# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. California · September 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438750

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert John Stockton v. Smith, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** September 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 ROBERT JOHN STOCKTON, Case No. 24-cv-06676-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF LEAVE
TO FILE SURREPLY; GRANTING
9 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10 SMITH, et al.,
Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 37
11 Defendants.

12
13 Plaintiff, an inmate at California State Prison – Corcoran, filed this pro se action pursuant
14 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against former Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) warden Smith, and PBSP
15 correctional officers Juneau and Durham, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his
16 safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they placed inmate Winson in his housing unit
17 group in May 2024. Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
18 Dkt. No. 32. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, Dkt. No. 33; Defendants have filed a reply, Dkt. No.
19 36; and Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to file a surreply, Dkt. No. 37. For the reasons set
20 forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a surreply, Dkt. No. 37; and
21 GRANTS Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Dkt. No. 32.
22 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
23 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
24 During the relevant time period, Plaintiff was housed at PBSP, defendant Smith was PBSP
25 warden, and defendants Juneau and Durham were PBSP correctional counselors. Dkt. No. 32-5
26 (“Smith Decl.”) at ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 32-4 (“Juneau Decl.”) at ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 32-3 (“Durham Decl.”) at ¶
27 1.
1 I. Restricted Custody General Population (“RCGP”) Placement
2 In May 2024, inmates who faced a substantial threat to their personal safety if housed in
3 the general population could temporarily be placed in a housing unit called Restricted Custody
4 General Population (“RCGP”). RCGP is an increased security setting with additional restrictions
5 on inmate movement. Juneau Decl., ¶ 2; Smith Decl., ¶ 4. The purpose of RCGP was to house
6 inmates with safety concerns until the inmate demonstrated that he could be safely reintegrated
7 into the inmate population in a regular housing unit. Smith Decl., ¶ 7. To demonstrate that they
8 could safely program with other inmates, RCGP inmates could seek placement in a group and
9 spend out-of-cell time with the inmates assigned to the group. Smith Decl., ¶ 7. Spending out-of-
10 cell time with a small group of inmates without any serious incidents occurring demonstrated that
11 the inmate could be safely placed in a larger inmate population. Smith Decl., ¶ 7; Juneau Decl., ¶
12 7; Dkt. No. 32-2 at 15.
13 Upon an inmate’s assignment to an RCGP, the prison’s Institutional Classification
14 Committee (“ICC”) reviewed the inmate’s case factors to determine the inmate’s local
15 programming, including access to an outdoor exercise yard or dayroom. Smith Decl., ¶ 5. For
16 their out-of-cell time (exercise yard and dayroom), an RCGP inmate was assigned either to “walk
17 alone” status or to a group. Smith Decl., ¶ 5. An RCGP inmate on “walk-alone” status attended
18 yard alone with no physical interaction with other inmates. Smith Decl., ¶ 5. An RCGP inmate
19 assigned to group attended yard with inmates assigned to their specific group. Smith Decl., ¶ 5. If
20 the ICC determined that an RCGP inmate was eligible for group, the ICC considered the following
21 factors in determining which group would be appropriate: the other inmates assigned to the
22 particular group, the inmate’s list of documented enemies, the inmate’s documented Security
23 Threat Group affiliations (if any), and the inmate’s recent rules violations. Durham Decl., ¶ 3;
24 Juneau Decl., ¶ 3; Smith Decl., ¶ 6. The ICC also conducted a hearing with the inmate present,
25 interviewed the inmate for any safety concerns, and verified whether the inmate felt they could
26 safely participate in the specific group under consideration. Durham Decl., ¶ 3; Juneau Decl., ¶ 3;
27 Smith Decl., ¶ 6. Because the RCGP was a high security setting, it was not uncommon for RCGP
1 Smith Decl., ¶ 8. Therefore, unless an RCGP inmate’s case factors indicated a significant risk of
2 violence towards the other inmates assigned to a specific group, the fact that an RCGP inmate had
3 a disciplinary history including violence-related infractions did not necessarily preclude the RCGP
4 inmate from participation in group. Smith Decl., ¶ 8.
5 II. Inmate Winson
6 In 1989, inmate Winson entered into CDCR custody pursuant to a conviction for first
7 degree murder and attempted first degree murder and related term of life without parole. Dkt. No.
8 33 at 51. In 1994, inmate Winson was validated as part of the Aryan Brotherhood Security Threat
9 Group (“STG”). Dkt. No. 33 at 52. Inmate Winson is white. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
10 In or around January 2017, after reviewing inmate Winson’s file and numerous documents,
11 the CDCR Departmental Review Board (“DRB”) concluded that inmate Winson’s safety was at
12 risk in general population. The DRB noted the following. Since approximately 1995, inmate
13 Winson had been targeted by the Aryan Brotherhood for assault for a variety of reasons, including
14 refusing to carry out ordered assaults, claiming Aryan Brotherhood membership, and utilizing
15 Aryan Brotherhood member’s names without their permission. On August 20, 2015, while housed
16 at Kern Valley State Prison, a validated Nazi Low Rider STG associate attempted to murder
17 inmate Winson. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
18 On February 28, 2017, inmate Winson arrived at the RCGP and was cleared to program in
19 Group 1. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
20 On September 12, 2017, inmate Winson battered inmate Cole with a deadly weapon. Dkt.
21 No. 33 at 52. As a result, inmate Winson was placed on Walk Alone (“W/A”) status. Dkt. No. 33
22 at 52.
23 On December 16, 2018, the ICC cleared inmate Winson to program with other inmates in
24 Group 2. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
25 On March 6, 2019, the ICC approved inmate Winson for double-cell status and declined
26 inmate Winson’s request to be celled with a specific Aryan Brotherhood affiliate. Dkt. No. 33 at
27 52.
1 Brotherhood, the DRB continued inmate Winson’s RCGP placement. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
2 On July 13, 2021, a validated Aryan Brotherhood associate battered inmate Winson. Dkt.
3 No. 33 at 52.
4 On January 13, 2022, the DRB concluded that inmate Winson remained a priority target
5 for the Aryan Brotherhood and that RCGP placement therefore continued to be appropriate.
6 Inmate Winson denied having issues with the Aryan Brotherhood, stating that all his prior
7 altercations were unrelated to the Aryan Brotherhood and due to personal issues with the other
8 inmate involved. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
9 On April 29, 2022, an STG Investigator reviewed inmate Winson’s file. At that time
10 inmate Winson was assigned to Group 2. The STG investigator reported the following. Inmate
11 Winson attended yard, dayroom, and group activities without incident. While inmate Winson was
12 not disruptive, he did not get along well with staff and other inmates in his housing unit. Due to
13 inmate Winson having been accused of disrespecting an Aryan Brotherhood member, the Aryan
14 Brotherhood had deemed inmate Winson a priority target, with the order supported by two
15 additional Aryan Brotherhood members. Two Aryan Brotherhood members had implemented an
16 authorization to assault/murder any RCGP white inmate who did not, within thirty days of being
17 placed in group, assault another inmate with the intent of murdering that inmate. Despite the
18 Aryan Brotherhood directive to members to assault inmate Winson, inmate Winson had
19 successfully programmed in RCGP group settings for a number of years. However, there was no
20 information indicating that the Aryan Brotherhood had ceased targeting inmate Winson. Based on
21 this information, prison officials decided to retain inmate Winson in RCGP with continued Group
22 2 clearance. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
23 On November 2, 2022, an 180-Day Safety Review was conducted for inmate Winson.
24 Prison officials again concluded that inmate Winson’s safety would be at risk in general
25 population and retained him in RCGP. Staff reported that inmate Winson was a porter; was
26 assigned to Group 2; attended yard, dayroom, and group activities; and while not disruptive, did
27 not get along well with staff and other inmates. Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
1 consequently was rehoused in the Administrative Segregation Unit (“ASU”). Dkt. No. 33 at 52.
2 On November 15, 2023, the ICC recommended that inmate Winson be released from the
3 ASU, and placed back into RCGP Facility B on close custody status with walk/alone status,
4 double cell clearance, and individual exercise yard. Dkt. No. 33 at 53, 57-58.
5 From November 2023 to May 2024, inmate Winson served as a porter on Plaintiff’s tier.
6 Plaintiff and inmate Winson talked daily through Plaintiff’s door and their interactions were
7 cordial. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 19-20. However, Plaintiff did not know if inmate Winson was “playing”
8 him and being friendly “just for the benefit to get next to you.” Dkt. No. 32-2 at 20. Plaintiff got
9 along “fairly well” with inmate Winson but described themselves as having different politics,
10 explaining that he was motivated to obtain parole whereas “some of these guys that maxed out
11 parole [like inmate Winson], they don’t care about that.” Dkt. No. 32-2 at 20.
12 A. Inmate Winson’s Assignment to Group 6
13 On May 23, 2024, Defendants chaired inmate Winson’s ICC. Durham Decl., ¶ 7; Juneau
14 Decl., ¶ 7; Smith Decl. ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 33 at 56-58. To determine inmate Winson’s RCGP group
15 assignment, Defendants reviewed the following case factors: classification reviews while in
16 CDCR custody; documented enemies; Security Threat Group affiliations; and disciplinary history,
17 including the February 2023 incident of violence. Based on this review, Defendants concluded
18 that there was no indication that inmate Winson would act violently towards Plaintiff or any
19 Group 6 inmate, or that inmate Winson would target and attack any white inmate in his group.
20 Durham Decl., ¶¶ 8, 9; Juneau Decl., ¶¶ 8, 9; Smith Decl., ¶¶ 11, 12.
21 At this meeting, inmate Winson requested to be assigned to a group. Inmate Winson told
22 Defendants that he believed he could safely program with the inmates assigned to Group 6, which
23 included Plaintiff. Durham Decl., ¶¶ 7, 9; Juneau Decl., ¶¶ 7, 9. At that time, Inmate Winson’s
24 records indicated no documented enemy concerns with any inmates in Group 6 and no
25 documented enemy concerns with Plaintiff; indicated that inmate Winson and Plaintiff were not
26 documented affiliates of enemy STGs; and indicated that inmate Winson and Plaintiff were
27 affiliated with the same STG. Dkt. No. 33 at 56-58; Durham Decl., ¶ 8; Juneau Decl., ¶ 8; Smith
1 Yard status, and cleared inmate Winson for participation in Group 6. Dkt. No. 33 at 56-58.
2 Plaintiff was not informed beforehand about inmate Winson being assigned to his group
3 and was not asked whether inmate Winson posed a threat to his safety. Dkt. No. 22 at 20.
4 Previously, when inmate Blakeslee, a white inmate, had been assigned to Plaintiff’s group,
5 correctional officials informed Plaintiff beforehand and obtained assurances from both Plaintiff
6 and inmate Blakeslee that they could program together peacefully before approving inmate
7 Blakeslee’s placement into Plaintiff’s group. Dkt. No. 22 at 20; Dkt. No. 33 at 64. Plaintiff and
8 inmate Blakeslee programmed together peacefully for four months until inmate Blakeslee was
9 transferred to another prison. Dkt. No. 22 at 20.
10 B. Inmate Winson’s Arrival in Group 6 and May 31, 2024 Incident
11 In December 2023, Plaintiff was cleared for participation in Group 6. Durham Decl., ¶ 6.
12 Plaintiff remained in Group 6 until May 31, 2024. Durham Decl., ¶ 6. Prior to inmate Winson’s
13 arrival, Plaintiff was the only white inmate in this group and the remaining inmates were Hispanic.
14 Dkt. No. 32-2 at 15.
15 On or around May 23, 2024, inmate Winson was placed in Group 6 and assigned to the cell
16 next to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 19-20. Despite their prior cordial relationship, Plaintiff was
17 suspicious of inmate Winson due to inmate Winson’s attempted murder of inmate Perkins.
18 Plaintiff noticed that staff was hyper-vigilant once inmate Winson arrived in Group 6. Usually the
19 atmosphere in dayroom was relaxed and the guards did not have riot guns. However, after inmate
20 Winson’s arrival, whenever inmate Winson and Plaintiff were at day room, staff would stand at
21 the windows with riot guns, as if they were waiting for something to happen, and would keep their
22 eyes on inmate Winson and Plaintiff. Plaintiff talked to inmate Winson, trying to encourage
23 inmate Winson to program together peacefully. During that first week, inmate Winson followed
24 Plaintiff everywhere and Plaintiff could not shake him. But there were otherwise no notable
25 interactions with inmate Winson that first week. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 22.
26 Plaintiff did not inform Defendants or any other correctional officer about his concerns.
27 Plaintiff stated at his deposition that if an inmate felt he was in immediate danger, he could tell
1 if an inmate prematurely informed staff that he had safety concerns or went to staff every time he
2 felt intimidated or threatened, it would make an inmate “look like [he had] . . . mental issues” or
3 “look silly.” Dkt. No. 32-2 at 16-17.
4 On May 31, 2024, when Plaintiff arrived at yard, he saw inmate Winson speaking with one
5 of the Southern Hispanic inmates. Plaintiff walked over, shook inmate Winson’s hand, and
6 walked away. Inmate Winson followed Plaintiff. After one or two laps around the yard, Plaintiff
7 felt inmate Winson grab his arm and then saw inmate Winson pull out a knife. Plaintiff and
8 inmate Winson struggled. Plaintiff wrestled the knife away from inmate Winson and stabbed him,
9 and kept yelling, “Get on the ground,” and did not stop until he saw that correctional officers were
10 close enough for Plaintiff to feel safe. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 24-30.
11 On June 9, 2024, Plaintiff was issued RVR No. 7450428 by correctional officers, accusing
12 him of attempting to murder inmate Winson. Dkt. No. 22 at 32. On January 30, 2025, inmate
13 Winson was asked two questions in connection with the hearing on this RVR.

14 Q1: Who started the altercation?
Inmate Winson: I did since I pulled it out of my pocket.
15
Q2: How did it start?
16 Inmate Winson: When I was out to yard, I picked up a black object and put it in my pocket.
Once Stockton came out to yard, we were walked together and I pulled the black object out
17 of my pocket and unwrapped it, it was a weapon. We then both got into a struggle over the
weapon. I then fell and split my chin open which is where all the blood came from.
18
19 Dkt. No. 33 at 18. Plaintiff had asked the hearing office to ask inmate Winson two additional
20 questions: “Who brought the weapon to the yard?” and “Did you suffer any broken bones or lose
21 conscientiousness as a result of the altercation?” Of these two additional questions, the hearing
22 officer did not ask the first question because he deemed it irrelevant due to reports stating that
23 Plaintiff was seen with a black object in his hand and the hearing officer did not ask the second
24 question due to Plaintiff being provided a Form 7219 indicating the injuries suffered by inmate
25 Winson. Dkt. No. 33 at 18. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff was found guilty of RVR No.
26 7450428. Dkt. No. 33 at 19.
27 //
1 III. CDCR Administrative Remedy Process and Plaintiff’s Relevant Grievances
2 A. CDCR Administrative Grievance Process
3 During the relevant time period, the California Department of Corrections and
4 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provided inmates the following administrative remedy process for non-
5 healthcare related issues. To dispute “a policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the
6 [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] Department or departmental staff that
7 causes some measurable harm to their health, safety, or welfare,” the inmate was required to fill
8 out and submit a CDCR Form 602-1 to his prison’s Office of Grievances (“OOG”) for a first level
9 review. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§ 3481(a), 3482(a). In the Form 602-1, the inmate was required to
10 “describe all information known and available to the [inmate] regarding the claim, including key
11 dates and times, names and titles of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff
12 members), and names and titles of all witnesses, to the best of the [inmate’s] knowledge.” 15 Cal.
13 Code Regs. § 3482(c)(2). The inmate was required to submit the claim within sixty calendar days
14 of the claim being discovered. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3482(b). The OOG was required to provide
15 the inmate with a written decision no later than sixty calendar days after the OOG’s receipt of the
16 grievance, with the decision clearly explaining the reasoning for the decision as to each claim. Id.
17 at §§ 3481(a); 3483(i). The inmate could appeal the OOG decision by filing a written appeal with
18 the Office of Appeals (“OOA”) within sixty days of discovering the OOG decision. Id. at § 3484.
19 A final decision by the OOA was required to exhaust an inmate grievance. Id. at § 3483(l).
20 1. OOG “Rejected” Decision
21 At the OOG level, the relevant state regulations specified that when a claim concerned an
22 anticipated policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or departmental
23 staff, the OOG should “reject” the claim, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3483(g)(6)(B); and that the
24 rejection did not constitute exhaustion of administrative remedies because the prisoner could
25 appeal the decision to the OOA, id. at § 3483(l)(1)(F).
26 2. OOA Decisions – “Denied” or “Rejected”
27 Among other options, the OOA could “deny” or “reject” the appealed claim. A denial by
1 evidence available that the decision by the Office of Grievances was proper.” 15 Cal. Code Regs.
2 § 3485(g)(1).
3 a. OOA “Denied” Decision – Exhaustion
4 The administrative remedies process was exhausted where the OOA “denied” decision”
5 was a decision on the merits or due to a lack of jurisdiction” and the prisoner would not receive
6 any further answer from the OOA. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l)(4)(A).
7 b. OOA “Denied” Decision – Unexhausted
8 The administrative remedies process was not exhausted where the OOA issued a “denied”
9 decision, and the denial was because: (1) the OOG correctly redirected, reassigned, or disallowed
10 the claim, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l)(1)(A); or (2) the prisoner failed to write legibly enough
11 for the OOA to understand the issue on appeal as required in subsection 3484(c)(1); 15 Cal. Code
12 Regs. § 3485(l)(2); or (3) the prisoner failed to describe clearly enough why the OOG decision
13 was inadequate as required in subsection 3484(c)(2);15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l)(2); or (4) the
14 OOG correctly screened out the claim as a pending legal matter, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l)(4).
15 c. OOA “Rejected” Decision - Unexhausted
16 A rejection by the OOA (“rejected”) meant inter alia that “the claim was correctly
17 ‘rejected’ by the Office of Grievances pursuant to subsections 3483(g)(6)(A) through (g)(6)(D).”
18 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(g)(6). “If a claim is ‘rejected’ . . . because the Office of Grievances
19 correctly ‘rejected’ the claim under subsections 3483(g)(6)(A) through (g)(6)(D), then the
20 administrative remedies process was not exhausted.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l)(3).
21 B. Grievance No. 573754
22 Plaintiff is familiar with CDCR’s administrative grievance process, having frequently filed
23 grievances during his time in custody. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 32-39. While in custody, Plaintiff has
24 filed at least fifty grievances regarding poor prison conditions. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 39. Plaintiff
25 testified at his deposition that he had no issues submitting a grievance for the May 31, 2024
26 incident. Dkt. No. 32-2 at 33, 35.
27 Plaintiff has identified Grievance No. 573754 as the grievance that he alleges exhausts his
1 Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 573754 on or about June 5, 2024. Plaintiff titled
2 Grievance No. 573754 “staff misconduct” and alleged in this grievance that Warden Smith
3 endangered him by placing inmate Winson in his group:

4 STAFF MISCONDUCT
Specifically, I was housed in RCGP at PBSP programming successfully without issue or
5 violence. Warden Smith elected to pit prisoner Wi[n]son #C-63916 and I in le[]thal
combat, on or about May 24th, 2024.
6
Prisoner Wi[n]son was classified as a high priority target of a STG prison gang, and
7 documentation generated by staff indicates he was in “bad standing” with an STG prison
gang and prisoner Wi[n]son was expected to assault and or attempt to murder any white
8 prisoner approved to group with him, at any time he was approved to group with others.

9 This documentation was deemed “Reliable” by staff yet Warden Smith elected to put my
life in direct jeopardy and approve group with prisoner Wi[n]son and I.
10
The RCGP program is a hypervigilant violent program and prisoner Wi[n]son has an
11 extensive history of violence. This was known to Warden Smith, CCII Durham and CCII
Junno on or about May 24, 2024.
12
On May 31, 2024 while housed in RCGP I was placed in RHU/ASU for alleged attempted
13 murder of prisoner Wi[n]son.

14 I was placed in a vulnerable position and Warden Smith is directly responsible. I have a
right to life and to be free from dangerous situations. Warden Smith “set up” a violent
15 alter[c]ation with no regard for life.

16 Action requested:
Warden Smith be investigated for misconduct, mitigating factors be considered to my
17 placement, and RCGP to closed down and to have CCII Durham and CCII Junno be
removed from RCGP classification process, and my rights reserved for civil suit action,
18 with no trickle down c/o harassment.

19 I do not have access to the documentation located [in] Wi[n]son’s C-file in regards to his
expectation to assault other white prisoners.
20
21 Dkt. No. 33 at 21-22.
22 On June 13, 2024, the OOG issued a decision rejecting Grievance No. 573754. The OOG
23 decision classified the claim as “Category: Offender Discipline” and “Sub-category: Serious Rules
24 Violations Report.” The OOG decision rejected Grievance No. 573754 as follows:

25 Your claim concerning Offender Discipline; Serious Rule Violation Report is rejected for
the reason or reasons indicated below:
26
Your claim concerns an anticipated policy, decision, action, condition or omission by the
27 Department or departmental staff. This generally means the decision or action is not final
1 If you are dissatisfied with this response you may appeal this decision by mailing the
CDCR Form 602-2 included in this response to the California Department of Corrections
2 and Rehabilitation, Office of Appeals. Do not resubmit this claim to the Office of
Grievances.
3
Dkt. No. 33 at 24.
4
On June 14, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the OOG decision as follows: “My grievance has
5
nothing to do with any serious rule violation report ‘findings.’ It has to do with Warden Smith,
6
CII Durham & CII Junno putting my life in danger by putting a documented STG gang
7
member/associate enemy in my yard.” Dkt. No. 33 at 23.
8
On July 24, 2024, the OOA issued a decision denying Grievance No. 573754, stating that
9
the OOG correctly rejected Plaintiff’s claim as anticipatory and that this decision exhausted
10
Plaintiff’s administrative remedies.
11
I. ISSUE ON APPEAL
12 Appellant infers the Department’s rejection of this claim as anticipatory was improper.

13 II. RULES AND REFERENCES

14 A. CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
Title 15, section 3483(g)(6)(B)
15
B. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED
16 CDCR Form 602-1, Log #573754, CDCR Form 602-2, Log # 573754, Grievance
Decision, Log #573754
17
III. REASONING AND DECISION
18 The institution rejected appellant’s claim as anticipatory. A review of appellant’s
grievance, grievance response, and appeal documents confirms the rejection was proper as
19 the event forming the basis for appellant’s claim had not been formally finalized. For this
reason, this claim is denied.
20
IV. REMEDY
21 Your claim has been denied. Therefore, there is no applicable remedy.

22 Decision: Denied
After a thorough review of all documents and evidence available at the time of this written
23 decision, it is the order of the Office fo Appeals that this claim is denied. This decision
exhausts the administrative remedies available to the claimant with CDCR.
24
25 Dkt. No. 33 at 26.
26 DISCUSSION
27 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) Plaintiff has not
1 (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. Nos. 32, 36. Plaintiff has filed an
2 opposition, Dkt. No. 33, and requested leave to file a sur-reply, Dkt. No. 37.
3 I. Request for Leave to File Surreply (Dkt. No. 37)
4 On June 23, 2026, Plaintiff requested leave to file a surreply. Dkt. No. 37. In his proposed
5 surreply, Plaintiff seeks to file with the Court the Inmate Orientation Book for Pelican Bay State
6 Prison Restricted Custody General Population; argues that his book establishes that prison
7 officials must have inmates sign a CDC 128 stating that they can program with the inmates listed
8 in order to be placed in a small group; argues that Defendants failed to follow this CDC 128
9 requirement when placing inmate Winson in his RCGP group; and proffers a declaration stating
10 that the RCGP was a stressful, violence-prone environment intended to facilitate gladiator-style
11 fights. Plaintiff argues that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) allows for supplemental filings where the
12 information was unavailable to the non-moving party. See generally id.
13 Plaintiff states that he was unable to include these arguments in his opposition for the
14 following reasons. Plaintiff states that he promptly filed his opposition to the summary judgment
15 motion on December 8, 2025, in order to meet the court deadline, but was aware at that time, and
16 informed the Court accordingly, that he had not been provided the necessary and requested
17 discovery. Dkt. No. 37 at 8. Plaintiff states that he did not receive Defendants’ response to his
18 first set of request for production of documents (“RFP”) until late December 2025. On January 9,
19 2026, Plaintiff was moved to California State Prison – Corcoran without access to his property,
20 and he remained housed there until he was transferred back to Pelican Bay State Prison on
21 February 16, 2026, to face charges in Del Norte Superior Court arising out of Defendants’
22 accusation that he had attempted to murder inmate Winson. The Del Norte Superior Court
23 criminal case was dismissed on April 9, 2026, and Plaintiff was sent back to CSP-Corcoran’s
24 isolation unit. Plaintiff was informed by CSP-Corcoran staff that most of his property had been
25 stolen, misplaced, or lost. Plaintiff had no tablet and the prison law library had been disassembled
26 to update the technology, which rendered Plaintiff unable to use the computer system to
27 shepardize caselaw. At some unspecified date, Plaintiff was able to locate some of his legal
1 this surreply as soon as he was able. Dkt. No. 37.
2 Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request to file a surreply for the following reasons. First,
3 Defendants argue that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) is an improper basis for introducing the orientation
4 manual as Rule 56(d) only allows a party to request an order deferring time to respond to the
5 summary judgment motion so that the party may conduct additional discovery; Plaintiff’s
6 opposition was not due until December 17, 2025, and he chose to file the opposition early; and
7 Plaintiff should have, and could have, sought an extension of time to file his opposition pending
8 receipt of the answer to his RFP. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to diligently pursue
9 discovery. Dkt. No. 38.
10 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for leave to file the proposed surreply docketed at
11 Dkt. No. 37 because Plaintiff has not met the requirement for filing a surreply. N.D. Cal. L.R. 7-
12 3(d) provides that once a reply is filed, no additional memoranda, papers or letters may be filed
13 without prior Court approval, except if new evidence has been submitted in the reply or a relevant
14 judicial opinion was published after the date the opposition or reply was filed by filing. N.D. Cal.
15 L.R. 7-3(d). Defendants’ reply brief in support of their summary judgment motion did not submit
16 new evidence, see Dkt. No. 36; and Plaintiff’s surreply did not reference a newly published
17 relevant judicial opinion, see Dkt. No. 37. Nor does Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) provide a basis for
18 granting leave to file a surreply six months after the opposition was filed. Rule 56(d) provides that
19 if a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, he cannot present
20 facts essential to justify his opposition, the Court may defer considering the motion, deny the
21 motion, allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery, or issue any other
22 appropriate order. Assuming arguendo that the proposed surreply presents facts essential to
23 Plaintiff’s opposition,1 the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he could not have
24 timely presented these facts. Plaintiff commenced this action on September 25, 2024, and the
25 Court ordered service of the operative complaint and authorized the commencement of discovery
26 on May 5, 2025. If Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s RFP was due in late December 2025,
27
1 presumably Plaintiff served his RFP on Defendants in October or November 2025. Plaintiff has
2 not addressed why he waited six months to serve discovery requests.
3 II. Summary Judgment Standard
4 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show there is
5 “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
6 law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2014). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the
7 case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material
8 fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
9 nonmoving party. See id.
10 A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing
11 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
12 party will bear the burden of proof at trial [,] . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an
13 essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
14 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
15 burden of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
16 of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the
17 pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
18 admissions on file, ‘designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See
19 id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party must show more than “the mere
20 existence of a scintilla of evidence.” In re Oracle Corp Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir.
21 2010) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). “In fact, the non-moving party must come forth
22 with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party’s
23 favor.” Id. (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252). If the nonmoving party fails to make this
24 showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. at
25 323.
26 For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most
27 favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with
1 submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999).
2 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility determinations or
3 weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v.
4 Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
5 III. Exhaustion Claim
6 A. Exhaustion Requirement and Legal Standard
7 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) sets forth the following exhaustion
8 requirement: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §
9 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
10 facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
11 The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007), and
12 requires “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,
13 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion requires using all steps of an administrative process and “demands
14 compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
15 system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its
16 proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90–91. Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all
17 that is required by the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 217–18.
18 “Under § 1997e(a), the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availab[ility]’ of
19 administrative remedies: An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not
20 exhaust unavailable ones.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016) (alteration in original); see
21 also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The obligation to exhaust ‘available’
22 remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case,
23 then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the
24 grievance.”) (emphasis and alterations in original). “When prison officials improperly fail to
25 process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted available administrative
26 remedies.” Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (administrative
27 remedies unavailable where prison failed to timely respond to inmate’s grievance; inmate filed
1 federal civil rights claim). To fall within this exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, an
2 inmate must show: “(1) that he actually filed a grievance or grievances that, if pursued through all
3 levels of administrative appeals, would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he seeks to pursue
4 in federal court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance or grievances for reasons
5 inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823-
6 24 (9th Cir. 2010). A prisoner need not exhaust further levels of review if he has been reliably
7 informed by an administrator that no more remedies are available. Brown, 422 F.3d at 935. If
8 prison officials improperly screen out an inmate’s appeals, the inmate cannot properly complete
9 the grievance process and administrative remedies are effectively unavailable. Sapp, 623 F.3d at
10 822-23. Administrative remedies are effectively unavailable when prison officials decline to reach
11 merits of a particular grievance “for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable
12 regulations.” Id. at 822-24.
13 Where a prison’s grievance procedures do not specify the level of factual specificity
14 required in the grievance, “‘a grievance suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for
15 which redress is sought.’” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Strong
16 v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). The grievance should include sufficient information
17 “to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures.” Id. (citation and internal
18 quotation marks omitted). The grievance need not include legal terminology or legal theories
19 unless they are needed to provide notice of the harm being grieved. Id. Nor must a grievance
20 include every fact necessary to prove each element of an eventual legal claim. Id. The purpose of
21 a grievance is to alert the prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay groundwork
22 for litigation. Id.
23 Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead
24 and prove. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 216. The defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an
25 available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not exhaust that remedy. Albino v. Baca,
26 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). Once the defendant has carried that burden, the burden
27 shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his
1 unavailable to him. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. But as required by Jones, the ultimate burden of
2 proof remains with the defendant. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable
3 to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule
4 56. Id. at 1166. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the
5 district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id.
6 B. Analysis
7 Defendants argue that Grievance No. 573754 did not exhaust the claim in this action –
8 Defendants’ alleged failure to protect him from the May 31, 2024 assault by inmate Winson –
9 because the grievance was not substantively decided as it was procedurally rejected as anticipatory
10 pursuant to 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3483(g)(6)(B). Specifically, Defendants argue as follows. The
11 OOG correctly rejected Grievance No. 573754 on June 13, 2024, because the June 9, 2024 RVR
12 accused Plaintiff of attacking and attempting to murder inmate Winson on May 31, 2024, and the
13 issue of whether inmate Winson was wrongfully assigned to Plaintiff’s Group 6 therefore could
14 not be decided until the RVR was decided, which did not happen until February 10, 2025. The
15 OOG’s rejection was procedural and not on the merits. The OOA denial was also not a
16 substantive review of the underlying merits of Grievance No. 573754, and was simply a
17 concurrence with the OOG decision to procedurally reject the grievance as anticipatory. In
18 support of these arguments, Defendants cite the language in the OOG decision instructing Plaintiff
19 to wait until the decision or action being grieved was final and file a new grievance at that time,
20 and also cite 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(l). Defendants argue that Plaintiff was required to file a
21 new grievance after the RVR was decided in order to exhaust the claim in this action. See
22 generally Dkt. No. 32 at 13-16; Dkt. No. 36.
23 Plaintiff argues that Grievance No. 573754 satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
24 for the following reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that Grievance No. 573754 was misconstrued as
25 challenging RVR No. 7450428, when in actuality it “clearly” challenged staff misconduct, namely
26 correctional officials’ decision to place inmate Winson in Plaintiff’s group despite knowing that
27 inmate Winson would assault or murder any white inmate with whom he was grouped. Dkt. No.
1 he sought to grieve the claim raised in this action, therefore satisfying the purpose of the PLRA’s
2 exhaustion requirement, and that proper exhaustion does not require that he pursue “other
3 grievance paths that are irrelevant to the issue at hand,” such as the validity of the RVR since the
4 validity of the RVR is not determinative as to whether the decision to place inmate Winson in
5 Plaintiff’s group was appropriate. Dkt. No. 33 at 5. Third, Plaintiff argues that prison officials
6 rendered administrative remedies unavailable when they failed to follow protocol for investigating
7 staff misconduct claims by refusing to substantively address the issues raised in Grievance No.
8 573754 and instead giving a blanket rejection. Dkt. No. 33 at 6.
9 The Court finds that Defendants have not carried their burden of proving that Plaintiff did
10 not exhaust his available administrative remedies.
11 First, the OOA decision is reasonably read as exhausting Plaintiff’s administrative
12 remedies. Although the OOA decision agreed that the OOG correctly denied the grievance as
13 anticipatory, the language in the OOA decision otherwise implied that administrative remedies
14 were exhausted. The OOA decision specified that the OOA “denied” Grievance No. 573754;
15 stated that the “decision exhaust[ed] the administrative remedies available to [Plaintiff] within the
16 CDCR,” and that Plaintiff had “no applicable remedy.” Dkt. No. 33 at 26. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §
17 3485(1) specifies that a “denied” decision exhausts a prisoner’s administrative remedies where the
18 denial is “on the merits or due to a lack of jurisdiction,” id. § 3485(1)(4)(A), and that the only
19 instance where a denial does not exhaust administrative remedies is where the denial is based on
20 the determination that the OOG correctly redirected, reassigned, or disallowed the claim, id. at §
21 3485(1)(1)(A). As the OOG did not redirect, reassign, or disallow Grievance No. 573754,2 and
22 the OOA stated that Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were exhausted, Plaintiff could reasonably
23 believe that in using the phrase “denied,” the OOA had decided Grievance No. 573754 on the
24

25
2 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3483(g) defines “redirected” as forwarding the grievance to an appropriate
authority such as the healthcare division, or the Remedies Compliance Coordinator, or the Public
26
Records Act Coordinator; defines “reassigned” as assigning the claim to a different Office of
Grievances than the one which originally received it because the majority of evidence is located at
27
the other Office of Grievances; and defines “disallowed” as discarding the grievance because it
1 merits, and that the denial therefore exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to 15 Cal.
2 Code Regs. § 3485(1)(5)(A). In contrast, if the OOA had “rejected” Grievance No. 573754, as
3 the OOG had done, Plaintiff’s administrative remedies would have been unexhausted pursuant to
4 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3485(1)(3). The OOA’s decision to “deny,” instead of “reject,” Grievance
5 No. 573754 exhausted Plaintiff’s administrative remedies.
6 Second, Plaintiff was not required to file a new grievance after his RVR was decided as the
7 OOA decision reliably informed him that no more remedies were available by stating that
8 the “decision exhaust[ed] the administrative remedies available to [Plaintiff] within the CDCR,”
9 and that Plaintiff had “no applicable remedy.” See Brown, 422 F.3d at 935 (prisoner need not
10 exhaust further levels of review if he is reliably informed that no more remedies are available).
11 The Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the
12 failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
13 IV. Eighth Amendment Claim
14 A. Legal Standard
15 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to
16 guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The failure of
17 prison officials to protect inmates from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth
18 Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively,
19 sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate
20 health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows
21 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps to
22 abate it. Id. at 837. The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
23 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference. See id.
24 at 837. With respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation, “deliberate
25 indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than
26 acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”
27 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to
1 or safety.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute
2 deliberate indifference. See id. at 835-36 & n.4. A prisoner need not wait until he is actually
3 assaulted or harmed to state a claim and obtain relief. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845.
4 B. Analysis
5 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law because
6 Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Defendants knew of, and failed to address, a significant
7 and plain risk to his safety from placing inmate Winson in his group. Defendants point to the
8 following in support of their argument. Defendants conducted a comprehensive review of inmate
9 Winson’s records in preparing for the May 23, 2024 ICC hearing, and the review did not indicate
10 that inmate Winson posed a significant safety risk to Plaintiff or that inmate Winson would target
11 and attack another white inmate in his RCGP group. While inmate Winson had past disciplinary
12 issues, many inmates assigned to the RCGP unit similarly had past disciplinary issues, including
13 violence-related infractions, and inmate Winson’s last incident of violence was over a year prior.
14 Inmate Winson had no documented enemy concerns with any of the Group 6 inmates. Inmate
15 Winson and Plaintiff were not affiliated with enemy Security Threat Groups (“STGs”); rather,
16 inmate Winson and Plaintiff were documented as affiliated with the same STG. There was also no
17 indication during the May 23, 2024 ICC hearing that inmate Winson had any issues with, or would
18 attack, Plaintiff. In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that, prior to the May 31 incident, he got along
19 “fairly well” with inmate Winson. Plaintiff never expressed any safety concerns about inmate
20 Winson or to any correctional staff prior to the May 31, 2024 incident. Dkt. No. 32 at 18-21.
21 Plaintiff opposes the summary judgment motion on the following grounds. Plaintiff argues
22 that it was clear to Defendants that inmate Winson would attack him because of the following
23 factors. Inmate Winson had a “lengthy assaultive history.” He had three incidents in RCGP prior
24 to May 2024; two of the three incidents involved assaulting other inmates; and the other inmates
25 attacked were all alleged STG affiliates. Defendants know that STG white affiliates have been
26 instructed to assault other white inmates with the intent to murder, or else be murdered
27 themselves. Plaintiff has a documented history of enemy concerns with all STG affiliates. In
1 without another white prisoner put him at risk from all STG affiliates. Plaintiff further argues that
2 Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to his safety by failing to alert him that inmate
3 Winson would be housed with him; by not interviewing Plaintiff prior to placing inmate Winson
4 in Group 6; and by not giving Plaintiff an opportunity to oppose inmate Winson’s placement in
5 Group 6. Dkt. No. 33 at 7-9.
6 In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit for the
7 following reasons. There is no regulation or policy requiring Defendants to conduct an ICC
8 hearing with the inmates already assigned to a group prior to assigning a new prisoner to that
9 group. Plaintiff had the opportunity to oppose inmate Winson’s placement because he was free to
10 inform staff at any time of any safety concerns he had regarding inmate Winson. Inmate Winson’s
11 documented STG affiliation did not preclude his assignment to Group 6 or to a group with
12 Plaintiff because Plaintiff and Winson are not documented as enemies; Plaintiff and Winson are
13 affiliated with the same STG; inmate Winson had previously programmed in a group setting in
14 RCGP without incident; inmate Winson had remained discipline-free for the prior year; inmate
15 Winson had no documented enemy concerns with any Group 6 inmate; and inmate Winson had
16 expressed a desire to program positively in a group setting and stated that he could safety program
17 with inmates in Group 6. Dkt. No. 36 at 4-6.
18 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
19 not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated the Eighth
20 Amendment. The Eighth Amendment has a two-part test. First, did the prison official know that
21 prison conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate? If the prison official
22 knew, then the second question is did the prison officials take reasonable steps to abate the harm?
23 Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendants knew that
24 Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm if inmate Winson were placed in Plaintiff’s RCGP
25 group. It is undisputed that Plaintiff never informed Defendants of any safety concerns that he had
26 regarding inmate Winson. Defendants have stated that they drew the conclusion that the Group 6
27 inmates, including Plaintiff, were not at risk of substantial harm from inmate Winson’s placement
1 and disciplinary history and took into consideration the enemy concerns of Plaintiff and the other
2 Group 6 inmates.
3 Plaintiff has not pointed to any facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendants
4 ever subjectively concluded that a serious risk of harm existed here. Instead, the uncontroverted
5 record contains a number of facts supporting Defendants’ conclusion that it was safe to place
6 inmate Winson in Plaintiff’s group: (1) placing an inmate with past disciplinary issues in a group
7 did not expose the other inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm as many RCGP inmates had
8 a history of disciplinary issues yet programmed successfully in group; (2) inmate Winson had
9 been disciplinary/violence free for a year prior to placement in Group 6; (3) inmate Winson
10 expressed a desire to program successfully in group; and asked to be placed in Group 6; (4) inmate
11 Winson was not a documented enemy of anyone in Group 6; and (5) inmate Winson and Plaintiff
12 were affiliated with the same STG. Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants should have known that
13 Plaintiff was at risk if housed with inmate Winson does not state an Eighth Amendment claim, as
14 the Eighth Amendment requires that Defendants knew of the risk, not should have known of it.
15 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (official must both be aware of facts from which inference could be
16 drawn that substantial risk of serious harm exists, and must also draw that inference). The issue is
17 not whether Defendants’ judgment ultimately turned out to be correct, or was perfect. Instead, the
18 Eighth Amendment requires a showing on which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants
19 were deliberately indifferent in the face of an objectively and subjectively determined serious risk.
20 The record here establishes no material dispute of fact on these issues.
21 Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants exposed him to harm by failing to consult
22 him before placing inmate Winson in his group fails to state an Eighth Amendment violation as a
23 matter of law. There is no prison regulation requiring prison officials to obtain consent or
24 feedback from the inmates already in the group before assigning a new inmate to that group.3
25

26
3 The PBSP RCGP Inmate Orientation Handbook does not require prison officials to obtain CDC
128 from inmates already in the group before a new inmate is assigned to the group. Rather, the
27
handbook’s CDC 128 directive applies to inmates wishing to be in the group. Dkt. No. 37 at 17
] More importantly, the Eighth Amendment does not require this either.
2 The Court therefore finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
3 law on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
4 || V. Qualified Immunity
5 Qualified immunity is an entitlement, provided to government officials in the exercise of
6 their duties, not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
7 {| 200 (2001). To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must
8 consider whether (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was
9 clearly established at the time of the incident. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
10 || Courts are not required to address the two qualified immunity issues in any particular order, and
11 instead may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
12 || immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at
13 hand.” /d. at 236. Because there was no violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, as explained
14 || above, the inquiry ends.
CONCLUSION
a 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request for leave to file a surreply,
17 || Dkt. No. 37; and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 32. Judgment
Zz 18 is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. The Clerk shall close the case.
19 This order terminates Dkt. No. 32.
20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21 Dated: 9/9/2026
2 Abeipyred 5 □□□
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
23 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438750. Public record. Not legal advice.