# Santos v. Blanche

> Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · September 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11436653

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- **Decided:** September 8, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

23-7191-ag
Santos v. Blanche
1

2 In the
3 United States Court of Appeals
4 For the Second Circuit
5 ___________
6
7 August Term 2024
8 No. 23-7191-ag
9
10 FLAVIO DIVINO SANTOS,
11 Petitioner,
12
13 V.
14
15 TODD BLANCHE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
16 Respondent.∗
17 ___________
18
19 ARGUED: DECEMBER 11, 2024
20 DECIDED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2026
21 ___________
22
23 Before: LOHIER, Chief Judge, SULLIVAN, and KAHN, Circuit Judges.
24 ________________
25
26 Petitioner Flavio Divino Santos, a citizen of Brazil, attempted to enter the
27 United States in 2004, was issued an expedited removal order, and was deported.
28 In 2017, Santos reentered the United States without inspection and was issued a
29 reinstatement order based on his 2004 expedited removal order. Santos was not
30 removed at the time but, in 2023, was detained pursuant to his reinstatement order.
31 Santos subsequently ﬁled a motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind his
32 reinstatement order with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which the
33 agency denied. Santos seeks review of two distinct agency actions: (1) a July 2,

∗
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.
1 2017 order reinstating his 2004 expedited removal order and (2) an August 23, 2023
2 order denying his motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind that reinstatement
3 order.
4 As to the 2017 reinstatement order, we reaﬃrm our precedent that a
5 reinstatement order is a ﬁnal order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) such that
6 we have jurisdiction to review his claims. Guided by the Supreme Court’s recent
7 decision in Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259 (2025), we acknowledge that the 30-day ﬁling
8 deadline at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule rather than a
9 jurisdictional bar. However, even assuming that deadline is subject to equitable
10 tolling, we ﬁnd that Santos did not exercise the requisite diligence to warrant
11 tolling in this case.
12 As to the 2023 denial of Santos’s motion, we conclude that 8 U.S.C.
13 §§ 1252(a) and 1252(b)(6) together grant us jurisdiction to review CBP’s denial of
14 Santos’s motion to reopen. We further hold that 8 C.F.R § 103.5(a) authorizes CBP
15 to reopen, reconsider, and rescind its decisions to reinstate removal orders. We
16 hold that CBP denied Santos’s motion on the erroneous understanding that it had
17 no authority to reopen or reconsider its reinstatement decision, that it therefore
18 misperceived the law and, as such, that it abused its discretion.
19 Accordingly, we DENY Santos’s petition for review as to his 2017
20 reinstatement order. We GRANT Santos’s petition as to the 2023 denial of his
21 motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind the 2017 reinstatement order, VACATE
22 that denial, and REMAND for CBP to consider Santos’s motion in the ﬁrst
23 instance. The government’s motion to dismiss Santos’s petition for review is
24 DENIED as moot.
25
26 Judge Sullivan concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.
27
28 ________________
29
30 ANNELISE M.J. DE ARAUJO, Araujo & Fisher, LLC, Boston,
31 MA, for Petitioner.
32
33 TIM RAMNITZ, Senior Litigation Counsel (Brian M.
34 Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General
35 and Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, on the brief),
36 Oﬃce of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S.
37 Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

2
1
2 TRINA REALMUTO (Kristin Macleod-Ball, on the brief),
3 National Immigration Litigation Alliance, Brookline, MA,
4 for Amicus Curiae National Immigration Litigation Alliance,
5 in support of Petitioner.
6 ________________
7
8 MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
9
10 Petitioner Flavio Divino Santos (“Santos”), a citizen of Brazil, attempted to

11 enter the United States in 2004, was issued an expedited removal order, and was

12 deported. In 2017, Santos reentered the United States without inspection and was

13 issued a reinstatement order based on his 2004 expedited removal order. Santos

14 was not removed at the time but, in 2023, was detained pursuant to his

15 reinstatement order. Santos subsequently ﬁled a motion to reopen, reconsider,

16 and rescind his reinstatement order with U.S. Customs and Border Protection

17 (“CBP”), which the agency denied. Santos seeks review of two distinct agency

18 actions: (1) the July 2, 2017 reinstatement of his 2004 expedited removal order and

19 (2) the August 23, 2023 denial of his motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind that

20 reinstatement order.

21 Each of the two orders that Santos challenges raises several issues for this

22 Court. As to his 2017 reinstatement order, we must consider: (1) whether we

23 have jurisdiction to review reinstatement orders, (2) whether Santos’s petition for

3
1 review was timely, and (3) if Santos’s petition was untimely, whether equitable

2 tolling cures that defect. In Part I of this opinion, we hold that reinstatement

3 orders are ﬁnal orders of removal, such that we have jurisdiction to review them

4 under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We further hold that Santos’s petition for review was

5 untimely and that, even assuming that equitable tolling applies to the thirty-day

6 deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), Santos is not entitled to tolling. We therefore

7 deny Santos’s petition for review as to his 2017 reinstatement order.

8 As to the 2023 denial of Santos’s motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind

9 his 2017 reinstatement order, we must consider: (1) whether we have jurisdiction

10 to review a motion to reopen a reinstatement order, (2) whether CBP has the

11 authority to reopen reinstatement orders under 8 C.F.R § 103.5, and (3) if CBP

12 does have that authority, whether it erred in denying Santos’s motion. In Part II

13 of this opinion, we hold that we have jurisdiction to review Santos’s motion to

14 reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6). We further hold that CBP is authorized to

15 reopen, reconsider, and rescind reinstatement orders and that it misapprehended

16 its authority to do so when it denied Santos’s motion. We therefore grant

17 Santos’s petition for review as to his 2023 motion to reopen, vacate the agency’s

18 decision, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4
1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2 A. INITIAL ENTRY

3 Santos is a citizen of Brazil who ﬁrst entered the United States without

4 inspection in 1995. He lived in the United States for several years, during which

5 time he had a U.S. citizen child. Santos then left the country and, in 2004, sought

6 reentry on a B-2 visitor visa. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

7 denied Santos entry and issued him an expedited removal order pursuant to 8

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).

9 In late 2016 and early 2017, Santos arranged to return to the United States

10 with the help of a smuggling network. While en route to the United States, the

11 smugglers warned Santos and his wife that they had previously broken the legs of

12 a client who had not paid his smuggling debt and that they would kill anyone who

13 revealed their identities to U.S. law enforcement.

14 B. REENTRY AND REINSTATEMENT

15 On or about July 1, 2017, Santos entered the United States without

16 inspection at the border in Vermont, where he was apprehended by CBP agents

17 shortly after crossing. These agents served Santos with a Form I-871 Notice of

18 Intent/Decision to Reinstate his 2004 expedited removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

5
1 § 1231(a)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. CBP informed Santos of his right to contest the

2 decision to reinstate his removal order in English. Santos represents that he does

3 not speak English and therefore did not understand that he had a right to contest

4 that order. This reinstatement order is the ﬁrst of two agency actions that Santos

5 challenges in his petition for review.

6 Santos was transferred to the custody of the U.S. Marshal and charged with

7 unlawful entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) in the United States District Court for the

8 District of Vermont. Both Santos and his wife cooperated with the investigation

9 into the smuggling network that had arranged for their entry into the United

10 States, providing detailed information on the arrangements that the network used

11 and other evidence, including ﬁnancial documents. Thereafter the government

12 dismissed the criminal complaint against Santos.

13 C. WITHHOLDING-ONLY PROCEEDINGS

14 While he was still in CBP custody, Santos expressed a fear of returning to

15 Brazil and was referred to an asylum oﬃcer for a “reasonable fear interview”

16 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. At that interview, which took place on September

17 14, 2017, Santos claimed that, because of his cooperation with U.S. law

18 enforcement, he feared retaliation from the smugglers who had transported him

6
1 into the United States. The asylum oﬃcer found Santos credible, but also found

2 that he had not established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Santos

3 requested that an immigration judge review the asylum oﬃcer’s determination

4 pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g). On September 28, 2017, Santos appeared for a

5 hearing at the Boston Immigration Court and testiﬁed before an immigration judge

6 (“IJ”) who vacated the asylum oﬃcer’s reasonable fear decision and ordered a

7 “withholding-only” hearing on Santos’s claims. 1

8 Santos submitted evidence to support his fear claims, including police

9 reports of threatening calls his relatives continued to receive, and photos depicting

10 his sister-in-law’s home, which had been ransacked, riddled with bullet holes, and

11 vandalized with graﬃti bearing death threats related to Santos’s cooperation with

12 law enforcement. The IJ held an individual merits hearing on January 22, 2018,

13 and denied Santos’s applications for withholding of removal. Santos appealed to

14 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which adopted and aﬃrmed the IJ’s

15 decision on October 2, 2020. Santos was released from DHS custody in April 2018,

16 during the pendency of his withholding-only proceedings.

1 When in withholding-only proceedings, noncitizens may only seek withholding of
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) or under the regulations that implement the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16–208.17, 1208.16–1208.17.
7
1 D. MORE RECENT PROCEEDINGS

2 In early 2020, Santos’s wife was granted asylum by an IJ in the San Francisco

3 Immigration Court. According to Santos, she was granted asylum on the same

4 facts and circumstances he alleged in his own asylum petition. On May 18, 2020,

5 Santos’s wife ﬁled an I-730 Asylee Relative Petition on Santos’s behalf. U.S.

6 Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied that petition on May 18,

7 2022 due to Santos’s outstanding reinstatement order.

8 Santos represents that, on August 1, 2022, he sent a request for a stay of

9 removal and rescission of his reinstatement order to the U.S. Immigration and

10 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) ﬁeld oﬃce in San Francisco, to which he was

11 regularly reporting at the time. He further represents that ICE denied that motion

12 by phone on April 20, 2023. Santos also submits that, on April 25, 2023, his counsel

13 ﬁled a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request for the entirety of his

14 immigration ﬁle in order to assess his reinstatement order, and that his counsel

15 received a response to the FOIA request on June 1, 2023.

16 Meanwhile, on August 4, 2023, Santos ﬁled a motion to reopen, reconsider,

17 and rescind his 2017 reinstatement order with CBP in Boston, arguing that DHS

18 violated his due process rights by failing to advise him of his rights to contest the

8
1 reinstatement order at the time it was issued. Speciﬁcally, he claims that he was

2 not advised in a language he understood of his right to make an oral or written

3 statement challenging the reinstatement decision in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b).

4 On August 23, 2023, CBP denied Santos’s motion. This denial is the second of the

5 two agency actions that Santos challenges in his petition for review.

6 E. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

7 Santos ﬁled the instant petition for review on September 22, 2023. Santos

8 then ﬁled a motion for a stay of removal, and the government ﬁled a motion to

9 dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Following argument, a motions panel

10 of this Court granted the motion for a stay and referred the motion to dismiss to a

11 merits panel. The motions panel further ordered the parties to brief the following

12 questions:

13 [W]hether (1) a decision to reinstate a removal order is a ﬁnal order of
14 removal subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a); (2) the CBP
15 has statutory or regulatory authority to reopen or rescind a reinstated
16 removal order; (3) if so, whether this Court has jurisdiction to review
17 such a ruling; and (4) this Court can review the 2017 reinstated
18 removal order if Respondent does not invok[e] the 30-day ﬁling
19 deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
20
21 Certiﬁed Order, Dkt. No. 33. Following brieﬁng and argument, Santos moved to

22 withdraw his motion for a stay of removal. This panel granted that request, and

9
1 then ordered supplemental brieﬁng on the issue of equitable tolling, which the

2 parties duly ﬁled.

3 DISCUSSION

4 Santos’s challenges to the two agency actions at issue present questions of

5 statutory construction, which we review de novo. See Fisher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

6 32 F.4th 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2022).

7 I. 2017 REINSTATEMENT ORDER

8 Santos urges this Court to review his 2017 reinstatement order. The gist of

9 his challenge to that order is that CBP did not comply with the regulations for

10 reinstating his removal order because it failed “to provide actual notice of his right

11 to make a statement contesting the [agency’s] determination . . . in a language he

12 could understand” and “fail[ed] to provide him with an interpreter in order to

13 allow a response.” Petitioner’s Reply Br. at 22; see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b) (requiring

14 immigration oﬃcers to provide noncitizens with notice of the reinstatement

15 decision and of the opportunity to contest it and requiring that oﬃcers consider

16 that challenge). Speciﬁcally, Santos represents that he speaks only Portuguese but

17 was notiﬁed of his rights in English, which forms the basis of his due process claim.

18 See Certiﬁed Administrative Record at 495, 505; Petitioner’s Br. at 26; see also

10
1 Bergamo v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 192 F.3d 78, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (“An

2 agency is bound to follow procedures required by its own regulations, even if

3 these regulations were not statutorily or constitutionally mandated.” (citing United

4 States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694–95 (1974))).

5 A. JURISDICTION OVER SANTOS’S 2017 REINSTATEMENT ORDER UNDER 8

6 U.S.C. § 1252(A)(1)

7 Our analysis begins with our jurisdiction to review Santos’s 2017

8 reinstatement order. See Juras v. Garland, 21 F.4th 53, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2021). Judicial

9 review of immigration orders is circumscribed by statute. As relevant here, 8

10 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) vests the circuit courts of appeal with jurisdiction to review

11 “ﬁnal order[s] of removal.” Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2009)

12 (alteration in original). Therefore, our ability to review Santos’s 2017

13 reinstatement order turns on whether that order is a “ﬁnal order of removal”

14 within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

15 Although the government took the contrary position in its main brief, it

16 argues in supplemental brieﬁng that Santos’s reinstatement order is not a ﬁnal

17 order of removal and that we therefore lack jurisdiction to hear his appeal. For the

18 reasons set forth below, we disagree.

11
1 “[A]ny statutory reference to ‘an order of removal’ is deemed to include a

2 reference to an order of deportation,” Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 267 (2025)

3 (cleaned up), which Congress deﬁned in the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death

4 Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 2 That

5 deﬁnition reads:

6 (A) The term “order of deportation” means the order of the special
7 inquiry oﬃcer, or other such administrative oﬃcer to whom the
8 Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining
9 whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable
10 or ordering deportation.
11 (B) The order described under subparagraph (A) shall become ﬁnal
12 upon the earlier of—
13 (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals
14 aﬃrming such order; or
15 (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted
16 to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration
17 Appeals.
18
19 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47). We must therefore determine whether Santos’s 2017

20 reinstatement order is (1) an order of removal and (2) ﬁnal.

21 Santos’s reinstatement order is an order of removal. In Nasrallah v. Barr, the

22 Supreme Court decided that an IJ’s order granting or denying protection under

2 Following the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-828, the terms “order of removal” and “order
of deportation” are used to the same eﬀect in diﬀerent sections of Title 8. See IIRAIRA § 309(d)(2)
(“[A]ny reference in law to an order of removal shall be deemed to include a reference to an order
of exclusion and deportation or an order of deportation.”). Though this opinion uses “removal,”
the terms are interchangeable.
12
1 the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)—one issued in “withholding-only”

2 proceedings—is not an “‘order of deportation’ because it is not an order

3 ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’” 590 U.S. 573,

4 584 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)). It further held that orders on CAT relief

5 do not “merge into ﬁnal orders of removal”—unlike, for instance, an IJ’s

6 “evidentiary rulings”—because “ﬁnal orders of removal encompass only the

7 rulings made by the immigration judge or Board of Immigration Appeals that aﬀect

8 the validity of the ﬁnal order of removal.” Id. at 582 (emphasis added).

9 Reinstatement orders are new and distinct agency decisions from the

10 removal orders on which they are predicated. The statute requires that DHS make

11 factual determinations prior to reinstatement of the sort contemplated by

12 Nasrallah. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (requiring ﬁndings that an individual is a

13 noncitizen, that they do not have authorization to reenter the United States, and

14 that they have previously been removed or granted voluntary departure while

15 subject to a removal order); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (same); see also Beekhan v. Holder, 634

16 F.3d 723, 725 (2d Cir. 2011) (reviewing whether petitioner’s reentry was actually

17 unlawful); Miller v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2008) (contemplating review

18 of “the predicate facts underlying the reinstatement order”); Ochoa-Carrillo v.

13
1 Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 845–48 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing both reinstatement

2 procedures and their factual and legal underpinnings); Vega-Anguiano v. Barr, 982

3 F.3d 542, 544–45 (9th Cir. 2019) (reviewing challenge to the legal underpinning of

4 a reinstatement order). These factual determinations are independent of those the

5 agency is required to make for the underlying removal order because a

6 reinstatement order “conclud[es] that the alien is deportable [and] order[s]

7 deportation.” Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted); see

8 Herrera-Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2010). 3

9 Although the reinstatement statute states that “the prior order of removal is

10 reinstated,” that reinstatement is explicitly predicated on agency ﬁndings of fact.

11 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“If the Attorney general ﬁnds . . . .”) (emphasis added). The

12 Supreme Court has explained that “law-enforcement discretion” is so

13 fundamental that it endures “even in the presence of seemingly mandatory

14 legislative commands.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).

15 The Court has speciﬁcally stated that the Executive may, in its discretion, abandon

3 The government’s reliance on United States v. Rodriguez is misplaced. In Rodriguez, this
Court did not address whether reinstatement orders are “ﬁnal orders of removal.” Rodriguez
was a criminal case in which the defendant moved to dismiss an indictment for aggravated
illegal reentry based on the alleged invalidity of his original removal order. See 162 F.4th 288,
291, 294 (2d Cir. 2025). The discussion of reinstatement orders in Rodriguez has no bearing on
the issue before us: whether such orders are “orders of removal” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)
and 1252(a)(1).
14
1 removal, including after issuing a removal order, despite the statute’s directive

2 that the agency “shall remove” noncitizens with removal orders. 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1231(a)(1)(A); see Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483

4 (1999). As such, we conclude that Santos’s 2017 reinstatement order is an “order

5 of removal.”

6 Having determined that reinstatement orders are distinct orders of removal,

7 we turn to whether they are “ﬁnal,” and, as such, subject to judicial review. 8

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). The issue of when a reinstatement order becomes ﬁnal came

9 before this Court in Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F.4th 180 (2d Cir. 2022), abrogated

10 on other grounds by Riley, 606 U.S. at 299. In that case, we assumed that a

11 reinstatement order is a judicially reviewable ﬁnal order of removal and concluded

12 that such orders become ﬁnal when the reinstatement decision “is deﬁnitive and

13 not subject to further review within the agency.” Id. at 192–93 & n.18.

14 The deﬁnition of ﬁnality we delineated in Bhaktibhai-Patel makes sense

15 because § 1101(a)(47)(B) “ties ﬁnality to the ﬁnal stage of agency review available

16 as of right . . . .” Id. at 192. The immigration statutes focus on completion of agency

17 review as the measure of ﬁnality beyond the deﬁnition at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).

18 See Bhaktibhai-Patel, 32 F.4th at 194 (“Thus, in § 1231(a)(1) [removal periods] and

15
1 § 1252 [judicial review] alike, ‘Congress focused our attention on the agency’s

2 review proceedings’ as the decisive metric for determining the ﬁnality of a

3 removal order.” (quoting Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534 (2021))).

4 Our holding that reinstatement orders are judicially reviewable ﬁnal orders

5 of removal is consistent with Congress’s scheme. At the time that Congress

6 deﬁned orders of deportation, that deﬁnition encompassed reinstatement orders

7 because they could be appealed to the BIA. The enactment of a new reinstatement

8 statute did not change this. In 1996, when Congress enacted § 1101(a)(47), a prior

9 version of the reinstatement statute was in eﬀect. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (repealed

10 1996). Under the regulations implementing that statute, reinstatement authority

11 was vested exclusively in immigration judges and their reinstatement orders were

12 appealable to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.8(a) (repealed 1997) (reinstatement

13 authority), 242.23(d) (repealed 1997) (same), 242.21 (allowing appeal of IJ

14 reinstatement orders to the BIA); see also Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir.

15 2011) (recognizing noncitizens’ prior ability to move to reopen before the BIA);

16 Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that noncitizens

17 could appear before IJs to contest reinstatement); Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 247,

16
1 253 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing the prior regime, including the “right to appeal an

2 adverse [reinstatement] decision to the Board”).

3 Neither party has presented evidence, nor has this Court found any, to

4 suggest that Congress’s subsequent amendments to the reinstatement statute

5 intended to exclude reinstatement orders from the provision that deﬁnes what

6 constitutes a ﬁnal order of removal. 4 See Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629,

7 645 (2022) (“This Court does not infer that Congress, in revising and consolidating

8 the laws, intended to change their policy, unless such an intention be clearly

9 expressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). True, the Supreme Court has

10 described Congress’s intent in enacting the new reinstatement statute as “toe[ing]

11 a harder line” by subjecting all illegal reentrants to reinstatement and

12 “foreclos[ing] discretionary relief from the terms of the reinstat[ment] order,”

13 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 (2006), but imposing harsher

14 consequences for illegal reentry is a separate and distinct policy goal from an

15 indirect curtailment of judicial review.

4 In Bhaktibhai-Patel, we also noted the “seemingly odd result” that reinstatement orders
are reviewable but that, under its holding, reentrants “generally may not obtain judicial review
of subsequent withholding-only proceedings.” 32 F.4th at 195. The Supreme Court has since
addressed that oddity in Riley, writing that the timing and reviewability of withholding-only
proceedings have no bearing on the ﬁnality of a removal order. 606 U.S. at 270–72.
17
1 When presented with a similar question about appellate jurisdiction over

2 the BIA’s denials of motions to reopen, the Supreme Court wrote that “[a]ny

3 lingering doubt . . . [is] dispelled by a familiar principle of statutory construction:

4 the presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Kucana v.

5 Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010). “We have consistently applied that interpretive

6 guide to legislation regarding immigration, and particularly to questions

7 concerning the preservation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Id. at 251–52 (further

8 requiring “’clear and convincing evidence’ to dislodge the presumption” (citations

9 omitted)).

10 Our own precedent supports the conclusion that reinstatement orders

11 constitute ﬁnal orders of removal subject to our review. In Garcia-Villeda v.

12 Mukasey, this Court considered, among other things, a due process challenge to

13 the reinstatement procedure under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. 531 F.3d 141, 149–50 (2d Cir.

14 2008). We entertained the challenge via a petition for review of a reinstatement

15 order, id. at 144, and so appeared to have assumed jurisdiction sub silentio.

16 However, we also wrote that, among the procedural safeguards available under

18
1 the scheme, noncitizens “may also challenge the reinstatement order in a court of

2 appeals.” Id. at 150 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)). 5

3 Later, in Herrera-Molina v. Holder, we also took up a petition for review of a

4 reinstatement order. 597 F.3d at 131–32. Even though the initial petition for review

5 was ﬁled prior to the BIA’s decision, we explained “that the reinstatement of his

6 prior deportation order [became] a reviewable ﬁnal order . . . .” Id. at 132. We then

7 proceeded to address the merits of the petitioner’s due process challenge to the

8 agency’s reinstatement of his order. Id. at 132–40. These opinions were followed

9 by a number of cases in which we, once again, sub silentio exercised jurisdiction

10 over challenges to reinstatement orders. See, e.g., Miller, 539 F.3d at 162; Amos v.

5 Each of our sister circuits to consider this issue has agreed that reinstatement orders may
be judicially reviewed. See Ponta-Garca v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 341, 342 (1st Cir. 2004) (“An order
reinstating an earlier order of deportation is subject to review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.”); Dinnall,
421 F.3d at 251 n.6 (“Because an order reinstating a prior removal order is the functional
equivalent of a ﬁnal order of removal, we have jurisdiction to hear [the] petition.” (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted)); Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti, 263 F.3d 102, 105 (4th Cir.
2001) (“First, we note that, as the INS concedes, we clearly have subject matter jurisdiction in this
case.”); Ojeda-Terrazas v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 292, 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[R]einstatement of
[petitioner’s] previous deportation order is a ﬁnal order of the INS. A fair interpretation of [§
1252] grants this court the authority to review the lawfulness of the reinstatement order.”); Avila
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 560 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (“An order of reinstatement is a ﬁnal order
of removal under § 1252(a)(1).”). But see Ruiz-Perez v. Garland, 49 F.4th 972, 976 (5th Cir. 2022)
(noting that Ojeda-Terrazas’s holding “may require reassessment”).
19
1 Holder, 358 F. App’x 261, 262 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); Familia v. Holder, 600

2 F. App’x 23, 24 (2d Cir 2015) (summary order). 6

3 We recognize that our dicta in Bhaktibhai-Patel questioned the limited

4 reasoning underpinning our prior holdings that reinstatement orders are ﬁnal

5 orders of removal subject to judicial review. In Bhaktibhai-Patel, we referred to our

6 precedents as only “implicitly hold[ing]” that reinstatement orders are “ﬁnal

7 order[s] of removal” and described that holding as “rest[ing] on an unstable

8 foundation.” Id. at 195. We nevertheless refrained from ruling on our jurisdiction

9 under § 1252(a), see id. at 192 n.18, because we found the petition untimely under

10 § 1252(b)(1) and held that such a defect was jurisdictional, id. at 193. But the Riley

11 Court subsequently rejected the logic that an agency order “may never become

12 ﬁnal” in view of § 1101(a)(47)(B) if “it cannot be appealed to the BIA.” Id. at 195

13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Riley, 606 U.S. at 267. As discussed above,

14 there is a sound statutory basis to reaﬃrm our prior holdings, and we expressly

15 hold that a reinstatement order is a ﬁnal order of removal subject to judicial review

16 under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

6See also Villegas de la Paz v. Holder, 640 F.3d 650, 653 (6th Cir. 2010) (exercising jurisdiction
to review a reinstatement order); Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); Duran-
Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.5 (10th Cir. 2003) (same).
20
1 For these reasons, this Court has jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to

2 review Santos’s challenge to his 2017 reinstatement order.

3 B. TIMELINESS AND EQUITABLE TOLLING

4 Section § 1252(b)(1) provides that a “petition for review must be ﬁled not

5 later than 30 days after the date of the ﬁnal order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

6 Santos ﬁled this petition for review on September 22, 2023, more than six years

7 after his reinstatement order became “ﬁnal” on July 2, 2017. Santos argues that we

8 should apply equitable tolling and deem his petition timely.

9 Even assuming equitable tolling applies, the record reveals that Santos is not

10 entitled to tolling. We have held that equitable tolling is warranted where “the

11 party seeking tolling was prevented from timely ﬁling in some extraordinary way

12 and passes with reasonable diligence through the period it seeks to have tolled.”

13 Perez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 327, 330 (2d Cir. 2026) (per curiam) (internal quotation

14 marks omitted). A review of the record in the light most favorable to Santos fails

15 to show that he exercised reasonable diligence during the time period he seeks to

16 toll.

17 Santos provides no explanation, nor is one readily apparent, for the delay of

18 more than two months between the May 18, 2022 USCIS denial of his Asylee

21
1 Relative Petition, which he claims placed him on notice of his reinstatement order,

2 and his August 1, 2022 request to the San Francisco ICE ﬁeld oﬃce to rescind that

3 order. Moreover, Santos’s failure to ﬁle the FOIA request until eleven months after

4 he was indisputably on notice of his reinstatement order is incompatible with any

5 argument that he exercised due diligence. As such, Santos’s petition for review of

6 the 2017 reinstatement order is untimely.

7 II. 2023 DENIAL OF SANTOS’S MOTION TO REOPEN, RECONSIDER, AND

8 RESCIND

9 Having determined that Santos’s petition for review of his 2017

10 reinstatement order is untimely, we next consider his petition for review of

11 CBP’s 2023 denial of his motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind the 2017

12 reinstatement order.

13 A. JURISDICTION OVER CBP’S DENIAL OF SANTOS’S MOTION UNDER 8

14 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(6)

15 As before, we begin by determining whether we have jurisdiction to review

16 CBP’s denial of Santos’s 2023 motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind his

17 reinstatement order. We hold that we do.

22
1 Section 1252(b)(6) provides that “[w]hen a petitioner seeks review of a [ﬁnal

2 order of removal], any review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order

3 shall be consolidated with the review of the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6).

4 Section 1252(b)(6) “expressly contemplates” appellate jurisdiction over “decisions

5 refusing to reopen or reconsider” ﬁnal orders of removal. Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S.

6 143, 147 (2015). The Supreme Court has further held that circuit courts have

7 jurisdiction to review the denials of motions to reopen, in a case involving a denial

8 by the BIA. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242, 253 (2010) (“Action on motions to

9 reopen . . . therefore remain subject to judicial review.”). The government seeks to

10 limit § 1252(b)(6) to petitions for review of BIA-issued removal orders. Yet

11 § 1252(b)(6) provides that “[w]hen a petitioner seeks review of an order under this

12 section, any review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order shall be

13 consolidated with the review of the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6). The statute

14 draws no distinction between ﬁnal removal orders issued by the BIA and by DHS.

15 Exercising jurisdiction here gives eﬀect to Congress’s purpose to channel multiple

16 agency actions into the petition for review process. Section 1252(b)(6) is one of

17 several provisions in the IIRAIRA that sought to consolidate and streamline

18 judicial review of agency action in the courts of appeals. See generally Luna, 637

23
1 F.3d at 93, 95–96 (discussing how AEDPA and IIRAIRA amendments

2 “consolidated all judicial review” and “reject[ed] the existing dual tracks of

3 review” (cleaned up)).

4 As such, we hold that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a) and 1252(b)(6) provide us with

5 jurisdiction to review CBP’s denial of Santos’s motion to reopen. Accordingly, we

6 turn to the merits.

7 B. CBP’S AUTHORITY UNDER 8 C.F.R. § 103.5

8 CBP denied Santos’s motion because it believed that “there is no prescribed

9 mechanism for CBP to reopen, reconsider, or vacate . . . a reinstatement order.”

10 Special App’x at 36. Because we conclude that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 vests CBP with

11 authority to reopen, reconsider, and rescind Santos’s reinstatement order, we

12 vacate and remand for the agency to consider his motion in the ﬁrst instance.

13 “As always, we begin with the text.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450,

14 457 (2022). Section 103.5 is quite broad: where “the aﬀected party ﬁles a motion,”

15 § 103.5 grants the “oﬃcial having jurisdiction” authority to “reopen the

16 proceeding or reconsider the prior decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). The “oﬃcial

17 having jurisdiction is the oﬃcial who made the latest decision in the proceeding.”

18 Id. § 103.5(a)(1)(ii).

24
1 On its face, then, the plain language of § 103.5 contemplates that

2 immigration oﬃcials, like CBP oﬃcers, have the authority to consider and grant

3 motions to reopen and reconsider so long as those CBP oﬃcers were the oﬃcials

4 who made the latest decision in the proceeding. See id. § 103.5(a)(1). “Where there

5 is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be

6 a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the plain

7 meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves did

8 not suggest.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95–96 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.);

9 see also Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).

10 The regulation’s exclusion of several categories of decisions from its reach,

11 see id. § 103.5(a)(1)(i), does not alter or undermine our conclusion because none of

12 these exclusions apply to removal orders issued by DHS, such as reinstatement

13 orders. See Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir. 1999);

14 N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 302 (2017). Speciﬁcally, § 103.5 expressly

15 excludes all those matters over which the BIA has authority. See 8 C.F.R.

16 § 103.5(a)(1)(i) (“Except where the Board has jurisdiction . . . .”). It further

17 excludes all matters relating to “Special Agricultural Workers” over which the

18 Executive Oﬃce of Immigration Review has jurisdiction, and matters relating to

25
1 adjustment of status. See id. Section 103.5 could have added to its list of exclusions

2 motions to reopen reinstated removal orders. The fact that it does not supports

3 our conclusion. 7

4 The government raises two distinct arguments as to why we should not

5 interpret § 103.5 to grant CBP the authority to consider Santos’s motion to reopen.

6 First, it claims that § 103.5 should be cabined to the beneﬁts context. Second, it

7 claims that the reinstatement statute, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), itself bars motions

8 to reopen reinstatement orders. We address each argument in turn.

9 1. SECTION 103.5 IS NOT LIMITED TO THE BENEFITS CONTEXT

10 Irrespective of the clear answer that the text of the regulation provides, the

11 government, relying on the title of the regulation and its references to USCIS Form

12 I-290B, argues that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 is limited to the beneﬁts context. We do not

13 ﬁnd these arguments persuasive. More speciﬁcally, the government argues that

14 § 103.5 provides only for reopening and reconsidering beneﬁts applications before

15 USCIS because § 103.5 is housed within Part 103, titled “Immigration Beneﬁt

7
The partial dissent submits that “if section 103.5 covers only beneﬁts, then the expressio
unius canon would simply suggest that the section applies to all non-excluded beneﬁts.”
Sullivan, J., dissenting in part, infra 6. In support, the partial dissent supplies an analogy of a
customer seeking a lobster in an ice cream shop. That analogy assumes its conclusion – that
§ 103.5 covers beneﬁts only. To assume that we are in an ice cream shop, rather than a grocery
store, begs the question.
26
1 Requests; USCIS Filing Requirements; Biometric Requirements; Availability of

2 Records,” and within a subpart titled “Applying for Beneﬁts, Surety Bonds, and

3 Fees.” Amicus has provided the Court with cases in which the government has

4 endorsed, and our sister circuits have accepted, a contrary litigating position. See

5 Amicus Br. at 9; see also Xu v. Garland, 26 F.4th 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[T]he

6 government . . . contend[ed] . . . that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(i) authorizes the DHS to

7 cancel a [DHS-issued removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)].”); Escoto-Castillo v.

8 Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011) (“As the government notes, . . . Escoto-

9 Castillo could have ﬁled a timely motion to reopen the removal proceedings. See

10 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a).”). Although titles may be useful for interpretive purposes, they

11 are “of use only when [they] shed[] light on some ambiguous word or phrase.” Pa.

12 Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

13 The text of § 103.5 is not ambiguous. Again, § 103.5 provides that when an

14 “aﬀected party ﬁles a motion,” “the oﬃcial who made the latest decision in the

15 proceeding” “may . . . reopen the proceeding or reconsider the prior decision.” 8

16 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i)–(ii). The title of the regulation cannot supply the escape

17 hatch for which the government grasps. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 524 U.S. at 212 (“The

27
1 title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” (alterations accepted)

2 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 8

3 The government’s reliance on the language of Form I-290B, a USCIS form

4 referenced in § 103.5, to argue that § 103.5 applies only to beneﬁts applications

5 before USCIS is equally unavailing. See Respondent’s Br. at 25–26 (citing the form

6 and instructions, which are published on USCIS’s website). The reference in the

7 regulation to Form I-290B was introduced in 2005. 9 See Adjustment of the Appeal

8 and Motion Fees to Recover Full Costs, 70 Fed. Reg. 50954-01, 50957 (Aug. 29,

9 2005). In that amendment, the agency did not make substantive changes to the

10 text of the regulation but merely introduced Form I-290B to replace the then-

8 Urging a contrary conclusion, the partial dissent begins with context, see Sullivan, J.,
dissenting in part, infra 2–4 (discussing Part 103’s title and the provisions neighboring
§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)), and only later arrives at text, see id. at 5 (analyzing the text of § 103.5(a)(1)(i)).
But that context-ﬁrst approach inverts the correct order of analysis. Although some of the
surrounding sections do relate to immigration beneﬁts, § 103 also addresses distinct subjects
such as procedures for precedent decisions—including from removal proceedings—by the
Attorney General, see 8 C.F.R. § 103.10, immigration bonds, see id. § 103.6, and fees, including
those payable to other agencies besides USCIS, see id. § 103.7.
9 Reliance on the current version of the form is not instructive because it may diﬀer from

the 2005 version. The current version of Form I-290B states that it was last modiﬁed on May 31,
2024, such that it postdates the regulation’s amendment by nearly two decades. Neither party
has submitted to this Court the version of Form I-290B that was in eﬀect in 2005. To the extent
the current version of the form has any force, however, its scope is not as limited as the partial
dissent suggests. Contrast Sullivan, J., dissenting in part, infra 4 (asserting that Form I-290B
governs only “aﬃrmative requests for beneﬁts” but not “responses to CBP’s enforcement actions”
(emphasis removed)), with Form I-290B at 3, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (May 31, 2024),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/document/forms/i-290b.pdf (requiring applicants to
authorize the release of any information “to other entities and persons where necessary for the
administration and enforcement of U.S. immigration law” (emphases added)).
28
1 obsolete Form I‑290A, which was directed to the defunct Immigration and

2 Naturalization Service. Id. at 50956. In the same amendment, the agency added a

3 fee provision relating to Form I-290B and described its purpose as follows: “For

4 ﬁling an appeal from any decision under the immigration laws in any type of

5 proceeding over which the [BIA] does not have appellate jurisdiction—$385.00 . . . .”

6 Id. at 50957 (emphasis added). This language as to the form’s purpose is broad

7 and unambiguously encompasses motions to reopen like Santos’s. 10

8 The language of the regulation, which refers to both an “applicant or

9 petitioner,” does not alter our analysis. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). Although both

10 “applicant” and “petitioner” may refer to noncitizens seeking immigration

11 beneﬁts, noncitizens seeking something other than an immigration beneﬁt may

12 also be referred to as applicants. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f) (applications for

10 We are unpersuaded that Form I-290B cannot be used to ﬁle motions or appeals with
agencies other than USCIS. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(d)(15) (setting the fee for ﬁling of Form I-290B
with ICE). The form does focus on USCIS beneﬁts appeals and motions, as one would expect of
a USCIS form, yet the instructions, which the government relies upon, specify that the form “is
primarily used to ﬁle” appeals with the Administrative Appeals Oﬃce or motions with USCIS, not
that this is the form’s exclusive purpose. Instructions for Notice of Appeal or Motion, available at
https://www.uscis.gov/i-290b. One agency’s use of another’s ill-ﬁtting forms is not unheard of in
the immigration context. See e.g., State Dep’t Foreign Aﬀairs Manual, 9 FAM 103.4-3(a)(3)(b),
601.7-3(c)(2)(a) (requiring ﬁling of DHS Form G-28 to establish an attorney/client relationship
before the Department of State); Form G-28, available at https://www.uscis.gov/g-28 (requiring
attorneys to specify which agency of DHS they are appearing before).
29
1 Temporary Protected Status) and 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a) (visa petitions) with 8 C.F.R.

2 § 208.16(a) (applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection).

3 We recognize that two of our sister circuits have reasoned that 8 C.F.R.

4 § 103.5 is limited to immigration beneﬁts, but we are unpersuaded by their

5 reasoning. In Lavery v. Barr, the Fifth Circuit engaged in limited analysis; it

6 considered only the title of § 103 and the beneﬁts-related nature of some

7 surrounding sections and did not discuss the text of the regulation. See 943 F.3d

8 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2019). The Tenth Circuit in Aguilar-Aguilar v. Napolitano came to

9 the same conclusion, albeit in dicta, because the case was on direct review of a

10 DHS-issued removal order. See 700 F.3d 1238, 1242 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012). Although

11 the Tenth Circuit did reference the text, it conclusorily noted that “[r]ead in

12 context, the meaning of ‘aﬀected party’ in § 103.5(a)(1)(i) refers to an unsuccessful

13 petitioner [for beneﬁts] under § 103.2.” Id. 11

14 That § 103.5 is not limited to the beneﬁts context is buttressed by Department

15 of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). In that case, the Supreme

16 Court examined its jurisdiction to review a habeas petition challenging a DHS-

11 Like the government and the partial dissent, Lavery—in a single paragraph—errs in
relying on context over text. See 943 F.3d at 276. And the relevant language in Aguilar-Aguilar is
dicta, not a holding. See 700 F.3d at 1242 n.3. Hence, there is no “clear authority” that § 103.5 is
limited to the context of beneﬁts. Contra Sullivan, J., dissenting in part, infra 9.
30
1 issued removal order issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Id. at 114–15. As

2 relevant, the Court ultimately held that certain statutory limitations on judicial

3 review did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 140. In so doing, the Court

4 wrote that Thuraissigiam could pursue his claims administratively, noting that

5 “[d]epartment oﬃcials and immigration judges may reopen cases or reconsider

6 decisions” under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1). Id. at 140 & n.28. Although we recognize

7 that Thuraissigiam was a beneﬁts case in which the Court considered a decision by

8 an asylum oﬃcer in credible fear proceedings, the Court’s choice of language was

9 broad and came in the context of a discussion of the petitioner’s due process rights,

10 not the nature of the relief he sought. As such, we conclude that Santos’s argument

11 about the scope of § 103.5 ﬁnds support in Thuraissigiam, in which the Supreme

12 Court made no reference to an atextual limitation to the beneﬁts context.

13 Several of our sister circuits have similarly refrained from reading a beneﬁts

14 restriction into § 103.5. For example, in Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, the Eighth

15 Circuit wrote that “[a]s the government notes . . . Escoto-Castillo could have ﬁled

16 a timely motion to reopen the removal proceedings[, s]ee 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a),” to

17 raise a challenge to his DHS-issued removal order. 658 F.3d at 866; see also Turcios

18 v. Wolf, 828 F. App’x 496, 500 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (ﬁnding that § 103.5

31
1 provides for motions to reopen expedited removal orders and, more generally,

2 “proceeding[s] conducted by someone other than the BIA”); Evers v. Mukasey, 288

3 F. App’x 441, 441 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (“Pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

4 § 103.5(a)(1)(i), Evers could have ﬁled a motion to reopen proceedings as an

5 ‘aﬀected party’ after the DHS’s [expedited removal] decision.”). For the foregoing

6 reasons, we conclude that motions to reopen or reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5

7 are not limited to the beneﬁts context or to USCIS.

8 2. THE REINSTATEMENT STATUTE DOES NOT BAR REOPENING OF

9 REINSTATEMENT ORDERS

10 Contrary to the government’s position, the reinstatement statute, see 8 U.S.C.

11 § 1231(a)(5), does not bar reopening of reinstatement orders. That provision reads

12 in relevant part: “[T]he prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date

13 and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). The

14 subject of that sentence is “the prior order of removal,” meaning the original

15 removal order. As discussed supra in Part I.A, reinstatement orders are agency

16 actions distinct from original removal orders. Section 1231(a)(5) plainly forbids

17 the reopening of the original removal order, not a subsequent reinstatement order.

18 A bar to reopening the original removal order is also consistent with the purpose

32
1 of § 1231(a)(5), which penalizes noncitizens who reenter the United States after

2 being removed by barring any challenges to their original removal. Yet petitioners

3 may still raise limited challenges to reinstatement orders. In fact, the regulations

4 themselves require the agency to advise noncitizens of their right to contest the

5 reinstatement decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b). It would make little sense to

6 provide such a procedural protection without any mechanism to pursue it.

7 There are good reasons to allow such limited challenges. For example,

8 citizens who fall prey to cases of mistaken identity may argue that they are, in fact,

9 citizens, and that the agency has erred in establishing the factual predicates to a

10 reinstatement order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(2). Interpreted

11 otherwise, citizens wrongly issued an invalid reinstatement order would be left

12 with no recourse. Likewise, noncitizens who have authorization to enter the

13 United States may raise that claim if the agency erroneously determines that they

14 do not have such authorization and issues a reinstatement order. See 8 C.F.R.

15 § 241.8(a)(3). Santos’s motion to reopen his reinstatement order does not seek to

16 attack the underlying removal order but the reinstatement process itself.

17 Although the Seventh Circuit in Tapia-Lemos v. Holder, 696 F.3d 687, 689 (7th

18 Cir. 2012), endorsed the government’s interpretation of § 1231(a)(5), it did so based

33
1 on a premise that a subsequent decision of that court has since undermined, see

2 Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 790–92 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit in

3 Tapia-Lemos reasoned that, because the petitioner was already barred from

4 reopening his original removal order by the ninety-day deadline set forth in 8

5 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), § 1231(a)(5) must be read to bar reopening of

6 reinstatement orders, rather than underlying removal orders, to avoid

7 surplusage. 12 See Tapia-Lemos, 696 F.3d at 690. That reasoning fails, however,

8 because the Seventh Circuit did not consider that § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) does not bar

9 reopening of all removal orders, just those more than 90 days old. The fact that

10 the petitioner in Tapia-Lemos happened to be barred from reopening his original

11 removal order by a separate provision does not render the bar in § 1231(a)(5) a

12 nullity. Our reading of § 1231(a)(5) has the independent eﬀect of barring the

13 reopening of all original removal orders underlying reinstatement orders,

14 including those not otherwise covered by § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Indeed, one year

15 later, the Seventh Circuit construed § 1231(a)(5) to bar reopening of an original

16 removal order, giving it precisely the eﬀect that Tapia-Lemos labeled surplusage.

12The canon against surplusage requires courts to “give eﬀect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But the Supreme Court has counseled that “our preference for avoiding surplusage
constructions is not absolute.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004).
34
1 See Cordova-Soto, 732 F.3d at 790, 793. The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Tapia-

2 Lemos that § 1231(a)(5) serves no function if it does not bar reopening of

3 reinstatement orders is incompatible with its more recent application of that

4 section to bar original removal orders. See Cordova-Soto, 732 F.3d at 793. 13

5 It is also incompatible with the consistent application of § 1231(a)(5) to bar

6 reopening of original removal orders by this Court and ﬁve of our sister circuits.

7 This Court has regularly interpreted and applied § 1231(a)(5) to bar reopening of

8 underlying removal orders, rather than reinstatement orders. See, e.g., Garcia-

9 Villeda, 531 F.3d at 150; Miller, 539 F.3d at 164–65; Lema v. Holder, 363 F. App’x 88,

10 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order). Likewise, several of our sister circuits have

11 applied the statute in the same way. See Sanchez-Gonzalez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 411,

12 414 (6th Cir. 2021) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) to limit reopening of

13 petitioner’s original removal order); Tarango-Delgado v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1233,

14 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2021) (same); Gutierrez-Gutierrez v. Garland, 991 F.3d 990, 994

13 Nor does the Seventh Circuit’s reading in Tapia-Lemos of 8 C.F.R. § 103.5, which turned
on its incorrect reading of § 1231(a)(5), survive that court’s decision one year later in Cordova-
Soto, 732 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2013). See Tapia-Lemos, 696 F.3d at 689 (concluding incorrectly that
§ 1231(a)(5) bars reopening of reinstatement orders, and then reasoning that, because “[a]
regulation cannot countermand a statute, . . . § 103.5(a) does not apply to decisions that reinstate
removal orders.”). Tapia-Lemos’s reasoning does not support the partial dissent’s reading of
§ 103.5. And, as discussed, the Seventh Circuit corrected its misreading of § 1231(a)(5) one year
later in Cordova-Soto.
35
1 (8th Cir. 2021) (same); Rodriguez-Saragosa v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir.

2 2018) (same); Cordova-Soto, 732 F.3d at 793 (same); but see Suate-Orellana v. Garland,

3 101 F.4th 624, 631–32 (9th Cir. 2024).

4 For these reasons, we hold that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1) provides CBP with the

5 authority to reopen and reconsider its decision to reinstate a removal order. 14

6 C. JUSTICIABILITY UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 701(A)(2)

7 Having established that the agency has the authority to adjudicate motions

8 to reopen and reconsider its decisions to reinstate removal orders, we must decide

9 whether this case is justiciable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), a provision of the

10 Administrative Procedure Act that precludes judicial review where “agency action

11 is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). We hold that

12 judicial review is not precluded by § 701(a)(2).

13 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court interpreted § 701(a)(2) and held that

14 judicial review is precluded where “the statute is drawn so that a court would have

15 no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of

16 discretion.” 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). Pursuant to this rule, the Court concluded

14 As in Bhaktibhai-Patel, we need not decide whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) excepts
constitutional or legal claims from the § 1231(a)(5) bar on review of an underlying removal order.
See 32 F.4th at 192 n.17.
36
1 that a Food and Drug Administration decision to refrain from taking certain

2 enforcement actions was unreviewable. Id. at 823. The Court noted, however, that

3 the § 701(a)(2) exception “remains a narrow one.” Id. at 827–28 (citation omitted).

4 “The legislative history of the [APA] indicates that it is applicable in those rare

5 instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there

6 is no law to apply.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410

7 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8 Where there exist meaningful standards, § 701(a)(2) does not bar judicial

9 review. The Supreme Court recently held that review was not barred in Salinas v.

10 United States Railroad Retirement Board, which concerned the Railroad Retirement

11 Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a decision denying a former employee’s

12 application for beneﬁts. See 592 U.S. 188, 190 (2021). In that case, the Court

13 exercised jurisdiction because, even though “[w]hether to grant reopening is

14 ultimately discretionary,” the Board “ha[d] established substantive criteria to

15 guide its discretion.” Id. at 191. The Court found that a regulation providing that

16 “a decision may be reopened ‘[w]ithin four years of the date of the notice of such

17 decision, if there is new and material evidence’” was a suﬃciently substantive

37
1 criterion to permit judicial review. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R.

2 § 261.2(b)).

3 Section 103.5 sets forth a similar standard by which this Court may review

4 the agency’s exercise of its discretion: it provides that reopening may be had “for

5 proper cause shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i), and that motions must “state the

6 new facts to be provided . . . and be supported by aﬃdavits or other documentary

7 evidence,” id. § 103.5(a)(2). 15 These standards are similar to those for motions to

8 reopen before the immigration courts, which must “state the new facts that will be

9 proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by

10 aﬃdavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). This Court

11 regularly, and uncontroversially, reviews such motions. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448

12 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (setting forth our standard of review for such

13 challenges); see also, e.g., Mohamed v. Bondi, No. 24-723, 2026 WL 41091, at *4 (2d

15 We further note that another part of 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 and the underlying reinstatement
regulation both provide additional substantive criteria by which courts may review decisions on
motions to reopen or reconsider reinstatement orders. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5(a)(1)(i), (3) (providing
for reconsideration for “proper cause” upon a motion “stat[ing] the reasons for reconsideration
and . . . supported by any pertinent precedent decisions to establish that the decision was based
on an incorrect application of law or Service policy”); id. § 241.8(a)(3) (setting forth the substantive
criteria for the decision to be reconsidered, including that “the oﬃcer shall consider all relevant
evidence, including statements made by the alien and any evidence in the alien’s possession” and
that the “oﬃcer shall attempt to verify an alien’s claim, if any, that he or she was lawfully
admitted, which shall include a check of Service data systems . . . .”). As such, we are satisﬁed
that 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) does not preclude our review of motions ﬁled under 8 U.S.C. § 103.5(a).
38
1 Cir. Jan. 7, 2026) (summary order); Rahman v. Bondi, No. 24-103, 2025 WL 3085594,

2 at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (summary order). 16

3 Even assuming that § 701(a)(2) applies, we may nonetheless review the

4 agency’s decision because “review is not entirely foreclosed [where an agency]

5 misperceives the law or misunderstands its jurisdiction.” Vela-Estrada, 817 F.3d at

6 71 n.1 (noting that, in such cases, “it is appropriate to remand to allow the [agency]

7 to consider its authority”); see also, e.g., Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645,

8 651 (3rd Cir. 2017) (recognizing the same exception); Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575,

9 587 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Thompson v. Barr, 959 F.3d 476, 483 (1st Cir. 2020) (same).

10 That was the case here. The denial that CBP issued Santos stated that “there

11 is no prescribed mechanism for CBP to reopen, reconsider, or vacate an expedited

12 removal order or a reinstatement order.” Special App’x at 36. At a minimum, CBP

13 misperceived the law and misunderstood its jurisdiction over Santos’s motion,

14 which it was authorized to adjudicate. See supra Section II.B. Where an

15 adjudicator’s conclusions are predicated on “erroneous determinations of law,” he

16
We have joined other circuits in applying Heckler only in those rare cases where neither the
statute nor the regulations provide meaningful standards of any kind. See, e.g., Ali, 448 F.3d at 518
(explaining that we may not review BIA decisions regarding whether to reopen cases sua sponte under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides merely that this is “within the discretion of the Board” and can be done
“at any time” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a))); Vela-Estrada v. Lynch, 817 F.3d 69, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2016)
(explaining that we may not review BIA decisions regarding whether to self-certify appeals under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(c), which provides merely that it may do so “in its discretion” (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(c))).

39
1 has “necessarily” abused his discretion. Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Pub. Co., 240

2 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). As that is the only

3 basis for CBP’s denial, and because it has the power to consider Santos’s motion

4 to reopen, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

5 CONCLUSION

6 Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, we DENY Santos’s petition

7 for review as to his 2017 reinstatement order. We further GRANT Santos’s petition

8 as to CBP’s 2023 denial of his motion to reopen, reconsider, and rescind his 2017

9 reinstatement order, VACATE CBP's decision, and REMAND for the agency to

10 consider Santos’s motion in the ﬁrst instance. The government’s motion to dismiss

11 Santos’s petition for review is DENIED as moot.

40
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that (i) we have jurisdiction over reinstated

removal orders; and (ii) Santos’s challenge to his 2017 reinstated removal order

came too late. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), (b)(1). But I cannot join its holding that we

may also review Customs and Border Protection’s 2023 denial of Santos’s motion

to reopen the reinstated order. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion

of the majority opinion.

“[A]gency action is not subject to judicial review to the extent that such

action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,

190–91 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an action

is so committed, we must examine whether any “judicially manageable standards

are available for judging how and when an agency should exercise [its]

discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). If we lack such standards,

“then it is impossible to evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of discretion,’” and

“review is not to be had.” Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (making agency action

unreviewable if it “is committed to agency discretion”).

The majority agrees with this general principle. See Maj. Op. at 36. But it

nonetheless insists that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 – which allows Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) to “reopen [a] proceeding or reconsider [a] prior decision” if a

movant shows “proper cause” – applies to removal orders, thus providing a

“meaningful standard[]” of review, id. at 37–38 (internal quotation marks omitted).

I disagree. Both the regulation’s text and persuasive precedent show that section

103.5 governs only requests for certain immigration benefits, not motions asking

CBP to reconsider discretionary decisions to reinstate removal orders. And

without section 103.5 – which is the only source of “meaningful standards” that

the majority identifies – we have no “law to apply” and therefore may not review

CBP’s denial of Santos’s motion. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

I. The Text of Section 103.5 Makes Clear that It Does Not Govern Reinstated
Removal Orders.

Section 103.5 lies in the middle of Part 103, which is titled “Immigration

Benefit Requests; USCIS Filing Requirements; Biometric Requirements;

Availability of Records.” See Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023)

(“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the

resolution of a doubt about [its] meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Subpart A of that section begins by establishing general procedures for

“[a]pplying for benefits,” such as asylum or withholding of removal. To that end,

2
Section 103.2 first tells applicants how to “[s]ubmi[t] . . . benefit requests” to U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). And sections 103.3 and 103.5

then detail what an applicant should do if USCIS initially denies his request.

Specifically, section 103.3 explains how to formally appeal, while section 103.5

establishes procedures allowing the party “affected” by the denial of benefits to

ask the “official who made the latest decision” in the benefits “proceeding” to

reconsider.

Section 103.5 does not just provide abstract guidance – it expressly mandates

that motions for reconsideration “be submitted on Form I-290B.” See 8 C.F.R

§ 103.5(a)(1)(iii). And Form I-290B in turn includes a link to “information on the

immigration benefit types that are eligible for . . . [a] motion using this form.” See

Form I-290B, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (May 31, 2024),

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-290b.pdf; see also 8

C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1) (requiring applicants to follow “form instructions”). Those

types include both important benefits like asylum (Form I-589) and more mundane

ones like a replacement green card (Form I-90). See When to Use Form I-290B, Notice

of Appeal or Motion, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Apr. 3 2025),

3
https://www.uscis.gov/i-290b/eligibility. But notably absent from this list of

benefits is coaxing CBP into reconsidering a reinstated removal order.

That makes sense: section 103.5 and its accompanying form clearly govern

affirmative requests for benefits, not responses to CBP’s enforcement actions. Indeed,

section 103.5 does not involve CBP at all; section 103.2(a)(7)(i) explains that USCIS

– not CBP – “will consider a benefit request.” And unlike CBP, USCIS plays no

role in reinstating orders of removal.

The majority does not seriously contest any of this analysis, and it does not

claim that motions to reconsider reinstated removal orders somehow involve

immigration benefits. In fact, it concedes that (i) the title of Part 103 describes

benefits, and such titles may be “useful for interpretive purposes”; (ii) “some of

the surrounding sections do relate to immigration benefits”; and (iii) Form I-290B

is an “ill-fitting form” for motions to reconsider reinstated removal orders because

it ”focus[es] on USCIS benefits appeals and motions,” not CBP’s removal orders.

Maj. Op. at 27–28 & n.8, 29 n.10. Nevertheless, the majority contends that it may

avoid this unpleasant context because “the plain language of [section] 103.5”

unquestionably extends to agency decisions unrelated to benefits, and “when

4
there is no ambiguity[,] . . . there is no room for construction.” Id. at 25 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

But the majority offers a strained reading of section 103.5. As discussed

above, that section allows any “affected party” to file a motion with “the official

who made the latest decision in the proceeding.” But who qualifies as an “affected

party”? Affected by what, exactly? And in what kind “proceeding”? The

surrounding context provides clear answers: “affected” parties are those who

have encountered a specific kind of decision – the denial of benefits. See Aguilar-

Aguilar v. Napolitano, 700 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Read in context, the

meaning of ‘affected party’ in [section] 103.5(a)(1)(i) refers to an unsuccessful

petitioner [for benefits] under [section] 103.2.”); see also Grajales v. Comm’r, 47 F.4th

58, 62 (2d Cir. 2022) (“We must not look merely at the plain language of a particular

clause[] but consider [it] in connection with . . . the whole statute.” (quoting Dada

v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008))).

Perhaps sensing the weakness of its bare textual argument, the majority also

invokes the expressio unius canon, explaining that because section 103.5 “exclu[des]

. . . several categories of decisions from its reach” it must implicitly include all other

matters. Maj. Op. at 25. But see Whetsel v. Network Prop. Servs., LLC, 246 F.3d 897,

5
902 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has reduced

force in the context of interpreting agency[-]administered regulations.”). But if

section 103.5 covers only benefits, then the expressio unius canon would simply

suggest that the section applies to all non-excluded benefits. Just imagine a sign at

an ice cream shop saying that it served every major flavor except chocolate chip.

That instruction would suggest that the shop had vanilla, chocolate, and even

cookie-dough ice cream on hand – but it wouldn’t mean that the shop also served

lobster.

Finally, the majority drops a last-ditch structural argument into a footnote,

suggesting that Part 103 “also addresses distinct subjects” other than immigration

benefits. Maj. Op. at 28 n.8. But no one contests that fact: Part 103’s title makes

clear that it deals not only with “Immigration Benefit Requests,” but also with

“USCIS Filing Requirements; Biometric Requirements; [and] Availability of

Records.” As the structure of the regulation makes obvious, however, different

sections discuss different issues. While sections 103.2 through 103.5 deal with

benefits, section 103.6 pivots to “[i]mmigration bonds,” and section 103.10 describes

“[p]recedent decisions.” I do not see how these later sections, on unrelated topics,

could retroactively alter the meaning of section 103.5 – especially given that section

6
103.10, which the majority cites as the only other provision in Part 103 involving

“removal proceedings,” Maj. Op. at 28 n.8, expressly cross-references a different

regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 103.10 (“Proceedings before [Department of Justice

agencies] are governed by [P]art 1003 of 8 CFR.”).

In sum, the text, context, and structure of section 103.5 all make clear that it

regulates benefits proceedings. I therefore cannot sign onto the majority’s shut-

your-eyes-theory of interpretation, which ignores the “fundamental canon of . . .

construction that the words of a [text] must be read in their context and with a

view to their place in the overall . . . scheme.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697,

721 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Precedent Confirms that Section 103.5 Does Not Apply to Reinstated
Removal Orders.

The majority’s reading also creates a jarring Circuit split. All of our sister

Circuits to have seriously considered this issue have concluded that “[section]

103.5(a) does not apply to decisions that reinstate removal orders.” Tapia-Lemos v.

Holder, 696 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Lavery v. Barr, 943 F.3d 272, 276 (5th

Cir. 2019) (“[T]he scope of 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 is limited to aliens who affirmatively

seek and are then denied select immigration benefits.”); Aguilar-Aguilar, 700 F.3d

7
at 1243 n.3 (same). 1 And with good reason: Part 103 is not some convoluted or

arcane regulation, muddled by contradictory signals or shadowy language. Its

meaning is clear.

The majority hardly engages with most of these cases. Instead, it simply

pronounces – in a single paragraph – that their analysis was “limited” and

“conclusor[y].” Maj. Op. at 30. But it is the majority’s bare dismissal of these

opinions that is “conclusory.” Rather than articulating how or why our sister

Circuits erred, it simply rejects them out of hand.

Confronted by unanimous authority on the other side, the majority also

casts about for its own precedents. It relies first on Department of Homeland Security

v. Thuraissigiam, where the Supreme Court explained in a footnote that

“[immigration] officials and immigration judges may reopen cases or reconsider

decisions.” 591 U.S. 103, 140 n.28 (2020). But Thuraissigiam involved a request for

a classic benefit – asylum in the United States. Id. at 114; see Maj. Op. at 31

1 The majority suggests that Tapia-Lemos’s conclusion about 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a) was tacitly
overturned by the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789
(7th Cir. 2013). Maj. Op. at 35 n.13. But the court in Cordova-Soto did not address section 103.5.
See generally 732 F.3d 789. And given that the court’s determination in Tapia-Lemos about the scope
of section 103.5(a) was necessary to its judgment denying the alien’s petition for review, Cordova-
Soto could not have overturned that component of the decision. See, e.g., Brooks v. Walls, 279 F.3d
518, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (“One panel of this court cannot overrule another implicitly.”).

8
(conceding that “Thuraissigiam was a benefits case”). It thus fits comfortably

within the regulatory scheme sketched out above.

The majority’s other precedents, a smattering of out-of-Circuit cases

(including two non-precedential decisions) that left open the possibility that

section 103.5 has a broader scope, fare no better. See Maj. Op. at 31–32 (citing

Escoto-Castillo v. Napolitano, 658 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 2011); Evers v. Mukasey, 288

F. App’x 441 (9th Cir. 2008); Turcios v. Wolf, 828 F. App’x 496, 499 (10th Cir. 2020)).

For starters, they all involved section 1228, which deals with the removal of

“alien[s] convicted of aggravated felon[ies]” – not section 1231(a)(5), the provision

at issue here. Furthermore, none of them grappled with the operative question

presented in this case. Instead, they merely suggested – in dicta and while

responding to tertiary arguments – that section 103.5 might stretch beyond

benefits. They did not offer any meaningful analysis: Evers and Turcios failed even

to consider whether section 103.5 might not apply, and Escoto-Castillo provided

just one (similar) sentence of reasoning – that the petitioner “cite[d] no clear

authority for” the proposition that section 103.5 is limited to benefits, Escoto-

Castillo, 658 F.3d at 866. Given that courts since Escoto-Castillo have generated the

kind of “clear authority” that the Eighth Circuit deemed to be lacking in 2011, the

9
majority’s reliance on Escoto-Castillo is particularly misplaced. See Tapia-Lemos, 696

F.3d at 689; Lavery, 943 F.3d at 276; Aguilar-Aguilar, 700 F.3d at 1243 n.3.

* * *

In sum, the majority takes language housed in a benefits-focused regulation

that specifically instructs movants to use a benefits form to apply to an agency that

doles out benefits and concludes that this language in fact allows them to seek non-

benefits relief on removal from a different agency. Because I cannot agree that

section 103.5 is secretly an omnibus, all-purpose regulation allowing petitioners to

ask immigration agencies to reconsider virtually any decision in virtually any

context, I respectfully dissent. Cf. West Virginia, 597 at 723 (explaining that

sweeping rules are “rarely accomplished through modest words, vague terms, or

subtle device[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11436653. Public record. Not legal advice.