# Bowlds

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · September 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438595

## Case

- **Full name:** Dustyn D. Bowlds v. Anthony Purdy, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** September 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

DUSTYN D. BOWLDS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:24-CV-435-SJF

ANTHONY PURDY, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Dustyn D. Bowlds, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two
claims. First, he is proceeding against Detective Anthony Purdy in his individual
capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for violating the Fourteenth
Amendment by using excessive force while taking a DNA sample on August
2, 2024, at the Grant County Jail. Second, he is proceeding against Detective David
Meeks and Lieutenant Mark Persinger in their individual capacities for compensatory
and punitive damages for violating the Fourteenth Amendment by holding his head
while Detective Purdy used excessive force to take a DNA sample. Defendants moved
for summary judgment on October 31, 2025. [DE 40].1 Defendants argue they did not
use excessive force and that they are protected by qualified immunity. [DE 41 at 6–9].
After several extensions, Plaintiff filed an untimely response. [DE 51; see also DE 49].
Defendants filed a reply. [DE 52]. The summary judgment motion is now fully briefed
and ripe for ruling.

1 References to “DE” are to docket entries in this case, No. 1:24-CV-00435-SJF.
All parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 28
U.S.C. § 636(c); [DE 32]. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment.
I. Procedural Deficiencies
In their reply brief, Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to comply with Local
Rule 56-1(b). A party moving for summary judgment must separately file a supporting
brief and a “Statement of Material Facts.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a)(2)–(3). A party
opposing summary judgment must then file a response brief and a “Response to

Statement of Material Facts.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(1)–(2). This Response to Statement
of Material Facts must contain numbered responses to each paragraph in the Statement
of Material Facts and citations to the evidentiary record supporting each disputed fact.
See N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b)(2)–(3). If a party fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);

Turner v. Cox, 569 F. App’x 463, 467 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing a district court’s
discretion to enforce local rules against pro se litigants by adopting defendant-movants
Statement of Material Facts); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682–83 (7th Cir. 2003).
Despite Plaintiff filing a response brief as contemplated by Local Rule 56-1(b)(1),
Plaintiff failed to file a Response to Statement of Material Facts under Local Rule 56-

1(b)(2). Plaintiff’s response brief also failed to squarely address Defendants’ assertions
of fact. Indeed, Plaintiff’s only factual assertions pertain to the disputability of the video
recording and the appropriateness of taking the DNA sample, the latter of which is
beyond the scope of Plaintiff’s claims. [See DE 51; see also Court’s screening order at DE
9]. Thus, for any facts not pertaining to the video, the Court considers Defendants’
Statement of Material Facts, [DE 41], along with affidavits and depositions referenced

therein, as undisputed, as permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).2
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed, except as otherwise noted. Detective
Anthony Purdy is trained in the use of buccal swabs3 for DNA searches. [DE 41 at 3].
While Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Grant County Jail, Detective Purdy
obtained a search warrant to collect DNA from Plaintiff’s mouth using a buccal swab.

On August 2, 2024,4 Detective Purdy went to the Grant County Jail to collect Plaintiff’s
DNA. Plaintiff was then escorted from his cell to the jail’s processing desk, where
Detective Purdy informed Plaintiff he would take his DNA sample. [DE 41 at 3].
Plaintiff did not want to provide a DNA sample. He stated that he had the right to

2 The Court does not make this finding based on Plaintiff’s failure to draft numbered factual responses, as
Defendants argued. [DE 52 at 2]. Although a court is entitled “to insist on strict compliance with local
rules designed to promote the clarity of summary judgment,” Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886–87 (7th
Cir. 2011), when a pro se litigant opposes summary judgment, the court construes their factual
contentions liberally. Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 318 (7th Cir. 2023). Here, both parties failed to
comply with the formatting requirements for statements of material facts. Defendants failed to separately
file their Statement of Material Facts and instead included it in their brief. N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(a); [DE 41 at
2]. Thus, the Court will overlook Plaintiff’s failure to format his singular assertion as a numbered
response as required by Local Rules. But, as stated, the Court will not excuse Plaintiff’s total failure to
respond to Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts, and thus deems Defendants’ Statement of Material as
undisputed except for facts pertaining to the video.
3 A buccal swab is a thin, plastic or paper stick with a cotton tip. [DE 41 at 3].
4 There are several discrepancies between Defendants’ accounting of the relevant dates and the dates
reflected by the record. Defendants represent that the search warrant was issued on August 7, 2024. [DE
41 at 2]. The record reflects that the search warrant was issued on August 1, 2024. [DE 42-3]. Defendants
also represent in their brief that Detective Purdy searched Plaintiff on August 7, 2024 [DE 41 at 3], which
is contradicted by Defendants’ pleadings, [DE 19 at 2], and the record, [DE 42-4 Manual Filing], which
demonstrate that Detective Purdy performed the search on August 2, 2024. While these discrepancies are
puzzling, the exact dates are immaterial to the parties’ disputes and do not warrant denial of Defendants’
motion.
refuse, then indicated he did not consent, and proceeded to close his mouth with his
head down. [DE 41 at 3; DE 42-4 Manual Filing at 1:00–2:00]. Detective Purdy informed

Plaintiff that if he did not cooperate, the assisting officers—Lieutenant Persinger and
Sergeant Meeks—would hold Plaintiff down while Detective Purdy swabbed the inside
of his mouth. [DE 41 at 3; DE 42-4 Manual Filing at 1:35–1:45]. Plaintiff continued to
refuse cooperation. [DE 41 at 3]. Detective Purdy warned Plaintiff again and asked him
how he wanted to proceed. [DE 41 at 3].
Plaintiff refused to cooperate, so Lieutenant Persinger and Sergeant Meeks began

to hold Plaintiff by his head and neck and assisted with forcing Plaintiff’s mouth open.
[DE 41 at 4]. Plaintiff continued to resist the swab by trying to keep his mouth closed.
[DE 41 at 4]. Defendants were able to open Plaintiff’s mouth enough for Detective
Purdy to insert the buccal swab and collect DNA from Plaintiff’s cheek. [DE 41 at 4].
Plaintiff resisted during the entire swab by trying to close his mouth. [DE 41 at 4[.

The entire restraint and buccal swab lasted about twenty-seven seconds. [DE 42-5
Manual Filing at 1:30–1:57]. As Detective Purdy finished the swab, Plaintiff blew
forcefully from his mouth and his front right middle tooth came out, only half of which
remained after he had chipped it during a prior fight. [DE 38 at 18, 22]. The other front
middle tooth was already missing from the same fight. [DE 38 at 18].

Neither Detective Purdy nor the other assisting officers ever put their fingers or
hands inside Plaintiff’s mouth. [DE 41 at 4]. Detective Purdy used only a buccal swab to
obtain the DNA. [DE 41 at 3]. Detective Purdy contends that he did not feel any
resistance as he removed the swab from Plaintiff’s mouth. [DE 41 at 4]. Detective Purdy
never applied pressure to Plaintiff’s teeth with the buccal swab, nor did he use force
other than as needed to obtain the DNA amidst Plaintiff’s resistance. [DE 41 at 4].

Plaintiff contends “the video does not show the amount of pressure applied to
gain their desired results” and that “[t]he use of restraints and force was not needed to
achieve their goal.” [DE 51 at 3]. Plaintiff maintains that instead, his DNA could have
been obtained through records or a blood draw. [DE 51 at 3]. He believes Detective
Purdy used excessive force to insert the buccal swab and to pull the swab out.
Regarding Lieutenant Persinger and David Meeks, Plaintiff could not explain how the

force used was excessive, only stating that “the way [Lieutenant Persinger and David
Meeks were] just holding me it was just . . . it was unnecessary.” [DE 38 at 25–26]. When
pressed about how exactly Detective Purdy (using the buccal swab) knocked his tooth
out, Plaintiff responded “they [were] holding my face forcefully. I don’t know. There
was a lot going on right then.” [DE 38 at 34].

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A court may grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, . . . [and]
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the

evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (internal citations omitted).

Opponents to summary judgment must assert more than some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). They must present
sufficient evidence to show the existence of each element of their case on which they
will bear their burden at trial. Celotex¸ 477 U.S. at 322–23; Modrowksi v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d
1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013).
A party opposing summary judgment must support an assertion that a fact is

genuinely disputed by citing to particular materials in the records. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). “If the opposing party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails
to properly address another party’s assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . consider the
fact undisputed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
“[F]acts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only

if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. (56(c)). A court’s role is “not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and
inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is a material dispute that
requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994).

Relevant to this case, video evidence may unsubstantiate a purported genuine
issue of material fact only when “the video is so definitive that there could be no
reasonable disagreement about what the video depicts.” Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, 77
F.4th 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). This narrow and pragmatic
exception does not apply when a video is open to interpretation and when the same
video fails to “utterly discredit” a non-movant’s version of events. Id. Altogether, the

unique nature of video evidence still comports with the general rule that if a factual
record “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of these events, so his claims arise

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir.
2018) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)). “Pre-trial detainees cannot
enjoy the full range of freedoms of unincarcerated persons.” Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d
388, 390–91 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). However, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits “punishment” of pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). A

Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim is thus the “functional equivalent” of the
Fourth Amendment excessive force standard. Raddant v. Douglas Cnty., 170 F.4th 583,
590 (7th Cir. 2026) (explicitly looking to both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
precedent when examining objective reasonableness related to pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claim). The core question of this standard is whether an officer’s actions

are “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). Thus, to succeed here, Plaintiff must show that the force
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 592 (citing Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015)).

In assessing a plaintiff’s burden, the court should examine several relevant
factors, such as the nexus between the need for the use of force and the amount of force
used, the extent of the plaintiff’s injury, any effort made by the officer to limit the
amount of force, and whether the plaintiff was resisting. Kingsley¸ 576 U.S. at 397. These
factors are not exhaustive, however, id., and courts will also consider whether an officer
gave warnings before using force. Zorn v. Linton¸ 146 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026) (per curiam).

The reasonableness of a particular use of force is an objective legal determination
to be made by the court. Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 2018). Likewise,
when excessive force claims are intertwined with the defense of qualified immunity, the
court gives “enhanced deference to officers’ on-scene judgments about the level of
necessary force.” Id. (citing Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 2013))

(internal quotations omitted). As Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
intertwined with their affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the Court begins
there.
A. Qualified Immunity
A qualified immunity defense involves two related questions. The court may first

examine whether the official violated a federal right. Second, the court considers
whether “‘the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.’”
Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). If either question is answered negatively, the defendant is
immune. Id. A district court may grant a motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds by relying on either prong of the test. Id. at 1063 (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–37 (2009)).
Once a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, “it becomes the plaintiff's
burden to defeat it.” Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, 702 F.3d 388, 404 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, a
plaintiff bears the burden of proving both a violation of a federal right and that the
unlawfulness of the conduct was clearly established at the time the violation occurred.
Id. at 1062; Mabes v. Thompson, 136 F.4th 697, 705 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Critically, as to the second element, a plaintiff does
not meet this burden by citing generic legal principles. Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063
(citing City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021)). Instead, a plaintiff alleging
excessive force must either: (1) identify analogous precedent clearly establishing the law
and articulating the right at issue with analogous application, id. (further citations

omitted); or (2) “show ‘that the force was so plainly excessive that, as an objective
matter, the [] officers would have been on notice that they were violating [the
Constitution.]’” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015)). Although an analogous case
need not be identical, it must be clear enough that it places the constitutional question

beyond debate. Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063 (quoting Schimandle v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff’s
Off., 114 F.4th 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2024)). Even with the second route, there must be “some
settled authority” showing that “a general constitutional rule” applies “with obvious
clarity to the specific conduct in question.” Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 640 (citations omitted).
A district court’s assessment of qualified immunity must be structured
specifically to each defendant and to each claim brought against them. Mabes, 136 F.4th

at 706 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Est. of Williams v. Cline, 902 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2018)).
Accordingly, the Court addresses each Defendant in turn.
i. Detective Purdy
Plaintiff’s response brief does not respond to Defendants’ qualified immunity
arguments. Instead, Plaintiff’s response brief mentions only general legal principles,
without citation, and without application or discussion of how it relates to what he

experienced during the buccal swab. [See DE 51 at 2]. The Court’s own review failed to
unearth precedential authority even indicating a possibility the force used in this
context was clearly unlawful or plainly excessive. Officers may be permitted to use
significant force when a detainee is resisting, and that would still not amount to
objectively unreasonable excessive force under Kingsley and Graham. C.f. Turner v. City

of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff appears to concede this, stating
in response that “[f]orce may be used to restore or maintain order,” [DE 51 at 2]. Yet
Plaintiff fails to articulate why force was inappropriate after he resisted the search.
Plaintiff’s brief is devoid of any argument that the pressure Detective Purdy applied
was beyond what is permitted in like circumstances of resistance, and his brief is

likewise devoid of any analogous precedent supporting such an assertion.
Nor has Plaintiff offered a modicum of settled authority to signal that a general
rule applies with obvious clarity. Although Plaintiff disputes whether the video
recording shows the extent of force used by Detective Purdy, he fails to explain how the
extent of force was objectively unreasonable in this context. Thus, the Court cannot say
that Detective Purdy’s actions were “plainly excessive” either. Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 639.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to dispute Detective Purdy’s assertion that he used
no more force than necessary to collect the DNA effectively affirms Defendants’
position that Detective Purdy’s force was objectively reasonable. See Section II, supra at
4–5; Lamz, 321 F.3d at 683 (reasoning that failing the “obligation to respond with
particularity to the statement of material facts” “results in an admission”). Plaintiff’s
contention, that the video does not show the level of force used, may dispute the extent

of force in terms of a physical calculus, but it fails to dispute the objective
reasonableness of it. Whatever level of force Detective Purdy employed, Plaintiff has
failed to shoulder his burden of proving that it was clearly unlawful at the time, in the
context of multiple warnings and Plaintiff’s resistance. Thus, Detective Purdy is
immune.

ii. Lieutenant Persinger and Sergeant Meeks
Although Seventh Circuit precedent cautions against jumbling the factual
analysis of separate defendants, Plaintiff’s claim against Sergeant Meeks is identical to
that of Lieutenant Persinger. Plaintiff fails to distinguish Lieutenant Persinger’s force
and Sergeant Meek’s force used during restraint.

Lieutenant Persinger and Sergeant Meeks are protected by qualified immunity
because Plaintiff fails to establish the unlawfulness of their use of force.5 Even

5 Defendants’ argument as to Lieutenant Persinger and Sergeant Meeks is mostly devoted to a “failure-to-
protect” analysis. [DE 41 at 9]. The Court’s prior order, [DE 9], does not mention failure to protect and
instead suggests Plaintiff’s grievances are with how the two officers held his head. Still, Defendants
construing Plaintiff’s argument liberally, his sole assertions that could relate to
Lieutenant Persinger and Sergeant Meeks are that “the use of restraints and force was

not needed [sic]” and that the video does not show the pressure used. [DE 51 at 3]. As
with Detective Purdy, Plaintiff cites no authority establishing that restraints of the head
and neck are objectively unreasonable after a detainee resists compliance, despite
multiple warnings.
Nor does Plaintiff meet his burden by arguing that restraints were avoidable
through an alternative blood draw. The only issue before the Court is whether

Lieutenant Persinger used excessive force while restraining Plaintiff’s head. [See DE 9].
Detective Purdy obtained a facially valid warrant to collect DNA from Plaintiff’s mouth.
[See DE 42-3]. Even assuming Plaintiff would comply with a blood draw, Defendants
were not required to seek alternative means in the face of Plaintiff’s noncompliance.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the restraints and buccal swab being “unnecessary” is thus

misplaced and fails to meet his burden of establishing the unlawfulness of Lieutenant
Persinger’s conduct.
Plaintiff’s reliance on general legal principles falls short of placing the right
beyond debate or showing that force was plainly excessive. Thus, Lieutenant Persinger
and Sergeant Meeks are immune.

IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court

argued that the two assisting officers’ actions were reasonable, [DE 41 at 6], which is sufficient for a
motion for summary judgment.
(1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 40]; and
(2) DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against

Plaintiff Dustyn Bowlds and to close this case.
SO ORDERED this 3rd of September 2026.

s/Scott J. Frankel
Scott J. Frankel
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438595. Public record. Not legal advice.