# Baker

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11437321

## Case

- **Full name:** Terrence Claudell Baker v. Delaware County, Ohio, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

TERRENCE CLAUDELL BAKER, : Case No. 2:26-cv-161
:
Plaintiff, :
: Chief District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
:
DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is currently before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Amended Complaint
to determine whether the Amended Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
§ 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court previously granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, screened his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and recommended dismissal of
his case. (Docs. 2, 5). A week later, Plaintiff filed objections (Doc. 6) and an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 7).
Considering the liberal policy in favor of granting amendments under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15, the Court RETRACTS the May 5 Report and Recommendation (Doc. 5) and
considers the Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) as the operative Complaint. Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp.,
388 F.3d 930, 936 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff, however, is cautioned that he will not be given
unlimited opportunities to amend his complaint. See Kanu v. Siemens PLM, No. 1:18-CV-38,
2019 WL 1090398, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:18-CV-38, 2019 WL 4110434 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2019) (“[J]ustice simply does not require this
Court to permit a pro se plaintiff unlimited opportunities to amend [her] complaint, in hopes of
eventually stating some claim.”).
Now, after conducting the required screen of the Amended Complaint, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 7).
I. STANDARD
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant
whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To
prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when
the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328–29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th

Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when
the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level
of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The
Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (“dismissal
standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.
at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and a municipal liability claim and sues Delaware
County, Ohio, and John/Jane Doe Law Enforcement Officers 1-10, in their official and individual
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations, see Erickson, 551
U.S. at 94, the Undersigned summarizes Plaintiff’s fact contentions as follows: 2018 Searches
Claims; 2019 Pre-Trial and Trial Claims; 2025 Accessed Records Claims; and Monell Claim.
A. 2018 Searches Claims
Plaintiff asserts that, at the onset of the investigation in mid-2018, Delaware County law

enforcement did not identify him “through direct observation, controlled interaction, reliable
witness identification, surveillance naming him, or other independently corroborated means.”
(Doc. 7 at 2). Instead, Plaintiff alleges that he was identified by “recovered paperwork” through a
warrantless search of a vehicle he did not own and was not present within at the time of the traffic
stop and search. (Id. at 2–3). As a result, his “identification as a suspect therefore arose from a
vehicle search that, on the face of the records later obtained by Plaintiff, lacked a documented
warrant, consent, probable cause, or other recognized exception.” (Id. at 3). According to Plaintiff,
this subjected him to “surveillance, search, seizure, and arrest” without “reliable contemporaneous
evidence” and that “probable cause was built through later inference and post hoc justification.”
(Id.).

After the vehicle search, Plaintiff asserts that the residential search warrant issued on
August 17, 2018, was deficient in that “it did not specifically authorize seizure of Plaintiff’s
personal notebook or general personal writings.” (Id. at 4). He contends that “neither the warrant
nor any separately identified facts provided a sufficiently individualized probable-cause basis to
seize his personal notebook.” (Id.). Therefore, he asserts, the seizure of the notebook “exceeded
the scope of the warrant and was not justified by the plain-view doctrine because the notebook was
not contraband, was not listed in the warrant, and any allegedly incriminating nature was not
immediately apparent without further inspection, interpretation, or evidentiary use.” (Id.).
B. 2019 Pre-Trial and Trial Claims
After his arrest and during his subsequent criminal case in 2019, Plaintiff states that he
filed a motion to suppress the notebook, but that the motion was “not heard prior to trial.” (Doc.
7 at 5). Plaintiff asserts that “retention of the notebook, failure to provide a timely suppression
hearing, and later evidentiary use of the notebook deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to

challenge the seizure before the property was used against him.” (Id.). Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges
that the notebook and “testimonial evidence” primarily constituted the prosecution’s case against
him, instead of physical evidence; he asserts that certain charges “were not supported by physical
evidence,” as “no drugs, paraphernalia, or lab-confirmed substances were recovered from
Plaintiff.” (Id.).
C. 2025 Accessed Records Claims
In 2025, three years after his release from incarceration, Plaintiff obtained official records
that he asserts revealed several claims that he was unaware of at the time of Delaware County’s
investigation and his criminal case. (Doc. 7 at 2, 4–6). Plaintiff asserts that in February 2019, he
was arrested in a different location from where the residential search took place, months after the

August 2018 search. (Id. at 5). He explains that the records he obtained in 2025 included a
“warrant-entry information sheet requesting entry of a Delaware County warrant” that was dated
February 25, 2019. (Id.). Because “no new affidavit, no updated warrant application, and no new
individualized showing of probable cause was presented to account for the passage of time, the
change in location, or the then-current basis for seizure,” Plaintiff contends that the Delaware
County law enforcement officers “relied on stale or defective process rather than updated and
individualized probable cause.” (Id.).
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that his 2025 review of the records revealed both a tracking
device warrant on the vehicle involved in his identification and the residential search warrant had
been placed under seal for ninety days, as well as “the affidavit . . . inventory, return, dockets,
indices, and references” for the stated purpose that “disclosure would be detrimental to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges this sealing “prevented him from timely
inspecting the warrant materials, affidavits, return and related records that would have allowed a

more immediate challenge to the legality of the searches and seizures” in 2018–2019. (Id.).
Relatedly, he asserts that the return and inventory of the search on August 17, 2018, was not
completed until September 14, 2018, which was not a prompt return. (Id. at 32–33). Plaintiff
contends that, because “the inventory contained handwritten alterations and vague descriptions”
and “the return did not clearly identify who received notice,” the “irregularities impaired the
reliability of the official record and complicated timely challenge to what was seized, when it was
seized, and under what authority it was retained.” (Id. at 33).
D. Monell Claim
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a Monell claim against Delaware County for the customs and
polices that permitted the alleged constitutional violations, as well as a failure to train, supervise,
or discipline the law enforcement officers involved in his case. (Id. at 10). He further asserts that

Delaware County “tolerated or permitted a practice of using defective or boilerplate warrant
processes rather than individualized probable-cause determinations,” arguing that the warrants
used in his case demonstrate that pattern. (Id.). Therefore, Plaintiff asserts that, rather than an
isolated incident, his case demonstrates that “Delaware County’s customs, failures in training [and]
supervision, ratification of officer conduct, and deliberate indifference were moving forces behind
the violations suffered by Plaintiff.” (Id.).
For relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief; “compensatory damages in an amount to be
determined at trial; punitive damages against the individual-capacity Defendants in an amount to
be determined at trial; costs of this action and any relief available under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; such
further relief as the Court deems just and proper,” and a jury trial. (Id. at 11–12).
III. ANALYSIS
The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its
entirety.

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Barred under Heck
In response to the First Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice as barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
Plaintiff expressly disclaims that he seeks “to directly invalidate his conviction, but rather seeks
damages for independent constitutional injuries stemming from unlawful search, unlawful seizure,
unlawful retention, denial of timely challenge, and county policy or custom.” (See generally, Doc.
5; Doc. 7 at 5). Further, he added Fourth Amendment claims to his initial Fourth Amendment
claims regarding the notebook in his Amended Complaint. (Compare Doc. 3; Doc. 7). After
review, Heck still governs Plaintiff’s claims; therefore, for the following reasons, the Undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice.

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 civil rights action seeking monetary relief
on the basis of an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or sentence will not lie unless the plaintiff
has already succeeded in having the conviction or sentence invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–
87. Under Heck, when a successful § 1983 civil rights action for damages would necessarily imply
the invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff demonstrates that the decision resulting in his confinement has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
643 (1997).
Still, under very limited circumstances, some Fourth Amendment claims may not be
barred. In Heck, the Supreme Court noted that “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly

unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced
in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487 n.7. The Supreme Court explained that “[b]ecause of doctrines like independent source
and inevitable discovery, . . . and especially harmless error, . . . such a § 1983 action, even if
successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” Id. In a
later case, however, the Supreme Court clarified that in some cases, “a Fourth Amendment claim
can necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, and that if it does it must, under Heck, be
dismissed.” Wallace v. Kato, 293 F. App’x 384, 395 n.5 (2007). The Sixth Circuit has held that
the district court must conduct a “case-by-case” assessment in determining “whether a favorable
Fourth Amendment judgment would impugn the validity of an outstanding conviction.” Harper

v. Jackson, 293 F. App’x 389, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2008) (and cases cited therein).
Although Plaintiff expressly disavows seeking to invalidate his conviction, a favorable
judgment on any of his Fourth Amendment claims “would impugn the validity of [his] outstanding
conviction.” Harper, 293 F. App’x at 391–392. All of his Fourth Amendment claims—the alleged
warrantless vehicle search, the alleged deficient residential search warrant, the alleged lack of
individualized probable cause at the initiation of the case or at Plaintiff’s arrest, the sealed
warrants, the altered and delayed return and inventory, and the seizure and subsequent use of the
notebook at trial—“necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction” as they involve the process
and evidence directly responsible for Plaintiff’s conviction. Wallace, 293 F. App’x at 395 n.5; see
also McClelland v. Mohr, No. 2:20-CV-5331, 2020 WL 6075706, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. McClelland v. City of Steubenville, No. 2:20-CV-
5331, 2020 WL 7047051 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2020) (finding that alleged deficiencies in probable
cause for Plaintiff’s arrest were more appropriately brought in habeas than under § 1983);

Gonzales v. City of Fostoria, No. 3:13cv796, 2014 WL 99114, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2014)
(finding that the alleged unlawful search would implicate the Fourth Amendment as that search
produced evidence used in Plaintiff’s conviction). Plaintiff even implicitly argues as much when
alleging that the prosecution primarily relied on the notebook and testimonial evidence at his trial,
evidence which resulted in his conviction. (Doc. 7 at 5).
Similarly, Heck bars Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. (Id. 7 at 9–
10). All of Plaintiff’s due process claims—the sealed records, the delayed and irregular inventory
and return, and the denied suppression hearing—involve the process responsible for Plaintiff’s
conviction. When “the criminal proceeding that is the subject of Plaintiff’s complaint resulted in
Plaintiff’s conviction . . . Heck bars Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for due process violations.” Anderson

v. Ohio, No. 2:24-CV-01951, 2025 WL 2721191, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2025).
Additionally, Plaintiff has not established any of the four avenues that would make Heck
inapplicable to his case. First, Plaintiff’s conviction of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity,
additional prohibited offenses, drug trafficking, and receiving stolen property and his sentence of
four years imprisonment and five years of post-release control were affirmed on direct appeal.
State v. Baker, 2020-Ohio-5094 (5th Dist.), motion for delayed appeal denied, State v. Baker,
2021-Ohio-717, 161 Ohio St. 3d 1473, 164 N.E.3d 475. And while Plaintiff has served his term
of imprisonment, he is still subject to post-release control. Heck therefore still applies to his case.
See Pettus-Brown v. Adult Parole Auth., No. 2:18-CV-82, 2019 WL 1455208, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 2, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2058627 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2019).
Second, Plaintiff has not established that the conviction or sentence has been expunged by
executive order. Third, state tribunal invalidation has not occurred in this case. Fourth, no writ of
habeas corpus has been issued. In sum, Heck and its bar on any claims that would necessarily

invalidate a conviction still applies to the claims raised in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
B. Plaintiff’s Municipal Liability Claims Dismissed
Because Plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable civil rights violation under § 1983 against
any individual Defendant, his municipal liability claims against Delaware County also fail and
should be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Pinter v. City of New York, 448 F. App’x 99, 106
(2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff’s “Monell claims are derivative of his claims against the
individual defendants, and therefore any claims dismissed as against the individual defendants
must also be dismissed as against the City”) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,
799 (1986)).
Because Heck governs Plaintiff’s claims and Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims are
derivative of those claims, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In light of this conclusion, the
Undersigned does not reach the statute of limitations issues that are evident on the face of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: September 8, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and
Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520,
530 (6th Cir. 2019). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11437321. Public record. Not legal advice.