) extended the due date to October 2, 2023. The Referee’s Report properly concluded that
there was an unpaid principal balance of $2,300,000, as supported by a Borrower Statement of
Account dated April 25, 2024, showing a principal balance of $2,300,000 on June 6, 2023, which
remains unpaid. (See Referee’s Report at 13, 73–74.)

Pursuant to the Note, in the event of a default, the Borrower is obligated to pay interest at a

rate of 24% per annum, with the annum consisting of 360 days. (§ 3.) The Borrower defaulted on its
payment obligations by failing to make the required payment by October 2, 2023. (See SJ Order at 3,
8.)

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The Referee’s Report calculates default interest from October 3, 2023 to May 30, 2025, finding
that $929,200 in default interest is due for those 606 days based on a per annum rate of 24%. (Referee’s
Report at 5; Note § 3.) This calculation is correct.
Section Three of the Note permits interest to accrue until the loan amount is fully repaid. I
respectfully recommend that from May 31, 2025 until the date of entry of judgment, interest at a per
diem rate of $1,533.33 ($2,300,000 x 0.24/360) be added to the default interest amount.

The Referee’s Report calculates $115,000 in late charges. (Referee’s Report at 5; July 20, 2026
Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4.) Section Three of the Note imposes “a late charge of five percent (5%) for each
$1.00 of such payment.” Five percent of the unpaid balance of $2,300,000 is $115,000.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the Court confirm the Referee’s Report in the
total amount of $3,344,200 plus an additional per diem amount of $1,533.33 from May 31, 2025 until
the date of the entry of judgment.
II. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff requests $89,658.26 in attorneys’ fees for 204.1 hours of work by lawyers and
paralegals at Zeichner Ellman & Krause LLP, costs of $909.25, and “anticipated” legal fees and
disbursements of $7,500 and $500, respectively. (Decl. of Regularity ¶¶ 32, 40, 44.)

The Consolidated Mortgage entitles Plaintiff to an award for its costs and expenses in
enforcing the Note and in connection with a default, including attorneys’ fees. (Ex. C to Compl. ¶ 42,
Dkt. 1-3.)
The lodestar or “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours
required by the case” creates a “presumptively reasonable fee.” See Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658

4
F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany,
522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008) and Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010)).
1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

“According to the forum rule, the reasonable rate used to determine the amount of attorney’s
fees to award is calculated according to the prevailing rates in the district in which the court sits.”
Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation modified). “The prevailing
rates for experienced attorneys in the Eastern District of New York cases range from approximately
$100 to $450, depending on experience level.” Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 366 Realty LLC, No. 17-
CV-3570 (KAM) (JAM), 2026 WL 1740295, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2026) (internal citations
omitted); see also Kimba Indus. Inc. v. Fortegra Specialty Ins. Co., No. 24-CV-1334 (JMW), 2026 WL 618037,
at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2026) (concluding that after adjusting for inflation and market conditions,
updated forum rates in the Eastern District are $450 to $650 for partners, $300 to $450 for senior
associates, $150 to $300 for junior associates, and $100 to $150 for paralegals). “Moreover, attorneys’
fees awarded in the Eastern District of New York for cases concerning mortgages and promissory
notes have tended to be lower than in other cases.” 366 Realty LLC, 2026 WL 1740295, at *8 (internal
citations omitted).
In the Motion, Plaintiff provides biographical information for two of its main attorneys. (Decl.
of Regularity ¶¶ 38–39.) Steven Rand, Esq. has 35 years of legal experience and specializes in
“commercial litigation for banks and financial institutions,” including commercial foreclosures. (Id. ¶

38.) Mr. Rand’s standard hourly rate was $1,050 and has been reduced to $450 in the Motion. (Id. ¶
35; July 20, 2026 Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13.) Daniel Park, Esq. has over 10 years of experience as a commercial
litigator, including “commercial foreclosure litigation, asset recovery litigation, and other complex
commercial disputes.” (Decl. of Regularity ¶ 39.) Mr. Park’s standard hourly rate is $850 and has

5
been reduced to $350 in the Motion. (Id. ¶ 35; July 20, 2026 Suppl. Decl. ¶ 13.) Given Mr. Rand’s
and Mr. Park’s experience, I find that their requested hourly rates are reasonable.
In an additional declaration, Plaintiff provides biographical information for its remaining
billers. (See Aug. 3, 2026 Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 7–10.) Michael Antonivich is a senior managing clerk and
paralegal with over 35 years of experience and charges an hourly rate of $250. (Id. ¶ 9.) Anthony
Rosario is an assistant managing clerk and paralegal with over 25 years of experience and charges an

hourly rate of $250. (Id. ¶ 10.) Together, Mr. Antonivich and Mr. Rosario “performed 10.5 hours of
service.” (July 20, 2026 Suppl. Decl.) Because an hourly rate of $250 is higher than what is typically
awarded for paralegals in this district, see Kimba Indus. Inc., 2026 WL 618037, at *6, I respectfully
recommend that the hourly rates Mr. Antonivich and Mr. Rosario be reduced to $150.
Mark Schlussel, Esq. is a senior partner with over 45 years of experience and has expertise in
bank financing, bank litigation, real estate, and foreclosures. (Aug. 3, 2026 Suppl. Decl. ¶ 7.) His
hourly rate is $995. (Id. ¶ 6.) Ethan Schlussel, Esq. is a partner with about 10 years of experience and
has expertise in banking and finance matters. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) His hourly rate is $732.60. (Id. ¶ 6.) Given
the prevailing rates in this district for partners in these matters, I find that the hour rates for Mark
Schlussel and Ethan Schlussel are unreasonably high and recommend that they be reduced to $450.
2. Reasonable Hours

“To determine whether the number of hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel was reasonable, the
Court must use its experience with the case, as well as its experience with the practice of law, to assess
the reasonableness of the hours spent in a given case.” Litkofsky v. P & L Acquisitions, LLC, No. 15-
CV-5429 (DRH) (AKT), 2016 WL 7167955, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, 2016 WL 7168069 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (internal citations omitted).

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Plaintiff submitted contemporaneous time sheets showing a total of 204.1 hours of work
performed by various lawyers and paralegals from September 11, 2023 to September 12, 2025. (See
Invoices, Dkt. 39-9.)
I find several problems with the Invoices. Several time entries refer to legal work unrelated to
this case. For example, a time entry on May 20, 2025 bills .20 hours for “Telephone conference with
opposing counsel regarding time to Answer complaint” (id. at 56), but Defendants already filed an

Answer on March 21, 2024. (See Dkt. 17.) An entry on June 3, 2025 bills 1.10 hours to “Consider
strategy in connection with answers and counterclaims filed by defendant Kwok” (Invoices at 58), but
Kwok is not a defendant in this case. Likewise, on August 1, 2025, 1 hour is billed to “Review
Defendant Kwok motion for declaratory judgment,” and several subsequent entries cover work on
filings apparently related to such motion. (Id. at 65.) Furthermore, an entry on August 29, 2025 bills
.10 hours to “Review order assigning new Magistrate” when no such order exists and no new
Magistrate Judge was assigned. (Id. at 66.) An entry on September 2, 2025 bills .30 hours to a
“Telephone conference with R. Frommer regarding his potential motion for summary judgment” (id.
at 68), although summary judgment was already resolved. On September 8, 2025, .40 hours was billed
to “Correspondence with Judge Pollak’s law clerk regarding potential hearing” (id.) when Judge Pollak
was never assigned to this case.
In response to the Court’s inquiry about these time entries, Plaintiff stated that “[w]hile these
entries are not related to this matter, they were validly billed to the client” because there is another

federal case, Golden Bridge R2 LLC v. Sunrise Plaza LLC, et al., No. 24-CV-236 (NRM) (PCG) and a
state court action, both involving Borrower and Guarantor. (Aug. 10, 2026 Suppl. Decl. ¶ 4.)
The Invoices all identify the client as “Golden Bridge R2 LLC” and the matter as “Sunrise
Plaza LLC and 150-30 12 Ave Realty LLC,” without differentiating among the work done on the two
federal court cases or state court action.
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Section 42 of the Consolidated Mortgage states, “If it becomes necessary to employ counsel
to collect the obligation described herein or to protect or foreclose said mortgage, the Mortgagor
hereby agrees to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees for the services of such counsel together with all other
costs and disbursements in connection therewith whether or not suit be brought.” By its plain
language, this clause provides for the recovery of fees incurred to protect or foreclose solely the
mortgage in this case, and no other. While a client and its counsel may reach an agreement on how

the client will be billed, the Court may only award fees here in accordance with the terms of the
Consolidated Mortgage and Note, which are limited to this foreclosure action.
In addition, there are other billing deficiencies. For example, on May 2, 2024, Mr. Park billed
2.4 hours to attend the initial conference (Invoices at 28), but the initial conference only lasted 12
minutes. Mr. Park states that part of this billing entry includes travel time. (See Aug. 3, 2026 Suppl.
Decl. ¶ 12.) Travel time should be calculated using half of the regular rate. See Pennacchio v. Powers,
No. 05-CV-986 (RRM) (RML), 2011 WL 2945825, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) (noting that “it is
customary in this circuit to reduce attorney’s fees by fifty percent for travel time”) (citing Granite Music
Corp. v. Ctr. St. Smoke House, Inc., No. 09-CV-872A, 2011 WL 1898909, at * 18 (W.D.N.Y. May 19,
2011) and Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 01-CV-3925 (ARL), 2010 WL 1207418, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
23, 2010)).
When there are multiple billing problems, and especially when there is insufficient information
for the Court to properly determine which fees were validly incurred, the Court may make an across-

the-board reduction in the award. See 366 Realty LLC, 2026 WL 1740295, at *8 (“Across-the-board
percentage cuts are appropriate for excessive or otherwise improper billing rather than scrutinizing
the propriety of each individual time entry.”) (citing Green v. City of New York, 403 F. App’x 626, 630
(2d Cir. 2010)) (citation modified); see also H.C. v. Dep’t of Educ., 71 F.4th 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2023)
(upholding a twenty percent reduction of attorneys’ fees). Given the excessive billing rates for some
8
of Plaintiff’s counsel, the undifferentiated and improper inclusion of billing for other matters, and
other improper billing, such as for travel time, I find that a reduction of the requested award of
$89,658.26 by 40% is appropriate.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount
of $53,794.96.

Plaintiff submitted a Bill of Costs, identifying a filing fee of $405, a service fee of $484.24, and
a docket fee of $20. (See Dkt. 39-8.)
Local Civil Rule 54.1(a) states that “[w]ithin 30 days after the entry of final judgment . . . unless
this period is extended by the court for good cause shown, any party seeking to recover costs must
file with the clerk a notice of taxation of costs by ECF . . . indicating the date and time of taxation
which must comply with the notice period prescribed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and annexing a bill of
costs.” (emphasis added).
While “[f]ee awards typically include those reasonable out-of-pocket costs incurred by the
attorney, including for items such as shipping, filing fees, process servers, and litigation support,”
Jericho Plaza, 2026 WL 476134, at *5 (internal citations omitted), Plaintiff has submitted the request as
a Bill of Costs. The Clerk has not entered final judgment, so filing the Bill of Costs is premature.
I respectfully recommend that Plaintiff’s request for costs as stated on the Bill of Costs be
denied at this time, and that Plaintiff be permitted to re-submit the Bill of Costs to the Clerk after

entry of final judgment.

Plaintiff requests that it be awarded attorney’s fees for “additional time charges have been and
will be incurred from November 1, 2025, through and including the closing of title of the referee’s
sale in an amount of at least $7,500.00 which includes estimated fees incurred in connection with this
9
motion, the referee’s sale and closing, together with further disbursements (excluding advertising fees
for the notice of the foreclosure sale) in the amount of approximately $500.00.” (See Decl. of
Regularity ¶ 40.)
Although Plaintiff asserts that “[t]hese anticipated fees and disbursements are reasonable for
this type of action” (id.), it provides no support for actual amounts of fees or disbursements. I do not
find that awarding estimated amounts for legal work that has not yet been done or expenses that have

not yet been incurred to be appropriate on this application.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiff not be awarded $7,500 for anticipated
legal work or $500 for future disbursements at this time, but that Plaintiff be granted leave to submit
an additional application for attorneys’ fees and disbursements after they have been incurred.
III. Post-Judgment Interest
Post-judgment interest is mandatory in civil actions, and such “interest shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity
Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar
week preceding the date of the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); see also Jericho Plaza Portfolio LLC, 2026
WL 476134, at *14.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the Court approve post-judgment interest, which
is calculated based on the weekly average one-year constant maturity Treasury yield for the week

preceding the date on which judgment is entered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d
158, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that an award of post-judgment interest is “mandatory” and
“governed by federal statute”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that: (1) the Referee’s Report be
confirmed in the total amount of $3,344,200, with an additional per diem interest amount of $1,533.33
10
from May 31, 2025 to the date of entry of judgment, (2) an award $53,794.96 in attorneys’ fees be
awarded, (3) post-judgment interest be awarded, and (4) the annexed Order be entered.
Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be filed in writing with the Clerk of
Court within fourteen (14) days of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to
timely file any such objection waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order. Caidor v. Onondaga
Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008).

SO ORDERED:

Peggy Kuo
PEGGY KUO
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
August 11, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439244. Public record. Not legal advice.