# Brown

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · September 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438961

## Case

- **Full name:** Darlene Brown v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

DARLENE BROWN,1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00066
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
FRANK BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Darlene Brown filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. Currently pending is Brown’s Motion for Judgement [sic]
on the Administrative Record (“Motion for Judgment”) (Doc. No. 9), filed along with a supporting
Memorandum of Law (Doc. No. 10). The Commissioner of Social Security filed a complete copy
of the underlying Administrative Record (“AR”) (Doc. No. 6) and a Response to the Motion for
Judgment (Doc. No. 14). The plaintiff filed a Reply in further support thereof. (Doc. No. 15.) The
Magistrate Judge to whom this matter was referred has issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) (Doc. No. 19), recommending that Brown’s motion be denied. Brown filed a timely
Objection (Doc. No. 20), to which the Commissioner has responded (Doc. No. 21).
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s Objection will be overruled, and her motion
will be denied.

1 The Magistrate Judge granted the plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion to Substitute Party,
substituting Darlene Brown’s husband, Rojelio Garcia, Jr., as the plaintiff in this matter, following
Darlene Brown’s death. (See Doc. Nos. 16, 17.) Following the parties’ and the Magistrate Judge’s
convention, the court has not modified the case caption to reflect this change.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive
pretrial matter, the district court must review de novo any portion of the report and
recommendation to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001); Massey v. City of

Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 1993). In conducting its review of the objections, the district
court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or
return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
In the context of a case seeking social security benefits, the court must “uphold the ALJ’s
decision unless the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard or made findings that are
unsupported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Moats v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558, 561 (6th Cir.
2022), cert. denied sub nom. Moats v. Kijakazi, 143 S. Ct. 785 (2023); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).
“‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a term of art, . . . [a]nd it is not [a] high threshold.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to
an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support
the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (quoting
Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This standard requires ‘“more than a
mere scintilla’” but less than a preponderance; substantial evidence is such ‘relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Miller v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.
2001)); see also Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103. The court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence or
revisit questions of credibility. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). Similarly,
the court will not reverse findings of an ALJ merely because the record contains evidence—even
substantial evidence—to support a different conclusion. Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d
387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
II. BACKGROUND
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge sets forth in detail the ALJ’s findings as to the plaintiff’s

residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the parties’ positions, and the applicable legal standards, and
he addresses the sole issue raised in the plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment—namely, that the “ALJ’s
RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ used her own lay
medical opinion to interpret raw medical data and failed to build a logical bridge between the
evidence and the RFC.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.) The R&R finds that the record in this case is
replete with doctors’ evaluations, medical assessments, test results, and the like, all
of which were properly considered by the ALJ, and all of which constitute
substantial evidence. Additionally, the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that [s]he
carefully considered the testimony of both Plaintiff and the VE. While it is true that
some of the testimony and evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegations of disability, it
is also true that much of the evidence supports the ALJ’s determination [of the
plaintiff’s RFC].
(Doc. No. 19 at 9.) On this basis, the R&R rejects the plaintiff’s claim for relief and recommends
that her Motion for Judgment be denied.
III. DISCUSSION
The plaintiff objects to the R&R, arguing that “the Magistrate Judge’s finding is not well-
explained, relied on post hoc rationalizations, and failed to actually address the crux of Plaintiff’s
arguments.” (Doc. No. 20 at 1.) The “crux” of the plaintiff’s argument in her Motion for Judgment
is that the ALJ did not adequately explain her determination that the plaintiff needed to be able to
alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes. (See Doc. No. 10 at 7 (“Here, in
pertinent part, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with an RFC for a range of light work with a sit/stand
option every thirty minutes. However, this RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence because
the ALJ used her own lay medical opinion to evaluate Plaintiff’s need for a sit/stand limitation and
failed to provide any evidentiary support for the limitation she included in the RFC.” (citing AR
20)).) The plaintiff maintains that “the evidentiary basis and reasoning behind the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is not evidence from the decision” and that “[t]his is error.” (Id. at 8.)
On de novo review of this issue, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision was adequately

explained and is supported by substantial evidence. At step four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ
made the following RFC finding:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) except lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently,
can stand and walk with normal breaks for 6 out of 8 hour[s per] day, can sit with
normal breaks for 6 hours out of an 8 hour day, can occasionally climb stairs and
ramps, never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, frequently balance, occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, tolerate occasional exposure to extreme cold and
extreme heat, occasional exposure to vibrations, no exposure to hazardous
machinery or unprotected heights, limited to office level noise, alternate sit and
stand every thirty minutes.
(AR 20.) To explain this finding, the ALJ’s opinion includes a comprehensive review of the
plaintiff’s treatment records and subjective complaints. The ALJ specifically considered the
plaintiff’s testimony that she had “stop[ped] working because of her chronic lower back pain which
prevents her from sitting or standing for longer than 10 minutes” but also found that the plaintiff’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id. at 21.) The
ALJ identified this evidence as including the plaintiff’s reported activities as well as treatment
notes showing that the plaintiff reported that medication helped keep her pain under control and
repeated findings that she had a normal gait and 5/5 strength. (Id. at 21–22.)
In addition, while the record in this case does not include a treating physician’s assessment
of the plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities, it does contain the opinions of two State
Agency medical consultants, both of whom assessed the plaintiff as able to lift or carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and as able to stand/walk and sit (with normal breaks)
about 6 hours each in an 8-hour workday, with some postural and environmental limitations. (See

AR 58–59, 68–69.) The ALJ relied on these opinions too—in addition to the medical records, the
plaintiff’s reported activities, and her subjective complaints—to reach the RFC, which she
explained as follows:
Considering the above evidence, I find that the claimant is capable of lifting and
carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. Throughout the record,
the claimant was found to have normal strength (Exhibits 1F/39, 7F/90, 6F/18,
7F/38, 46). The claimant is also able to stand and walk with normal breaks for 6
out of 8 hour[s per] day and can sit with normal breaks for 6 hours out of an 8 hour
day. The claimant reported pain, but was consistently treated with medication and
it was noted that she received relief from medication and was stable (Exhibits
1F/11, 7F/74, 70, 52, 18F/39). The claimant reports stiffness and pain and thus is
limited to occasionally climbing stairs and ramps, never climbing ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, frequently balancing, occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, and
crawling. While the examinations often showed normal strength, gait and range of
motion, the claimant presented with tenderness and reports of widespread pain
which reasonably results in her reduced ability to perform the postural movements
noted (Exhibits 4F/4, 7F). I have also considered the claimant’s testimony regarding
intolerance to temperature changes and need to change position and thus find that
the claimant can tolerate only occasional exposure to extreme cold and extreme
heat, occasional exposure to vibrations, no exposure to hazardous machinery or
unprotected heights, limited to office level noise, and needs to alternate sit and stand
every thirty minutes. In assessing this residual functional capacity, I have
considered the longitudinal record in accordance with SSR 12-2p as the symptoms
of fibromyalgia can wax and wane. The records show that the claimant has treated
this condition effectively with consistent medication such that she is capable of the
range of light work assessed above, including the ability to sit and stand every thirty
minutes.
As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms, they are not fully consistent with the allegations as the
records reflect that the claimant has had improvement with treatment (Exhibits 1F,
7F, 18F). Additionally, the claimant has not taken additional steps in pain relief
other than medication. While the claimant reported that she could not afford any
other . . . interventions such as injections or ablation, there is also no evidence that
the claimant needed emergency care for severe pain or pursued alternative methods
for treatment. However, this lack of additional care is generally consistent with the
records that show that the medication helped to manage her pain (Exhibit 7F).
. . . . I have fully considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings as follows:
The findings of the State Agency medical consultants are somewhat persuasive
(Exhibits 2A, 4A). Thomas Thrush, M.D., and Gurcharan Singh, M.D., found that
the claimant can perform a range of light work, and this is supported by their review
of the evidence. The consultants reviewed the evidence, and they are well-qualified
by reason of training and experience in reviewing a record and formulating an
opinion as to limitations. The consultants’ assessments are consistent with and well
supported by the evidence of the record as a whole. As discussed above, the
claimant conservatively treated her pain with medication which was noted to
provide some improvement and she often had normal findings on examinations
with some decreased range of motion and tenderness (Exhibits 1F/11, 7F/74, 70,
52, 18F/39, 1F/39, 7F/90, 6F/18, 7F/38, 46). The claimant was also able to perform
a range of activities such as managing her medications and finances, preparing
simple meals, driving a few times a month, manage her hygiene and perform some
chores depending on her pain (Exhibit 14F, 4E). Dr. Singh’s findings concerning
the claimant’s environmental limitations are more persuasive as he had the
opportunity to review additional records and these environmental limitations are
consistent with the claimant’s testimony. However, it is found that the claimant also
requires a sit and stand option as set forth in the above residual functional capacity
based on her testimony that she has to change positions to help relieve pain. She
also reported this to her providers, and it is consistent with her reports of pain and
objective findings on tenderness that would require this movement.
(AR 23–24.)
The ALJ, that is, was presented with conflicting evidence. And, in evaluating the plaintiff’s
RFC, the ALJ properly considered all of that evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). It is the ALJ’s
function to weigh the evidence and reach a conclusion as to a claimant’s RFC. See Coldiron v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“This court has recognized that,
under [the applicable] regulations, ‘the ALJ is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the
medical evidence and the claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of [the claimant’s] residual
functional capacity.’ An ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by weighing
the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering an RFC finding.” (quoting Webb v.
Comm of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004)). Here, as the ALJ explained, she partially
accepted the plaintiffs testimony that she needed to alternate between sitting and standing but did
not find that the record fully supported the plaintiff's claim that she needed to alternate between
sitting and standing every ten minutes. And the ALJ found the medical consultants’ opinions
partially persuasive, but they did not take into account the plaintiff’s claim that she needed to
alternate between sitting and standing. The ALJ adequately explained her determination that the
plaintiff’s RFC included a need to alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes, and
that determination is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not “use[] her own lay
medical opinion to interpret raw medical data,” nor did she “fail[] to build a logical bridge between
the evidence and the RFC.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1.) The plaintiff's Objection, therefore, is without
merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
As set forth herein, the plaintiff's Objection (Doc. No. 20) will be overruled. The court will
accept and adopt the R&R (Doc. No. 19) and deny the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment (Doc. No.
9). An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

fel bg
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438961. Public record. Not legal advice.