# Chestnut

> District Court, E.D. California · August 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11436900

## Case

- **Full name:** Dunier Rodriguez v. Christopher Chestnut
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 DUNIER RODRIGUEZ, (A 094-928-995), No. 1:26-CV-04004-DAD-CKD
12 Petitioner,
13 v. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
14 CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT,
15 Respondent.
16
17 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who filed this habeas corpus action pursuant
18 to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
20 I. Factual and Procedural History
21 Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in
22 2007. ECF No. 7-1 at 5. In 2016, Petitioner was convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) and
23 (c)(1)(A)(i) for possessing counterfeit access devices with intent to defraud. Id. See also ECF No.
24 9-1 at 2. On January 27, 2026, when Petitioner returned to the United States after a trip to Cuba,
25 U.S. immigration officials detained him, charged him administratively under 8 U.S.C. §
26 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and initiated
27 removal proceedings against him. ECF No. 9-2. He is currently detained at the California City
28 Immigration Processing Center. ECF No. 1.
1 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 26, 2026, arguing that
2 detention places his health at risk and is unnecessarily harsh when alternatives to detention are
3 available. ECF No. 1. An amended petition filed June 29, 2026, claims that Petitioner’s
4 prolonged and indeterminate detention without bond violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No.
5 7. In its answer, Respondent asserted that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. §
6 1225(b)(2), which does not permit release on bond. ECF No. 9. Petitioner countered that the
7 procedures available under the statute do not satisfy the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 10.
8 II. Statutory Immigration Framework
9 Noncitizens who are seeking admission to the United States are subject to mandatory
10 detention if an examining immigration officer determines that the noncitizen is not entitled to
11 admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). A lawful permanent resident returning to the United States
12 after travel is considered to be seeking admission if they have committed an offense identified in
13 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), including a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(c); 8
14 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The parties do not dispute that Petitioner has been convicted of a
15 crime involving moral turpitude – an offense identified under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) – and that §
16 1225(b)(2) governs his detention.
17 III. Due Process
18 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
19 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
20 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in
21 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s
22 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
23 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
24 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
25 strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
26 Petitioner raises an as-applied procedural due process challenge to the constitutionality of
27 his prolonged mandatory detention. At this point, Petitioner has been detained for over six
28 months.
1 The Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of mandatory detention1 in
2 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 at 531 (2003). However, the Supreme Court did so with the
3 understanding that detention is relatively “brief” and “limited,” and “lasts roughly a month and a
4 half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months in the minority of cases in which the
5 alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 513, 529 n.12, 530. Justice Kennedy joined the opinion in full but
6 wrote a concurring opinion recognizing the viability of as-applied challenges under the majority’s
7 framework: “[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful
8 permanent resident [noncitizen] . . . could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his
9 risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.”
10 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Later, in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392
11 (2019), the Supreme Court recognized the right to bring such as-applied challenges: “Our
12 decision today on the meaning of that statutory provision [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)] does not foreclose
13 as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have
14 now read it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420.
15 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has expressly declined to address “[w]hether due
16 process requires a bond hearing” in such situations. Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th
17 Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). However, the Ninth Circuit
18 has expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without
19 any process is constitutional.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). Other
20 Circuit Courts of Appeal have concluded that Demore does not foreclose as-applied challenges to
21 mandatory, but prolonged, detention. Recently, the Second Circuit held that “[t]he Constitution
22 does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged period under
23 section 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural protections—like a
24 bond hearing—become necessary.” Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2024). The
25 undersigned finds this authority persuasive and agrees that Demore does not bar an as-applied
26 challenge to prolonged detention without an appropriate hearing to determine whether such
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1 Though Demore v. Kim examined the mandatory detention scheme of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), its reasoning
28 also applies to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
1 detention is justified. The next step is to determine the appropriate framework in which to
2 analyze Petitioner’s procedural due process argument.
3 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first step is determining
4 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step
5 examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest
6 accord with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
7 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due
8 process applies, the question remains what process is due.”).
9 The undersigned has considered the various tests developed by district courts within the
10 Ninth Circuit, and finds that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the appropriate
11 test for due process challenges to prolonged mandatory detention. The undersigned is particularly
12 persuaded by the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Black, 103 F.4th at 145-49, that the Mathews test
13 is flexible enough to account for the factors identified by federal courts when deciding whether
14 detention has become unreasonably prolonged. Under Mathews, the court considers three factors:
15 (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3)
16 the government’s interest involved including any fiscal or administrative burden that additional
17 procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
18 A. Private interest
19 An individual’s private interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is “unquestionably
20 substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts of Appeal have
21 generally declined to adopt a specific threshold for when detention becomes prolonged. See
22 German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 3d Cir. 2020);
23 Black, 103 F.4th at 150; Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7–9 (1st Cir. 2021). While the Ninth
24 Circuit has not addressed this question, it has previously referred to detentions longer than six
25 months as prolonged “in the context of detentions for which no individualized bond hearings had
26 taken place at all because the statutes on their faces did not allow for them.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53
27 F.4th at 1207 (citations omitted). Indeed, other courts within this Circuit have found due process
28 violations where the length of mandatory detention without bond was similar to the length of
1 detention at issue here. See, e.g., Chen v. Aitken, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
2 (holding petitioner’s seven-month detention under § 1225(b) was “prolonged” because it “has
3 lasted well beyond the typical period described in Demore” and “neither release nor removal are
4 imminent”).
5 Moreover, courts hearing as-applied challenges to mandatory detention have also
6 considered the likely duration of future detention. See Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870,
7 880-81 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (finding administrative appeals and likely appeal to the Ninth Circuit
8 weighed toward granting request for bond hearing). Petitioner’s individual hearing in
9 Immigration Court has been scheduled for August 14, 2026. EOIR Automated Case Information,
10 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. A hearing before an Immigration Judge is not the
11 end of Petitioner’s removal proceedings. Either party may then choose to appeal the IJ’s decision
12 to the Board of Immigration Appeals and Petitioner could ultimately seek review by the Ninth
13 Circuit Court of Appeals. Based on its duration to date and the likelihood of continued
14 mandatory detention during all phases of removal proceedings, the undersigned finds Petitioner’s
15 detention is sufficiently “prolonged” and confers a substantial private interest.
16 B. Risk of erroneous deprivation
17 The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s]
18 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
19 procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. This factor favors Petitioner. “[T]he risk of
20 an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is
21 substantial.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated on other
22 grounds). Indeed, “[i]n the absence of any meaningful initial procedural safeguards, it appears to
23 us that almost any additional procedural safeguards at some point in the detention would add
24 value.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original); see also Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-7996
25 NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (finding “high” risk of an erroneous
26 deprivation where petitioner had not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during
27 his one-year detention under § 1226(c)). Additional procedures are likely to be particularly
28 meaningful. Petitioner’s convictions stem from a non-violent crime committed nearly a decade
1 ago. As a longtime lawful permanent resident, Petitioner has a strong interest in pursuing a
2 defense against removal, thereby making his risk of flight low. Accordingly, the second Mathews
3 factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
4 C. Government Interest
5 Under this factor, the Court weighs the government’s interest, “including the function
6 involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement
7 would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Higher courts have repeatedly recognized that, “[t]he
8 government has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous criminal
9 [noncitizens].’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 515). Courts
10 have also recognized that the detention of noncitizens during removal proceedings can serve the
11 legitimate government purpose of preventing flight. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053,
12 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 528). Thus, in some general way, the
13 government has an interest in the detention of non-citizens held under § 1226(c). However, “the
14 additional procedural safeguards we would allow here under Mathews do nothing to undercut
15 those interests. At any ordered bond hearing, the IJ would assess on an individualized basis
16 whether the noncitizen presents a flight risk or a danger to the community, as IJs routinely do for
17 other noncitizen detainees.” Black, 103 F.4th at 153–54; see also Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at
18 *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not undercut the government’s asserted interest in effecting
19 removal. After all, the purpose of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents a
20 flight risk or danger to the community.”) (citing In re Guerra, 24 I.&N. Dec. 37 (B.I.A. 2006)). In
21 Petitioner’s case, the government’s interest in further detaining him without a hearing to
22 determine whether such detention is justified is minimal. Administrative burden is a legally
23 cognizable interest under Mathews, but Respondent’s interest is diminished by the low fiscal and
24 administrative burdens associated with a bond hearing. See D. L.C. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 25511,
25 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (“Custody hearings in immigration court are routine and impose a
26 ‘minimal’ cost on the government.” (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D.
27 Cal. 2025)).
28 / / /
1 IV. Remedy
2 For reasons explained above in the Mathews analysis, the undersigned finds a bond
3 hearing to be the appropriate relief in this case. At the bond hearing, the government should bear
4 the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of
5 flight or danger. See Singh v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-0940 DC DMC (HC), 2026 WL 392169, at
6 *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026) (collecting cases); Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00127 DC SCR
7 (HC), 2026 WL 766567 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2026) (adopting Findings and Recommendations
8 and granting a bond hearing). This is the appropriate burden given the liberty interests at stake.
9 See Black, 103 F.4th at 157 (“[O]nce detention under section 1226(c) has become so prolonged
10 that due process warrants a bond hearing . . . the government must justify continued detention at
11 such a hearing . . .by clear and convincing evidence.”).
12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
13 1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED.
14 2. Respondent be ordered to provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond
15 hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying
16 Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, within fourteen (14) days of
17 any order resolving the § 2241 petition.
18 3. Respondent be further directed to file a notice certifying compliance with the above
19 provision within seven (7) days from the date of the bond hearing.
20 4. If Petitioner is granted release on bond, Respondent shall return all of Petitioner’s
21 documents and possessions at the time of release.
22 5. Any order not address the circumstances in which Respondent may detain Petitioner in
23 the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and Petitioner
24 receives notice of the final order of removal.
25 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after
27 being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with
28 the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period
1 | is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties
2 || have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v.
3 || Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets
4 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties
5 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal
6 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
7 | Dated: August 12, 2026 □□ I / dip Ze

9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11436900. Public record. Not legal advice.