# Riley

> District Court, W.D. Arkansas · August 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438493

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Edward Riley v. Special Agent John Jones; Investigator Jake Eudy; and Chief Deputy Joey Davis
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Arkansas
- **Decided:** August 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION

MICHAEL EDWARD RILEY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 4:24-cv-04130-JTS-SGS

SPECIAL AGENT JOHN JONES;
INVESTIGATOR JAKE EUDY; and
CHIEF DEPUTY JOEY DAVIS DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Micheal Edward Riley, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Currently before the Court are all Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting
documents. (ECF Nos. 58-60, 63-65). Plaintiff responded. (ECF Nos. 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79,
80). Defendants Davis and Eudy replied. (ECF No. 81). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and (3) (2011) the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, United States District Judge, referred
this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.1
The Court finds the matter ripe for consideration and RECOMMENDS both Defendant
Jones’s and Defendants Eudy and Davis’s Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 58, 63)
should be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Complaint should be DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1 Effective April 29, 2026, this matter has been reassigned to the Honorable John Thomas
Shepherd, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 20, 2024, pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1-2).2 In his Complaint, Plaintiff originally named twelve defendants and a alleged multitude
of claims. (ECF No. 1). The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, the United States Magistrate Judge
previously assigned to this case, issued a screening Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b) recommending dismissal of all defendants except Defendants: John Jones, Jake
Eudy, and Joey Davis. (ECF No. 8, p. 11). Judge Bryant also recommended Plaintiff’s First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims alleged against Defendants Jones, Eudy, and Davis as
the only claims to proceed. Id. The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, the District Judge assigned to
the case at the time, adopted Judge Bryant’s Recommendation in toto. (ECF No. 12).
Defendants Joey Davis and Jake Eudy (collectively hereafter “County Defendants”) filed
their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 22, 2026, along with a Brief in support and a
Statement of Undisputable Facts. (ECF Nos. 58-60). In their Motion and supporting documents,
County Defendants argue: (1) they are entitled to qualified immunity; (2) County Defendants did
not violate Plaintiff’s free speech rights, and even if they did, they did not violate clearly

established law as Plaintiff’s speech violated Arkansas statutes and should be considered “fighting

2 Plaintiff is not currently incarcerated, nor was he incarcerated on December 20, 2024. However,
in his Complaint, his original set of claims included conditions of confinement claims related to
his incarceration in the Howard County Detention Center. (ECF No. 1). Accordingly, this case
was classified as a prisoner civil rights matter upon filing. Plaintiff has contended with this
designation throughout the litigation. The Honorable Barry A. Bryant, the first United States
Magistrate Judge assigned to this case, addressed Plaintiff’s arguments on this issue by Order on
May 14, 2025, stating: “This case is appropriately designated as Plaintiff brings claims regarding
his arrest and incarceration. He need not have been incarcerated at the time of filing his Complaint
to warrant that designation. Furthermore, the Court does, by this Order, correct any reference to
Plaintiff as a current prisoner in any of its previous docket entries and recognize[s] Plaintiff is a
former prisoner instead. However, the screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint was appropriately done
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1915(e) which applies the same standard as 28 U.S.C. section
1915A(b) in requiring claims that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from relief to be
dismissed by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B).” (ECF No. 26)
words;” (3) County Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights because they arrested
him, searched his property, and seized his property in a reasonable manner pursuant to valid
warrants supported by probable cause; and (4) Plaintiff failed to state any Howard County policy
or custom that caused his alleged constitutional violations. (ECF No. 59).

Plaintiff filed his Response and supporting documents to the County Defendants’ Motion
on March 2, 2026. (ECF Nos. 71, 75, 76, 79). In his Response Briefs, Plaintiff argues: (1)
summary judgment must be denied because genuine disputes of material fact remain because he
did not commit the crime he was accused of committing thus there was no reason to arrest Plaintiff
or search his camper; (2) both the arrest and search warrant did not exist at the time they were
purportedly executed, or alternatively; (3) Defendant Jones committed a “Franks violation” by
lying to the judge to obtain the warrant; and (4) Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights. (ECF No. 73, 79).
County Defendants replied arguing: (1) Plaintiff’s did not dispute the existence of a valid
warrant and its production on this record other than an accusation that Defendants are “lying;” (2)

Plaintiff’s accusations that Defendant Jones lied in the supporting documents for both warrants
has no bearing on his claims against County Defendants; and (3) while Plaintiff alleges Defendants
ransacked his home, in his deposition he admitted the only thing damaged at his camper was the
padlock on the door. (ECF No. 81).
Defendant Jones filed his Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents (ECF
Nos. 63-65). In his Brief, Defendant Jones argues: (1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against
him are barred by sovereign immunity; (2) Defendant Jones is entitled to qualified immunity in
his individual capacity on all other claims; (3) Plaintiff’s Facebook messages are not protected
speech under the First Amendment; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any due process
violations regarding his arrest or the search of his home. (ECF No. 64).
In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment he argues
genuine issues of material fact remain because (1) there was no reason to arrest or search his

camper; (2) both his arrest and the search of his camper were done without warrants and were
unreasonable, or alternatively the search was unreasonable because it went beyond the scope of
the warrant and was destructive; and (3) Defendant Jones committed a Franks violation by
submitting false information in the applications and affidavits for his arrest and search warrant.
(ECF No. 73).
II. FACTUAL BACKROUND
The Court notes Plaintiff’s presentation of his claims in his Complaint is somewhat
convoluted. However, Judge Bryant previously compiled a summation of Plaintiff’s factual
allegations from his Complaint in the screening Report and Recommendation, and the Court finds
it efficient to incorporate Judge Bryant’s summation, in pertinent part, here for purposes of the

instant Motions for Summary Judgment:
Plaintiff asserts his claims under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 1, p. 4).
When prompted by the complaint form to indicate how each Defendant acted under
color of law as is required by Section 1983, Plaintiff responded:
“All individuals I have named were on duty working as law enforcement officers
or as court authorities at the time of the violations of my rights. Jones asked for
arrest warrant and Cooper signed one for him, and I went to jail for same warrant.
Arrested by Joey Davis on Warrant.”
(quoting Plaintiff’s Complaint at ECF No. 1, p. 4 (errors in original)).
When prompted by the complaint form to enumerate the facts that gave rise to his
claims, Plaintiff provided four pages of factual allegations and claims. The Court
will summarize Plaintiff’s claims including the relevant facts.
In June 2024, Plaintiff became aware a female acquaintance of his was a
confidential informant for “DTF.” The female acquaintance “set up” another
elderly acquaintance of Plaintiff’s as a drug dealer. This agitated Plaintiff as he
thought it was unfair to the elderly acquaintance. Plaintiff then sent the informant
a “message” expressing his opinion of her and the police involved in the criminal
case with the elderly acquaintance. According to Plaintiff, he did not threaten
anyone in his message, but he did give his opinion about the moral character of the
officers involved. (ECF No. 1, p. 10). It was this message that brought about the
search of Plaintiff’s home and Plaintiff’s arrest. The search and Plaintiff’s arrest
are the crux of his Complaint. (ECF No. 1, p. 11).
Plaintiff asserts Defendant Jones and Eudy broke into his home and stole his phone
and computer. He also claims Judge Cooper shouldn’t have destroyed his life by
signing his arrest warrant without any formal charges or affidavit filed.
Additionally, Judge Chesshir should not have signed the search warrant without a
supporting affidavit. (ECF No. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff then claims legal procedures
were not followed regarding the search warrant executed on his home. Specifically,
Plaintiff states the warrant was not returned after execution with an inventory of
items seized. Id. As a result of this arrest and search warrant Plaintiff was
“kidnapped” and illegally held for thirty-five days sleeping on a concrete floor with
sewage. Id. Plaintiff then lists his claims based on the above facts as: “Bogus
charge. False arrest. Malicious prosecution. Violated my right to be free from
illegal search and seizure. And violated my right to free speech. And abuse of
power on their part.” Id.
(ECF No. 8).3
The Court, like Judge Bryant, construes Plaintiff’s remaining claims to be: (1) illegal search
of his camper and illegal seizure of his cell phones and computer; (2) improper arrest without a
warrant or probable cause; and (3) violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech through
retaliatory arrest or improper inducement to prosecute.
On this summary judgment record the parties have submitted multiple affidavits and
declarations from the parties involved: (1) Defendant John Jones, Special Agent with the Ninth-
West Judicial District Drug Task Force Team (hereinafter “Task Force”); (2) Heather Tweddle,
informant and witness for the Task Force in a criminal matter against nonparty Charles Pound; (3)
Defendant Joey Davis, Chief Deputy Howard County Sheriff’s Office (hereinafter “HCSO”); (4)

3 The Court has omitted the portions of Judge Bryant’s recommendations related to claims and
Defendants that were dismissed by the Screening Order on March 5, 2025. (ECF No. 12).
Defendant Jake Eudy, Investigator at HCSO; and (5) Plaintiff. The Court will enumerate the
pertinent testimony from each below along with complete images of the applicable warrants and
supporting documents as well as the Facebook messages at issue.
Heather Tweedle’s Declaration

Heather Tweedle stated in her Declaration, under penalty of perjury, that she was a witness
for the State of Arkansas in a criminal matter against Charles Pounds. (63-1, p. 1). On August 10,
2024, she contacted nonparty Agent Garner from the Task Force about threatening messages she
received from Plaintiff on Facebook. She also sent Agent Garner a copy of the messages. Id.
Prior to sending the messages, Plaintiff came to Ms. Tweedle’s house accusing her of working
with Agent Garner and Defendant Jones. Id. at 2. Ms. Tweedle stated in her Declaration that she
refused to open the door for Plaintiff. Id. Finally, Ms. Tweedle stated she reached out to Agent
Garner because Plaintiff was being aggressive and the messages she received from him on
Facebook scared her. Id. Ms. Tweedle “left town” shortly after receiving the messages from
Plaintiff. Id.

Defendant Jones’s Declaration
Defendant Jones stated in his Declaration that he was employed with the Task Force from
December 2021 through February 2025. (ECF No. 63-2, p. 1). The Task Force operates under the
authority of the Ninth-West Judicial District of Arkansas Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. Id. On
August 10, 2024, Defendant Jones’s partner, Special Agent Justin Garner, was contacted by
Heather Tweedle, an informant and key witness for the Task Force in a criminal matter against
nonparty Charles Pounds. Id. Ms. Tweedle informed Agent Garner that she received threatening
messages from Plaintiff on Facebook. Ms. Tweedle also provided copies of the threatening
messages to Defendant Jones and Agent Garner. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s messages to Ms. Tweedle are
attached to Defendant Jones’s Declaration and read:
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(ECF No. 63-6) (hereinafter “Application for Search Warrant”). Further, the executed Search
Warrants reads in total:

20

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HOWARD COUNTY
STATE OF ARKANSAS
STATE OF ARKANSAS
-vs- ) wo INLD
)
Michael Edward Riley )
DOB: /1969 ) > ; oN
1292 Bluff Springs Ru. ) 7 A oN
Mineral Springs, Arkansas ) FILED c
DEFENDANT(s) =} | wR 3 i A
Cireult a) □□ □
en Sr Say □
SEARCH WARRANT as
SEARCH AWABBANT UrFETY
IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY IN AND FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS
TO; Any Shenff, Constable, or Policeman in the State of Arkansas:
UPON application supported by swom affidavit having been filed before the Court, it is hereby
found that the premises and all grounds, structures, outbuildings, vehicles, and all persons located at the
described premises as follows shall be searched, to wit;

The camper of Michael Riley at 1292 Bluff Springs Rd, Mineral Springs, Howard County, Arkansas,

The above-described property/residence is located within the jurisdictional boundaries of Howard County.
It is reached by travelling west from the Mineral Springs United Post Office which is located at 501 E
Runnels St in Mineral Springs for about 0.7 miles to Bluff Springs Rd. Continue west onto Bluff Springs
Rd. and travel about 2.0 miles to 1292 Bluff Springs Rd.
The property to be searched is a camper sitting to the northeast of the main residence, The camper sits
sitting cast and west with the front door facing south.
Law Enforcement is currently sitting on the camper which will eliminate the possibility of serving the
warrant on the wrong location.
The above-described property/residence is currently located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the
County of Howard, State of Arkansas, and said property/residence is subject to search and seizure upon
ene or more grounds as it contains evidence relating to a violation of Sections § 5.64404, Unlawful Lise
of Communication Device and $-53-109 Intimidating a Witness, of Arkansas State Statute.

21

Property to be Seized from the Property to be Searched
Having determined that probable cause does exist and to believe that the Controlled Substance
Marijuana, a Schedule 1V Controlled Drug is being concealed in the above-described property in
violation of Arkansas State Statute particularly § 5-64, the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. The
Court now orders that the following items to be searched for and seized if found.

a. Phone or other electronic device capable of sending and recenving electronic messages or
calls.

Ilis hereby foul that poubable cause caists tu believe Ghat such pooper conceals aud/us
contains such property and/or contraband.

THEREFORE, YOUARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO:

1. Search the above-described premises within a reasonable time not to exceed sixty (60) days.
2. The premises as herein, described as the residence of Michael Riley 1292 Blull Springs Ra,
Mineral Spnigs, Howard Louily, Arkansas.
3. And if any such items of property and/or contraband or Michael Riley herein described, be found,
tumedield aulfun wuuitained Uirerein, seiecd any such poupenty aulfon peas anulon Guile abe
and maintain it according to law.
4, Leave a true and correct copy of this warrant with the occupant or a person who is apparently
responsible control of such premises. And, if the occupant or no one else in apparent and
responsible control is not present therein, leave a copy of this warrant suitably affixed thereto,
§. Upon completion ofthe search, make and deliver a receipt, fairly describing the things seized
with the occupant or person in apparent responsible control of such premises.
6, Also, acopy of such things and property seized will be made and returned to the issuing Judicial
Officer,

22

7. Within a reasonable time, return this warrant to the issuing Judicial Officer along with a verified
report of the execution thereof,
§. During execution of this Search and Seizure Warrant upon discovery of the person(s) or thing{s)
so specified, this affiant or a person of responsibility shall take possession or custody of them
under authority of this warrant.

IT 15 50 ORDERED
7 =
Dated this aE of SL Dos,

jf UG LE
Time , a YZ
a. — 2? ee

TIRCULEIUDGE
Se
ya, SX
FueD.-
Sarg Go

(ECF No. 63-7) (“Search Warrant”).
Defendant Jones points out in his Declaration that both the Application for Search Warrant
and the executed Search Warrant specifically describe the property to be seized as: “phone or other
electronic device capable of sending and receiving electronic messages or calls.” (ECF No. 63-2,
p. 4).
While Defendant Jones was not present for Plaintiff’s arrest, he did arrive afterward and
complete the search of Plaintiff's camper with the help of Defendant Eudy. (ECF No. 63-2, p. 4).

23

Defendant Eudy first used a tool to cut the padlock off the camper door and then Defendants Jones
and Eudy looked under furniture, inside cabinets and drawers, and in areas that could conceal small
objects like a cellular phone. Id. Defendant Jones stated in his Declaration that nothing in the
camper was disturbed outside of the necessary course of moving items aside and no property was

damaged during the search. Id. Defendant Jones took Plaintiff’s personal computer and two cell
phones, but no other property was removed from the camper. Id. After concluding the search,
Defendant Jones left a copy of the warrant at the camper, the camper was secured, and Defendant
Jones and the other officers left the property. Id.
Finally, Defendant Jones stated in his Declaration that he spoke with Plaintiff at the
Howard County Detention Center (“HCDC”) after the search. He informed Plaintiff his camper
was searched and that he would receive a copy of the warrant. Additionally, Defendant Jones
questioned Plaintiff at that time. Id.
Defendant Davis’s Affidavit
Defendant Davis testified in his Affidavit that he is a Chief Deputy with HCSO. (ECF No.

58-2). On September 26, 2024, Defendant Davis was notified that Plaintiff threatened a
prosecution informant. Defendant Davis knew Plaintiff already had an active arrest warrant
stemming from a June 6, 2024 charge of failure to appear. Accordingly, Defendant Davis and two
other officers, Todd Tallant and Defendant Eudy, went to Plaintiff’s camper to execute the Failure
To Appear Warrant of Arrest on him. (ECF No. 58-2, p. 1). This warrant for arrest is attached to
Defendant Davis’s Affidavit. It was issued on June 6, 2024 by nonparty, Cynthia Grady, and
executed by Defendant Davis on September 26, 2024. (ECF No. 58-2, p. 6). The executed FTA
Arrest Warrant reads in its entirety:
suseee27 Case 4:24-cv-04130\ SSRN Dog STFiled,0U/22/26 Page GksPyL@ucnac &
4-00-53 pm POR ARE >) Page 1 of | J
WARRANT #: WR-24-514 &
STATE OF “ARELANSAS District Court Of Howard County
COUNTY OF HOWARD COUNTY 5 426 Main Street
CITY OF NASHVILLE ORDER Suite 7
Nashville, Arkansas T1852
(870)845.7522
Gash Bond Only
Name: Riley, Michael E Home; — (000)000-0000
Address: 131 Woodland Drive Works:
Mashville, Arkansas 71852 Party 9427
Race: White Hair Height 0.00 DOB; SSN;
Sex: Male Eve: Weight: DL:
The State of Arkansas To Any Sheriff, Policeman, Constable, Coroner, Jailer, Or Marshal In The State Of Arkansas, Greeting, It
Appearing That There Are Reasonable Grounds For Believing That The Above-Named Parson Has Commitied The Offeyse int,
Below. You Are ‘Iherefore Commanded To Arrest And Bring The Above-Named Person Before Jessica § Gunter Iudgé ohth Fitrict “is,
Court Of Howerd County To Be Dealt With According To Law. Zi Sent Aa 4 , ly
Given Under My Hand And Seal Of Said Coun This_G™ bay or_(\umo 202d fk 5A gee y
Judge / Clerk of the Court EIS in sae
anny pe
Lisue_Case Charge Dos □□ Cash = Bond §=Wanant
Date Number Bumuber Description Only Acnit Fee Tots}
Failure To Appear
Oaea4 CR24-796 Wh-ld-514 Failure To Ag-ear-Class Bind - TRIAL ATE No S195.00 uN He.
CR-LD-PSS WR-IO-415 Now Payment Of Fines No dem «= 0.00 □ as.00
HOWARD COUNTY TOTALS, $23.0 $50.00 S2580.00

TOTAL TO COLLECT: S22h eo 550.00 FAVAh.eo
1 Certify That I Served This Warrant Of Arrest By Jee And Thar Taking Into My Conmiy Te Above-Named Person BY
On The of
eee ee Chit Dads Joey Daves
Officer of Service
Service Fees $0 City Court Date: ce
MileageFee: $0 City Comt Time:
Total Fees: $0 County Court Date:
County Court Time:
ERP HES SEF OSES ELE TEES PEPE SESS EAE HEPES EE LESS EE TEE HH HLEPHER EEE PS EEE RE SA SHAR RASS PS ep SESE See Pets eee ES ES EET
Filed This Day Of 20
Clerk of the Court

(ECF No. 58-3, p. 6) (hereinafter FTA Warrant’).
In the HCSO Incident Report completed by Defendant Davis on September 26, 2024, and
also attached to his Affidavit on this record, he stated the offense for arrest as Failure to Appear
and listed the code section as 5-54-120. Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-54-120 is the code section
detailing the charge of Failure to Appear. Also, in his Arrest Notes on this same Incident Report,
25

Defendant Davis notes: “On the above date, Deputy Todd Tallant, Deputy Jake Eudy, and myself
arrested Michael Riley at a camper at 1292 Bluff Springs Road. We knocked on the door and
Michael Riley came out and was arrested and transported to the Howard County Detention
Facility.” (ECF No. 58-3, pp. 4-5).

Defendant Davis goes on to state that Plaintiff initially refused to come out of his camper,
and the officers spoke with Plaintiff through the window of the camper for several minutes. (ECF
No. 58-2, p. 1). However, Plaintiff eventually came outside and immediately locked the camper
with a padlock. He was then arrested and taken into custody without incident. Id. Defendant
Davis then transported Plaintiff to the HCDC. Id. While booking Plaintiff into HCDC, Defendant
Davis received a call from Defendant Jones advising him the Search Warrant was issued for
Plaintiff’s camper along with the Felony Arrest Warrant for the charge of intimidating a witness.
Defendant Davis then returned to Plaintiff’s camper to assist with the search. However, upon
arrival at the camper, Defendants Jones and Eudy were already inside the camper executing the
Search Warrant, so Defendant Davis remained outside the camper and did not assist in the search.

Once the search was complete and the camper closed up, the three Defendants left the property.
(ECF No. 58-2, p. 2).
Defendant Eudy’s Affidavit
Defendant Eudy averred in his Affidavit that he is an investigator and former Deputy of
HCSO. (ECF No. 58-3). Like Defendant Davis, Defendant Eudy was notified, on September 26,
2024, that Plaintiff threatened a prosecution informant. (ECF No. 58-3, p. 1). Defendant Eudy
also knew Plaintiff had an outstanding FTA Arrest Warrant from June 6, 2024. Id. Accordingly,
Defendant Eudy along with nonparty Officer Tallant and Defendant Davis went to Plaintiff’s
camper to execute the FTA Arrest Warrant on September 26, 2024. Id.
Upon arrival at the camper, the officers knocked on the camper door, but Plaintiff refused
to open it. Defendant Eudy and the other officers spoke with Plaintiff through the door for several
minutes. Id. Plaintiff ultimately opened the door, stepped outside, and immediately locked the
camper door with a padlock. The officers then arrested Plaintiff without incident. Id. Defendant

Davis then transported Plaintiff to the HCDC. Id.
Before leaving Plaintiff’s camper site, Defendant Eudy received a call from the 9th West
Drug Task Force advising the Search Warrant was issued for Plaintiff’s camper along with the
Felony Arrest Warrant for Plaintiff on the charge of intimidating a witness. Id. at 2. Defendant
Eudy remained at the camper. When Defendant Jones arrived, he provided Defendant Eudy with
a copy of the Search Warrant and Felony Arrest Warrant. Id. Defendant Eudy then used a tool to
cut the padlock off Plaintiff’s camper door, and he and Defendant Jones searched the inside of
Plaintiff’s camper. Id. Regarding the scope of the search, Defendant Eudy specifically stated:
The search consisted of looking under furniture, inside cabinets and drawers and
areas that could conceal a small object like a cellular phone.

Nothing was disturbed in the camper outside the necessary course of moving items
aside. [Plaintiff’s] property was not damaged in the course of the search.

A personal computer and cell phone were located in the search. No other property
was removed from [Plaintiff’s] residence.

At the conclusion of the search, [Plaintiff’s] camper was secured, and all law
enforcement officers vacated the property.

Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s Declarations4
Plaintiff states in his Declaration, under penalty of perjury, that all three Defendants are
“liars.” (ECF No. 76, p. 1). Specifically, he states they lied in their testimony when they stated
they had a search warrant for his camper and that they left a copy of that warrant at his camper

after the search. He also states they lied when they swore they secured his camper before they left.
Id.
Plaintiff further states in his Declaration that he never threatened Ms. Tweedle by message
or in person. Plaintiff contends that nothing said in his Facebook message was intended to prevent
her from testifying as a witness in any criminal matter. Therefore, he never violated A.C.A. § 5-
53-109. Id. The “DA” agreed and told Defendants to release Plaintiff from jail. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff also states in his Declaration that his phone and computer were in plain sight on
the countertop in his camper. Therefore, there was no reason to look anywhere else in his camper
for these items. Additionally, “they” left the camper “looking like a bomb had hit it.” Id.
Moreover, Plaintiff states there was no reason to conduct a search for either of these devices as he

freely admitted to writing the Facebook messages and those messages were available on Facebook
for review. Id.
Next, Plaintiff states Defendant Jones perjured himself on both the Felony Arrest Warrant
Affidavit and Application for Search Warrant. Id. Plaintiff states, Defendant Jones “predated”
these documents to “get out of this lawsuit” by stating Plaintiff had threatened someone. Further,

4 Plaintiff filed two Declarations, (ECF No. 72, pp. 2-4; ECF No. 76, pp. 1-3), but the Court is
unable to determine which is in response to Defendant Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
which is in response to County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. However, both
Declarations contain the same information and statements from Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court
finds them interchangeable and supporting of both of his Responses.
Plaintiff states Defendant Jones has filed falsified exhibits in this matter with the help of his
attorney Zaisha Heardmon. Id.
Plaintiff also states he has repeatedly requested discovery in this matter that has been
ignored. Plaintiff states he requested in writing through the mail and at his deposition for the “meta

data of the emails that both the [Felony Arrest Warrant] and [Search Warrant Affidavits] state that
they were applied for by,” but Defendants have never produced. Plaintiff states this discovery was
not produced because it did not exist. Id. Which, according to Plaintiff, proves that the search and
arrest warrant did not exist until Defendants Davis and Eudy were served with the summons for
this lawsuit. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff states another falsehood in Defendants’ declarations is their interactions
with Plaintiff at his camper before his arrest. Plaintiff maintains he immediately opened the
window to his camper when Defendants Davis and Eudy, and Officer Tallant arrived to arrest him.
Plaintiff was within the officer’s sight the entire time talking on the phone. The only “rustling”
was Plaintiff putting on his shirt while in plain view of the officers. Id.

Additional Facebook Messages
Plaintiff produced additional Facebook messages showing Ms. Tweedle’s response to the
subject messages and a set of messages between himself and non-party Lester Pennington. (ECF
No. 80). Plaintiff claims the messages between Plaintiff and Pennington show Plaintiff was
“hundreds of miles away in another state” when he found out about Ms. Tweedle involvement in
the arrest of Charles Pounds. Plaintiff contends this proves he could not have gone to her house
to threaten her. Id. The messages between Plaintiff and Pennington produced by Plaintiff read in
total:
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(ECF No. 79, pp. 11-19).
Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did send the Facebook messages submitted on
this record to Ms. Tweedle. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 31). Plaintiff also admits he can see now in

hindsight where the messages “could be intimidating.” Id. However, he maintains that he did not
mean for them to intimidate her at the time. Id. He insists he had no intent to intimidate Ms.
Tweedle at the time he sent the Facebook messages. Id. at 34.
Plaintiff also testified in his deposition that Defendants Davis and Eudy along with
nonparty Officer Tallant came to arrest him on September 26, 2024. Defendant Jones was not
present at his arrest. Plaintiff was informed at his arrest when he got into the police vehicle that
he was being arrested for “misdemeanor fines, misdemeanor warrant on unpaid fines.” (ECF No.
58-1, pp. 43-4). Plaintiff goes on to testify that even though that is what he was told at the time of
arrest, he does not believe he was arrested on the FTA Warrant. Id. at 44. Plaintiff did not receive
the FTA Warrant until 6:00 p.m. that evening, but he was immediately served with the Felony

Warrant for intimidating a witness upon arriving at the jail. Id. Plaintiff admits he was aware of
both the FTA Warrant for arrest and the Felony Warrant for arrest for intimidating a witness on
September 26, 2024. Id.
In response to questions regarding how Defendant Jones violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights regarding his arrest Plaintiff testified:
Yes, because his name’s on the thing going to Tom Cooper for an arrest warrant
that violated my constitutional right. Actually, I can tell you saying my name,
saying whatever he said to get the warrant, you know, I didn’t intimidate no witness.
He violated my rights by telling Cooper that I had, by going to Cooper at all. He
was violating my rights for freedom of speech. I should be able to say anything I
want about those crooked son of bitches.

(ECF No. 58-1, p. 70).
When Plaintiff was given a copy of the Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit in his deposition,
he testified he had never seen it before and stated: “I can assure you that this was made after that
day.” (ECF No. 58-1, pp. 48-9). Plaintiff admits he was served with the Felony Arrest Warrant
but testifies he never got the Affidavit supporting the Felony Arrest Warrant for intimidating a

witness. Id. When asked what evidence he had to prove the Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit did
not exist on September 26, 2024, Plaintiff testified he would call the “Court clerk” to testify no
Affidavit was ever filed in his criminal case. Id. at 50. Plaintiff alleges in his Deposition that the
Affidavit for his Felony Arrest Warrant for intimidating a witness is a “forged” document. (ECF
No. 58-1, p. 51). Also, Plaintiff does not disagree that Judge Cooper signed the Felony Arrest
Warrant. He just disagrees with Judge Cooper’s finding of probable cause to support the Felony
Arrest Warrant. Id. at 52-3.
Regarding the Search Warrant for his camper, Plaintiff testified Defendant Jones told
Plaintiff at the HCDC, the day of his arrest, that he got a Search Warrant for his camper and got
his phone and computer. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 55). However, Plaintiff never saw the Search Warrant.

Id. at 56. Further, he testified “protocol” was not followed because the Search Warrant was not
left at his camper, they did not file the Search Warrant with the Court Clerk within five days, and
they failed to secure his camper back after the search. Id. at 57. Instead, according to Plaintiff,
the Search Warrant was filed the day Defendants Eudy and Davis were served with the instant
lawsuit. Id. When Plaintiff was asked what evidence he had to prove the Search Warrant did not
exist on September 26, 2024, he testified: “I don’t even know yet.” Id. at 58.
Plaintiff further testified, regarding the Search Warrant, that he sees Judge Chesshir’s
signature on the Warrant, but he does not “believe that.” (ECF No. 58-1, p. 66). Plaintiff believes
it was sent by email to Judge Chesshir because it says on the Warrant it was sent by email. Id.
Plaintiff wants to see the email accounts of Judge Chesshir and Defendant Jones to prove it was
sent. Id. Plaintiff testified that if there are no emails between Defendant Jones and Judge Chesshir
on September 26, 2024, it will prove the Search Warrant did not exist on the day of the search. Id.
at 71.

Additionally, even if Judge Chesshir actually signed the Search Warrant, Plaintiff disputes
his finding of probable cause. Id. at 67. Plaintiff believes there was no reason to conduct a search
of his camper because he told Ms. Tweedle to show the messages to her cop friends, and any
mention of marijuana is completely unsupported by corroborating evidence. Id.at 67-69.
Regarding Defendants Davis and Eudy, Plaintiff agrees that neither played any role in
submitting affidavits for the Search Warrant. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 76). When specifically asked
how they played a role in the Search Warrant, Plaintiff responded: “Your client was only involved
in it by being there when he searched it.” Id. Plaintiff also testified he took no issue with the
manner in which Defendant Davis arrested him on September 26, 2024. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 78).
Plaintiff testified he has no physical injuries from any of his claims herein. (ECF No. 58-

1, p. 73). Lastly, the only broken item at his camper during the search was the padlock on the front
door. Id. at 79.
Finally, Plaintiff testified he was in custody at the HCDC for 35 days—22 of those days
were for the outstanding fines he was picked up on for FTA. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 63-65, 92).
Plaintiff states the other 14 days were for the illegal arrest of intimidating a witness. Id.
Plaintiff’s Criminal Docket
The Court attempted to review Plaintiff’s criminal docket for the instant charge of
intimidating a witness as such docket would likely contain material information related to
Plaintiff’s claims herein. Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n. 2 (8th Cir. 2005) (court may
take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records). However, the only document filed
was the Search Warrant and Affidavit in support of Search Warrant. State v. Michael Edward
Riley, 31SW-25-5, https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/31SW-25-5 (last visited July 27, 2026).
Further, as alleged by Plaintiff, these documents were filed on March 3, 2025, after Plaintiff filed

this lawsuit in December 2024 and Defendants Davis and Eudy were served on March 3, 2025.
(ECF No. 16). There is no indication on the publicly available Arkansas Court Connect records
that Plaintiff was charged with intimidating a witness, or that any prosecution ensued.
Furthermore, the summary judgment record is devoid of any booking information for Plaintiff
from the HCDC on September 26, 2024.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was never charged with intimidating a witness
and that he has now received his seized property back. Id.; (ECF No. 58-1, p. 65).5

III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record “shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Once
a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine

5 Plaintiff also filed Statements of Disputed Facts. (ECF Nos. 74-75). These disputed facts are
numbered and comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has thoroughly
reviewed such disputes and determined all such disputes have been enumerated herein through the
rendition of Plaintiff’s sworn testimony in his Declaration and Deposition.
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).

The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. “A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).

IV. DISCUSSION
As previously stated, the Court construes Plaintiff’s remaining claims to be: (1) illegal
search of his camper and illegal seizure of his cell phones and computer; (2) improper arrest
without a warrant or probable cause; and (3) violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech
through retaliatory arrest or inducement to prosecute. Plaintiff has alleged these claims in both
individual and official capacities meaning he also alleges these claims against Howard County and
the State of Arkansas. (ECF Nos. 1, pp.8-9). Defendants have both asserted qualified immunity,

and Defendant Jones has assert sovereign immunity against his official capacity claim. (ECF Nos.
59, 64). After a thorough review of the summary judgment evidence and the parties arguments
the Court has determined that Plaintiff disputes: (1) that either warrant (search or arrest) existed
on September 26, 2024; and alternatively (2) that Defendant Jones was truthful in his affidavits for
application of both warrants; and finally, (3) that his arrest regarding the messages to Ms. Tweedle
violated his rights to free speech through retaliatory arrest or inducement to prosecute. The Court
will first address Defendant Jones’s claim of sovereign immunity against Plaintiff’s official
capacity claim as he was an employee of the State of Arkansas during the time at issue. Next the
Court will address Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against County Defendants. Then, the Court
will address each of Plaintiff’s three remaining claims in turn as they relate to each specific

Defendant.
Sovereign Immunity—Jones
Defendant Jones was employed with the Task Force at the time in issue. The Task Force
operates under the authority of the Ninth-West Judicial District Prosecuting Attorney’s Office,

making Defendant Jones an agent of the Prosecutor. (ECF No. 63-2, p. 1). In Arkansas,
prosecuting attorneys are officers of the state. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 20. Accordingly, any
official capacity claim asserted against Defendant Jones is essentially a claim against the State of
Arkansas.
States and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under section 1983. Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); McLean v.

Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). “This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or
equitable.” Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986)). “Congress did not abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity when
enacting the law that was to become section 1983.” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir.
1991) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)), overruled on other grounds by Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). “A suit against state employees in their official capacities is the
functional equivalent of a suit against the State.” Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir.
2013). Accordingly, any legal or equitable relief sought against Defendant Jones in his official
capacity is barred and such claims should be dismissed.
Official Capacity—County Defendants

Official capacity claims are “functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). In
this case, Plaintiff's official capacity claim against County Defendants is treated as a claim against
Howard County, Arkansas. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2010).
“[I]t is well established that a municipality [or county] cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory, that is, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Atkinson v. City of
Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1214 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish Howard County’s liability
under Section 1983, “plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant
to an official custom, policy, or practice of the governmental entity.” Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d
814, 817 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against County

Defendants is “functionally equivalent” to alleging their employer, Howard County, had a policy,
custom, or took an official action that deprived him of his constitutional rights. Veatch, 627 F.3d
at 1257; Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006).
To establish a claim for “custom” liability, Plaintiff must demonstrate:

1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees;
2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental
entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the official of that misconduct; and

3) That Plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the government entity’s custom, i.e., that
the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.
Johnson v. Douglas County Medical Dept., 725 F.3d 825, p. 828 (8th Cir. 2013). “A single
deviation from a written, official policy does not prove a conflicting custom.” Id. at 828 (internal
citation omitted).

While Plaintiff makes vague and conclusory statements regarding corrupt behavior of
Howard County law enforcement officials in general, Plaintiff wholly failed to allege any facts or
assertions that County Defendants’ alleged actions were committed pursuant to a policy or practice
of the governmental entity. Furthermore, he has not argued County Defendants’ alleged actions
were pursuant to a custom or policy of Howard County. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s official
capacity claims against County Defendants fail as a matter of law.
Qualified Immunity

Next, all Defendants have asserted qualified immunity against all of Plaintiff’s claims in
their individual capacities. Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official[] from liability in
a § 1983 action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or
statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley,
574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “At
summary judgment, qualified immunity shields a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983
action unless: (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the

deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly established at the
time of the deprivation.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and
quotations omitted).
The Court may use its discretion in determining which of these two prongs to address first.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a constitutional right was not clearly established
at the time of deprivation, then the Court need not determine whether the particular plaintiff’s
constitutional rights were violated based on the facts before it because the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity regardless. See Dimock, v. City of Brooklyn, 124 F.4th 544, 550 (8th Cir.
2024).

For this analysis, the Court looks to the law at the time of the incident on September 26,
2024. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “clearly established law should not be defined at a
high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). A right is clearly established if it is sufficiently clear for every reasonable official to
understand the actions would violate a constitutional right. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)
(per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). The case precedent need not be directly on point, but
it must place the constitutional question beyond debate. White, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal citation

and quotation omitted). The Eighth Circuit recently expounded on this standard by explaining “[a]
clearly established right is dictated either by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority.” Dimock, 124 F.4th at 550 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Dimcok Court went on to explain the legal principle must “clearly prohibit the officer’s
conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id.
The Court will analyze all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims through the lens of Defendants’
qualified immunity assertions.
Illegal Arrest Claims

Plaintiff claims he was arrested illegally, on September 26, 2024, because the Felony Arrest
Warrant for intimidating a witness—Ms. Tweedle—was improperly obtained by Defendant Jones
or alternatively did not exist at all at the time of his arrest. (ECF No. 1).
First, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claim that the Felony Arrest Warrant did not exist on
September 26, 2024. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he received a copy of the Felony
Arrest Warrant after arriving at the HCDC on September 26, 2024. (ECF No. 58-1, pp. 43-46).
Accordingly, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s claim the warrant did not exist as it is clearly

undisputed that the Felony Arrest Warrant existed when Plaintiff received a copy of it on
September 26, 2024, immediately following his arrest.
Next, the Court will address Plaintiff’s claim he was illegally arrested on September 26,
2024. “An arrest executed pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally does not give rise to a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officer.” Fair v. Fulbright, 844 F.2d
567, 569 (8th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, even if the arrest warrant was
found invalid for reasons not apparent from the face of the warrant, the arresting officers are

generally entitled to qualified immunity as long as no facts are alleged from which it could be
inferred a reasonable officer would have known that the actions he took were illegal. See Stigall
v. Madden, 26 F.3d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 1994) (existence of a warrant shields the deputy “from
liability for executing it, unless a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the arrest
was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization”). Finally, “[l]iability under Section 1983
requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Madewell v.
Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976)).
To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, a complaint must set forth specific factual allegations
showing what each named defendant allegedly did, or failed to do, that violated the Plaintiff's

constitutionally protected rights.
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff had an outstanding FTA Arrest Warrant from Howard
County issued on June 6, 2024. (ECF No. 58-3, p. 6). Plaintiff does not challenge the validity or
existence of this FTA Arrest Warrant in any way in his Complaint. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also
testified in his Deposition that he was informed at the time of arrest that he was being arrested for
“misdemeanor fines, misdemeanor warrant on unpaid fines.” (ECF No. 58-1, pp. 43-4). Plaintiff
does however argue that he does not believe he was arrested pursuant to this FTA Arrest Warrant

because Defendant Davis did not have the FTA Arrest Warrant on his person during the arrest.
Arkansas law does not require that an officer have an arrest warrant in his possession when
he arrests an individual. Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.3. Moreover, Plaintiff testified he was given a copy
of the FTA Arrest Warrant later in the day after his arrest. (ECF No. 58-1, p. 46,49).

Plaintiff’s major contention in his Response is his allegation that Defendant Davis told
Plaintiff he was being arrested for intimidating Ms. Tweedle after arriving at the HCDC and gave
Plaintiff a copy of that Felony Arrest Warrant about five minutes after arriving at the HCDC from
his arrest. Id. According to Plaintiff, this proves he was arrested pursuant to the Felony Arrest
Warrant for intimidating a witness and not the FTA arrest warrant. Id.
The Court is unconvinced by Plaintiff’s arguments in the face of the summary judgment

evidence. The summary judgment record includes an executed FTA Arrest Warrant dated by
Defendant Davis on September 26, 2024. (ECF No. 58-2, p. 6). Additionally, both Defendants
Davis and Eudy testified in their Affidavits that they arrested Plaintiff pursuant to the FTA Arrest
Warrant. (ECF No. 58-2, pp. 1, 4-5; ECF No. 58-3, pp. 1, 4-5). Finally, the incident reports from
Howard County regarding Plaintiff’s arrest on September 26, 2024 indicate he was arrested for a
failure to appear charge. (ECF No. 58-2, p. 4-5).
Moreover, the Felony Arrest Warrant presented on this record is not executed. (ECF No.

63-5). Additionally, Defendant Jones’s Incident Report on the charge of intimidating Ms. Tweedle
is dated September 30, 2024, four days after Plaintiff’s arrest by Defendants Davis and Eudy, and
it does not indicate any arrest was made. (ECF No. 63-8). Most interestingly, there is no indication
of a criminal prosecution of Plaintiff related to an intimidating a witness charge or arrest on the
publicly available Arkansas Criminal Court Records website.

As to Plaintiff’s illegal arrest claim, Defendant Jones cannot be held liable under Section
1983 for Defendant Davis and Eudy’s actions in arresting Plaintiff pursuant to the FTA Arrest
Warrant that he played no part in obtaining or executing. See Madewell, 909 F.2d at 1208. It is
undisputed that Defendant Jones was not present during Plaintiff’s arrest on September 26, 2024.
(ECF No. 58-1, p. 43).

Second, Defendants Davis and Eudy are entitled to qualified immunity for executing an
arrest of Plaintiff pursuant to the facially valid FTA Arrest Warrant. See Stigall, 26 F.3d at 869.
The Court need not take allegations asserted by the Plaintiff as true when they are clearly
contradicted by the summary judgment record. The Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). However,
when the parties tell conflicting stories the Court is not required to believe facts blatantly
contradicted by the record so that no reasonable jury could believe them. Id. Nor can the Court
rely on speculation or conjecture to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Moody v. St.
Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994).6 Plaintiff does not support his allegation that

6 The Court notes that the attorneys in this matter seem somewhat confused as to what arrest
warrant was executed on Plaintiff at his camper on September 26, 2024. The County Defendants’
Brief states: Plaintiff was arrested on the Felony Arrest Warrant, (ECF No. 59, p. 7); and Defendant
Jones’s Brief states: both the Felony Arrest Warrant and the FTA Warrant were executed, (ECF
No. 64, p. 3). However, the Affidavits from the arresting officers, (ECF Nos. 58-2, 58-3), and the
incident reports and warrants themselves clearly indicate it was the FTA Warrant which was
executed on September 26, 2024. No copy of the executed Felony Arrest Warrant is on this
Defendants Davis and Eudy arrested him pursuant to the Felony Arrest Warrant with any more
than a mere scintilla of evidence and speculation, and such cannot create an issue of fact in the
face of such well documented summary judgment evidence presented herein. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986).

Accordingly, the Court finds both Defendants Davis and Eudy are entitled to qualified
immunity for Plaintiff’s arrest on September 26, 2024, as they arrested him pursuant to the facially
valid FTA Arrest Warrant.
Plaintiff’s alternate claims that Defendant Jones improperly acquired the Felony Arrest

Warrant will be addressed below in the section on Franks violations.
Illegal Search and Seizure Claims
The Court construes Plaintiff’s illegal search claim to state three separate grounds: (1) the

Search Warrant did not exist at time of the search thus making the search illegal; and alternatively
(2) if the Search Warrant did exist, the search conducted went beyond its scope because the items
to be seized pursuant to the warrant were sitting in plain view on the kitchen counter; and (3)
Defendant Jones and Eudy did not conduct the search in a reasonable manner. (ECF No. 1).
The Fourth Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend.
IV.7 Further, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

summary judgment record, (ECF No. 62-5), and the incident report for intimidating a witness is
dated September 30, 2024, (ECF No. 63-8, p. 1-2).
7 The Court recognizes Plaintiff also lists the Fourteenth Amendment in his Complaint as a basis
for his claims. (ECF No. 1, p. 4). However, when a “particular Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id.
“To be valid, a search warrant must be based upon a finding by a neutral and detached judicial
officer that there is probable cause to believe that evidence, instrumentalities or fruits of a crime,
contraband, or a person for whose arrest there is probable cause may be found in the place to be

searched.” Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1998). “Probable cause for a warrant
exists only when the totality of the circumstances provides sufficient facts to lead a prudent person
to believe there is a fair probability that contraband or other evidence of a crime will be found.”
Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
recognize “[o]nce a judicial officer has issued a warrant upon a finding of probable cause” great
deference will be afforded to that issuing judges’ findings. Walden, 156 F.3d at 870 (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).

First, the Court notes it is undisputed Defendant Davis did not participate in the search of
Plaintiff’s camper. He arrived back at the site after the search was underway and did not enter
Plaintiff’s camper during the search. (ECF No. 58-2, p.2). Defendant Davis cannot be liable
pursuant to Section 1983 for actions he did not take or cause. Accordingly, any claims asserted
against him for improper search and seizure fail as a matter of law. See Madewell, 909 F.2d at
1208.

Second, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Search Warrant existed on September 26, 2024. First the documents on the summary
judgment record supporting the existence of the Search Warrant include: (1) a file marked copy

analyzing these claims.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). The Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend IV. Therefore, the Court will apply it here.
from Howard County Circuit Clerk of the Application for Search and Seizure Warrant with a
handwritten acknowledgement by Judge Bryan Chesshir dated September 26, 2024, at 11:00 a.m.,
on the supporting Oath, stating it was signed in Nashville, Arkansas, (ECF No. 63-6); (2) a file
marked copy from Howard County Circuit Clerk of the Search Warrant also containing a hand

written acknowledgment by Judge Bryan Chesshir on September 26, 2024 at 11:00 a.m. in
Nashville, Arkansas (ECF No. 63-7); (3) Defendant Jones’s Declaration, sworn under penalty of
perjury, that he prepared the Application for Search Warrant and met with Judge Chesshir
personally for his signature, (ECF No. 63-2, pp. 3-4); and (4) Defendant Eudy’s testimony, in his
Affidavit, also sworn under penalty of perjury, that he received a copy of the Search Warrant from
Defendant Jones at Plaintiff’s camper before they began the search, (ECF No. 58-3, p. 2).
In the face of the summary judgment evidence produced by Defendants, Plaintiff must

produce evidence on which a jury could reasonably find the Search Warrant did not in fact exist.
See Gibson v. Am. Greetings Corp., 670 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff supports his contention the copy of this Application and Search Warrant is
fraudulent with the following summary judgment evidence: (1) he never received a copy of the
Search Warrant until he filed this lawsuit, (ECF No 58-1, pp. 55-8); (2) a copy of the Search
Warrant was not filed with the Howard County Circuit Clerk until March 3, 2025, well after this

lawsuit was filed, (ECF No. 58-1, p. 57); (3) the execution by Judge Chesshir of the Oath on the
Application for Search Warrant states it was done by email, (ECF No. 63-6, p. 4); and (4)
Defendant Jones, through his attorney in this matter, represented in discovery that no emails exists
between Judge Chesshir and Defendant Jones related to this Search Warrant or its Application,
(ECF No. 69; 69-1).
Even considering all of Plaintiff’s assertions as true, the Court does not find a reasonable
jury could determine the Search Warrant did not exist on September 26, 2024. See Gibson, 670
F.3d at 853. At this stage, Plaintiff must do more than show some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (explaining the non-moving party “must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” and he may not
rest on mere allegations or pleading denials, but must “come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial”); Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, Missouri, 840 F.3d 982,
986-87 (8th Cir. 2016) (the non-moving party must meet proof with proof to survive summary
judgment).
The Court recognizes Plaintiff’s valiant efforts through discovery to locate meta data or
emails regarding the Search Warrant, and Plaintiff was successful in his efforts in proving no

emails exist.8 Accordingly, the Court accepts the fact no emails were exchanged between Judge

8 Plaintiff made extensive arguments during discovery that this statement “via email” indicated the
Search Warrant was signed over email. (ECF Nos. 69-70). Thus, if the Search Warrant was
emailed between Defendant Jones and Judge Chesshir there would be metadata or emails with date
and time stamps indicating when the search warrant was signed. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel ordering Defendant Jones to produce any emails between himself and Judge
Chesshir regarding Plaintiff’s Search Warrant. (ECF No. 62). Defendant Jones’s attorney
complied with this Order to Compel informing Plaintiff that no such emails exist. (ECF No. 69-
1). Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Court’s Order to Compel arguing Defendant Jones’s should
have to produce “a sworn declaration, under penalty of perjury, detailing the specific forensic or
IT search methods used to determine that no emails exist. Or state that no emails exist, because
there were never any emails sent. And that his Affidavit and Application for a search warrant
submitted to this court as ECF Document 63-6 . . . are all fabrications and lies.” (ECF No. 69).
The response by Defendant Jones’s attorney indicating no emails between Defendant Jones
and Judge Chesshir exist is a sufficient discovery response pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Furthermore, it complies with the Court’s Order to Compel. Additionally, Defendant
Jones did submit a sworn statement in his Declaration on this summary judgment record that he
met with Judge Chesshir personally to obtain the signed Search Warrant. (ECF No. 63-2, p. 3-4).
Therefore, when the Court considers this sworn statement, as Plaintiff requests, along with
Chesshir and Defendant Jones regarding the Search Warrant as an undisputed fact on this summary
judgment record. However, this undisputed fact does not create a material issue for trial. See
Davenport v. City of Little Rock, 142 F.4th 1036,1041-2 (8th Cir. 2025).

In Davenport, the plaintiff argued that a search warrant was fabricated after the fact. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Davenport’s Fourth
Amendment claims for unlawful search and entry explaining the theory of fabrication was not
supported by the summary judgment record. Id. This Court finds the same here. The summary
judgment record in Davenport included, like the instant record, a copy of the subject search warrant
that was signed and dated by a judge and file marked by the appropriate court. Id. Unlike the
record here, the Davenport record also included an attestation by the clerk of court stating she
recognized the signing judge’s signature and stating that the warrant had been filed the day after

the search occurred. Id.
The plaintiff in Davenport presented competing evidence by pointing to another search
warrant, regarding the same suspects, executed in the same investigation, on the same day, on a
neighboring structure. That warrant contained additional court filing seals that the contested
warrant did not contain. The court clerk could not explain this discrepancy, but the plaintiff failed
to show how it was relevant to the existence of the warrant on the day of the search. Id. Finally,

the plaintiff in Davenport pointed to select officer statements referring to “a” warrant when there
should have been “two” warrants since two structures were searched. However, there were
competing officer statements that referred to “two” warrants. Id.

Defendant Jones’s attorney’s representation pursuant to Court order that no emails exist, the Court
is satisfied that no emails exist.
Here, Plaintiff heavily relies on the reference to “via email” in Judge Chesshir’s signature
on the Application for Search Warrant. This reference appears here:

_—>___. = | a
Lsawaee to and subscribed to me on this Mio of AMP F>L024 at L/ t Lip 72 cock
□ ff
[ via email at the location of [hs ee JAC.

Judge /

(63-6, p. 4).

Like the lack of additional court seals in Davenport, there is no explanation on this record
for the inclusion of “via email” on Judge Chesshir signature on the Search Warrant Application.
However, the Search Warrant itself, which was also dated by Judge Chesshir on the same day as
the Application, does not include any reference to email:

56

IT ISSO ORDERED

Dated this HAG day 0

Time 7

nai oF Pr

"IRCU UDGE 545
2 6
Y
fr
= FILED -
of AR 3 508
Suerte © f
Fy

(ECF No. 63-7, p. 3). The Court finds this unexplained discrepancy an insufficient fact to survive
summary judgment. Davenport, 142 F.4th at 1042 (explaining that a scintilla of evidence in
support of plaintiffs position is insufficient to survive summary judgment) (citing Gibson, 670
F.3d at 853)). Plaintiffs theory requires a belief that a conspiracy ensued in which Judge Chesshir
agreed to postdate the Search Warrant, the Howard County Clerk filed a fraudulent document
when accepting the Search Warrant; both Defendants Jones and Eudy conspired to create and
postdate the Search Warrant and perjured themselves in Affidavits to this Court, and Defendant
Jones’s attorney (an officer of this Court bound by a strict code of legal ethics) lied on this record
in the face of an Order to Compel when she stated no emails exists between Defendant Jones and
Judge Chesshir.

57

Furthermore, the Court did not overlook Plaintiff’s allegations he never received a copy of
the Search Warrant or any receipt of his seized property, and the delay in the filing of the Search
Warrant.9 While these may show sloppy procedure, these facts do not provide sufficient evidence
to support the allegation the Search Warrant did not exist in the face of the signed and file-marked

copy of the Search Warrant on this summary judgment record. Id.
Plaintiff also argues Defendants went beyond the scope of the Search Warrant during their
search. On the face of the Search Warrant it indicated: “The camper of Michael Riley at 1292
Bluff Springs Rd, Mineral Springs, Howard County, Arkansas” was to be searched. (ECF No. 63-
7, p. 1). Plaintiff does not contend Defendants Jones and Eudy searched the wrong camper.
Instead, in his Declaration, he argues his computer and phone were sitting in plain sight on the
kitchen counter, so the Defendants had no reason to search through the entire camper. (ECF No.

72, p. 3). Also, he argues, it looked like a “bomb” went off in his camper and they left the door
unlocked when they left. Id.
The Search Warrant authorized the following as property to be seized during the search:

Phone or other electronic device capable of sending and receiving electronic messages or
calls.

9 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert a constitutional violation related to Defendants Jones
and Eudy’s failure to provide him with a copy of the Search Warrant or a receipt of the items
seized, the Court finds both Defendants Jones and Eudy are entitled to qualified immunity to such
a claim. DeArmon v. Burgess, 388 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 2004) (officers were entitled to qualified
immunity for violations of state criminal procedure or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 by
failing to leave a copy of the warrant or receipt after a search and seizure). Additionally, Judge
Bryant previously addressed any property seizure claims in his screening R&R. (ECF No. 8).
(ECF No. 63-7, p. 2). While there was no receipt of property seized submitted on the record the
parties do not dispute that one computer and two cell phones were seized during the search. (ECF
No. 58-1, p. 69).

The Court notes that the items seized were exactly what the Search Warrant authorized—
phones and a computer—which reasonably falls into the described category of “electronic device
capable of sending and receiving electronic messages.” Further, the Search Warrant did not list a
particular phone or state only one phone or one device was the subject of the search. Officers
executing search warrants are not obligated to interpret the warrant narrowly. See Mountain Pure,
LLC v. Roberts, 814 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding officer’s seizure of a business’s
drawings, schematics, and operating manuals were reasonable seized under a search warrant
authorizing seizure of “business records” and “purchase records” of a company being investigated

for fraudulent application for disaster relief). Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants Eudy and
Jones are entitled to qualified immunity when they continued to search for additional electronic
devices capable of sending messages even though Plaintiff’s phone and computer were sitting on
the kitchen counter in plain sight.
Next, Plaintiff seems to challenge the reasonableness of Defendant Eudy and Jones’s
search when he complains his camper looked like a “bomb” went off inside it and the door was

left unlocked. There is no evidence on the summary judgment record to indicate what if any
property was damaged during the search. In his deposition Plaintiff testifies the padlock on his
front door was the only damaged property and the camper was a mess before the search occurred.
(ECF No. 58-1, pp. 78-9).
The Fourth Amendment does protect against unreasonable or unnecessarily destructive
searches and seizures. See Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 388 (8th Cir. 1989). However, the
law recognizes that “officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order
to perform their duty.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1979). Further, the method of
executing a search warrant is generally within the discretion of the executing officers and the
officers only lose qualified immunity if their actions were objectively unreasonable. Walden v.

Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit has specifically recognized
“dumping trash and emptying closets and drawers are activities that are reasonably necessary to
conducting a thorough search” for small items identified in a search warrant, and breaking locks
on entry doors are not objectively unreasonable. Cook v. Gibbons, 308 Fed.Appx.24, at *31 (8th
Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, based on the current record, the Court finds Defendants Jones and Eudy’s
manner of searching Plaintiff’s camper was objectively reasonable and within clearly established

law. Thus, they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the search of Plaintiff’s
camper. Cook, 308 Fed.Appx. at 31.
Franks Violation

In his Response, Plaintiff makes an additional alternate argument that Defendant Jones
committed a Franks violation in both his Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit and the Search Warrant
Application. (ECF No. 73, p. 23). In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978), “the Supreme
Court defined a limited exception to the presumptive validity of an affidavit supporting a search
warrant application.” United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1443 (8th Cir. 1995).
Under Franks v. Delaware, if the government intentionally includes materially false
statements in its warrant affidavits or includes materially false statements with reckless disregard

for the truth that is the legal equivalent of intentional falsehood, a suppression court must set aside
those statements and then review the remaining portions of the affidavits to see if what remains is
sufficient to establish probable cause. Criminal defendants bear the burden of proving the
intentional or reckless inclusion of false statements in a warrant affidavit. Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

This same analysis applies to Section 1983 claims alleging a probable cause affidavit for
an arrest warrant included false information or omitted truthful information. Howe v. Gilpin, 65
F.4th 975 (8th Cir. 2023); see also Estate of Nash v. Folsom, 92 F.4th 746, 754 (8th Cir. 2024)
(noting Franks had been extended to cover recklessly omitted information).

Including a false statement in a warrant affidavit is a Franks violation when the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the affiant knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, includes a false statement in a warrant
affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause.
Omitting information violates Franks when (1) ... facts were omitted with the intent to
make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby make, the affidavit misleading, and
(2) ... the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding
of probable cause.
Estate of Nash, 92 F.4th at 754 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Innocent mistakes
or negligence do “not suffice to demonstrate reckless or deliberate falsehood.” United States v.
Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 928 (8th Cir. 2010).
“In a § 1983 case, the issues are whether ‘the warrant application is so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable,’ and, if deliberate
falsehood is alleged, whether the affidavit is truthful, which ‘means that the information put forth
is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. Omissions and falsehoods that are
immaterial or not supported by the record do not suffice.’” Howe, 65 F.4th at 980 (quoting Morris
v. Lanpher, 563 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up)).
Here, it is undisputed that Ms. Tweedle was an informant and witness for the State of
Arkansas during the time in issue. It is further undisputed that Plaintiff sent Ms. Tweedle the
above-included Facebook message regarding her role in the arrest of Mr. Pounds. Plaintiff does
not dispute the content of the messages, but only disputes that such content was intended to be

threatening. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jones lied to obtain his Felony Arrest Warrant and the
Search Warrant. (ECF No. 74).
However, the Court cannot determine the Affidavit for Felony Arrest Warrant or the
Application for Search Warrant on this summary judgment record contain falsities. First, the
Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit included the following facts sworn to by Defendant Jones: (1)
Ms. Tweedle, a key witness in an ongoing criminal case, contacted the Task Force and stated she
received “threatening messages” from Plaintiff on Facebook that scared her; and (2) Ms. Tweedle

then sent Defendant Jones’s partner, Special Agent Garner, a copy of the messages and Defendant
Jones reviewed the messages. Defendant Jones then listed a few of the statements made by
Plaintiff in the subject messages but did not include a copy of the entire message thread for the
Judge’s review. The statements Defendant Jones included: (1) “people are gonna learn that to
have a safe earth, safe society, people like you and your garner friend, cant be in it;” (2) “Your
type will be removed as soon as identified for what u r;” (3) “your garner buddy will be scared to
stop a speeder. Cause of how many those mfers have had their heads blown off;” and
(4) Defendant Jones then states in the Affidavit that the Plaintiff suggested to Ms. Tweedle “she
keep a watch for strangers who may be watching her and who don’t appreciate what she did.”

(ECF No. 63-4, pp. 1-2). After a review of the full Facebook message, the Court concludes all of
these statements are in fact included in the Facebook messages. (ECF No. 63-3).
The Court notes that Defendant Jones did not include Plaintiff’s entire message in the
Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit, or Ms. Tweedles’s response message. However, the Court does
not find this omission material. This Court has reviewed the entirety of the messages, included
above in the Factual Background. The Court finds if the Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit were

supplemented with this omitted information it would still support a finding of probable cause. See
Estate of Nash, 92 F.3d at 754; Block v. Dupick, 758 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2014) (an officer
is still entitled to qualified immunity if [her] affidavit, supplemented by the omitted facts, still
supports a probable cause finding.”). Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant Jones is entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Franks argument as it relates to the Felony Arrest Warrant. Id.
Regarding the Application for the Search and Seizure Warrant Defendant Jones included
the following assertions facts: (1) Plaintiff was arrested at his camper on September 26, 2024, but

Plaintiff took several minutes to come out of the camper after arresting officers announced
themselves; (2) Defendant Davis stated he could hear Plaintiff rustling around inside the camper
consistent with someone trying to hide something; (3) Plaintiff had a Felony Warrant for Arrest
for intimidating a witness through Facebook “with a multitude of threats on August 10, 2024;” (4)
Defendant Jones recently did a phone extraction and analysis on a phone belonging to Charles
Riley and saw multiple message to Plaintiff talking about buying drugs from Plaintiff; (5)
Defendant Davis spoke with Plaintiff on the phone on September 26, 2024, at the number 337-
800-0890 asking Plaintiff to turn himself in but Plaintiff did not; (6) when Plaintiff was arrested at
his camper he did not bring his phone with him out of the camper and he locked the camper with

a padlock prior to being taken into custody; (7) Plaintiff’s electronic device clearly possesses not
only the threats to a witness but messages of him selling drugs which would constitute a felony
under Arkansas Statute; and (8) Defendant Eudy is positioned at Plaintiff’s camper to ensure no
one else enters until this search warrant can be executed. (ECF No. 63-6, p. 3). Defendant Jones
went on to conclude in his Application for Search Warrant that:

I believe that evidence of [Plaintiff] and possible other persons involved in the distribution
of the Controlled Dangerous Substances will be discovered during the search of the camper
utilized by [Plaintiff] 1292 Spring Rd. Mineral Springs, Howard County, Arkansas.
(ECF No. 63-6).
Again, Defendant Jones did not attach the Facebook messages between Plaintiff and Ms.
Tweedle to the Application. However, the statement that a Felony Warrant had issued based on
those messages is not false information. Furthermore, the Court previously determined the
omission of the entirety of the messages was immaterial. See Estate of Nash, 92 F.3d at 754; Block
v. Dupick, 758 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2014) (an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity if
his affidavit, supplemented by the omitted facts, still supports a probable cause finding.”).
Next, Plaintiff disputes that he rustled around in his camper consistent with concealing
something, however, he does not dispute he failed to immediately come outside his camper upon
the officer’s arrival nor does he dispute he left his cell phone inside the camper when he did exit.
Accordingly, even without the statement regarding the rustling, the Court finds Judge Chesshir
could have found probable cause to issue the search warrant for Plaintiff’s cell phone inside the

camper.
Finally, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he had no idea what Defendant Jones was
talking about regarding text messages between himself and his cousin regarding drugs. (ECF No.
58-1, p. 58). Again, even without the statement regarding drugs, the Court finds Judge Chesshir
would have probable cause to issue search warrant for Plaintiff’s phone or other electronic device
regarding the Facebook messages to Ms. Tweedle.
Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant Jones is entitled to qualified immunity related to
Plaintiff’s Franks argument on the Search Warrant. See Estate of Nash, 92 F.3d at 754; Block v.
Dupick, 758 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2014) (an officer is still entitled to qualified immunity if
his affidavit, supplemented by the omitted facts, still supports a probable cause finding.”).

First Amendment Retaliation Claim for Speech
In Plaintiff’s final claim, he asserts his arrest for intimidating a witness violates his First
Amendment rights. First, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff has not made a constitutional challenge
to A.C.A. § 5-53-109, the Arkansas intimidating a witness statue. Accordingly, there is no facial

challenge to consider. On the contrary, Plaintiff claims his statements do not fall within Section
5-53-109, his statements were protected speech under the First Amendment, and he was only
arrested with intimidating a witness because he hurt the officers’ feelings. (ECF No. 73).
The Court interprets the crux of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim to be one of retaliation
for speaking out against the officers and Ms. Tweedle in his Facebook messages. Plaintiff clarifies
this in his deposition when he explains his reasoning for believing Defendant Jones is liable for

his arrest even though Defendant Jones did not arrest him: Plaintiff believes Defendant Jones
violated his rights to free speech by going to Judge Cooper to get an arrest warrant based on
Plaintiff’s Facebook message statements. Plaintiff further asserts he should be able to say anything
he wants about Defendant Jones and the other officers mentioned in his Facebook message. (ECF
No. 58-1, p. 70).
To state a general First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he
engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the government official took adverse action against him

that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) that the
adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” Santiago
v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir.
2004)). In addition, when the retaliatory claim is one for a retaliatory arrest or retaliatory
inducement to prosecute, the plaintiff must also show there was no probable cause to support his

arrest or underlying criminal charge or prosecution. See Nieves v. Bartlet, 587 U.S. 391, 404
(2019); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260-1 (2006). Meaning, Plaintiff must not only allege
facts to establish the three elements for general retaliation, but he must also plead and prove the
absence of probable cause for his arrest. Id.
First, as determined by the Court herein, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendants Davis and
Eudy on a valid FTA Warrant. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain a retaliatory arrest claim as
his arrest was valid and supported by a valid warrant that has not been challenged in this case. Id.

However, the Eighth Circuit and United States Supreme Court have also recognized a
retaliatory inducement to prosecute claim. See Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1009 (8th Cir.
2013) abrogated on other grounds by Laney v. City of St. Louis, 56 F.4th 1153, 1157 n.2 (8th Cir.
2023); Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265 (holding a showing of retaliatory motive on the part of the
governmental official, combined with an absence of probable cause, is “enough for a prima facie
inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement infected the prosecutor’s decision to

bring the charge”). Giving Plaintiff’s Complaint a liberal construction as he is proceeding pro se,
this claim appears to fit Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Jones. However, even if the Court
interprets Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim as such, it still fails as a matter of law because the
Felony Arrest Warrant was supported by probable cause. Id.
The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause in order to arrest an individual. U.S.
Const. amend. IV. An arrest warrant must be supported by probable cause at the time it is issued.
Meaning, the totality of the circumstances must be sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe
that the subject of the arrest warrant committed the claimed offense. Ulrich v. Pope Cnty, 715
F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). This Court provides great deference
to the finding of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer through the issuance of an arrest

warrant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, an
eventual determination of innocence does not negate the initial finding of probable cause for an
arrest warrant. See Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir. 2013). The Court will not second
guess Judge Cooper’s finding of probable cause to arrest based on accurate information that is
undisputed by Plaintiff—his own statements from the Facebook Messages.
Moreover, Plaintiff was not prosecuted for any charges related to intimidating a witness.
The record does not even show he was ever arrested for or charged with intimidating a witness.

However, if he was arrested for this charge, the record indicates such an arrest would have been
supported by probable cause shown in the Felony Arrest Warrant Affidavit.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable First Amendment claim based on his arrest
or any attempt to induce prosecution for intimidating a witness when the summary judgment record
clearly shows probable cause existed to arrest him and potentially prosecute him. See Nieves v.
Bartlet, 587 U.S. 391, 404 (2019); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260-1 (2006).

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend County Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 58) be GRANTED and Defendant Jones’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 63) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Referral Status: The referral in this matter should be terminated.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.
DATED this 10th day of August 2026.
Spencer G. Singleton
/s/
HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438493. Public record. Not legal advice.