# Parks

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · September 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438979

## Case

- **Full name:** Carlton B. Parks v. United States, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

CARLTON B. PARKS, )
) Case No. 1:24-cv-5
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Atchley
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Dumitru
UNITED STATES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 81] of Tennessee Valley Authority
(“TVA”), and individual Defendants Jeffrey Lyash, Edward Spoone, Kristi Foxx, and Jamie Lynch
(the “TVA Defendants”). For reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 81] will be
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims against all TVA Defendants DISMISSED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a wide-ranging Amended Complaint spanning over ten years and sixty-five pages,
Plaintiff asserts civil rights violations, violation of federal criminal statutes, and various state
common law claims ranging from fraud to conspiracy. His claims begin with the end of his
employment with Murray Guard in 2014 and spread out into the different pieces of litigation he
brought related to that termination. Though he settled his initial Chancery Court lawsuit against
Murray Guard in 2018, he then sued the attorney who represented him for malpractice. When that
action was dismissed, he appealed unsuccessfully. In 2019, he sued the Tennessee Valley
Authority, asserting, inter alia, that the TVA was his joint employer and thus liable for his
allegedly unlawful termination and for age and race discrimination during his employment. District
Judge Travis R. McDonough dismissed his claims and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that dismissal.
Unhappy with the results of his prior litigation, he now brings claims against over thirty
individuals and entities involved in those lawsuits, including Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Jeffrey
Sutton, District Judge McDonough, and Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger; several state court
judges; Hamilton County, Tennessee; members of the Hamilton County Clerk’s Office; lawyers

who represented him in the past; lawyers who represented his opponents; his former employer,
Murray Guard; and, relevant here, the Tennessee Valley Authority and several TVA employees.
Plaintiff has already sued the TVA and each of the individual TVA Defendants in this
Court. See Parks v. Lyash, et al., Case No. 1:19-cv-349 (E.D. Tenn.) (“Parks I”). As he does here,
Plaintiff alleged in Parks I that he was jointly employed by TVA and Murray Guard starting in
2013. [See Parks I, Doc. 100 at 3-5]. He alleged he was discriminated against based on his race
and age in several respects, including, inter alia, the handling of his sensitive security clearance
application, his removal from TVA’s Raccoon Mountain site, and the conduct of a supervisor. He
alleged that after he made a formal complaint, Murray Guard and TVA orchestrated a plan to
remove him. [Id.]. He claimed to have a “contractual agreement” with TVA that it breached and/or

interfered with. [Id. at pgs.12, 16-17].
The Amended Complaint [Doc. 15] in this case restates all of these factual allegations and
then some. Plaintiff again alleges his security clearance application was mishandled, that he was
improperly removed from TVA sites, that his supervisor created a hostile work environment, and
that other aspects of his employment and termination were discriminatory and unlawful. [See, e.g.,
Doc. 15 at pgs. 23-31]. He again alleges TVA and Murray Guard orchestrated his removal, that
his layoff was pretextual, and that TVA breached its contractual agreement with Plaintiff by
conspiring to have him wrongfully terminated. [Id. at pg. 19; Parks I, Doc. 17 at ¶ 50 (“TVA
breached its contract with Plaintiff when Defendants’ conspired and had him wrongfully
terminated.”’)]. The overwhelming majority of his factual allegations are dated between 2013 to
2016. In the instant action, however, he adds various allegations about the Parks J litigation itself.
These allegations relate to deposition testimony, discovery responses, and documents produced in
discovery in Parks I.
Plaintiff's claims at tumes defy description, but as depicted in the chart below, most are
nearly identical to those brought in Parks I. For clarity and ease of reference, the Court has
numbered his causes of action. Counts 1 to 14, 16, and 17 of the Amended Complaint are against
one or more TVA Defendants. Statutes highlighted in grey are criminal statutes for which there is
no private right of action."
yatta ww ed i oe A □□□ Cis tai)
Count 1: Title VII Title VII Race Discrimination / | Dismissed on summary
Discrimination [Doc. 15 Wrongful Termination Parks IJ, | judgment Parks J, [Doc. 158];
at pgs. 23-24] [Doc. 17 at pgs. 12-13; pg. 20] | affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]

Count 2: Title VII Title VII Retaliation [/d. at Dismissed on summary
Retaliation [/d. at pgs. 25- | pgs. 13-15]. judgment Parks J, [Doc. 158];
26] affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]
Count 3: Title VII Hostile | Title VII Hostile Work Dismissed on summary
Work Environment [/d. at | Environment [/d. at pg. 15]. judgment Parks I, [Doc. 158];
pg. 27] affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]

! Jones v. Thompson Towers Apts., 2025 WL 2941911, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 2025)
(explaiming 18 U.S.C. § 371 confers no private cause of action in a civil case and collecting cases);
Ongori v. Hawkins, 2017 WL 6759020, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and §
1623 are “criminal statutes that do not allow a private right of action”); Doss v. Beshear, 2016 WL
2990748, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Ky. May 20, 2016) (18 U.S.C. § 2071 is a criminal statute that carries no
private right of action); Dionne v. United States Navy, 2024 WL 5245093, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec.
30, 2024) (“18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a criminal statute that does not provide a private right of action.”);
Douglas v. McLain, 2016 WL 51277, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2016) (no private nght of action
under T.C.A. § 39-16-702); Burnside v. Walters, 2014 WL 4809937, at *1 (WD. Tenn. Sept. 26,
2014) (no private right of action under T.C.A. § 39-16-703).

Count 4: ADEA Age ADEA Age Discrimination Dismissed on summary
Discrimination [/d. at pg. | [Jd. at 15-16]; judgment Parks J, [Doc. 158];
27| affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]]
Count 5: § 1981 Race § 1981 Race Discrimination/ | Dismissed on summary
Discrimination [/d. at pg. | Retaliation [/d. at pg. 16]. judgment Parks I, [Doc. 158];
28] affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]
Count 6: Breach of Breach of Contract [Jd. at 16- | Dismissed on summary
Employment Contract [/d. | 17] judgment Parks I, [Doc. 158];
at pg. 29] affirmed [Jd., Doc. 163]
Count 7: Intentional Interference with Prospective Dismissed, judgment on the
Interference with Employment Relationship [/Jd. | pleadings Parks J, [Doc. 100]
Employment Relationship | at pg. 17]
and § 1981 [/d. at pg. 30]
Count 8: Tortious Tortious Interference with Dismissed, judgment on the
Interference with Employment Relations pleadings Parks I, [Doc. 100]
Employment Relationship | Contract [/d. at 17-18]
and § 1981 [/d. at 30-31]
Count 9: Inducement and | Inducement of Breach of Dismissed, judgment on the
Procurement of Breach of | Contract, Tortious interference | pleadings Parks J, [Doc. 100]
Contract; T.C.A. § 47-50- | [/d. at 18]
109; and § 1981 [/d. at
pgs. 31-32] Procurement of Breach of
Contract [/d. at 18-19
Count 10: Civil Civil Conspiracy [/d. at 19-20] | Dismissed, judgment on the
Conspiracy, Fraud, and pleadings Parks J, [Doc. 100]
Conspiracy to Defraud
[Jd. at pgs. 32-33]
Also cites 18 U.S.C. §
28 U.S.C. §
2679(2)(b) (exclusiveness
of remedies); and 16
U.S.C. § 831e-2(2)(1)
(exclusiveness of
remedies)
Count 11: Title VII, See Title VII, § 1981, and Dismissed on summary
§ 1981, ADEA [/d. at pgs. ADEA claims, above. Parks J, | judgment Parks I, [Doc. 158];
33-34] [Doc. 17 at pgs. 12-16] affirmed [/d., Doc. 163]

Also cites 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(1)(2)(A)B):
(c)(1)(2); (d)(1); and
§ 2071(a)(b)
Count 12: Fifth &
Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process; “Bivens
Act” claim [/d. at pg. 34]
Count 13: Failure to
Train & Supervise [/d. at
pgs. 34-35]
Count 14: § 1981
“Official Policy or
Custom” claim [/d. at pgs.
35-37]
Count 16: Civil Fraud,
Tort of Deceit, Civil
Conspiracy to Defraud —
[Id. at 37-38]
Also cites 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621(1)(2) (Perjury) and
18 U.S.C. § 371 (Criminal
Conspiracy Statute)
Count 17: Civil Fraud;
Civil Conspiracy; Tort of
Deceit, “Bivens Act”
claim; First, Fifth, and
Fourth Amendment
Violations [/d. at pgs. 39-
40]
Also cites 18 U.S.C. §
2071(a)(b) (Concealment
/Destruction of
Government Records); 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (False
Statements); 18 U.S.C. §
1623(a) (Perjury under
Oath); 18 U.S.C. §
1621(1) (Perjury); T.C_A.

§ 39-16-702(a)(1-4)
(Perjury); T.C.A. § 39-16-
703(a)(1-3) (Aggravated
Perjury)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true ‘well pleaded facts’ set forth in the
complaint.” In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Generally, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007)). “The [plaintiff's] factual allegations, assumed to be true, must do more than create
speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to
relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). “Mere
labels and conclusions are not enough; the allegations must contain ‘factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id.
at 575 (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and the
Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. The Court is mindful that pro se complaints
are liberally construed and are held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings prepared
by attorneys. Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2012). However, the Court
is “not require[d] to either guess the nature of or create a litigant’s claim.” Leeds v. City of
Muldraugh, 174 F. App’x 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se
pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law,” and ultimately, those who proceed
without counsel must still comply with the procedural rules that govern civil cases, including the
pleading standards set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Durante v.
Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006); Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss,

L.P.A., 161 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ro se litigants are not relieved of the duty to
develop claims with an appropriate degree of specificity.”); see also E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13
(“Parties proceeding pro se shall be expected to be familiar with and follow the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and these rules.”).
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Defendants seek dismissal based on claim preclusion, arguing that each of Plaintiff’s
claims against TVA was or could have been litigated in Parks I. TVA further shows that (i) the
Title VII and ADEA claims must be dismissed because the TVA was not Plaintiff’s employer; (ii)
the breach of contract and § 1981 claims fail because there was no contract for employment; (iii)
the Title VII and ADEA claims are time-barred; (iv) the Bivens claim and state law tort claims are

barred by the statute of limitations; (v) Title VII and ADEA claims cannot be brought against the
individual TVA Defendants; (vi) the individual defendants are immune from liability for the state
law tort claims; and (vii) any purported criminal claim must be dismissed because there is no
private right of action as to any of them. As to Plaintiff’s claims regarding Defendants’ sworn
statements and discovery in Parks I, Defendants contend they are spurious, precluded, and fail to
state a claim.
Plaintiff largely concedes that he brought the same claims in Parks I. [Doc. 98]. Yet he
contends the District Court and the Sixth Circuit did not address the evidence on the merits of his
claims, so the resolution of that litigation was not “on the merits.” He argues his claims are not
time-barred because of various acts of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy. Finally, he says his
allegations related to TVA’s conduct in Parks I represent new claims.
IV. ANALYSIS
As Defendants show, several rulings in Parks I dispose of most of Plaintiff’s claims here.

First, the Court granted a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims as to the
individual TVA Defendants. Parks I, [Doc. 34 at 2]. Second, on May 17, 2022, the Court granted
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the following claims: (i) interference with
prospective employment relationship; (ii) tortious interference with employment contract; (iii)
unlawful inducement of breach of contract and tortious interference with business relationship in
violation of T.C.A. § 47-50-109; (iv) unlawful procurement of breach of contract in violation of
T.C.A. § 47-50-109; (v) civil conspiracy; and (vi) “any claims based on the loss of [Plaintiff’s]
security clearance.” Parks I, [Doc. 100 at 19]. These claims were dismissed with prejudice. [Id.].
Lastly, on September 14, 2022, Judge McDonough granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on all remaining claims. Parks I, [Doc. 158]. This included: (i) Title VII claims

for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment; (ii) age discrimination under the
ADEA; (iii) discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (vi) breach of contract. [Id. at 7, 17].
Parks appealed various rulings of the District Court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Parks
I, [Doc. 163]. Relevant here, the Sixth Circuit held: (i) Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims were
properly dismissed because TVA was not Parks’s employer or joint employer; (ii) Plaintiff failed
to establish the existence of a valid contract between himself and TVA as required to state a § 1981
or breach of contract claim; (iii) Plaintiff’s remaining state law tort claims were time-barred; and
(iv) Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was properly denied as futile. [Id.].
“The doctrine of res judicata encompasses two separate concepts: issue preclusion and
claim preclusion.” Wilkins v. Jakeway, 183 F.3d 528, 532 (6th Cir. 1999). At issue here is claim
preclusion. “Claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters that ‘should have been
advanced in an earlier suit.” Wheeler v. Dayton Police Dept., 807 F.3d 764, 766 (6th Cir. 2015).

To establish claim preclusion, Defendants must show: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior
action; (2) a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the second
lawsuit that should have been raised in the first; and (4) that the claims in both lawsuits arise from
the same transaction.” Id. (citations omitted, cleaned up). Applying that standard here requires the
dismissal of the overwhelming majority of Plaintiff’s claims. To the extent he raises new claims,
they are time-barred and/or fail to state a claim.
A. Counts 1 through 10
It is plain on the face of the Amended Complaint that most of Plaintiffs’ claims are
precluded and must be dismissed. Claim preclusion clearly applies to Counts 1, 2, and 3 for Title
VII discrimination, Count 4 for ADEA age discrimination, Count 5 for race discrimination under

§ 1981, and Count 6 for breach of contract. All of these claims arise out of Plaintiff’s 2013 to 2014
employment with Murray Guard, his experience with TVA in the course of that employment, and
his layoff/termination. Plaintiff has added new allegations based on information he learned in
Parks I, but those allegations are about the same 2014-2016 events. Parks raised the same claims
against the same TVA Defendants in Parks I and they were resolved on summary judgment. The
elements of claim preclusion are met as to each claim and the claims contained in Counts 1 through
5 of the Amended Complaint are therefore DISMISSED.
The same is true of Count 7 for intentional interference with employment relationship,
Count 8 for tortious interference with employment relationship, Count 9 for inducement of breach
of contract, and Count 10 for civil conspiracy. Plaintiff raised these same claims based on the same
facts against the same Defendants in Parks I. Judgment on the pleadings was entered as to each
claim and they were dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff cannot avoid claim preclusion by citing
additional statutes or adding more detail about the same alleged misconduct he sued TVA for in

2019. Claim preclusion bars not just claims actually raised, but those that should have been
advanced in an earlier suit. The elements of claim preclusion are met as to Counts 7 through 10,
and the claims contained therein are DISMISSED.
B. Counts 11 to 14, 16, and 17
Plaintiff’s remaining claims against TVA appear in Counts 11 to 14, 16 and 17 of the
Amended Complaint.
Count 11 (Title VII; § 1981; ADEA)
Plaintiff’s eleventh cause of action asserts TVA had him discharged for discriminatory and
retaliatory reasons. [Doc. 15 at 33]. He adds allegations that TVA’s attorneys in Parks I obstructed
his evidentiary submissions. [Id.]. These attorneys are not named Defendants in this suit, and his

motion based on the same allegation in Parks I was denied. Count 11 is duplicative of Plaintiff’s
Title VII claims in Counts 1 to 3, ADEA claim in Count 4, and § 1981 claim in Count 5. Like
those claims, it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as Plaintiff’s claims in Parks I.
That he has added allegations against non-parties does not change that.
These claims are also untimely. In Parks I, Plaintiff alleged he received a right-to-sue
notice from the EEOC on October 30, 2019. [Parks I, Doc. 17 at pg. 21]. He filed the instant action
on January 8, 2024. [Doc. 1]. “Within ninety days of receiving notice of the final agency action or
the EEOC decision, or within 180 days of filing the initial complaint with the agency or the appeal
with the EEOC, the employee can file civil suit in U.S. District Court.” Locket v. Potter, 259 F.
App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2008 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a)-(d)); Harris v. Lee, 2014 WL
1612698, at * 3 (E.D. Ky. April 22, 2014) (plaintiff had ninety days to file Title VII or ADEA
claims after receiving right-to-sue letter from EEOC). Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim, however
characterized, is likewise time-barred. See Malone v. State of Tennessee, 2005 WL 2671343, at

*5-6 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2005) (discussing one-year and four-year limitations periods for
different § 1981 claims). The claims contained in Count 11 are DISMISSED.
Count 12 (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process; Bivens)
Plaintiff asserts he was entitled to procedural due process in the termination of his
employment and that his termination violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. [Doc. 15 at pg. 34]. These claims relate
exclusively to his prior employment, allegations of employment discrimination, and the
termination of that employment. The claims therefore “arose out of the same transaction or a series
of transactions, or . . . the claims arose out of the same core of operative facts.” Browning v. Levy,
283 F.3d 761, 773-74 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Because they are also against the same

Defendants, they should have been raised in Parks I. The final judgment on the merits in Parks I
therefore precludes the claims contained in Count 12.
They are, moreover, barred by the one-year limitations period for federal civil rights actions
in T.C.A. § 28-3-104. See Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he applicable
statute of limitations for Bivens claims in Tennessee is one year.”); see also Merriweather v. City
of Memphis, 107 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1989 as barred by one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-
3-104(a)(3)). Plaintiff attempted to amend in Parks I to add a Bivens claim and his motion was
denied for this reason.2 The claims contained in Count 12 are therefore DISMISSED because they
are precluded and time-barred.
Count 13 (Failure to train and supervise)
Plaintiff alleges TVA failed to train and supervise individual TVA Defendants Terry,

Spoone, Foxx, and Lynch “regarding Plaintiff’s equal rights, equal protection, and due process
rights under the law in his employment and also in Contract.” [Doc. 15 at pgs. 34-35]. He cites
testimony from depositions in Parks I as evidence that they were not properly trained and were
unaware of various rules and policies. [Id.]. This claim also clearly arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence as his claims in Parks I and indeed, he sought to amend to add such a
claim. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated:
As to Parks’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Parks sought to
add claims for failure to properly train and supervise employees, having
unconstitutional policies and practices in violation of the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, fraud, invasion of
privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. As the district court
determined, these claims were barred by Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations
for federal civil rights claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104, and for state-law tort
claims brought by at-will employees against their employers, Tenn. Code Ann. §
28-3-104(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court properly denied Parks’s motion for
leave to amend as futile.

[Parks I, Doc. 163 at 14]. Claim preclusion bars Plaintiff’s Count 13 for failure to train and
supervise, and in any event, the claim is time-barred as it arose many years before Parks filed this
case. That Parks later obtained evidence to support such a claim is immaterial. It arises out of his

2 Plaintiff sought to add the following claim: “Bivens Act for Deprivation of Rights under the U.S.
Constitution’s 1st Amendment (Freedom of Speech) and 14th Amendment (Equal Rights and
Protection Clause under Law).” [See Parks I, Doc. 38 at 2-3]. The Magistrate Judge explained why
the claim was time-barred, and that recommendation was accepted and adopted by the District
Judge, who denied the motion to amend as futile [Id., Doc. 43].
employment, which ended in 2014, the circumstances of which he has previously litigated.
Count 13 is DISMISSED.
Count 14 (§ 1981, “official unconstitutional policy or customs”)
Plaintiff alleges that TVA Defendants Terry, Spoone, and Foxx “are TVA managers and

are final-decision makers who created, adopted, and enacted unconstitutional policy and or
customs.” [Doc. 15 at 35-36]. This claim, too, arises out of the circumstances and termination of
Plaintiff’s employment. It is barred by claim preclusion, and in any event, time-barred. Count 14
is DISMISSED.
Counts 16 and 17
These causes of action overlap substantially, and the Court therefore addresses them
together. Count 16 lists the following civil claims: Civil Fraud; Tort of Deceit; Fraud; Civil
Conspiracy to Defraud. [Doc. 15 at 37-38]. For this cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
John Terry is liable for fraud and perjury and then returns to allegations surrounding his
employment and termination between 2014 and 2016. [Id.]. He claims Terry’s deposition

testimony and interrogatory responses in prior litigation conflicted with other evidence and that
Terry committed perjury. [Id.].
Similarly, Count 17 lists the following claims: Civil Fraud; Civil Conspiracy; Tort of
Deceit; Bivens Act – U.S. Constitution First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. [Doc. 15 at 39].
Plaintiff’s Count 17 is largely a restatement of Count 16 with additional detail and a few more
claims tacked on. [Id.]. He identifies a 2016 affidavit and a 2016 declaration by Defendant Terry
that allegedly included “inconsistencies, contradictions, lies, and misleading statements under
penalty of perjury.” [Id.]. He repeats various allegations about why he believes his
layoff/termination was pretextual and discriminatory. [Id.]. And then he points to a 2022
declaration, 2022 interrogatory responses, and a 2022 deposition that Terry gave in Parks I. Parks
says these, too, included lies, misstatements, and so on. [Id.].
Initially, both claims list criminal statutes for which there is no private right of action.
Those claims are therefore DISMISSED. Likewise, to the extent the claims contained in either

Count 16 or 17 are based on the circumstances and termination of Plaintiff’s employment, claim
preclusion applies for the reasons already explained.
That leaves Plaintiff’s claims for fraud,3 civil conspiracy, and purported “Bivens Act”
claims for violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, all arising out of alleged untruths or misstatements in Terry’s deposition testimony
and discovery responses. As to Plaintiff’s claims regarding litigation conduct in Parks I,
Defendants argue they “do not create any new or different claims here and were addressed by the
Parks I Court and the Sixth Circuit in ruling [on] and reviewing his many motions.” [Doc. 82 at
13]. Defendants say these claims are conclusory, spurious, and fail to present any claim. [Doc. 82
at 9, 13].

Plaintiff responds that Terry’s “acts, admissions and perjury’s constituted a new action
under the Bivens Act.” [Doc. 98 at 22]. Plaintiff says Terry violated his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. [Id.]. And he argues that Terry’s purported perjury “constituted Fraud pursuant
to T.C.A. § 28-3-105 (three year statute of limitations); Civil Conspiracy and a violation of
§ 1983.” [Id.].

3 “In Tennessee, ‘intentional misrepresentation,’ ‘fraudulent misrepresentation,’ and ‘fraud’ are
different names for the same cause of action and involve the same elements.” Hale v. Woodward,
729 F.Supp. 3d 792, 798 (M.D. Tenn. April 9, 2024). “Intentional misrepresentation,” meanwhile,
“derives its origin from the common law tort of deceit.” First Nat’l Bank v. Brooks Farms, 821
S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tenn. 1991). These are, in other words, just different names for the same cause
of action.
First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy in either Count 16 or Count 17, which in
any event is time-barred. Save the caption, there is no reference to conspiracy or conspiring in
either cause of action, and nothing from which the Court could infer “a common design by two or
more persons” to accomplish “an unlawful purpose, or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.”
Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).4 The Court will not create

a claim for a litigant who has failed to do so.
The claim is also time-barred. As the Sixth Circuit explained in Parks I, “[i]n Tennessee,
all actions for statutory penalties and injuries to the person must be commenced with one year of
the date the cause of action accrued.” Parks v. Lyash, 2023 WL 6237062, *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 12,
2023) (affirming dismissal of Park’s claim for civil conspiracy as time-barred); Polk v. General
Motors Corp., 2006 WL 1806016, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2006) (“The one year statute of
limitations set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 for personal injury actions applies to a claim of
civil conspiracy.”). Count 17 gives the relevant dates, and the most recent is Terry’s May 31, 2022,
deposition. [Doc. 15 at 40]. Plaintiff filed the Complaint [Doc. 1] on January 8, 2024, so any

conspiracy claim based on Terry’s 2022 deposition testimony, interrogatory responses, or other
sworn statements in prior litigation is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
In his Response [Doc. 98], Plaintiff recites his allegations against Terry in a section relating
to his § 1983 claims against the TVA Defendants. [Id. at 22]. He insists the statute of limitations
was tolled because the TVA Defendants somehow “conspired with judiciary officials to omit
material evidentiary documents from the Joint Appendix legally required to be submitted to the

4 Further weakening Plaintiff’s claims, Tennessee courts have held that “[c]onspiracy is not a cause
of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its
perpetration.” Foster Business Park, LLC v. Winfree, 2009 WL 113242, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 15, 2009).
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.” [Id. at 22]. And he claims that Terry’s “acts, admissions and
perjury’s constituted a new action under the Bivens Act.” [Id.]. None of these contentions have
anything to do with the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims against Terry based on his 2022
testimony.

As with his conspiracy claim, Plaintiff mentions “fraud” only in the caption of Counts 16
and 17 and as follows: “Defendant John Terry is liable Fraud, and Testimonial Perjury 16 U.S.C.
§ 1621(1)(2).” He states at one point that Terry’s June 2016 declaration contained
“misrepresentations.” [Id. at pg. 39, ¶ 185]. At bottom, his allegations are about purported perjury
that he has simply labeled as “fraud.”
Attempting to fit a square peg into a round hole, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for fraud. To
do so under Tennessee law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an intentional misrepresentation of an
existing material fact, (2) knowledge of the representation’s falsity, and (3) injury caused by
reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation.” Lopez v. Taylor, 195 S.W.3d 627, 634 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2005). Such a claim “must be stated with particularity, and the plaintiff must, at minimum,

allege the time, place and content of the misrepresentations; the defendant’s fraudulent intent; the
fraudulent scheme; and the injury resulting from the fraud.” Id. Even assuming Plaintiff has
adequately alleged the other elements of a fraud claim, he has not alleged reasonable reliance on a
misrepresentation or any resulting injury.
Finally, Plaintiff again asserts a “Bivens Act” claim based on Terry’s prior testimony and
sworn statements. That claim, too, is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See Zundel v.
Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he applicable statute of limitations for Bivens
claims in Tennessee is one year.”).
In the alternative, the Court holds that Terry is entitled to immunity for sworn statements
and testimony given in a prior proceeding. “It is well-settled that witnesses are granted absolute
immunity from suit for all testimony provided in judicial proceedings.” Spurlock v. Satterfield,
167 F.3d 995, 1001 (6th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Drouillard, 704 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (E.D. Mich.

2010) (“In the Sixth Circuit, witnesses are immune from suit no matter how egregious or perjurious
that testimony was alleged to have been.”). The rule of party presentation ordinarily prohibits the
Court from ruling on grounds not presented by the parties. Yet the degree to which Plaintiff’s
pleadings violate the basic pleading standards of Rule 8(a) makes it nearly impossible to tell what
claims he is bringing against which Defendants and why. For sixty-five pages, he recites dozens
of irrelevant facts, regurgitates testimony and discovery from past cases, and randomly lists a
dozen or more claims and statutes in a row without connecting them to anything. Under these
circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that Defendants underestimated the extent to which
Plaintiff believes his claims rest on Terry’s later statements in Parks I. Given the incoherence and
verbosity of Plaintiff’s pleadings and the well-established nature of witness immunity, the Court

finds that even if Plaintiff’s claims were not otherwise meritless, Terry would be entitled to witness
immunity.
Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because the doctrine of claim
preclusion applies, the statute of limitations has expired, and/or the allegations fail to state a claim.
The Court will briefly explain why Plaintiff’s arguments regarding claim preclusion and the tolling
of the statute of limitations are unpersuasive.
C. Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition
While Plaintiff largely concedes his claims are the same as those in Parks I, he makes
various arguments as to why claim preclusion should not apply and any statute of limitations was
tolled. His principal argument against claim preclusion is that TVA and the courts did not address
Plaintiff’s evidence on the merits of his claims. [Id. at 8, 9, 12, 14, 18-21]. He says, for example,
that Judge McDonough only considered certain elements of his hostile work environment claim
and that Judge Sutton “would not address the matter at the Sixth Circuit.” [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff misapprehends the meaning of “a final judgment on the merits” for claim
preclusion purposes. The finality of the prior judgment, not court’s reasoning, is what matters for
claim preclusion. With exceptions not relevant here, dismissal for failure to state a claim, judgment
on the pleadings, and entry of summary judgment are final judgments on the merits. Cobbs v.
Katona, 8 F. App’x 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2001) (“A prior Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted operates as an adjudication on the merits for
issue and claim preclusion purposes.”); see Parks I, [Doc. 100 at 19] (granting motion for judgment
on the pleadings in part and dismissing claims with prejudice); In re City of Detroit, 531 B.R. 171,
174 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (summary judgment “constitutes a final decision on the merits for res
judicata purposes”). That the District Court and/or the Sixth Circuit did not consider all the

evidence that Plaintiff thought was important does not undermine the finality of those judgments.
Plaintiff’s belief that evidence was omitted from his appeal in Parks I does not change that
outcome. See [Doc. 98 at 2] (“TVA and the Courts omitted Plaintiff’s substantive evidence from
the record so that the evidence could not be considered and not addressed on its merits.”). Nor
does the redaction of documents in the appellate record make the Sixth Circuit’s resolution of the
appeal any less final. [Id. at 11] (claiming TVA attorneys “unlawfully altered, obscured, blackened
and obstructed” Plaintiff’s evidentiary document); [id. at 22-23].
According to Plaintiff, Defendants cannot prove “claim preclusion applies just by reciting
it stating the Plaintiff previously lost.” [Doc. 98 at 10]. That is, in fact, almost exactly how
Defendants can and have shown claim preclusion. After a litigant obtains a final judgment on the
merits of his claim, he is not entitled to bring the same claim again against the same defendants.
However characterized, Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of his employment with Murray Guard and
the termination of that employment have already been brought or should have been brought in his

prior action against these same Defendants.
Plaintiff also makes various contentions about the statute of limitations, but none have
merit. As to his § 1983, fraud, and conspiracy claims, he says a three-year statute of limitations
applies and “April 12, 2024 is the Opinion accrual date,” so the claims are not time-barred. [Id. at
6]. Putting aside the actual statutes of limitation for these claims, they accrued long before the
Sixth Circuit denied Parks’s appeal on April 12, 2023.
Plaintiff also contends his claims “were tolled based upon the last known fraudulent and
conspirator acts.” [Doc. 98 at 3]. But in support of that contention he points to events alleged to
have occurred in 2014 and 2016, nearly a decade before he filed this action. [Id. at 3-4]. He says
that during Parks I, he found out something new about how his security clearance application was

handled. [Id. at 4]. But that does nothing to toll the statute of limitations on a claim he had already
raised by the time he received that discovery.
Finally, Plaintiff’s argues his § 1983 claims were tolled due to fraudulent concealment and
because TVA “conspired with judiciary officials to omit material evidentiary documents from the
Joint Appendix legally required to be submitted to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.” [Id. at 22-
23]. Putting aside the spurious nature of these allegations, he cites June 27, 2022, as the date that
“altered” documents were submitted. Conspiracy and § 1983 claims must be brought within one
year, and this action was not filed until June 8, 2024. The claims are time-barred.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 81] of Tennessee Valley Authority, Jeffrey
Lyash, Edward Spoone, Kristi Foxx, and Jamie Lynch is GRANTED and all claims against these
Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.
CHARLES E. ATCHLEY JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438979. Public record. Not legal advice.