# Lopez-Lopez

> District Court, W.D. Louisiana · August 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435397

## Case

- **Full name:** Conrado Udiel Lopez-Lopez v. Angel Wolfe, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** August 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435397

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

CONRADO UDIEL LOPEZ-LOPEZ CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:26-CV-1861

SECTION P
VERSUS
JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

ANGEL WOLFE, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Conrado Udiel Lopez-Lopez,1 a detainee in the custody of the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”), petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.2 Respondents
oppose the petition. [doc. # 7]. For reasons below, the Court should DENY the petition.
Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala. [Doc. 1, p. 2]. He entered the United States on
approximately August 27, 2007. Id. “For approximately 19 years following his entry,
Petitioner maintained stable housing and employment, has no criminal history and has three
United States Citizen children.” Id. On an unknown date, DHS “processed” Petitioner,
“placed [him] into full § 240 removal proceedings,” and released him on bond. [Id., p. 8]. He
“then lived in the United States for over seven years before being detained from the interior.”
Id. On April 7, 2026, ICE detained Petitioner during a traffic stop. [Id., p. 2].
Petitioner filed this proceeding on June 3, 2026. He claims that the Government is
violating his right to due process by failing to afford him a bond hearing. [Id., p. 10]. He

1 Petitioner’s ‘A-Number’ is 221-483-162.

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28
U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.
argues inter alia, “The government’s blanket refusal to afford a bond hearing, the basic
procedural safeguard distinguishing lawful civil detention from punishment, violates both
statutory command and constitutional guarantee.” Id. Respondents opposed the petition on
July 8, 2026. [Doc. 7]. Petitioner did not file a reply.
On July 20, 2026, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed.3 Petitioner has
until approximately August 19, 2026, to appeal the removal order.
Law and Analysis

I. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 versus 8 U.S.C. § 1226
The Fifth Circuit has held that aliens who have not been admitted may be detained
without bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) even when they have been present in
the United States for many years. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir.
2026). In reaching its conclusion, the court analyzed the meaning of “seeking admission” and
“applicants for admission” in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Id. The court concluded that “applicants for
admission,” which includes all aliens who have not previously been admitted to the United
States, are necessarily “seeking admission” and, therefore, subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id.
Here, Buenrostro-Mendez governs Petitioner’s detention status: he is detained under
Section 1225. “If the officer determines at the time of the interview that an alien has a
credible fear of persecution (within the meaning of clause (v)), the alien shall be detained for
further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (emphasis
added). “Any alien subject to the procedures under this clause shall be detained pending a
final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until
removed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added). “Subject to subparagraphs (B)

3 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited
and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section
1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Plainly, Section 1225 does not authorize release on bond. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138
S. Ct. 830 (2018). Petitioner is, therefore, not statutorily entitled to bond or a bond hearing.
The Court should dismiss his statutory claim accordingly.

II. Due Process
Petitioner claims that the Due Process Clause entitles him to a bond hearing. In Ford
v. Ducote, et al., 2020 WL 8642257 (W.D. La. Nov. 2, 2020), the district judge opined in
pertinent part:
In Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959
(2020), a Sri Lankan national was stopped 25 yards after crossing the
southern border of the United States. He was detained for expedited
removal. An asylum officer rejected his credible fear claim. Thuraissigiam
then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in which he, for the first time,
asserted a fear of persecution and requested a new opportunity to apply for
asylum. In reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court found the
detention did not violate the Due Process Clause. Although not a case of
unreasonable detention, the case is important as to Due Process rights for
illegal aliens. Citing Nishimare Ekin v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892), the Court held that with regard to foreigners who have never been
naturalized or acquired any domicile or residence in the United States, “‘the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.’” 140 S. Ct. at 1977.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), Kim had entered the United States
lawfully and had resided in this country for over 10 years before committing
a crime, which made him deportable. Like Ford, Kim argued his mandatory
detention violated due process when no determination had been made
whether he posed a danger to society or a flight risk. Also, like Ford, Kim
asked for an individualized bond hearing which was not authorized under
the statute. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found the detention without a bond hearing violated Kim’s due
process rights. In reversing the District Court and Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court held detention during these proceedings did not violate
Kim’s due process rights.
Also, like Ford, Kim relied on the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001). In Zadvydas, two aliens were held pending removal after final order
of deportation. However, no country would take them, so their detention
continued for years beyond the 90–day removal period of 8 U.S.C. §1231(a).
The Supreme Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is not authorized by the statute.” Id. at 699.
The Supreme Court concluded that six months was a presumptively
reasonable period of detention, beyond the removal period, to remove aliens
ordered deported. Id. at 702.

The Kim Court held that Zadvydas was materially different because the
detention of the aliens in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially
permanent.” Therefore, the correct standard to apply is to determine
whether Ford’s detention is “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.”

Ford’s detention is not “indefinite” or “potentially permanent.” Ford’s
detention ends when the removal proceedings end. Ford’s focus on
“unreasonable detention” is incorrect. As long as Ford’s detention is not
“indefinite” nor “potentially permanent,” Ford’s due process rights are not
violated. See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018).

2020 WL 8642257 at *2-3.
Here, Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing. See Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 531, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003) (“Detention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).4 As in Ford, Petitioner’s
detention is not indefinite or potentially permanent. An immigration judge ordered him
removed on July 20, 2026, and Petitioner has until August 19, 2026, to appeal to the Board
of Immigration Appeals.5 Accordingly, the Court should deny Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner
may re-file his claim should his detention become indefinite or potentially permanent.

4 See also Romero v. Tate, 2026 WL 1067566, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2026); Bekboev v. Vergara, 2026
WL 1011244, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2026); Mlaih v. Noem, 2026 WL 787536, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
19, 2026).

5 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation
III. Procedural Due Process
Petitioner does not claim that the Government violated his right to procedural due
process. At best, he cites Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), an oft-cited case
involving procedural due process. But Petitioner does not ever claim that he lacked
procedural due process or that he lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
Government deprived him of liberty. Petitioner only seems to claim that absent a bond
hearing, Respondents are violating his right to due process. Out of caution, the undersigned

examines an ostensible claim of lack of procedural due process.
Preliminarily, the undersigned highlights that the two issues—procedural due
process and the statutory interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226 as addressed above—
overlap but are distinct. Even though Petitioner is detained under Section 1225 and subject
to mandatory detention by statute, his statutory and regulatory statuses do not foreclose his
procedural due process claim.6
Next, courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks
whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the
[government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation
were constitutionally sufficient.” Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989) (internal citations omitted).
A. Liberty Interest

“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law[.]” U.S.
CONST. AMEND. V. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or

6 See Marceau v. Noem, 2026 WL 368953, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026) (“Marceau’s constitutional
interest in her liberty exists above and apart from the Immigration and Nationality Act and attendant
regulations.”) (citing A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025)).
permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “Freedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of
the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the
requirements of procedural due process applied to parole revocations. The Court first noted
that “the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of
unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on

others.” Id. at 482. Buttressing the parolee’s interest in liberty is the society’s interest “in
not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous
evaluation of the need to revoke parole” and its interest “in treating the parolee with basic
fairness.” Id. at 484.
The Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of
things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, including
to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life.” Id. at 482. “Though the [government] properly subjects [the
parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking
authorization to work and travel, his “condition is very different from that of confinement in
a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be
revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. Therefore, a parolee possesses
a protected interest in his “continued liberty.” Id.
Here, Petitioner’s release on bond was similar to the parole described in Morrissey.
His release, for example, allowed him—with the Government’s explicit permission—the
freedom to live, work, associate, and establish ties in the United States. Thus, Petitioner had
a protected liberty interest in his release.7
B. Procedures Attendant Upon Petitioner’s Deprivation
“The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution’s command of
due process,” as it “ensure[s] abstract fair play to the individual” and “minimizes
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). “The constitutional minimum of due process guarantees that

notice and an opportunity to be heard be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 700 F.3d 227, 239 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The opportunity to
present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
546 (1985). “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected interest.’”
Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 127, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990) (“Applying [the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 113, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)] test, the Court usually has held that the
Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty . .
. . ” (emphasis in original)).

7 See, e.g., O.F.C. v. Almodovar, 2026 WL 74262, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2026) (“Both immigration
parolees and those released on immigration bond are free to live their lives in this country and to form
the . . . enduring attachments of normal life. . . . While released on bond, Petitioner was able to resume
his life with his U.S.-citizen wife and his young U.S.-citizen children (one of whom was born while
Petitioner was released). . . . The Court has little difficulty concluding that if the Government wishes
to strip Petitioner of that liberty and these attachments, it must do so in a manner consistent with due
process.”) (internal quotation marks, quoted source, and record citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner does not argue that he was denied notice and an opportunity to be
heard, which are both key components of due process. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (“The
essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.”). And
even assuming Petitioner did not receive adequate process before his re-detention, he does
not plead a violation of his right to procedural due process because he only seeks a bond
hearing.
Petitioner appears to argue that the potential error in failing to provide a bond

hearing is detaining an individual who is not a flight risk or a danger to society. However,
as explained above Respondents are statutorily required to detain him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
Thus, even if a neutral decisionmaker determined that he was not a flight risk or a danger,
Respondents would still detain him.
In Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), the statute at issue
required all sex offenders to register so that their information could be published. The
respondent, a convicted sex offender, argued that the law violated his procedural due process
rights by requiring him to register without a hearing as to whether he was “currently
dangerous.” Id. at 6. Rejecting the argument, the Court opined, “Plaintiffs who assert a right
to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in
that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Whether
the respondent was not dangerous was “of no consequence” under the statute because it
required registration of all convicted sex offenders. Id. at 7.
Here, whether Petitioner is a risk of flight or danger is largely irrelevant to whether
the Government must—under relevant statutory and regulatory schemes—detain him and
remove him.8 Relevant issues, for example, include his identity, whether there were any

8 To be sure, noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) may be released on parole for “urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” if they “present neither a security risk nor a risk
relevant changed circumstances, his citizenship, whether he was ever admitted or paroled,
when he entered this country, and whether he is entitled to protection from removal. The
Government has provided, and is providing, process after detaining him in the form of a
Notice to Appear,9 the ability to respond to the Government’s motions, the opportunity to be
heard in a hearing or via motion(s), the opportunity to present evidence, and a potential
appeal. See Clavijo v. Thompson, 2026 WL 923310, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2026) (“8 USC
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), mandates detention of those falling within the definition of ‘applicants for

admission’ without regard to any individualized custody determination concerning
dangerousness or flight risk. And the Fifth Circuit in Buenrostro-Mendez has now
determined that such detention lawfully applies to ‘applicants for admission’ like Petitioner.
A hearing as to dangerousness or flight risk is thus irrelevant to the lawfulness of his
detention under the statute.”).
Accordingly, the Government has not violated Petitioner’s right to procedural due
process. The Court should dismiss this ostensible claim.
Recommendation
For reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Conrado Udiel Lopez-
Lopez’s petition be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by
this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and

of absconding.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Thus, a determination that Petitioner
is neither a flight risk nor a danger is not completely irrelevant. Here, however, Petitioner does not
contend that he is entitled to release for urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public benefit.
And even if he did, he had and has the opportunity to present such a contention in his removal
proceedings. If the Secretary of Homeland Security agreed, then Petitioner could attempt to
demonstrate that he is neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.

9 [Doc. 7-1, p. 5].
Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may
respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within
fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame
authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking
either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court,
except upon grounds of plain error.
In Chambers, Lafayette, Louisiana, this 4th day of August, 2026.

United Staten Mapireate Judge

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435397. Public record. Not legal advice.