# Gomez

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · September 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435707

## Case

- **Full name:** Raul Gomez v. Deanna Brookhart
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RAUL GOMEZ
Petitioner,
No. 13-cv-007762
v.
Judge Mary M. Rowland
DEANNA BROOKHART1
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Raul Gomez petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For
the following reasons, the amended petition is denied and a certificate of appealability
will not issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
When considering § 2254 habeas petitions, federal courts must presume as correct
the factual findings made by the last state court to decide the case on the merits
unless the habeas petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing evidence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2017). Where
Gomez has not provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the

1 Respondent reports that Gomez has been transferred to a facility outside of Illinois
for security reasons. [82] at 1. Accordingly, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of
Illinois, shall be substituted as respondent, where Gomez may be transferred back
to Illinois to continue serving his sentence.
following factual background is based on the Illinois Appellate Court’s findings in
People v. Gomez, 931 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. 2010).
Following a jury trial, Gomez was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted

first-degree murder and sentenced to terms of 50 and 40 years imprisonment. The
charges arose from an incident wherein Rafael Trujillo was fatally shot and Luis
Aguirre sustained nonfatal gunshot wounds. In October 2005, Aguirre lived at 6217
South Talman in Chicago, Illinois. On several occasions, Aguirre complained to his
neighbor about young people congregating on and near his property. According to
Aguirre, people were hanging out on Aguirre’s porch in his absence and leaving

bottles in his bushes.
On October 8, 2005, Aguirre and Trujillo attended a birthday party in
Schaumburg, Illinois. They consumed six or seven beers over the course of two to
three hours at the party. On the way home from the party, they stopped at a bar and
drank a “couple” more beers. Aguirre testified that he was “buzzed,” and denied that
Trujillo was drunk. They returned to Aguirre’s home around 1:40 a.m. Trujillo exited
the car, leaving the keys inside with the engine running.

Aguirre saw people congregating on his porch and the surrounding area. He was
angry and began yelling at the people to get off his property. Aguirre returned to
Trujillo’s car to retrieve the keys because he was concerned someone would try to take
the vehicle. As Aguirre was yelling and swearing at the group, Gomez walked up to
Aguirre and asked him if he knew who he was. Gomez put a gun against Aguirre’s
chest and fired. Aguirre fell to the ground and heard additional shots. Trujillo, who
was standing behind Aguirre, was also shot and subsequently died. Aguirre and
Trujillo were unarmed during the confrontation.
Gomez testified that as Trujillo and Aguirre were yelling at the group to leave,

Gomez and his friends were collecting their beer and getting ready to leave the area.
Gomez’s fiancé told him to “watch out” because one of the men was “getting
something” from the car. Gomez turned towards the car and saw Aguirre “underneath
the passenger seat” of Trujillo’s car. Gomez heard someone mention something about
calling the police, and Aguirre responded in a way that implied he did not need the
police. One of Gomez’s friends handed him a gun and Gomez approached and shot

Aguirre. Gomez testified that he did not see a gun, but that Aguirre “reached for his
back behind his jacket.” Gomez then shot at Trujillo because he was approaching and
“reaching for his shirt.” Gomez testified that based upon the trip to the car, the
reaching into their shirts, and his experiences growing up in the city, he assumed
they were pulling guns on him so he shot first. Aguirre did not explicitly threaten
Gomez, but Gomez testified that he took Aguirre’s “motions” as a threat.
Gomez testified that Aguirre touched him at one point during their interaction.

He described it as follows: “He grabbed me by the arm but it was nothing like fighting
type, it was more like trying to treat me like a little kid or something.” At no point
did Aguirre strike or hit Gomez.
The trial court instructed the jury on both self-defense and second-degree murder
premised on imperfect self-defense. The court refused to instruct the jury on second-
degree murder based on provocation. The jury convicted Gomez of first-degree murder
and attempted first-degree murder.
II. Procedural Background

On direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Gomez argued that the trial court
erred in: (1) denying his motion in limine to limit cross-examination of a defense
witness; (2) allowing the introduction of his prior conviction; (3) refusing to instruct
the jury on second degree murder based on provocation; and (4) limiting the scope of

his testimony. Gomez, 931 N.E.2d at 1238. The appellate court rejected each claim.
Gomez filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, seeking
review of the appellate court’s decision on the jury instruction issue. The Illinois
Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Gomez, 226 N.E.3d 28 (Table) (Ill.
2010).
On May 24, 2011, Gomez filed a post-conviction petition which raised the following
three claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting a photo of Trujillo’s

keys in the ignition; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on second-
degree murder based on provocation; and (3) Gomez’s sentence violated the Illinois
Constitution. [84-6] at 11-12. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. [84-7] at 4.
Gomez appealed and raised the same claims. [84-8] at 20-25. The appellate court
affirmed. [85-1] at 1. The appellate court held Gomez’s ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claim and sentencing claim were meritless, and his jury instruction claim
was barred by res judicata where it had been decided on direct appeal. Id. at 4-6.
Gomez filed a petition for leave to appeal which raised his ineffective assistance and
jury instruction claims. [85-2] at 16-18. The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to
appeal. People v. Gomez, 982 N.E.3d 771 (Table) (Ill. 2013).

On October 30, 2013, Gomez filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus. [1].
Gomez filed a motion to stay these proceedings to allow him to return to state court
to pursue a successive post-conviction petition. [4]. Respondent did not object, and
the Court granted Gomez’s motion. [9]; [12].
On May 15, 2023, Gomez filed a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction
petition. [85-4]. The proposed successive petition alleged, among other things, that

(1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Gomez on plea
negotiations; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing on direct appeal
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a photograph that showed
Trujillo’s keys in the ignition; and (3) Gomez’s sentence violated the Illinois
Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution under
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). [85-4] at 7-44. The trial court denied leave to
file the successive petition. [85-5] at 12.

On appeal, Gomez argued that trial counsel was ineffective for advising Gomez to
reject a 31-year plea offer and that his sentence violated the Illinois Constitution. [85-
6] at 10-19. On September 26, 2025, the appellate court affirmed, holding that Gomez
failed to demonstrate the cause and prejudice required to file a successive post-
conviction petition. [85-8] at 1. Gomez did not file a petition for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court.
III. Amended Habeas Petition

On December 16, 2025, Gomez filed an amended habeas petition in this Court.
Gomez’s amended petition raises the following claims: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to (a) present a photo showing Trujillo’s keys in the ignition
which would have corroborated Gomez’s self-defense claim; (b) properly advise Gomez
regarding a plea offer; and (c) adequately prepare for trial; (3) appellate counsel was

ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; (4) the
trial court violated Gomez’s due process rights by refusing to instruct the jury on
second degree murder based on provocation; and (5) Gomez’s sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment. [76] at 5-16.
LEGAL STANDARDS
“A federal habeas corpus petitioner is required to exhaust his available state
remedies before seeking federal relief.” Lisle v. Pierce, 832 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir.

2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). “Inherent in the habeas petitioner’s
obligation to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking relief in habeas corpus,
is the duty to fairly present his federal claims to the state courts.” King v. Pfister, 834
F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). More specifically, a habeas petitioner
must fully and fairly present his federal claims through one full round of state court
review before he files his federal habeas petition. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 845 (1999). If a habeas petitioner fails to fully and fairly present his federal
claims through one full round of state court review, he has procedurally defaulted his
claims. Tabb v. Christianson, 855 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2017). Additionally, “a
federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state
court—that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and

independent state procedural rule.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017).
Procedural default precludes federal courts from reviewing the merits of a petitioner’s
habeas claims. Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 2016).
A habeas petitioner may overcome procedural default by demonstrating cause
for the default and actual prejudice or by showing that the federal court’s failure to
consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006). The Supreme Court defines cause sufficient to excuse
procedural default as “some objective factor external to the defense” which prevents
a petitioner from pursuing his constitutional claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986); Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 272 (7th Cir. 2014).
Prejudice means actual prejudice infecting the “entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (citation omitted). A
fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when a habeas petitioner establishes that

“a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent.” Id. at 496; see also Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 531 (7th Cir.
2017).
A Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was contrary
to or an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme
Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000); Pinno v. Wachtendorf, 845
F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has explained that a state court’s
decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court law “if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law” or

“if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours.” Williams,
529 U.S. at 405. Under the “unreasonable application” prong, a habeas petitioner
must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it
unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. Id. at 407.
When a district court enters a judgement on a habeas petition, it must also deny

or grant a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Such a certificate will only
be issued if the applicant has made a “substantial showing of denial of constitutional
right.” Id. Or, as the Supreme Court puts it, “[w]here a district court has rejected the
constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
ANALYSIS

I. Procedural Default
A. Fully and Fairly Present—One Complete Round of Appellate Review
Respondent argues that all but one of Gomez’s claims are procedurally defaulted
because he did not fully and fairly present these claims through one complete round

of state court review. See Hicks, 871 F.3d at 530 (“petitioner must ‘fairly present’ his
constitutional claims through at least one complete round of the state’s established
appellate review process before presenting the claims to a federal court for habeas
review.”). More specifically, Respondent highlights the following claims in Gomez’s
amended petition: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2)(b) trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to properly advise Gomez regarding a plea offer; (2)(c) trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for trial; (3) appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal; (4) the
trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on second-degree murder based on
provocation; and (5) Gomez’s sentence is unconstitutional. [82] at 9-11.
Gomez presented claims (2)(b), (2)(c), (3), and (5) in his motion for leave to file a

successive petition, but he did not petition the Illinois Supreme Court for leave to
appeal those claims. Further, Gomez did not present claim (1)—that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction—in his direct appeal, initial post-conviction
petition, or motion for leave to a file a successive post-conviction petition. Gomez, 931
N.E.2d at 1238 (“Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence”); [84-
6] at 11-12; [85-4] at 7-44. As such, none of these five claims have been presented
through one full round of state court review and are therefore procedurally defaulted.

See Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502, 517 (7th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court will not hear
a state prisoner’s habeas claim unless the prisoner has first presented it to the state
courts for one full round of review.”).
Respondent further argues that though Gomez presented claim (4)—the trial
court’s refusal to instruct the jury on second-degree murder based on provocation—
through a complete round of state court review, he did not “fairly” present the claim
because it had no federal constitutional basis. Respondent notes that when Gomez
raised this claim on direct appeal and in his initial post-conviction petition he cited
neither the United States Constitution nor cases applying the federal Due Process

Clause. Instead, Gomez relied entirely on Illinois law to argue that he was entitled to
the instruction. [84-1] at 26-30; [84-4] at 17-20; [84-6] at 12; [84-8] at 23-25.
“Fair presentment requires the petitioner to give the state courts a meaningful
opportunity to pass upon the substance of the claims later presented in federal court.”
Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916 (7th Cir. 1999). “In the interests of federal-
state comity, both the operative facts and controlling law must be put before the state

courts.” Anderson v. Benik, 471 F.3d 811, 814-15 (7th Cir. 2006) (where petitioner’s
state court claim relied solely on a state statute and did not assert that statutory
error resulted in a due process violation, petitioner did not fairly present federal
claim); see also Riggins v. McGinnis, 50 F.3d 492, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1995) (if “a habeas
petitioner wishes to claim that [a] ruling at a state court trial denied him the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only
in federal court, but in state court” because it is “essential . . . that the state court be

alerted to the fact that [a petitioner is] asserting claims under the United States
Constitution.”).
Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2004) is instructive. In Perruquet, the
Seventh Circuit held that a habeas petitioner procedurally defaulted a self-defense
instruction claim because he did not argue in the state courts that the failure to give
the instruction violated his federal due process rights. Id. at 518-19. The Court
emphasized that its ruling aligned with principles of federalism and comity. Id. at
518. “[I]f we were to reach the merits of Perruquet’s constitutional claim, we
necessarily would have to do so de novo, as there is no state-court decision we can

look to for an evaluation of this claim.” Id. “This would be inconsistent with the high
level of deference to state-court decisions that Congress mandated when it passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,” particularly where “[t]he
Illinois courts [ ] have a much greater familiarity than we do with Illinois law and the
requirements it imposes on claims of self-defense [and] are better situated in the first
instance to identify those requirements and to consider whether they actually

interfered with Perruquet’s right to a fundamentally fair trial.” Id. at 518-19.
Here, like in Perruquet, Gomez failed to argue the federal basis for his instruction
claim in the state courts. Instead, he argued—both on direct appeal and in his initial
post-conviction petition—that he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree
murder premised on provocation under Illinois law. [84-1] at 26-30 (direct appeal
brief); [84-4] at 17-20 (petition for leave to appeal); [84-6] at 12 (initial post-conviction
petition); [84-8] at 23-25 (appellate brief). Where jury instruction claims typically

“turn on state law,” Illinois courts were better situated to evaluate the federal claim
Gomez now brings for the first time on federal habeas review. See Perruquet, 390 F.3d
at 511, 518-19. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Perruquet, principles of federalism
and comity necessitate a finding that Gomez’s jury instruction claim is procedurally
defaulted where he presented no federal basis for the claim before the state courts.
For these reasons, Gomez’s claims (1), (2)(b), (2)(c), (3), (4), and (5) are
procedurally defaulted.
B. Independent and Adequate State Law Grounds

Respondent further argues that the claims Gomez presented in his motion for
leave to file a successive post-conviction petition—claims (2)(b), (2)(c), (3), and (5)—
are also defaulted where the state court’s ruling on those claims rested on an
independent and adequate state law ground. [82] at 12-13. The trial court denied

Gomez leave to file a successive petition which raised these four claims because he
failed to demonstrate cause for his failure to raise the claims in his initial post-
conviction petition. [85-5] at 6-11. The court also found that Gomez failed to establish
prejudice. Id. The appellate court affirmed on the same basis. [85-8] at 1. The state
courts’ finding that Gomez failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test under Illinois
law is an adequate and independent state ground precluding habeas review. See
Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2016) (a determination that a

petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to file a successive post-
conviction petition is an application of a “state procedural rule” and constitutes “an
adequate and independent state ground precluding federal habeas review.”); see also
Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2009) (“when a state refuses to
adjudicate a petitioner’s federal claims because they were not raised in accord with
the state’s procedural rules, that will normally qualify as an independent and

adequate state ground for denying federal review”).
As such, in addition to being procedurally defaulted for failure to pursue one full
round of state court review, the claims presented in Gomez’s successive petition—
(2)(b) trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in advising about a plea offer, (2)(c) trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness in preparing for trial, (3) appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, and (5)
the unconstitutionality of his sentence—are further defaulted where the state courts’
rulings rest on an adequate and independent state law ground.
C. Exceptions to Procedural Default

The Court may reach the merits of a petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims if
he can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice, or show that the
Court’s failure to consider the claims would result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Gomez does not
argue cause and prejudice, nor does he argue that the fundamental miscarriage of
justice exception applies. Accordingly, the Court does not reach the merits of Gomez’s
defaulted claims.

II. Claim 2(a)—Counsel’s Failure to Present Photo at Trial
The Court reaches the merits of Gomez’s remaining ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim. Gomez argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to present at trial a photo of the inside of Trujillo’s car which showed his keys

still in the ignition.2 [76] at 8-9. According to Gomez, this photo would have

2 Gomez does not attach the photo to his amended petition. [76]. His reply suggests
that the photo may have been destroyed by police. [86] at 10-11. No such claim has
been presented to the state courts. In fact, the appellate court, in affirming the
dismissal of Gomez’s initial post-conviction petition, noted that Gomez did not
corroborated his self-defense claim. Id. at 8. Gomez testified that at some point during
the confrontation on October 8, 2005, he and his fiancée saw Aguirre return to
Trujillo’s car which was parked on the street. Gomez, 931 N.E.2d at 1242. Aguirre

testified that he returned to Trujillo’s car to retrieve the keys because he was
concerned someone would try to take the vehicle. Id. at 1239. Gomez believed that
Aguirre was arming himself with a gun. Id. at 1243. According to Gomez, “[h]ad
counsel done a competent job, the evidence portrayed in that photograph would have
further corroborated [Gomez’s] testimony” and “the jury would have believed that
Gomez’s testimony was truthful.” [76] at 8-9.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a
Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000); Pinno v. Wachtendorf, 845 F.3d
328, 331 (7th Cir. 2017). A petitioner must “show that the state court’s decision is so
obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (citing Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). “Needless to say, the AEDPA standard of review is
a difficult standard, and it was meant to be.” Baer v. Neal, 879 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir.
2018).

attach the photo “or otherwise explain why it was not attached to the petition.” [85-
1] at 5. As such, when ruling on this petition, the Court does not consider any claim
that police may have destroyed the photo.
To establish a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, Gomez must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88 (1984). “It is especially difficult to prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in federal habeas because Strickland and § 2254(d) together create
‘doubly deferential judicial review.’” Williams v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir.
2020) (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). Gomez fails to
demonstrate that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland in rejecting his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The last state court to make a substantive ruling on Gomez’s ineffective
assistance claim was the Illinois Appellate Court when it affirmed the dismissal of
Gomez’s initial post-conviction petition. [85-1]. The court held that counsel was not
ineffective where Gomez “failed to explain . . . how a photograph depicting the ignition
key of Trujillo’s vehicle in the ignition after the shooting would have supported his
claim of self-defense.” Id. at 4. Gomez’s theory at trial was that he acted in self-
defense, or alternatively, was guilty of second-degree murder where he unreasonably

believed in the need to defend himself. Id. at 3. But the appellate court found Gomez’s
claim “that the presence of the ignition key in the vehicle was proof that a victim went
to the vehicle to get a gun, was conjectural and irrelevant to any self-defense claim
since no evidence was adduced at trial that either Aguirre or Trujillo had a weapon.”
Id. at 5. Erica Lujano testified that she did not see anything in Aguirre’s hands after
he reached into the vehicle. Id. Other witnesses testified that neither victim had a
gun. Id. Gomez acknowledged during his trial testimony that he did not see a gun in
either Aguirre or Trujillo’s hands. Id. And no gun was found on either victim or shown
to have been in Trujillo’s car. Id. Accordingly, the court found that a photo of Trujillo’s

keys in the ignition could not “overcome the evidence in the record positively
rebutting [Gomez’s] self-defense claim as a matter of law.” Id. As a result, the court
held that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the photo. Id.
This decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the
controlling legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Under
Strickland, Gomez was required to prove both “that counsel’s performance was

deficient,” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466
U.S. at 669. The appellate court’s decision that Gomez failed to satisfy either prong
of Strickland was not unreasonable where a photo of Trujillo’s keys in the ignition
would not have advanced Gomez’s theory that he acted in self-defense or that he was,
at most, guilty of second-degree murder. Even if the photo would have contradicted
Aguirre’s testimony that he returned to the car to retrieve the keys, it would not have

shown that Aguirre or Trujillo were armed, or that Gomez believed the victims were
armed. As such, counsel’s decision not to present the photo did not fall “below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential,” and “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance”). Likewise, Gomez did not show a reasonable probability that
the result of his trial would have been different had the photo been presented. See id.
(“a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome” of a proceeding). Accordingly, the appellate court’s decision rejecting

Gomez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court.
Gomez’s ineffective assistance claims fails.
III. Certificate of Appealability

Under the 2009 Amendments to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings, the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A habeas petitioner is entitled to a
certificate of appealability only if he can make a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, (2003); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). For the reasons articulated above, Gomez has not made a substantial
showing of the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“[w]here a district court has
rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate
the reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong”). As such, the Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability as to claim 2(a).
Where a district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds, a certificate

of appealability should issue only if the petitioner shows that (1) jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right, and (2) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 485. Here, Gomez
has not established that reasonable jurists would debate that claims (1), (2)(b), (2)(c),
(3), (4), and (5) are procedurally defaulted. See id. at 484 (“Where a plain procedural
bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case,” the
claim is not debatable). As such, the Court declines to certify any of these issues for
appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner's amended petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 for a writ of habeas corpus [76] is denied, and the Court declines to issue a
certificate of appealability. Civil case terminated.

ENTER:

Dated: September 4, 2026 Marg /Vf bh L
“MARYM.ROWLAND
United States District Judge

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435707. Public record. Not legal advice.