# Tan

> District Court, E.D. California · August 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11437731

## Case

- **Full name:** Andre Rider v. K. Tan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ANDRE RIDER, No. 2:26-cv-2474-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 K. TAN, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a
2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See
4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).
5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim
6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific
8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this
9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law
10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
13 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) K. Tan, a dentist at the California
14 Health Care Facility (CHCF); (2) “Chief Medical Examiner” at CHCF; and (3) F. Enyeart, a
15 reviewing official on the Staff Misconduct Team at California Correctional Health Care Services.
16 See ECF No. 1, pg. 2. In his first claim, Plaintiff states that he was evaluated on December 28,
17 2023, for constant and severe tooth pain. See id. at 3. X-rays revealed that tooth no. 6 was
18 broken and required extraction. See id. Plaintiff underwent dental surgery on January 19, 2024,
19 at which time Defendant Tan removed the wrong tooth – tooth no. 4 instead of tooth no. 6. See
20 id. In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Chief Medical Executive” was
21 responsible for the conduct of Defendant Tan and was aware by way of Plaintiff’s grievances that
22 Plaintiff continued to suffer because the wrong tooth had been removed and the broken tooth
23 remained but failed to act. See id. at 4. In his third claim, Plaintiff contends that, despite his
24 continuing pain, Defendant Enyeart was deliberately indifferent and failed to arrange for further
25 dental care to address the broken tooth. See id. at 5.
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1 II. DISCUSSION
2 The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible Eighth Amendment medical
3 deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Enyeart based on Plaintiff’s allegation that,
4 despite being aware of Plaintiff’s continuing severe tooth pain following extraction of the wrong
5 tooth, Defendant Enyeart failed to arrange for additional dental care. Plaintiff has not, however,
6 stated cognizable claims against Defendant Tan or Defendant “Chief Medical Executive.” As to
7 Defendant Tan, Plaintiff has alleged facts which would, at most, establish medical malpractice,
8 which is not cognizable under § 1983. As to Defendant “Chief Medical Executive,” Plaintiff has
9 failed to establish a causal link between an individual defendant and a violation of his rights by
10 not naming the actual prison official alleged to be responsible for denial of further dental care
11 following extraction of the wrong tooth. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend
12 consistent with the legal principles outlined below.
13 A. Medical Deliberate Indifference
14 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
15 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
16 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
17 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
18 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
19 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
20 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
21 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
22 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
23 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
24 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
25 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
26 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
27 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
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1 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
2 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
3 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
4 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
5 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
6 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
7 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
8 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
9 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
10 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
11 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
12 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
13 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
14 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
15 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
16 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
17 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
18 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
19 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See
20 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
21 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
22 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
23 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
24 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
25 course of treatment does not generally give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v.
26 McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a claim involving alternate courses of
27 treatment may succeed where the plaintiff shows: (1) the chosen course of treatment was
28 medically unacceptable under the circumstances; and (2) the alternative treatment was chosen in
1 conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
2 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tan removed the wrong tooth. This
4 allegation amounts to a claim of medical negligence, which does not state a claim under § 1983.
5 To the extent Plaintiff can allege facts which would show that Defendant Tan was deliberately
6 indifferent with respect to the dental surgery, Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend.
7 B. Causal Link
8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
9 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
10 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
11 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
12 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
13 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
14 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
15 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
16 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
17 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
18 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
19 Here, Plaintiff names “Chief Medical Executive” as a defendant but has not
20 identified who this person is. To proceed, Plaintiff must name the individual alleged to be
21 responsible for failure to arrange for additional dental care following extraction of the wrong
22 tooth. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend.
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1 Il. CONCLUSION
2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
3 | amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
4 } 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
5 || amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
6 || 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the
7 || prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
8 || amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
9 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
10 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See
11 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
12 || each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between
13 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
14 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
15 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended
16 || complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and
17 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
18 || further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended
20 || complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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22 | Dated: August 14, 2026 Co
23 DENNIS M. COTA
4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11437731. Public record. Not legal advice.