# GLAUD

> District Court, D. New Jersey · September 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439135

## Case

- **Full name:** Ka’Lial Glaud v. The NFL Player Disability and Survivor Benefit Plan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** September 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KA’LIAL GLAUD,
Case No. 25–cv–15373–ESK–EAH
Plaintiff,

v.
OPINION
THE NFL PLAYER DISABILITY
AND SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN,
et al.,
Defendants.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
In this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) action, plaintiff
Ka’Lial Glaud challenges the denial of neurocognitive disability benefits under
his NFL Player Disability and Survivor Benefit Plan (Plan). In count one,
Glaud seeks relief against the Plan for payment of benefits. In counts two and
three, Glaud alleges that Dr. William Garmoe and Dr. Silvana Riggio, in their
capacity as the Plan’s medical advisory physicians (MAPs), breached their
fiduciary duties and caused harm to the Plan. Defendants collectively move to
dismiss those fiduciary duty claims. Because the Plan does not confer
fiduciary authority on MAPs, I find that dismissal with prejudice of counts two
and three is warranted.
I. BACKGROUND
The disability board (Board) is the Plan’s administrator and named
fiduciary. (ECF No. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 18, 20, 55; ECF No. 29–2 (Plan) §§ 1.2, 9.2.)
The Plan gives the Board “full and absolute discretion, authority, and power to
interpret, control, implement and manage the Plan” and decide benefit claims.
(Compl. ¶ 55; Plan § 9.2.) The Board maintains a network of neutral
physicians, who examine each player. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–47; Plan § 12.3(a).)
When at least three Board members identify a medical issue related to whether
benefits should be awarded, they may refer that issue to a MAP. (Compl.
¶¶ 49, 57; Plan § 9.3(a).) “A MAP has authority to decide only those medical
issues submitted by the … Board.” (Plan §§ 9.3(c), 12.2(b).) A MAP submits
a written determination to the Board, which is “final and binding regarding
such [referred] medical issues.” (Id. §§ 9.3(a), 12.2(b); Compl. ¶¶ 49, 50, 57.)
The Board retains full discretion over all other matters, including Plan
interpretation and benefit eligibility. (Compl. ¶ 57; Plan § 12.2(c).)
Glaud applied for neurocognitive disability benefits on March 1, 2023.
(Compl. ¶ 86; ECF No. 29–3 (Board Ltr.) p. 2.) After evaluation by two Plan
neutral physicians, the disability initial claims committee denied his claim on
April 13, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 116; Bd. Ltr. p. 2.) Glaud appealed to the Board on
September 25, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 154; Bd. Ltr. p. 2.) Glaud was examined by
additional Plan neutral physicians and underwent an independent evaluation
by a neuropsychologist. (Bd. Ltr. pp. 2, 3.) On May 15, 2024, the Board
referred for MAP review the question of whether Glaud acquired neurocognitive
impairment. (Id. p. 3; Compl. ¶¶ 58–60.) The referral was made under Plan
Section 9.3(a) to Garmoe, a neuropsychologist, and Riggio, a neurologist.
(Compl. ¶¶ 159, 160; Plan pp. 58, 59.) Without examining Glaud, Garmoe and
Riggio issued on June 8, 2024 a written report, finding Glaud’s neurocognitive
scores invalid and uninterpretable. (Compl. ¶¶ 161–165; Board Ltr. p. 3.)
They concluded that they could not determine whether he met the criteria for
neurocognitive impairment. (Compl. ¶ 162; Board Ltr. p. 3.)
At Garmoe and Riggio’s “strong recommendation,” Glaud underwent an
additional psychological evaluation. (Compl. ¶¶ 163, 167.) The evaluating
psychologist opined that Glaud had a neurocognitive disorder resulting from a
traumatic brain injury. (Id. ¶¶ 168–172.) Glaud submitted that report to the
Board on July 10, 2024. (Id. ¶ 173.) The Board voted to deny his appeal on
September 4, 2024. (Id. ¶ 177; Board Ltr. p. 2.) The Board issued its final
denial letter the next day. (Compl. ¶ 178; see generally Board Ltr.) The letter
stated that Glaud was ineligible for benefits under Plan Section 6.1(f). (Compl.
¶ 179; Board Ltr. p. 4.) It also stated that MAP decisions are “final and
binding” on the referred medical issues under Plan Section 9.3(a). (Compl.
¶ 179; Board Ltr. p. 4) Despite conflicting medical evidence, the Board adopted
Garmoe and Riggio’s conclusion that the evidence precluded a reliable
determination of neurocognitive impairment. (Compl. ¶¶ 179, 180; Board Ltr.
p. 4.)
Glaud filed this action on September 9, 2025. (See generally Compl.) On
November 27, 2025, defendants requested leave to file a motion to dismiss
counts two and three. (ECF No. 21.) Glaud opposed defendants’ request
(ECF No. 22), and on December 19, 2025, I held a pre-motion conference (ECF
No. 25). On February 6, 2026, defendants filed the motion to dismiss (Motion).
(ECF No. 29–1 (Mov. Br.).) Glaud filed an opposition to the Motion (ECF No.
30 (Opp’n Br.)), in response to which defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 31 (Reply
Br.)).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. A motion to dismiss may be granted only if the plaintiff has
failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests that make such a claim plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual
allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps.
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). “First, it must
‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). “Second, it should
identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to
an entitlement to relief.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679). “[A] complaint’s allegations of historical fact continue to enjoy a highly
favorable standard of review at the motion-to-dismiss stage of proceedings.”
Id. at 790.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss counts two and three, arguing that: (1) MAPs
are not fiduciaries as a matter of law because they exercise only medical
discretion, and the Board retains exclusive discretion over benefit entitlement
and plan interpretation; (2) Glaud alleges no plan level loss; (3) the breach of
fiduciary duty claims are conclusory and contra‑dicted by Glaud’s factual
allegations; and (4) further discovery and amendments would be futile. (See
generally Mov. Br.) Glaud contends that because the Plan gives MAPS “final
and binding” authority over medical determinations governing benefit
payments, and Garmoe and Riggio exhibited a pattern of ignoring disability
evidence to serve their own financial interests, the Motion should be denied.
(See generally Opp’n Br.) In reply, defendants emphasize the Board’s
independent authority over Plan eligibility and Glaud’s pleading discrepancies.
(See generally Reply Br.)
I will first address the threshold issue of whether Garmoe and Riggio are
ERISA fiduciaries. If they are not, counts two and three fail, and the
remaining grounds for dismissal need not be reached.
A. Fiduciary Status
ERISA defines a fiduciary as a person who (1) “exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or
exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets”; (2) “renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has
any authority or responsibility to do so”; or (3) “has any discretionary authority
or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A). Because fiduciary is defined “not in terms of formal trusteeship,
but in functional terms of control and authority over [a] plan,” a party not
expressly named as a fiduciary may serve as a functional fiduciary. Mertens
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); Spine Surgery Assocs. & Discovery
Imaging, PC v. INDECS Corp., 50 F. Supp. 3d 647, 655 (D.N.J. 2014).
“[F]iduciary status does not attach to a party who ‘merely perform[s] ministerial
duties or processes claims.’” Josef K. v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., No. 18–06385,
2019 WL 2342245, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2019) (alteration in original)
(quoting Kyle Railways, Inc. v. Pac. Admin. Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 513, 516–18
(9th Cir. 1993)). Rather, “a party may qualify as a fiduciary ‘if it has the
authority to grant, deny, or review denied claims.’” Id. (quoting Kyle Railways,
Inc., 990 F.2d at 516–18).
“[M]any courts have held that the determination whether a person is
acting as a fiduciary with respect to a plan under ERISA is a mixed question of
fact and law.” Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 869,
884 (E.D. Pa. 2011). “The determination whether benefits at issue are ‘plan
assets’—a component of the inquiry into whether a purported fiduciary owes a
duty with respect to the complained-of conduct—is also a mixed question of fact
and law.” Id. “Where there are no disputes of fact regarding the defendant’s
actions, the determination whether the defendant is an ERISA fiduciary is a
question of law.” Id.; Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., 323 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir.
2003) (reversing the judgment in favor of the defendant because the district
court erred in concluding that the defendant was not a fiduciary). But “if the
parties dispute the facts that establish the defendant’s fiduciary status,
including whether the defendant had authority and control over the
management and disposition of plan assets, then the issue should not be
resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.” Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 884–
85; Bd. of Trs. of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of N.J. Welfare Fund
v. Wettlin Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir.2001) (reversing the dismissal
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim because “further [factual] development is
required and … [the] record … [is insufficient to] say that, as a matter of law,
[the defendant] is not a fiduciary”).
Here, the parties do not dispute what authority the Plan assigns to MAPs.
They agree that Garmoe and Riggio’s roles as MAPs are fixed by the Plan.
Thus, their disagreement is not factual—i.e., about what authority Garmoe and
Riggio possess—but legal to determine how broadly ERISA requires that
undisputed authority to be understood. There is no factual dispute concerning
the scope of authority the Plan conferred and discovery cannot alter the Plan’s
allocation of decision making responsibility. By accepting Glaud’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, I will determine from the undisputed Plan
provisions whether MAPs have discretionary authority over Plan
administration within the meaning of ERISA.
Glaud argues that Garmoe and Riggio’s “final and binding” authority
renders them functional fiduciaries. (Opp’n Br. pp. 13–17.) But defendants
contend that the “final and binding” language amounts only to professional
medical discretion over a limited aspect of the claims process. (Mov. Br.
pp. 16–18.) I agree with defendants. The Plan gives the Board, not the MAPs,
authority to administer the Plan and decide benefit claims. (Plan §§ 1.2, 9.2.)
Instead, MAPs exercise medical judgment on a discrete issue. Their role is
narrower and is limited to deciding “only those medical issues submitted by the
… Board.” (Id. § 12.2(b).) Plan Section 9.3(c) makes a MAP’s decision final
and binding, but it also specifies that the Board retains “full and absolute
discretion, authority, and power” over Plan interpretation and whether a
claimant is entitled to benefits. (Id. § 9.3(c).) Taken on its face, the Plan
language reasonably indicates that MAPs play no more than a ministerial role
in this process. Cf. Spine Surgery Assocs., 50 F. Supp. 3d at 655 (finding that
while the defendant relied on language in the plan that limited its authority,
other provisions in the plan clearly afforded the defendant a degree of
discretion, rendering it an ERISA fiduciary).
Garmoe and Riggio did not determine whether Glaud’s claim or direct
payment of Plan assets would be approved. The Board was bound by their
medical determination that Glaud’s neurocognitive scores were inconclusive.
(Compl. ¶¶ 162, 163.) But that determination resolved only the medical issue
submitted to them. (See id.) The Board retained ultimate discretion to
determine whether the remaining Plan requirements were satisfied and
whether Glaud was entitled to benefits. (See Plan § 6.1.) In other words,
Garmoe and Riggio served as medical consultants, using their professional
judgment to advise the Board. See Confer v. Custom Eng’g Co., 952 F.2d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that because the plan supervisor’s role was limited to
following the instructions of the administrator, it did not have any discretion to
deny or allow a claim and was thus not an ERISA fiduciary).
Courts have consistently “refused to fit professionals … within the
statutory definition [of ERISA] when all they have done is advise the trustees
of an ERISA plan.” Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 535 (7th
Cir. 1991) (collecting cases); Painters of Phila. Dist. Council No. 21 Welfare
Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1150–51 (3d Cir. 1989). “These
courts supported this position by reading the … [statute] as speaking to actual
decision-making power rather than to the influence that a professional may
have over the decisions made by the plan trustees she advises.” Pappas, 923
F.2d at 535. “[T]here is no per se rule that prevents professionals who render
advice to an ERISA plan from becoming fiduciaries.” Id. at 538. But to
become a fiduciary, the professional must have “exercised … an unusual degree
of influence over a [p]lan.” Id.
Despite the Plan indicating otherwise, Glaud attempts to show Garmoe
and Riggio’s undue influence over the Plan by arguing that “the Plan delegates
MAPs the authority to independently create and manage the criteria under
which plan participants are medically evaluated.” (Opp’n Br. p. 18.) Glaud
emphasizes that Garmoe and Riggio co-authored the orientation manual
provided to neutral physicians authorized to perform neurological and
neuropsychological medical examinations under the Plan. (Id.; Compl.
¶¶ 188–190, 205–207.) It is unclear how authorship of a manual governing
neutral physicians establish fiduciary authority in Garmoe and Riggio’s distinct
capacities as MAPs. The Plan itself sets the eligibility criteria to receive
benefits. (Plan §§ 6.1, 6.2.) Neutral physicians examine claimants and
prepare reports that inform the Board, while MAP review is a separate process
governed by Plan Section 9.3(c). (See Reply Br. pp. 6, 7.)
In further support of his position, Glaud notes that Garmoe and Riggio
routinely ignore evidence of neurocognitive impairment. (Compl. ¶¶ 195–197,
212.) These allegations do not change the fiduciary-status analysis.
Assuming their history of unfavorable medical determinations in other cases
could be considered, such conduct concerns how Garmoe and Riggio exercised
medical judgment; it does not expand the authority the Plan conferred on MAPs
or establish discretionary authority over Plan administration or benefit
entitlement. See Josef K. v. Cal. Physicians’ Serv., 477 F. Supp. 3d 886, 902
(N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that a medical reviewer was not acting as a fiduciary
when it applied medical criteria but did not make the actual coverage decision).
Accordingly, MAPs do not have discretionary authority over benefit
entitlement. Since that authority is reserved for the Board, Glaud’s ERISA
fiduciary claims against Garmoe and Riggio cannot survive.
B. Plan-Level Loss
Having concluded that Garmoe and Riggio are not ERISA fiduciaries, I
need not reach defendants’ remaining arguments. ERISA applies only to a
“person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan” and breaches a fiduciary duty.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(2). Because fiduciary status is a threshold
prerequisite to counts two and three and that prerequisite is not satisfied,
defendants’ alternative arguments concerning plan-level loss, the sufficiency of
the alleged breaches, discovery, and the futility of amendment do not affect the
Motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion is GRANTED. Counts two and
three will be dismissed with prejudice. An order will follow.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 10, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11439135. Public record. Not legal advice.