# Wofford

> District Court, E.D. California · August 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434571

## Case

- **Full name:** Hongfei Yu v. Minga Wofford, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONGFEI YU, Case No. 1:26-cv-03669 (VC)

Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
v.
Re: Dkt. No. 1
MINGA WOFFORD, et al.,
Respondents.

Petitioner Hongfei Yu is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. See Dkt. No. 1. He contends that the bond hearing he received before an
Immigration (“IJ”), in which the IJ denied bond on a finding of “flight risk,” was constitutionally
inadequate because it failed to materially consider evidence against the correct legal standard. Id.
¶¶ 19, 48, 56. Respondents argue that that the petition should be dismissed because Petitioner has
not exhausted his administrative remedy of appealing his bond hearing determination to the BIA.
See Dkt. Nos. 8, 12. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that exhaustion may be
excused here, and orders Respondents to provide Petitioner with a renewed bond hearing.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of China who entered the United States on November 29,
2023. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 17. On April 2, 2026, he was arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) and served a notice to appear (“NTA”) placing him in removal
proceedings. See Dkt. No. 8-1. The NTA charges him as inadmissible for overstaying his visa. Id.
at 1. Following his detention, Petitioner was provided a bond hearing before an immigration
judge (“IJ”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The IJ denied bond, checking a box indicating that
Petitioner was a “flight risk.” Dkt. No. 1-4 at 1. The order does not include any further detail,
and Petitioner contends that the IJ did not provide any “further explanation” or make any
“individualized findings” with respect to the order. Dkt. No. 1 ¶19
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant petition along with an application for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) challenging the adequacy of his bond hearing. The Court denied the
TRO, finding that Petitioner, at the time, had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by
appealing the bond determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and had not
presented any evidence suggesting that exhaustion requirement should be excused. See Dkt. No.
10.
Since the order on the TRO, both parties have submitted responses with respect to the
habeas petition. Notably, Petitioner has presented evidence that he appealed his bond denial to
the BIA, which remains pending. See Dkt. No. 13-1. Additionally, he has submitted medical
evaluations from his time in detention indicating that his mental health has declined dramatically
since he appealed his bond order. See Dkt. No 14-1 at 1–2. Indeed, records indicate that he has
experienced suicidal ideation and was recently diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and prescribed
medication. Id. at 2; Dkt. No. 13-2 ¶¶ 3–6.
II. DISCUSSION
Both parties agree that Petitioner’s detention is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that
he was appropriately provided a bond hearing under that statute. Petitioner, however, maintains
that the IJ’s denial of bond through its one sentence order without materially considering the
factors relevant to a bond determination violated his due process rights. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 40–58.
In opposition, Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed as Petitioner’s appeal to
the BIA remains pending. Dkt. No 12 at 2.
A. Petitioner Has Submitted Evidence Demonstrating that Exhaustion Should
be Excused.
As the Court noted in denying the TRO, detainees are generally required to exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to seeking habeas relief from a bond order. Dkt. No. 10 at 2. In
determining whether exhaustion is warranted, courts consider (1) whether “agency expertise
makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision,”
(2) whether “relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme,” and (3) whether “administrative review is likely to allow the agency to
correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d
812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)).
However, a court may waive this requirement where (1) “administrative remedies are inadequate
or not efficacious,” (2) “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,” (3)
“irreparable injury will result,” or (4) “the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v.
Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
On the newly submitted evidence by Petitioner, the Court finds that waiver is appropriate
here. Since the ruling on Petitioner’s TRO, Petitioner has submitted evidence demonstrating that
he will suffer irreparable harm if required to wait for the BIA to issue a ruling on his appeal. In
his reply to the petition, he attests that his mental health has deteriorated significantly over the
last few months, resulting in thoughts of suicide. Dkt. No. 13-2 ¶¶ 3–5. Requiring Petitioner to
await further relief pending the BIA’s decision on appeal would cause irreparable harm to
Petitioner given his deteriorating mental health. Soriano v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-CV-00900-
DGE, 2026 WL 969764, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2026) (“given the lengthy delays inherent
in the current appeals process, the Court finds Petitioner will suffer irreparable injury if he is
required to wait for a BIA decision before being permitted to file a habeas claim”); Yan Lu v. Los
Angeles Field Dir., et al, No. 5:26-CV-00575-JAK (SPX), 2026 WL 1455320, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2026) (excusing exhaustion requirement where Petitioner would be irreparably harmed
by continued delay while waiting for BIA to rule); Tavurov v. Noem, No. 2:26-CV-00668-TLF,
2026 WL 1283513, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2026) (finding that “petitioner has presented
individualized evidence, related to his mental health struggles, that supports a finding that his
continued detention for a potentially lengthy period of time, pending a BIA appeal of the IJ’s
bond denial decision would create a risk of irreparable harm”).
Accordingly, the Court will consider Petitioner’s claim that his bond hearing violated due
process.
B. Petitioner’s Bond Hearing Violated Due Process.
The habeas court’s review of an immigration judge’s determination of flight risk is for
abuse of discretion. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 779, 784–785 (9th Cir. 2024). A court may
only determine whether the IJ applied the correct legal standard, not reweigh evidence. Martinez,
124 F.4th at 785. In making bond determinations, an IJ may consider:
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the
alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s family
ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the alien to
reside permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the alien's
employment history; (5) the alien's record of appearance in court;
(6) the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of
criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of
the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration violations; (8)
any attempts by the alien to flee prosecution or otherwise escape
from authorities; and (9) the alien's manner of entry to the United
States.
In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006); Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 805
(B.I.A. 2020). Petitioner contends that in conducting his bond hearing, the IJ did not engage in
any “meaningful review of these mandatory factors — and instead issu[ed] a one-word checked-
box decision” labeled “flight risk.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 55; Dkt. No. 8-4 at 1. Respondents have not
rebutted this contention by, for example, providing a recording of the hearing, transcript, or set
of written factual findings from the hearing.
The Court finds that the IJ abused its discretion here as it appears, based on the record
before the Court, that the IJ did not apply any standard at all when denying bond. “Central to this
conclusion are the absence of a reasoned explanation supporting the IJ’s decisions [or] of any
record demonstrating the IJ meaningfully engaged with the governing legal standard or evidence
presented[.]” Soto Gimenez v. Hernandez, No. 2:26-CV-00966-GJL, 2026 WL 1156075, at *6
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 29, 2026) (collecting cases). “The IJ provided very little to guide judicial
review in determining whether they applied the correct legal standard [as] the IJ did not provide
an explanation for the reasoning or point to anything in the record that indicated Petitioner was a
flight risk.” Valdez-Reyes v. Scott, No. 2:26-CV-01251-JHC, 2026 WL 1361635, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. May 15, 2026). Indeed, Petitioner contends that the IJ “denied bond by simply checking a
box labeled ‘Flight Risk’ with no findings of fact, no weighing of evidence, and no consideration
of any relevant factors”—a contention which Respondents have not disputed. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 62.
“Given the significant liberty interest at stake for noncitizens in immigration detention
and the weak or nonexistent governmental interest in continued detention without adequate
process, courts in this and other districts have found due process violations where IJ’s abuse
discretion in bond determinations[]” by failing to meaningfully engage with the BIA’s own legal
standards. Soto Gimenez, 2026 WL 1156075, at *5 (collecting cases); Soriano, 2026 WL
969764, at *4–5 (finding due process violation where IJ abused its discretion in denying bond);
Fuentes v. Mullin, No. 5:26-CV-01651-KS, 2026 WL 1847436, at 7–8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2026)
(same). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the IJ’s bond determination did not accord with
the requirements of due process when it apparently failed to apply the relevant legal standard and
weigh evidence.
C. Remedy
“In habeas cases, federal courts have broad discretion in conditioning a judgment
granting relief.” Lujan v. Garcia, 734 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2013); Burnett v. Lampert, 432
F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Federal courts have a fair amount of flexibility in fashioning
specific habeas relief.”). “Federal courts are authorized, under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, to dispose of
habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice require.’” Lujan, 734 F.3d 917, 933 (quoting Hilton v.
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987)). “Upon determining that an IJ provided a petitioner with a
legally or constitutionally inadequate bond hearing, district courts have either ordered
petitioner’s immediate release … or ordered that Respondents provide petitioner with a new
constitutionally adequate bond hearing.” Perez Velasquez v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-01759-GPC-
DDL, 2026 WL 1042479, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (citations omitted) (collecting cases).
Considering § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework, and that the Ninth Circuit
has found the procedures under § 1226(a) constitutionally adequate, the Court finds that an order
directing respondents to provide a renewed bond hearing, rather than immediate release, is the
appropriate remedy. Respondents should be granted the opportunity to cure the legal errors in
Petitioner’s bond proceedings through a remedial hearing. Moreover, because a written record of
the IJ’s reasoning is not available for the Court’s review, it is not clear that further immigration
bond proceedings would be futile or incapable of redressing Petitioner’s due process injuries.
Accordingly, the Court grants Petitioner’s alternative request for relief in the form of a renewed
bond hearing.
Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s habeas Petition (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED IN
PART. Respondents SHALL provide Petitioner a bond hearing before an immigration
judge within seven days of this Order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at which the immigration
judge must consider all evidence presented, as well as mitigating factors, and release Petitioner if
it is determined that Petitioner is not a flight risk. Respondents SHALL file status report
confirming that Petitioner recetved a bond hearing complying with this Order, or otherwise
confirming his release, within five days of the hearing. With said status report, Respondents shall
also submit a copy of the IJ’s decision and factual findings.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgement accordingly.
This order terminates all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 6, 2026 Low...
ee
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434571. Public record. Not legal advice.