# Brown

> District Court, D. Massachusetts · September 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435261

## Case

- **Full name:** Keith Brown v. Michael Leslie, Keith Barnes, and Beau Lirette
- **Court:** District Court, D. Massachusetts
- **Decided:** September 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)
KEITH BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-10854-JEK
)
MICHAEL LESLIE, KEITH BARNES, )
and BEAU LIRETTE, )
)
Defendants. )
)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KOBICK, J.
Plaintiff Keith Brown was pulled over in the early morning of August 7, 2021 for speeding
and for a marked lanes violation. After an officer handcuffed and frisked him, Brown was detained
in the back of a police cruiser for approximately 45 minutes, during which time he was subjected
to two additional searches before ultimately being released on a summons for operating a vehicle
with a suspended license. Brown pleaded guilty in December 2021 to that criminal offense. He
then filed this civil action against the three Massachusetts State Police Troopers involved in the
investigation—defendants Keith Barnes, Michael Leslie, and Beau Lirette—alleging that they
conducted unconstitutional searches of his body, and failed to intervene in their colleagues’
unlawful searches, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The defendants have each filed motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that
follow, Barnes’ and Lirette’s motions will be granted and Leslie’s motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or recounted in the light most favorable to Brown,
as the non-moving party, where supported by record evidence. Roberge v. Travelers Prop. Cas.
Co. of Am., 112 F.4th 45, 51 (1st Cir. 2024).

I. Barnes’ Initial Stop and Investigation.
In the early morning of August 7, 2021, Trooper Barnes was patrolling the roads between
Athol and Irving, Massachusetts. ECF 57, ¶ 1. Sometime before 1:45 a.m., while positioned on
Route 2, Barnes witnessed a car driving faster than the posted speed limit of 55 miles per hour. Id.
¶¶ 7-9.1 Barnes followed the car, which reached speeds of 80-85 miles per hour, failed to stay in
its lane, and made “jerky movements” back and forth. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. As the car moved to exit Route
2, Barnes activated his emergency lights, and the car immediately pulled to the side of a road off
the exit in Templeton, Massachusetts. Id. ¶¶ 12-13; ECF 61-1 (Barnes’ Cruiser Dash Camera
Footage), at 00:01:01.
At 1:49 a.m., Barnes exited his cruiser and approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. ECF

42-7 (Barnes’ Body Camera Footage), at 1:48:48-1:49:03. As he approached, the occupants could
be heard yelling at each other. Id. When he knocked on the window, the driver—later identified as
Keith Brown—lowered it, and the passenger—later identified as Jessica Frederick—sat quietly.
Id. at 1:49:01. Brown was eating chips from a bag but otherwise kept his hands visible to Barnes.
Id. at 1:49:06. After Barnes asked for their identifications, Frederick explained she had no ID on
her and provided a false name. Id. at 1:49:12-1:49:20; ECF 57, ¶ 16. Recognizing her as someone
he had previously arrested under a different name, Barnes confronted her about her identity. ECF

1 The parties dispute whether Barnes also witnessed the same car driving above the speed limit
earlier in the night, witnessed the car make a stop, and witnessed the driver and passenger get out
before speeding off. ECF 57, ¶¶ 2, 5-6.
42-7, at 1:49:25. Meanwhile, Brown, unable to locate his wallet, alternated between quickly eating
chips, feeling his pockets for his wallet, and putting his hands in the air or on the steering wheel.
Id. at 1:49:30-1:50:24. Barnes briefly stepped away to shine a flashlight in the back of the car
before returning to the driver’s side window. Id.

Over the course of about five minutes, Barnes and Frederick asked Brown to locate his ID
multiple times, and Brown repeatedly replied that he could not find his wallet and did not want it
to appear as if he were reaching for something by looking around the car more thoroughly. Id. at
1:49:30-1:54:20. At times, Brown appeared agitated and exhibited frustration with Frederick for
not understanding why he did not want to reach around the car. See, e.g., id. at 1:50:15, 1:50:30.
When asked by Barnes, Brown falsely stated that his name was Cedric Harris. Id. at 1:51:51; ECF
57, ¶ 16. Barnes suspected at that time that Brown had given him a false name. ECF 61, ¶ 8.
Frederick, visibly frustrated with Brown, asked to exit the car. ECF 42-7, at 1:52:33. At that point,
Frederick provided her true name and stated that there was a warrant out for her arrest. Id. at
1:53:02. Barnes then returned to questioning Brown, who continued to keep his hands on the

steering wheel or otherwise within Barnes’ view. Barnes asked Brown for his “real name,” and
Brown repeated that it was Cedric Harris. Id. at 1:53:09. After a brief exchange with Brown and
Frederick about where they were coming from and whether he had seen them earlier that night,
Barnes asked Brown if he had anything on him like a gun. Id. at 1:54:16. Brown replied that he
did not. Id.
Just after 1:54 a.m., Barnes informed Brown that he was “gonna be in handcuffs for a
minute,” “just for my safety.” Id. at 1:54:22. When Brown asked why Barnes was going to
handcuff him, Barnes replied “cus I don’t feel like fighting with you on the side of the road and
you’re not giving me your license.” Id. at 1:54:25-1:54:54. When Brown asked what the probable
cause was, Barnes stated “cus you’re obviously on something right now.” Id. Barnes then repeated
that Brown could either step out of the car to be placed be in handcuffs “until we figure this out”
or be forcibly removed from the car by Barnes and his colleague, who was expected to arrive “in
thirty seconds.” Id. at 1:55:05. Although Brown appeared agitated about the prospect of being

handcuffed, he responded calmly to Barnes. Id. at 1:54:25-1:56:06. During this interaction, Brown
went back to eating chips but otherwise kept his hands in the air. Id. at 1:55:34. Barnes then asked
Brown whether he had any guns, needles, or knives on his person. Id. at 1:55:45. Brown responded
that he was not sure whether his knife was on his person or somewhere in the car. Id. at 1:55:56.
Shortly after, Barnes placed Brown in handcuffs and removed him from the car. Id. at
1:56:22-1:57:18. Brown complied with Barnes’ instructions to facilitate the handcuffing and
repeatedly stated, “I will cooperate.” Id. Barnes then escorted him to the rear of the car and frisked
him—shaking Brown’s clothes and patting him down over the clothes. Id. at 1:57:25-1:57:49.
While doing so, he asked Brown what he “uses,” and Brown replied that he was just overtired. Id.
at 1:57:30-1:57:51. As Brown was responding to his questions, Barnes felt and retrieved from

Brown’s back pocket a folded knife and a cylindrical metallic object that Barnes believed to be a
crack pipe with residue, both of which he placed on the top of the car. Id. at 1:57:50-1:57:59; ECF
42-1, at 91:15-21.2 Barnes then asked Brown whether he uses “dope,” and Brown repeated that he
was overtired. ECF 42-7, at 1:57:54-1:57:59. Barnes next removed Brown’s hat and patted down
Brown’s front pocket, proceeding to reach inside and pull out multiple objects. Id. at 1:58:07. After
removing those items, he said, “I thought you said you didn’t use . . . you use something, you got

2 Brown disputes whether this item was a crack pipe, noting that the item was not field tested,
ECF 42-1, at 97; that no crack pipe was listed on Barnes’ incident report, ECF 57-2; and that no
crack pipe was identified on the motor vehicle inventory form, ECF 57-3. But Brown does not
dispute that Barnes believed the item to be a crack pipe after pulling it out of Brown’s pocket.
a crack pipe in your pocket right?” Id. at 1:58:18-1:58:22. Brown responded, “it’s in my pocket, it
ain’t in my mouth.” Id. Barnes next conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus test on Brown, through
which he determined that Brown was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Id. at 1:59:35;
ECF 42-1, at 77. Barnes nonetheless asked Brown when he had last smoked crack, and Brown

responded, “yesterday.” ECF 42-7, at 2:00:05-2:00:13. When Barnes then asked, “you just carry
that pipe around with you all the time?” Brown replied, “never leave home without it.” Id. at
2:00:13-2:00:16. At 2:00 a.m., Barnes placed Brown in the rear of his cruiser while the
investigation continued. Id. at 2:00:31.
II. Leslie’s Search of Brown.
With Brown secured in the back of his cruiser, Barnes asked Frederick if there was anything
in the car, and she replied that “there might be a couple crack stems.” Id. at 2:01:21. Barnes then
handcuffed and frisked Frederick. Id. at 2:01:31. Trooper Lirette—who had just arrived on the
scene—brought her to sit in the back of his cruiser. Id. at 2:02:40. Meanwhile, Barnes and Trooper
Leslie—who arrived while Barnes was taking Brown out of his car—began searching the grassy

area around the car. Id. at 2:02:50. Barnes informed Leslie that he believed Brown and Frederick
had just dropped off drugs in Athol, and that Frederick had a history of trafficking drugs. Id. at
2:03:07. He also explained that while Frederick did not appear to have any drugs on her, she had
previously “stuffed” (i.e., concealed in an anatomical cavity) 400 pills. Id. at 2:03:20.
With both Brown and Frederick detained, Barnes requested a tow truck and began to search
the car. Id. at 2:03:50-2:04:02. He asked Leslie to help, informing him that “I think [Brown] just
ripped out. There might be some dope in there.” Id. at 2:05:53. When Leslie asked if Barnes
thought Brown had drugs on his person, Barnes stated, “I don’t know, he started pounding chips
right when I did it and there’s an open ripped bag that he was sitting on.” Id. at 2:05:57-2:06:10.
Leslie replied that Brown “probably swallowed it,” and Barnes said, “I don’t know—I’m gonna
check on him, make sure he’s not—that’s what I’m thinking though.” Id.
At about 2:06 a.m., Leslie and Barnes approached Barnes’ cruiser, and Leslie opened the
door and asked Brown to step out of the car. ECF 42-8 (Leslie’s Body Worn Camera Footage), at

2:06:15. Leslie asked Brown why he was sweating, and Brown explained that it was hot in the
cruiser. Id. at 2:06:18. Leslie then had Brown widen his stance and, with gloves on, began a search
of his person. Id. at 2:06:24. The entire search lasted 24 seconds. Id. at 2:06:24-2:06:52; ECF 59,
¶ 82. Leslie began by shaking Brown’s three layers of shorts on his right, front, left, and back side.
ECF 59, ¶ 65; ECF 42-8, at 2:06:24-2:06:40; ECF 42-4, at 57 (Brown was wearing cargo shorts
over gym shorts and underwear). While doing so, he asked Brown why his pants were undone, and
Brown provided an unintelligible response. ECF 42-8, at 2:06:27. When he came to the back side,
he reached his hand in between Brown’s legs and began searching Brown’s intergluteal cleft (i.e.,
the crease between Brown’s buttocks) over his three layers of shorts. Id. at 2:06:41. It is disputed
whether Leslie’s finger penetrated Brown’s rectum or anus through his three layers of clothing.

Responding to the intergluteal cleft search, Brown exclaimed “Ow! Hey!” Id. at 2:06:43.
Leslie, keeping his hand between Brown’s legs, said “What is that? Tucked in your ass?” Id. at
2:06:45. Brown became agitated and said, “What is what? Hold up.” Id. at 2:06:45-2:06:49. Leslie
removed his hand from between Brown’s legs and told him to relax. Id. at 2:06:50; ECF 59, ¶ 81.
Brown, increasingly agitated, yelled at Leslie and accused him of sticking his finger “up [his] ass.”
ECF 42-8, at 2:06:51-2:06:58. Meanwhile, Leslie stepped away, remarking that Brown had
“something stuck.” Id. at 2:06:57. After Brown continued yelling at Leslie, Barnes and Leslie
physically restrained him against the car. Id. at 2:07:00-2:07:30. Brown then insisted that he had
nothing on him and told the troopers to pull his clothes off to check, declaring that Leslie should
strip search him rather than “poke [his] fucking ass with [his] fucking finger through [his] pants.”
Id. at 2:07:25. Leslie reiterated that “something [was] stuffed in [Brown’s] ass” and that there was
“definitely something there,” but said they would search him at the barracks instead. Id. at 2:07:30-
02:07:43. He then turned Brown around and guided him back into the cruiser. Id. at 2:07:45. Brown

continued to yell at Leslie, demanding his name and stating he would press charges while Leslie
walked away. Id. at 2:07:49-2:08:20. Lirette—who had approached moments before Leslie’s
search ended—remained with Brown.
Lirette introduced himself to Brown and asked for his name, to which Brown replied
“Cedric Harris.” ECF 42-9 (Lirette’s Body Worn Camera Footage), at 2:08:19. Brown
emphatically repeated that he had nothing on him and that Leslie had assaulted him. Id. at 2:08:22-
2:13:00. During their conversation, Brown asked Lirette why he was going to be taken to the
barracks because he had nothing on him, and Lirette replied that he did not know what charges
were at issue. Id. at 2:08:44. Brown also revealed to Lirette and Barnes that he had previously
served time for shooting a police officer. Id. at 2:10:36, 2:13:35. Lirette and Brown continued to

converse until Lirette got Brown in the car, shut the door, and stepped away at about 2:22 a.m.
III. The Automobile Search and Trooper Deliberations.
While Lirette spoke with Brown, Leslie and Barnes continued searching Brown’s car. ECF
42-7, at 2:08:38; ECF 42-8, at 2:09:20. Leslie told Barnes that he could feel something sticking
out of Brown’s rectum. ECF 42-8, at 2:09:39. After looking for a few minutes, Leslie informed
Barnes that he had found burnt Brillo from a crack pipe in the console. Id. at 2:11:30. Barnes
walked away, but Leslie continued searching. ECF 42-7, at 2:11:41; ECF 42-8, at 2:11:42. Turning
to the passenger side door, Leslie picked up an item and identified it as a crack pipe. ECF 42-8, at
2:12:24. Still searching, he said he could see another crack pipe, and he found a wallet containing
Brown’s license. Id. at 2:12:33. He provided the license to Barnes before continuing to search the
car and the various containers within it. Id. at 2:13:00-2:14:27. The license identified Brown as
Keith Brown. Id.
At 2:17 a.m., after calling the station because all the cruisers’ computers were down,

Barnes confirmed that Brown had a suspended license. ECF 42-7, at 2:17:40. He could not
otherwise locate Brown’s criminal history. Id. at 2:37:32. He and Leslie then opened the trunk to
Brown’s car and searched it and the containers within it. Id. at 2:17:44-2:20:50. During the search,
Barnes and Leslie discussed taking Brown to jail. Id. at 2:20:41.
Following the automobile search, Leslie asked Barnes if he wanted to take “all the crack
pipes and stuff” out before the car was towed, but Barnes declined. Id. at 2:21:13. The three
troopers then discussed whether they could take Brown and Frederick to the barracks together
because policy forbade booking a male and female simultaneously. Id. at 2:25:26-2:34:26. They
discussed, in the alternative, summonsing either Brown or Frederick and booking the other. Id. At
times, they muted their body cameras while conversing. See, e.g., id. at 2:31:30. Lirette proposed

trying to get Brown to give up any drugs on him in exchange for a summons. Id. at 2:33:24. Barnes
stated that he was unsure whether Brown had any drugs, to which Lirette replied that Leslie is
typically good about identifying when someone has drugs on them. Id. at 2:33:25. They then
discussed an approach where they would summons Brown after Lirette conducted a final search
of his person and Brown gave up any drugs. Id. at 2:33:30.
When Lirette discussed the idea with Brown, Brown said that he would “strip right there.”
ECF 42-10 (Back Seat Camera of Keith Barnes’ Cruiser) at 0:48:22. Lirette explained that road-
side strip searches are forbidden but asked if Brown was willing to do one. Id. at 0:48:25-0:48:48.
Brown confirmed that he was willing, suggested that they could do it in the bushes nearby, and
repeated that he had nothing on him. Id. at 0:48:49-0:49:07. Lirette then asked Leslie whether a
roadside strip search was permissible with the detainee’s permission, and Leslie indicated that it
was not. ECF 42-9, at 2:36:02-2:36:20. Meanwhile, the cruisers’ computers came back online, and
Leslie departed shortly thereafter. Id. at 2:36:24-2:41:10.

IV. Lirette’s Search of Brown.
At 2:41 a.m., approximately 45 minutes after Brown was first handcuffed, Barnes and
Lirette told Brown that they intended to summons him for driving with a suspended license,
contingent on Lirette conducting another search for drugs on Brown’s person. Id. at 2:41:18-
02:41:39. Brown said he was “good with that.” Id. at 2:41:39. With Barnes standing nearby, Lirette
then conducted an over-the-clothes search of Brown, using the “crush and squeeze method to check
the crease of [Brown’s] buttocks to ensure he [did] not have drugs concealed on his person.” ECF
61, ¶ 34; ECF 42-9, at 2:42:29.
While Lirette was feeling between Brown’s buttocks, Brown explained that he was wearing
multiple pairs of shorts. ECF 42-9, at 2:43:08. After confirming that Brown had multiple pairs of

shorts on, Barnes asked Brown, “you wanna take off the outer pair?” and Lirette paused his search
to ask Brown to clarify, stating “you wanna take off the outer pair? You do?” Id. at 2:43:20. Brown
replied, “yes, yes,” and stated that what Lirette was feeling was the ridge of one pair of shorts
beneath the outer pair. Id. at 2:43:21. Leaving Brown’s clothing in place, Lirette continued feeling
between Brown’s buttocks. As he did, Brown told Lirette and Barnes to “just take the fuckin’
shorts off.” Id. at 2:43:29. Lirette then stepped away from Brown, such that neither he nor Barnes
was in contact with Brown. Id. at 2:43:31.
After repeatedly telling the troopers to take the outer shorts off, Brown exclaimed, “I’ll do
it my fuckin’ self” while moving to pull down his pants and shimmy his body, with the result that
all three layers of clothing came down below his buttocks to his ankles. Id. at 2:43:49. Lirette
reacted, “whoa, whoa,” and told Brown they wanted to pull up his pants. Id. at 2:43:50-2:43:59.
Brown then leaned over, presenting his exposed buttocks to Lirette, who turned away. Id. at
2:44:04. Meanwhile, Barnes repeatedly told Brown to stop, and Lirette backed further away. Id. at

2:44:06. Neither Barnes nor Lirette conducted any further search, and Lirette asked Brown if he
needed help pulling up his pants. Id. at 2:24:35; ECF 61, ¶ 37. They eventually uncuffed Brown,
and Barnes gave him a courtesy ride to a 24-hour gas station. ECF 57, ¶¶ 37-38.
V. Procedural History.
Brown was charged in the Winchendon District Court with operating a motor vehicle on a
suspended license, in violation of M.G.L. c. 90, § 23, and two civil motor vehicle infractions—a
marked lanes offense, in violation of M.G.L. c. 89, § 4A, and speeding, in violation of M.G.L.
c. 90, § 17. ECF 57, ¶ 39. On December 15, 2021, he pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle
with a suspended license and was found responsible for the civil infractions. Id. ¶ 40.
Brown brought this lawsuit in April 2024 against Barnes, Leslie, and Lirette, seeking

compensatory and punitive damages. ECF 1-1, at 4-5. He claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that each trooper violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. ECF
1-1, ¶¶ 26-31. He also claims that Barnes failed to intervene in Leslie’s and Lirette’s searches, in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.3 After a period of

3 Brown also brought a negligence claim against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ECF
1-1, ¶¶ 32-38, but that claim was severed and remanded to Massachusetts Superior Court for lack
of federal jurisdiction, ECF 13. In opposition to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment,
Brown for the first time alludes to allegations of “excessive force.” See ECF 56, at 1, 8, 14-15, 22-
23; ECF 58, at 1, 10, 12, 14; ECF 60, at 1, 14, 16. But Brown’s complaint contains no claim for
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, see ECF 1-1, ¶¶ 26-38, and “[p]laintiffs
may not ‘raise new and unadvertised theories of liability for the first time in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment,’” Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Davila, 813 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2016)
(quoting Calvi v. Knox Cty., 470 F.3d 422, 431 (1st Cir. 2006)).
discovery, all three defendants filed motions for summary judgment. ECF 41, 44, 46. Following a
hearing, the Court took the motions under advisement. ECF 67.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the record, “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed
in the light most flattering to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue
in favor of either party.” Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
1990) (citation omitted). To prevail, the moving party must show that “there is no factual
determination which a rational factfinder could make as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact
that has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.” Gibson Found., Inc. v. Norris, 88 F.4th
1, 5 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). Courts “must consider the record and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,” but “need not credit
conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Dixon-Tribou v.

McDonough, 86 F.4th 453, 458 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). The non-moving party
may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials,” but instead must “present affirmative
evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986).
DISCUSSION
I. The Favorable Termination Rule.
Barnes and Lirette contend at the outset that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Brown’s
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because success on those claims would imply the
invalidity of Brown’s conviction for driving with a suspended license and his civil infractions. In
Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court “held that when a person convicted of a crime files a § 1983
claim seeking damages for an ‘allegedly unconstitutional conviction’ or for ‘other harm,’ the
district court ‘must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.’”

O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 528-29 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Barnes and Lirette contend that this favorable termination rule bars
Brown’s claims in this Court, because success on his claims would imply the invalidity of his
conviction insofar as they would “require a conclusion that his [guilty] plea” in the Massachusetts
District Court “was taken without a factual basis in contravention of Mass. R. Crim. Pro.
12(c)(3)(B)” and would require “the suppression of all the evidence against him.” ECF 43, at 7;
see ECF 47, at 8-10. It is undisputed that Brown’s conviction has not been vacated.
To determine whether Brown’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction, this Court “must consider the relationship between the § 1983 claim[s] and the
conviction, including asking whether [he] could prevail only by ‘negat[ing] an element of the

offense of which he [was] convicted.’” Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 179 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n.6); see Fairbanks v. O’Hagan, 255 F. Supp. 3d 239, 244 (D. Mass. 2017).
The crime to which Brown pleaded guilty, a violation of M.G.L. c. 90, § 23, ¶ 1, has the following
elements: (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle; (2) at the time of that operation the
defendant’s license was revoked or suspended; and (3) the defendant was notified that his license
had been suspended or revoked. See Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 50 (2002); Criminal
Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court, § 5.200 (2009 ed.). To be held responsible
for a marked lane infraction in violation of M.G.L. c. 89, § 4A, a driver can either fail to “maintain
[his] intended lane of travel” or fail “to ascertain the safety of a movement from that lane before
executing that movement.” Commonwealth v. Larose, 483 Mass. 323, 329 (2019). And to violate
M.G.L. c. 90, § 17, the driver must be operating a motor vehicle “at a rate of speed greater than is
reasonable and proper,” or faster than the statutory or posted limit. Commonwealth v. Whynaught,
377 Mass. 14, 21 (1979). Barnes and Lirette do not identify which of these elements, in their view,

would be negated if Brown were to succeed on his Section 1983 claims. Nor have they attached a
transcript of Brown’s plea colloquy in support of their contention that success on Brown’s Section
1983 claims would imply that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis or would require suppression
of evidence used against him.
The Court perceives no interrelation between Brown’s conviction and his Section 1983
claims in this case. He alleges here that Barnes, Leslie, and Lirette violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches of his person, and that Barnes failed to intervene in his
colleagues’ unlawful searches of his body. Brown does not dispute that Barnes permissibly pulled
him over for speeding and marked lane violations. Nor does he challenge the constitutionality of
the search of his car, which led to the recovery of his wallet and license, allowing the troopers to

identify him and learn that his license was suspended. See ECF 56, at 8 (outlining the scope of
Brown’s claims). Separately, Barnes’ frisk of Brown led to the recovery of a knife and an object
that Barnes believed to be a crack pipe. Neither of these items has any apparent connection to the
elements of operating a vehicle with a suspended license or the civil infractions, nor is it clear how
unlawfulness in the frisk would imply the invalidity of Brown’s conviction. Brown was not, of
course, charged with a drug or weapons offense. See Evariste v. City of Boston, No. 18-cv-12597-
FDS, 2020 WL 1332835, at *3 (D. Mass. March 23, 2020) (Heck bar applied where success on
claimed Fourth Amendment violation for an unlawful search, which had resulted in recovery of
drugs, would imply the invalidity of a conviction for possession of a controlled substance);
Mangual v. City of Worcester, 285 F. Supp. 3d 465, 471-72 (D. Mass. 2018) (same).
The Supreme Court was “careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term
‘necessarily.’” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004). This Court sees no basis for

concluding that success on Brown’s Section 1983 claims here would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his prior conviction, or that his claims and conviction are “so interrelated factually as
to bar the § 1983 claim[s].” Thore, 466 F.3d at 180. Accordingly, the favorable termination rule
enunciated in Heck does not preclude jurisdiction over Brown’s claims.
II. Fourth Amendment Claims.
Brown contends that each of the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches of his person. He challenges Barnes’ initial frisk that, he claims, morphed
into a search; Leslie’s subsequent search of his body and intergluteal cleft that, in his recollection,
penetrated his anus or rectum; and Lirette’s final search of his body, which he describes as a strip
search. All three defendants maintain that their interactions with Brown comported with

constitutional requirements. Leslie and Lirette further contend that they are entitled to qualified
immunity.4
A. Barnes’ Frisk of Brown.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. “Although as a general matter, warrantless searches [and seizures] are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, there are a few specifically established and well-

4 Although Barnes raises qualified immunity as a defense to Brown’s failure to intervene claim,
he does not assert a qualified immunity defense against Brown’s Fourth Amendment claim against
him. The defense is therefore waived as to Brown’s Fourth Amendment claim. See Rodríguez v.
Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[W]e deem waived . . . claims
adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed argument.”).
delineated exceptions to that general rule.” City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)
(quotation marks omitted). One exception, known as a Terry stop and frisk, permits an officer who
reasonably believes an individual “with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous” to temporarily detain the individual and “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer

clothing of such perso[n] in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.”
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In the context of a traffic stop, a Terry stop and frisk is
permissible if (1) a police officer detains a vehicle because of a violation of the traffic laws, and
(2) the officer “harbor[s] reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and
dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009). Evaluating whether an officer’s
suspicions reasonably justify a frisk is a “fact-sensitive task which looks at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether there is a particularized, objective basis to suspect someone
is armed and dangerous.” United States v. Harrington, 56 F.4th 195, 203 (1st Cir. 2022) (quotation
marks omitted). An officer conducting a permissible Terry frisk may reach beneath or within a
suspect’s outer clothing if, upon feeling an object, the officer reasonably suspects it to be a weapon.

United States v. Dubose, 579 F.3d 117, 122-23 (1st Cir. 2009).
There is no dispute here that the Terry stop—Barnes’ detention of Brown due to violations
of motor vehicle laws—was valid. Barnes pulled Brown over after observing him driving faster
than the posted speed limit and committing marked lane violations. The focus of the dispute is
whether Barnes reasonably believed that Brown may have been armed and dangerous when he
subjected Brown to a frisk. Barnes contends that his entire pat-down of Brown’s body was justified
by such a reasonable belief. Brown disputes that Barnes could have reasonably harbored a belief
that he was armed and dangerous. But even if Barnes was initially justified in so believing, Brown
contends, Barnes should have ceased conducting the frisk after removing Brown’s knife from his
back pocket, and the continuation of the frisk after that point amounted to an unconstitutional
search.
Based on the undisputed facts, Barnes was reasonably justified in suspecting that Brown
may have been armed and dangerous, such that a protective frisk was needed to ensure officer
safety.5 When asked, Brown told Barnes that he had a weapon in his possession—a knife—but

could not remember where it was located. Before the frisk, Barnes suspected that Brown had
provided him with a false name, and he knew that Brown’s passenger, Frederick, had also initially
provided a false name and had a warrant out for her arrest. Brown acted erratically throughout the
encounter by, among other things, quickly consuming chips out of a bag while Barnes was
questioning him and responding to some questions with unintelligible answers. Brown failed to
produce his driver’s license, despite repeated requests from Barnes, and he became more agitated
over the course of the five minutes preceding the frisk. Collectively, these facts would have led a
reasonable officer to suspect that Brown possessed a weapon, as he admitted, and that he may have
been dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona-Vicente, 817 F.3d 823, 828 (1st Cir. 2016)

(frisk justified where “[t]he driver of the car could not produce a driver’s license, suggesting the
[car] may have been stolen,” the passenger “appeared nervous during the stop,” and the driver
“was clutching a fanny pack in a manner that, based on [the officer’s] experience, was consistent
with there being a gun inside”); United States v. Mouscardy, 722 F.3d 68, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2013)
(frisk justified where passenger “repeatedly refused to identify himself,” “refused to remove his
hand from his pocket,” and was increasingly “agitated and nervous”); United States v. Herrera,

5 The parties disagree whether certain disputed facts—such as whether Barnes suspected prior
to the frisk that Brown had served prison time in connection with shooting a police officer—
support Barnes’ conclusion that Brown may be armed and dangerous. The Court does not address
or rely on any disputed facts, as the undisputed facts alone substantiate Barnes’ reasonable
conclusion that a protective frisk was necessary.
No. 17-cr-10112-ADB, 2018 WL 1020112, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2018) (defendant’s possession
of a knife provided reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous and justified the frisk).
Brown contends that, even if the initial frisk was justified, Barnes violated the Fourth
Amendment by continuing to search his person after discovering the knife in his back pocket. After

removing the knife and the object he suspected to be a crack pipe, Barnes returned to frisking
Brown and, upon reaching Brown’s front pocket, felt its exterior with his left hand and then
removed a piece of paper and other unidentified items with his right hand. As Brown sees it,
because Barnes had already located the knife that Brown warned him about, Barnes could no
longer possess a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous and could not justifiably
continue to frisk him. That argument holds no water. Barnes’ decision to continue frisking Brown
upon discovering the knife was justified based on the same reasons his decision to frisk Brown in
the first place was justified. The discovery of one weapon does not negate the possibility that
Brown may have possessed other weapons that could have posed a risk to officer safety. See
Herrera, 2018 WL 1020112, at *4 (“Given the presence of the knife, the pat frisk was a reasonable

next step by law enforcement to confirm that Defendant did not possess any other weapons that
could jeopardize the safety of the officers.”).
Brown also argues that Barnes’ pat-down surpassed the scope of a permissible Terry frisk
and therefore required a different exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
warrantless searches. In Brown’s view, after Barnes removed the knife from his back pocket,
Barnes impermissibly infringed his privacy rights by resuming the frisk and then retrieving various
items from his front pocket, one of which was the suspected crack pipe. See ECF 56, at 12-13;
ECF 57, ¶¶ 54-55. This argument is inconsistent with the body worn camera footage, which shows
Barnes simultaneously removing two objects from Brown’s back pocket: the knife and the
suspected crack pipe. See ECF 42-7, at 1:57:50-1:57:59.6 Barnes then held both objects in front of
the camera before placing them on the roof of the car. Id. Where, as here, the non-moving party’s
view of the facts is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Based on the camera footage, Barnes patted
the exterior of Brown’s shorts and, upon feeling hard objects in Brown’s back pocket, reached in
and retrieved the knife and the metallic object he believed to be a crack pipe. That retrieval did not
exceed the scope of a permissible Terry frisk, because Brown had previewed that he may have a
knife somewhere on his person, and Barnes could have reasonably suspected that one of those hard
objects would have been a weapon. See Dubose, 579 F.3d at 122-23. And even if Brown were
correct that one of the objects Barnes removed from Brown’s front pocket was a crack pipe, that
removal would not exceed the scope of a permissible Terry frisk, either. Having just removed from
Brown’s back pocket a folded knife and an object that appeared to be a crack pipe, a reasonable
officer in Barnes’ shoes, feeling a similarly sized bulge in a different pocket, would have been

justified in suspecting that object to likewise be a weapon or contraband. Accordingly, Barnes’
investigatory detention and frisk of Brown comported with constitutional requirements, and
Barnes is entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s Fourth Amendment claim against him.
B. Leslie’s and Lirette’s Searches of Brown.
After Barnes’ frisk of Brown, Leslie and Lirette each searched his body, looking
specifically for drugs. Although all agree that these officers conducted searches rather than Terry
frisks, the parties part ways on three key issues. First, they dispute whether Leslie and Lirette had

6 Brown testified at his deposition that when Barnes removed the putative crack pipe from his
pocket, he “thought it was a flashlight at first,” but he “believe[s]” it was a crack pipe, though he
is not certain. ECF 42-4, at 149:21-150:3.
probable cause to search Brown for drugs. Second, they disagree whether Brown was under arrest
at the time of the searches. The officers contend that their warrantless searches were permissible
searches incident to Brown’s arrest, as Brown was, at a minimum, under a de facto arrest for a
potential narcotics offense. Brown contends that he was never arrested, and that the officers

therefore cannot rely on the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Third,
the parties dispute whether, to the extent the officers’ searches were justified, those searches were
reasonable in scope. In the officers’ view, no reasonable jury could conclude that their searches
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Brown argues that a reasonable jury could conclude that
Leslie’s search penetrated his anal cavity and that Lirette strip searched him, such that neither
officer’s search was reasonable.
Leslie and Lirette also claim that qualified immunity shields them from liability on
Brown’s claims. Even when an individual has been subject to an unlawful search, a police officer
may nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity on constitutional claims for damages arising
out of that search. The qualified immunity inquiry “proceeds with a now-familiar two-part test:

‘(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional
right; and (2) if so, whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged
violation.’” Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358, 366 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Rocket Learning, Inc.
v. Rivera-Sánchez, 715 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013)). “The ‘clearly established’ inquiry itself has two
elements.” Id. The first requires the court to consider “the clarity of the law at the time of the
violation.” Id. (quoting Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 42 (1st Cir. 2013)). That element can
be satisfied by finding binding or persuasive case law addressing similar facts, or a more general
accepted proposition that applies with obviousness to the facts in question. Berge v. Sch. Comm.
of Gloucester, 107 F.4th 33, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2024). The second requires the court to consider “the
facts of the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Penate, 944 F.3d at 366 (quoting Drumgold,
707 F.3d at 42). It is the plaintiff’s “burden [to demonstrate] that the law was clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation.” Mitchell v. Miller, 790 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2015). A court

may address either prong of the qualified immunity analysis first, and it need go no further if that
inquiry is dispositive. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Where, as here, a defendant
asserts a qualified immunity defense on summary judgment, the court must “identif[y] the version
of events that best comports with the summary judgment standard and then as[k] whether, given
that set of facts, a reasonable officer should have known that his actions were unlawful.” Morelli
v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2009).
1. Probable Cause and Search Incident to Arrest.
Police officers may arrest an individual without a warrant if they have probable cause to
believe that he has committed or is committing a crime. Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d
500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009). If officers have probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest, they

may, under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, go beyond the pat-
frisk permissible in an investigatory stop to “search ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach
in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.’” United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The scope of such a search is
limited: officers may search only “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate
control,’” meaning “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. This “ensures that the scope of a search incident
to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any
evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332, 339 (2009).
The parties dispute whether Leslie and Lirette had probable cause to search Brown for
drugs after Barnes had already frisked him. Officers have probable cause to conduct a warrantless

search and arrest if, at that moment, “‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent
man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.’” Vargas-
Badillo v. Diaz-Torres, 114 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). The probable cause inquiry calls for “‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,’” and “not [of] the officer’s actual
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-
71 (1985) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)).
Based on the undisputed facts, Leslie and Lirette had probable cause to believe that Brown
was committing a drug-related offense and to search him for drugs. When Leslie commenced his

search, Barnes had already frisked Brown and discovered a suspected crack pipe with residue in
his pocket. Brown had told Barnes that he had last used crack cocaine the day before and that he
“never leave[s] home without” the pipe. ECF 42-7, at 2:00:05-2:00:16. Brown had been driving
with a woman whom Barnes knew to have a history of drug trafficking and who had previously
been caught “stuff[ing]” pills in an anatomical cavity. Id. at 2:03:09-2:03:24. And she had told the
officers that “there might be a couple crack stems” in Brown’s car. Id. at 2:01:21. All of these facts
would have led a reasonably prudent officer to believe that Brown had committed or was
committing a controlled substances offense, and that Brown may have drugs on his body that were
not uncovered during Barnes’ frisk. See United States v. Cook, 277 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“[C]ommon sense suggests that, where law enforcement officers are jointly involved in executing
an investigative stop, the knowledge of each officer should be imputed to others jointly involved
in executing the stop.”). And that probable cause did not dissipate between Leslie and Lirette’s
searches, because Leslie’s search was cut short due to Brown’s objections, and Leslie believed he

had felt narcotics tucked in Brown’s intergluteal cleft during that search.
Having concluded that Leslie and Lirette had probable cause to search Brown for drugs,
the next question is whether their searches were authorized under the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Whether an individual suspected of committing a crime is
under arrest is not always readily apparent. “There is no scientifically precise formula that enables
courts to distinguish between investigatory stops, which can be justified by reasonable suspicion,
and other detentions that the law deems sufficiently coercive to require probable cause—detentions
that are sometimes called ‘de facto arrests.’” United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir.
1994). Courts must assess the totality of the circumstances, asking “whether a reasonable person
in the [detainee’s] shoes would understand [himself] to be subject to restraints comparable to those

associated with an arrest.” Morelli, 552 F.3d at 20. Relevant considerations include the use of
physical restraints, the officers’ demeanor, the information conveyed to the detainee during the
stop, the length of the detention, and the surrounding environment. See id. at 20-21; United States
v. Rasberry, 882 F.3d 241, 247-49 (1st Cir. 2018); Zapata, 18 F.3d at 975. That said, courts must
“keep in mind that police conducting a Terry [investigatory] stop are entitled to take reasonable
measures to protect their own safety and taking such measures does not transform a Terry stop into
an arrest.” United States v. Jones, 700 F.3d 615, 624-25 (1st Cir. 2012).
Whether Brown was subject to a de facto arrest matters because the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement justifies the officers’ searches if he was subject to a formal
or de facto arrest, but otherwise may not justify the searches. On the one hand, Brown’s detention
bears many hallmarks of a de facto arrest: he was handcuffed for most of the 45 minutes he was
detained, his detention was not brief, multiple officers were present, and they restrained him in a
police cruiser throughout much of the detention. On the other hand, the officers never told Brown

that he was under arrest, they understood him to be detained rather than arrested, and they
ultimately released him on a summons rather than taking him to the station for booking. But
because the officers have asserted a qualified immunity defense, the Court need not determine
whether Brown was subject to a de facto arrest on the night of August 7, 2021. That is so because
qualified immunity will shield Leslie and Lirette from liability unless it was clearly established, as
of that date, that the search incident to arrest exception is inapplicable where (1) the officers had
probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a criminal offense, but (2) did not subject
the detainee to a formal or de facto arrest.
Brown has not demonstrated “that the law was clearly established” on this issue “at the
time of the alleged violation.” Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 77. He contends only that “qualified immunity

has no place in this case” because “[t]he law on searches and seizures is bedrock law and has been
well established for many years.” ECF 58, at 14; see ECF 60, at 16. But it is Brown’s “heavy
burden” to demonstrate that the contours of the Fourth Amendment “were sufficiently definite
[such] that any reasonable official in [the defendants’] shoes would have understood that [they
were] violating” his constitutional protections. Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 77. And Brown identifies no
case law indicating that, in 2021, it was clearly established that a warrantless search of a person
whom officers had probable cause to arrest, but did not ultimately subject to a formal or de facto
arrest, violates the Fourth Amendment. Nor is the Court aware of any such precedent. Because
Brown has not “identified a single precedent finding a [constitutional] violation under similar
circumstances,” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 14 (2021), or “demonstrate[d] that an
objectively reasonable official in the defendant[s’] position[s] would have known that [their]
conduct violated that rule of law,” Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation
marks omitted), Leslie and Lirette are entitled to qualified immunity on Brown’s claims that their

searches violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches.
2. Reasonableness of the Officers’ Searches.
Brown next argues that even if Leslie’s and Lirette’s searches were justified, the officers
nevertheless violated the Fourth Amendment because the scope of their searches exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness.
Even when an officer may permissibly search a suspect, the nature of the search may offend
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable” searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see
Rasberry, 882 F.3d at 246 (the Fourth Amendment “does not pretermit all searches and seizures,
but only those that are unreasonable”). “The reasonableness of an invasive search depends on
whether the totality of the circumstances justifies the degree of the intrusion.” Rasberry, 882 F.3d

at 250. With respect to Leslie’s search, Brown contends that the search was unreasonably invasive
because Leslie’s finger penetrated his anal cavity. Leslie asserts that no reasonable jury could
conclude that his finger penetrated Brown’s rectum, nor that his non-penetrative search of Brown’s
intergluteal cleft was unreasonable. He further asserts that qualified immunity applies because
Brown has failed to identify case law putting officers on notice that a non-penetrative search of a
suspect’s intergluteal cleft violates the Fourth Amendment in comparable circumstances. Leslie
does not argue that qualified immunity would apply if a jury were to conclude that he had digitally
penetrated Brown’s rectum.
In evaluating material disputes of fact on summary judgment, the Court must draw all
permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party. And a reasonable jury, considering the
undisputed record and drawing all inferences in Brown’s favor, could conclude that Leslie’s finger
penetrated his rectum while Leslie searched his intergluteal cleft. Brown testified that Leslie’s

finger “penetrated [his] ass through his clothes” and “went into [his] anus.” ECF 42-4, at 58-59.
The body worn camera footage of the search captures Brown shouting “Ow! Hey!” and exclaiming
that Leslie put his finger “up [his] ass.” ECF 42-8, at 2:06:43-2:06:58. It shows Brown becoming
immediately agitated and repeatedly accusing Leslie of “pok[ing] [his] . . . ass with [his] . . . finger
through [his] pants.” Id. at 2:07:25. Leslie denies Brown’s version of the facts, arguing that no jury
could conclude that penetration occurred where it is undisputed that Leslie “only searched over
[Brown’s] three layers of clothing and . . . was wearing gloves.” ECF 45, at 11. While Leslie’s
hand was at all times separated from Brown’s rectum by three layers of clothing—underwear, gym
shorts, and cargo shorts—that fact would not preclude a jury from concluding that digital
penetration occurred. Nor does Leslie’s prior knowledge that people suspected of criminal conduct

frequently dissemble compel the conclusion that Brown was feigning upset in this case. ECF 42-
2, at 107:14-109:14. Because a reasonable jury could find Brown’s account of the search credible,
and Leslie does not dispute that such a search would be unconstitutional, Leslie is not entitled to
summary judgment on Brown’s Fourth Amendment claim. See Spencer v. Roche, 659 F.3d 142,
146 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because individuals possess a strong interest in their bodily integrity, a
nonconsensual intrusion into the body requires a particularly robust justification.”).
With respect to Lirette’s search, Brown contends that Lirette subjected him to an
unreasonable strip search on the side of the road. Brown’s argument is rooted in two alternative
theories: first, that Lirette himself performed a strip search of Brown, or second, that Lirette
subjected Brown to such coercion that Brown felt compelled to remove his own shorts and allow
the officers to visually inspect his buttocks. Disputing both theories, Lirette maintains that the body
worn camera footage clearly refutes Brown’s suggestion that Lirette removed his clothes and
rebuts Brown’s claim that he coerced Brown to remove his own clothes.

Brown’s first theory is wholly inconsistent with the body camera footage, and no
reasonable jury could conclude otherwise, even with all inferences drawn in Brown’s favor.
Contrary to Brown’s contention that Lirette removed Brown’s shorts and conducted a strip search,
or ordered Brown to remove his shorts, it is indisputable that Brown removed his own shorts
through his own bodily movements on his own initiative. See Harris, 550 U.S. at 380 (“When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”). Indeed, when Brown told Lirette to
remove Brown’s shorts, Lirette immediately removed his hands from Brown’s body and backed
away. Brown then pushed down his shorts and shimmied his body such that all three layers of

clothing fell to his knees and ankles. When Lirette immediately told Brown to relax and asked
Brown if he wanted help pulling up his pants, Brown turned around, leaned over, and exposed his
buttocks to Lirette, who backed away while Barnes told Brown to stop. After requesting consent
to do so, Lirette helped Brown back into his pants without conducting any further search. Even
viewing these facts in Brown’s favor, no reasonable jury could conclude that Lirette conducted a
strip search of Brown in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Brown’s second theory is more nuanced. He points out that, by the time his shorts had
fallen to his ankles and his buttocks was exposed, he had been detained and handcuffed for 40
minutes; Lirette had asked him if he would consent to a strip search; he had overheard the troopers
debating whether they could perform a consensual strip search on the side of the road; he had
already been frisked and searched for drugs, without the troopers recovering any from his person;
and Lirette was subjecting him to yet another search of his intergluteal cleft. Under these
circumstances, Brown contends, he experienced such coercion that he had no choice but to remove

his shorts to prove to the officers that he was not concealing drugs in his buttocks. Lirette disputes
that such circumstances can amount to coercion, let alone unconstitutional coercion. And he points
out that he had probable cause to conduct a second search of Brown’s intergluteal cleft, because
Leslie’s prior search of that area had been prematurely terminated, and Leslie felt confident that
he had felt narcotics tucked in Brown’s buttocks.
In general, First Circuit precedent recognizes that strip searches “impinge seriously upon
the values that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect,” because they “require an arrestee
not only to strip naked in front of a stranger, but also to expose the most private areas of her body
to others,” sometimes in “degrading and humiliating positions.” Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6
(1st Cir. 1997). Accordingly, police officers may not conduct a visual body cavity search unless

they have a “reasonable suspicion,” specific to a suspect, that the suspect is concealing contraband
in the cavity. United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2007). But in the vast run of such
cases, the officers direct the suspect to remove their clothing or forcibly remove the clothing for
the suspect. See, e.g., id. at 60-61 (officers ordered the suspected to remove his clothes, “turn
around, bend over, and spread his buttocks so that the officers could see whether he had anything
concealed in his anal area”); Swain, 117 F.3d at 4 (officer “ordered [the suspect] to remove all of
her clothing except for her bra,” then “made [her] bend over and spread her buttocks”). Brown has
identified no case law in which the suspect chose to remove his own clothing and display his
private areas without an order to do so from a police officer.
The Court does not foreclose the possibility that circumstances surrounding a warrantless
search may become so coercive as to give rise to a valid Fourth Amendment theory similar to
Brown’s here. But because Lirette has raised qualified immunity as a defense, Brown has the
burden to demonstrate that the law in 2021 clearly established that an officer can effect an

unconstitutional strip search even when that officer does not remove, or order the suspect to
remove, his clothing and display his private areas. Mitchell, 790 F.3d at 77. Brown has not met
that burden, because he has not identified any case law involving comparable coercive
circumstances, let alone case law demonstrating that a reasonable officer in Lirette’s position
would have known that he was violating Brown’s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. Qualified
immunity thus shields Lirette from liability, and he is entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s
Fourth Amendment claim against him.
III. Failure to Intervene Claim.
Brown also claims that Barnes violated his constitutional rights by failing to intervene in
Leslie’s allegedly unconstitutional search and in Lirette’s alleged strip search. As to the former,

Barnes argues that Brown’s claim must fail as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could
conclude that he had a reasonable opportunity to intervene in Leslie’s search. As to the latter,
Barnes asserts that no duty to intervene existed because the record reveals that no strip search
occurred. Barnes further argues that, in any event, he is protected by qualified immunity because
it was not clearly established in 2021 that a duty to intervene applies outside the context of
excessive force by a fellow officer. Disagreeing, Brown contends that, because he was handcuffed
and detained, Barnes had an affirmative duty to protect him from unlawful searches.
Agreeing with Barnes that qualified immunity bars Brown’s claims, the Court bypasses the
question whether Barnes had a duty to intervene and violated that duty. The First Circuit has
explained that a duty to intervene “arises in a variety of factual circumstances and the phrase by
itself cannot determine either whether a duty arises or how claims of violation of the duty are to
be evaluated.” Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 2005). To determine if
a duty to intervene is clearly established in a particular context, the pertinent question is not

whether a duty to intervene exists writ large, but instead whether the law would have put an officer
in these particular circumstances on notice that he had a duty to intervene. See id. at 54. In August
2021, when the alleged constitutional violations occurred, cases in the First Circuit addressing duty
to intervene claims “primarily, if not exclusively, concerned allegations of failure to intervene in
the excessive force context.” Caldwell v. Cambra, 802 F. Supp. 3d 8, 37 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quotation marks omitted); see Brown v. City of Brockton, No. 24-cv-12048-ADB, 2025 WL
2677231, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2025) (collecting cases). And Brown has not asserted an
excessive force claim against the defendants in this case. See supra note 3.
Brown does not point to any pre-2021 cases from the First Circuit imposing on government
officials a duty to intervene in circumstances involving another government actor’s unjustified or
unreasonable search.7 Because the clearly established inquiry is satisfied only if “controlling

authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” have “placed the constitutionality
of the officer’s conduct beyond debate,” qualified immunity shields Barnes from liability for

7 Brown relies on two inapposite cases to assert that Barnes had a duty to protect him. The first,
Davis v. Rennie, deals with an excessive force claim brought by an involuntarily committed patient
who was punched repeatedly in the head while being restrained. 264 F.3d 86, 92-94, 97-98 (1st
Cir. 2001) (discussing plaintiff’s “right to be free from the use of excessive force and the
appellants’ failure to prevent that force”). He also cites a case from the Third Circuit for the
proposition that “[o]nce the state restrains an individual’s liberty, rendering that individual unable
to act for himself, . . . the state does acquire an affirmative duty to protect.” Shaw by Strain v.
Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1144 (3d Cir. 1990). That case, like Davis, deals with duties owed to
individuals involuntarily committed and subject to physical abuse. Both are therefore inapplicable
here.
failing to intervene in the unlawful searches allegedly conducted by Leslie and Lirette. Dist. of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quotation marks omitted); see Weichel v. Town of
Braintree, No. 20-cv-11456-IT, 2021 WL 1948096, at *6 (D. Mass. May 14, 2021) (duty to
intervene not clearly established outside excessive force context); Cosenza v. City of Worcester,

355 F. Supp. 3d 81, 101 (D. Mass. 2019) (same); Echavarria v. Roach, No. 16-cv-11118-ADB,
2017 WL 3928270, at *11 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2017) (same).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Barnes’ motion for summary judgment, ECF 41, is GRANTED;
Leslie’s motion for summary judgment, ECF 44, is DENIED; and Lirette’s motion for summary
judgment, ECF 46, is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Julia E. Kobick
JULIA E. KOBICK
Dated: September 3, 2026 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11435261. Public record. Not legal advice.