# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. California · August 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434566

## Case

- **Full name:** Nigel Albert Marin v. California Department of Rehabilitation
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 NIGEL ALBERT MARIN, Case No. 1:26-cv-03774 JLT FJS
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
REQUESTS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
13 v.
(Docs. 8, 13)
14 California Department of Rehabilitation,

15 Defendant.
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17 Nigel Albert Marin initiated this action on May 18, 2026, alleging in his original
18 complaint that the California Department of Rehabilitation failed to provide “legally mandated
19 vocational rehabilitation services to Plaintiff—a qualified individual with a disability” and that
20 those failures have “cascaded, predictably and preventably, into Plaintiff’s current homelessness,
21 complete depletion of his Social Security Disability Income, and imminent irreversible harm to
22 his ability to sit for and pass the July 28, 2026 California Bar Examination.” (Doc. 1 at 1.)
23 On May 18, 2026, the same day he filed his original complaint, Plaintiff also filed an
24 emergency application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc. 3.)
25 Therein Mr. Marin requested that the Court order DOR to “immediately authorize and disburse
26 subsistence funding totaling $11,229.13 (plus $306 in monthly parking permits)” for the
27 “displacement period of May 1 through July 28, 2026, and to authorize his purchase of a laptop as
28 a “vocational workspace tool.” (Id. at 1–2.)
1 On May 20, 2026, the Court denied his TRO request, explaining as follows:
2 Plaintiff’s motion must be denied because the Court is unable to
find likelihood of success on the merits, let alone that “the law and
3 facts clearly favor” Plaintiff.
4 First, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his Due Process claim because
there is no private right of action under the Due Process Clause.
5 Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the
6 United States Constitution.”). Instead, “a litigant complaining of a
violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
7 Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff does not attempt to frame his Due
Process claim as one arising under § 1983 and he cannot do so. This
8 is because the only named defendant, DOR, is an agency of the
State of California and therefore is immune from a suit for damages
9 under § 1983. See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Catham County, Ga., 547
U.S. 189, 193 (2006); see also Lett v. California Dep’t of Rehab.,
10 No. 2:12-CV-2265 MCE GGH, 2012 WL 5880440, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 21, 2012) (“The California Department of Rehabilitation
11 cannot be sued for damages in federal court because of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.”).
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As for Plaintiffs’ other federal claims arising under the ADA and
13 Rehabilitation Act, the Court has serious doubts as to their viability.
Plaintiff’s complaint focuses on services that DOR has refused to
14 provide as part of his IPE. However, to make out a claim under the
ADA, Mr. Marin must allege facts to support a plausible inference
15 that “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was
either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a
16 public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion,
17 denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his
disability.” Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 949 (9th Cir.
18 2017) (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 504 requires allegations
that suggest Mr. Marin was prevented from enjoying “‘meaningful
19 access’ to a benefit because of [his] disability.” Mark H. v.
Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added); see
20 also Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (to
establish Rehabilitation Act violation a plaintiff must show, among
21 other things, that he was “denied the benefit or services solely by
reason of [his disability]”).
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The difficulty here is that Plaintiff is attempting to bring these
23 claims against DOR for administering a program that is only
available to individuals with disabilities, and it remains unclear
24 what, if any, program benefit Mr. Martin has been denied due to his
disability. For example, in Avila v. California, No. 8:19-00613 JVS
25 (ADS), 2021 WL 518710, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted No. 8:19-00613 JVS (ADS), 2021 WL
26 515385, *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), the plaintiff alleged that
DOR denied him Vocational Rehabilitation Services to attend law
27 school “because he took 20 years to complete a Masters Degree
because he is disabled.” Even that allegation was insufficient to
28 survive a motion to dismiss because the record revealed multiple,
1 nondiscriminatory reasons existed for DOR’s decision not to fund
law school for the Plaintiff. Id; see also Wildey v. California, No.
2 07CV1154 JM (JMA), 2010 WL 1031211, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19,
2010) (refusing to find an ADA or Rehabilitation Act violation for
3 DOR employee who participated in vocational training program
that was only available to disabled individuals, but separately
4 evaluating whether the vocational training program provider
reasonably accommodated employee’s disability by providing a
5 flexible schedule).
6 Unlike in Avila, the present allegations provide absolutely no
insight into how DOR’s decisions to deny Mr. Marin’s requests for
7 benefits were “because of” a disability. For one thing, the
Complaint does not attach a copy of any decision from DOR about
8 his benefits. Nor is it apparent on this record why Mr. Marin’s
disability would have factored into DOR’s determination that it is
9 inappropriate to purchase Mr. Marin a performance laptop or
provide him with a subsistence stipend for the period from May 1
10 through July 28.
11 Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s “written admission” eliminates
any core factual dispute and renders his success “near-certain.”
12 (Doc. 3 at 3–4.) But the written admission to which Plaintiff refers
(see Doc. 3 at 4, 11) is a May 11, 2026 email from his DOR
13 Counselor that appears to indicate DOR plans to pay for Plaintiff’s
food, hotel, and travel accommodations during the July 2026 bar
14 exam itself. (Doc. 1 at 16.) This email confirms DOR’s willingness
to provide a benefit that is not in dispute; it does not justify a
15 finding that Plaintiff is entitled to the additional benefits and
payments he demands as part of this request for injunctive relief.
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For these reasons, the Court cannot find likelihood of success on
17 the merits. Thus, the request for injunctive relief (Doc. 3) is
DENIED.
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19 (Doc. 4 (footnote omitted).)
20 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend (Doc. 6), a motion for reconsideration of the
21 denial of his application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7), and numerous other documents
22 including some filings submitted on or about June 11, 2026 that appear to have been intended as a
23 renewed request for a TRO. (See Doc. 8.)1
24 On July 1, 2026, the assigned magistrate judge granted the motion to amend and the
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1 Plaintiffs’ filings are labeled in a manner that did not make it immediately clear that he was
26 requesting reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his TRO Request. For example, his filing is
labeled “amended addendum to renewed ex parte application for temporary restraining order” but
27 the documents he submitted to the Court do not appear to contain any actual renewed ex parte
application for a temporary restraining order, so the motion was not immediately flagged for
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1 request for reconsideration regarding Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application. (Doc. 11.) The
2 magistrate judge also ordered the docketing of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (Doc. 11 at 7;
3 Doc. 12.)2 On August 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction.
4 First, Plaintiff’ renewed request for a TRO filed is without merit. The Court’s May 20,
5 2026 Order concluded that Plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged how DOR failed to reasonably
6 accommodate him. The current record fares no better. For example, Mr. Marin asserts that certain
7 communications from DOR promised him financial assistance with housing, but facially they do
8 not appear to do so. Rather, they reveal only that DOR was attempting to assist Plaintiff with the
9 process of identifying housing options that fit within his own budget. (See Doc. 9.) That Mr.
10 Marin may have read them otherwise or asked leading questions in response to DOR
11 communications does not change the nature of the statements DOR made. In addition, the TRO
12 request concerned Mr. Marin’s attempts to have DOR pay for his housing, subsistence, and
13 equipment needs leading up to the July 2026 bar exam, which has now come and gone. Thus, his
14 TRO request is moot.
15 Plaintiffs’ recent motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 13) was filed after the July bar
16 exam concluded and concerns events that occurred shortly before and during that examination
17 period. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced difficulties accessing benefits
18 DOR apparently agreed to provide him during the examination period. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that
19 his bar exam experience involved a “one-time, non-repeatable” event of sitting for the exam
20 “compromised by lack of sleep, lack of food, and denial of a disability accommodation” in the
21 form of a provided laptop “that cannot be retroactively cured by a later damages award, because
22 the professional and career consequences of the exam outcome are not fungible with money.”
23 (Doc. 13 at 13.) Plaintiff argues that “[h]ad interim relief issued before July 26, 2026, the
24 conditions that produced this harm” including DOR’s failure to respond to his correspondence,
25 failure to provide him with a hotel check in “fallback,” failure to resolve his disputes about their
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2 The document the Court eventually docketed as the first amended complaint is captioned
27 “Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in Support of First Amended Complaint (Lodged Concurrently
with Motion for Leave),” (Doc. 12.) but the docket still does not appear to contain any document
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1 | per diem policy, and failure to reassign his case/account to different DOR personnel — would have
2 | been subject to court ordered correction before they materialized into injury.” (Doc. 13 at 18.) He
3 | contends that the “continued absence of a ruling has permitted the same unaddressed conditions
4 | to persist past the exam date itself, meaning the harm . . . remains uncorrected and ongoing
5 || today.” (/d.)
6 None of these alleged “continuing harms” merit the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory
7 | injunction at this stage of the case. First, the facts that underpin Plaintiffs preliminary injunction
8 | motion are not set forth in any pleading before the Court. Thus, it remains unclear how the events
9 | of the July 2026 bar examination support any viable federal claim. Finally, given that the July
10 | 2026 bar exam is now complete and the next opportunity to sit for the exam is not until February,
11 || the Court sees no need to adjudicate any request for injunctive relief until at least after the case
12 || has been screened and Defendants have been served. Thus, the motion for a preliminary
13 | injunction is DENIED.
14 To be clear, the Court does not currently possess a document that will operate as a first
15 | amended complaint. (See footnote 2.) Thus, within 30 days of the date of this order, Plaintiff
16 | SHALL either file his first amended complaint OR a second amended complaint in which he may
17 || attempt to add information about the events that took place during the July 2026 bar examination.
18 | It SHALL NOT be supported by a brief of legal authorities. Plaintiff is warned that if he fails
19 | to file an amended complaint by that deadline, the Court may initiate proceedings to
20 | dismiss this case for failure to prosecute.
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22 | IT IS SOORDERED.
°3 Dated: _August 6, 2026_ ears [Tourn
4 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434566. Public record. Not legal advice.