# Sullivan

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438341

## Case

- **Full name:** Anthony Sullivan v. Cody Waterkotte et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

ANTHONY SULLIVAN, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-4117
)
CODY WATERKOTTE et al., )
Defendants. )

ORDER
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court for screening is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Doc. 7), a Petition to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. 4), a Motion for
Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5), and a Motion for Status filed by Plaintiff Anthony Sullivan, a
resident of the Illinois Department of Human Services Treatment and Detention (“TDF”)
Facility under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1 et
seq.
I. Amended Complaint
A. Screening Standard
The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved
to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound
discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to
them.” Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally,
a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis “at any time” if the action is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2).

In reviewing the complaint, the district court accepts the factual allegations as true,
liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th
Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must
be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United
States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Factual Allegations

On April 8, 2026, Defendants Cody Watterkotte and John Doe seized a Universal
Serial Bus (a.k.a., USB) drive that Plaintiff stored in his TDF storage box and accessed
“privileged” documents and communications without Plaintiff’s approval. (Doc. 7 at 3.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff claims that Watterkotte and Doe downloaded “inappropriate content
(porn-like) media” onto the USB drive and then authored a false disciplinary report. On

May 6, 2026, Defendants Sharlene Caraway, Kenneth Queen, and Curtis Parsons, acting
as a Behavioral Committee (“Committee”), denied Plaintiff’s request to postpone a
hearing on the allegedly false disciplinary report so that Plaintiff could review the
evidence against him. The Committee subsequently determined that Plaintiff committed
the undisclosed allegations raised in the disciplinary report.

C. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) and IFP
Petition (Doc. 4) are granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s
amended pleading and calculate the filing fee under the Court's standard procedures.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id.; see also Brown v.

Phillips, 801 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal of First Amendment challenge
to keeping sexually explicit materials from TDF detainees unless evidence is provided
showing the restraint is rationally related to state’s interests). The Court concludes
Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state First Amendment Freedom of Expression and
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Caraway, Doe, Parsons,
Queen, and Watterkotte.

II. Injunctive Relief
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a
final hearing on the merits of the case. American Hospital Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328,
1330 (7th Cir. 1980). A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy”
and “should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). In civil suits, “damages are the norm, so the plaintiff must show why his case
is abnormal.” e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 604 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., B.V., 966 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992)).
“To determine whether a situation warrants such a remedy, a district court

engages in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases: a threshold phase and a
balancing phase.” Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of the United States of
Am. Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008). “A party seeking a preliminary injunction
must satisfy all three requirements in the ‘threshold phase’ by showing that (1) [he] will
suffer irreparable harm in the period before the resolution of its claim; (2) traditional legal
remedies are inadequate; and (3) there is some likelihood of success on the merits of the

claim.” HH-Indianapolis, LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 889 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief does not address any aspect of his threshold
requirement. Instead, Plaintiff seeks an Order directing Defendants to “preserve all
evidence” relevant in this case, to include the content on the USB drive at issue. Thus,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5) is denied. Defendants are directed to
preserve the content of the USB drive at issue. See Ogurek v. Gabor, 827 F.3d 567, 568 (7th

Cir. 2016) (“[A] district judge err[s] in refusing to compel production of [a] security video”
where the security video “would have been the dispositive piece of evidence in [the]
case.”).
Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 9) is moot with the entry of the Court’s Order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 4) and Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Doc. 7) are GRANTED.

2) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s amended pleading.

3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 5) is DENIED.

4) Defendants are DIRECTED to preserve the content of the USB drive at issue.

5) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, Plaintiff states First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against
Defendants Caraway, Doe, Parsons, Queen, and Watterkotte.

6) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait
until counsel has entered an appearance before filing any motions to give
Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions
filed before counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed by the
Court.

7) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.
Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not
filed an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of
this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
service of process, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and
dispositive motion deadlines.

8) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known,
said Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed
by the Clerk.

9) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends
the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include
all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an
answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits
of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no
response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

10) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other
documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel.
However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery
requests and responses are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail
his discovery requests and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery
requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are
attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin
until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a
scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

11) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

12) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court
of a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of
this lawsuit with prejudice.

13) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will
require that Defendant pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

14) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

15) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard
procedures.

ENTERED September 9, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless
____________________________________
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11438341. Public record. Not legal advice.
