# Bernal

> District Court, E.D. California · August 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434491

## Case

- **Full name:** William Bernal v. Sacramento County Sheriff Department, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. California
- **Decided:** August 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 WILLIAM BERNAL, No. 2:19-cv-00482-DC-AC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS
14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF A MATTER OF LAW AND DENYING
DEPARTMENT, et al., PLAINTIFF’S ALTERNATIVE MOTION
15 FOR A NEW TRIAL
Defendants.
16 (Doc. No. 188)

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18 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
19 law, or in the alternative motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 188.) Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g),
20 the pending motion is taken under submission to be decided on the papers. For the reasons
21 explained below, the court will deny Plaintiff’s motions.
22 BACKGROUND
23 The court conducted a jury trial in this civil rights case in April 2026. The jury rendered a
24 verdict that Defendants Deputy Craig Bliss and Deputy Nealy Chhlang did not use excessive
25 force against Plaintiff William Bernal while detaining him on March 5, 2018. (Doc. No. 181 at 2.)
26 The court entered judgment accordingly. (Doc. No. 184.)
27 In the pending motion, Plaintiff contends the court erred in permitting the jury to
28 determine whether Defendants used excessive force against him because doing so conflicts with
1 the law of the case doctrine and the decision by the Ninth Circuit on Plaintiff’s interlocutory
2 appeal of the court’s order on summary judgment in this case. (Doc. No. 188-1 at 3–6.)
3 On April 5, 2022, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of
4 Plaintiff’s federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
5 claims. (Doc. No. 32.) On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of interlocutory appeal of the
6 court’s order granting summary judgment. (Doc. No. 34.)
7 On July 7, 2023, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part
8 the district court’s grant of summary judgment. (Doc. No. 65.) Therein, the Ninth Circuit first
9 found that when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants used
10 significant force against him when they “pointed a gun at him, kicked his legs apart, turned his
11 head beyond its natural range of motion, kicked his knees to force his legs to buckle, smashed his
12 head into the hood of the car, and tightly handcuffed him, resulting in a great deal of pain.” (Id. at
13 13, 28.)
14 Next, the Ninth Circuit found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to
15 whether Plaintiff reached into an unsearched bag. (Id. at 31.) The Ninth Circuit, taking all
16 inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepted Plaintiff’s version of the event, that
17 Plaintiff “never reached into a bag. Rather, he used both hands to hold his cell phone as he
18 attempted to record the Deputies restraining [his wife].” (Id.) The Ninth Circuit held that none of
19 Plaintiff’s actions warranted any use of force, “much less to the extent the Deputies used” when
20 making inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff (Id. at 31–32.)
21 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit determined Defendants were not entitled to “forcibly
22 restrain” Plaintiff even if they accept as true Defendants’ account that Plaintiff had reached into
23 an unsearched duffel bag. (Id. at 32.) Instead, the Ninth Circuit found Defendants had no reason
24 to believe that Plaintiff’s reach into the duffel bag posed a threat to their safety because they had
25 “conducted a weapons check prior to arriving at the Bernals’ house and learned that there were no
26 firearms registered to the home.” (Id. at 32–33.) Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the
27 record showed Plaintiff was not a gang member, had no prior convictions, no warrants out for his
28 arrest, and was not suspected of committing a crime, much less a crime that entailed violence or
1 gun possession. (Id. at 33.) The Ninth Circuit stated that without more, Plaintiff’s “reach into the
2 duffel bag did not create cause to point a firearm at and aggressively restrain him.” (Id. at 33, 40.)
3 The Ninth Circuit also found that “[i]ndependent of whether [Plaintiff] reached into the
4 duffel bag,” Defendants did not have cause to use force under the undisputed facts. (Id. at 33–34.)
5 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that Defendants did not have cause “to use a substantial
6 amount of force to restrain” when it was immediately apparent to everyone at the scene that
7 Plaintiff had a cell phone in his hands, not a weapon. (Id.) Further, the Ninth Circuit, viewing the
8 evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepted Plaintiff’s version of the events, that
9 “he did not hit any of the officers” and that he struggled against Defendants’ holds to alleviate the
10 pain he experienced from his surgically repaired arms and/or shoulders. (Id. at 36–37.)
11 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that even if Plaintiff had intentionally elbowed Defendant
12 Chhlang, that resistance was “not proportionate to the significant amount of force the Deputies
13 used to restrain him.” (Id. at 37.)
14 Based on these findings, the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court erred in granting
15 summary judgment to Defendants by disregarding genuine disputes of material fact. (Id.) The
16 Ninth Circuit also stated that Defendants “used excessive force when they violently detained
17 [Plaintiff] despite knowing he was unarmed and posed no reasonable threat to officer safety.”
18 (Id.) Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity
19 with respect to Plaintiff because they were on notice they could not “violently” restrain him for
20 merely reaching into an unsearched bag. (Id. at 40.) The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
21 grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim and reinstated Plaintiff’s
22 pendent state law claims. (Id. at 41.)
23 On April 13, 2026, a six-day jury trial began. (Doc. Nos. 161, 164, 167, 170, 175, 178.) At
24 the close of Defendants’ case-in-chief, Plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law under
25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. (Doc.
26 No. 175.) At that time, the court deferred ruling on Plaintiff’s motion. (Id.) At the conclusion of
27 the trial, on April 21, 2026, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Defendants. (Doc.
28 No. 181.) In response to Question 2 on the verdict form, which asked the jury to decide whether
1 Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff, the jury answered “No.” (Id. at 2.) That same
2 day, the court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. (Doc. No. 184.)
3 On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed the pending renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
4 law or in the alternative, motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 188.) On June 9, 2026, Defendants
5 filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 189.) Plaintiff did not file a reply in support of
6 the pending motion.
7 LEGAL STANDARDS
8 A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
9 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue
10 during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
11 evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A party must make a
12 motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) before a case is submitted to the jury.
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). The court may deny or defer ruling on the motion, but if the jury returns
14 a verdict against the moving party, that party may renew its motion under Rule 50(b). Fed. R.
15 Civ. P. 50(b); see Vahora v. Valley Diagnostics Lab’y, Inc., No. 16-cv-01624-SKO, 2019 WL
16 5960205, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019) (“A motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule
17 50(b) is not a freestanding motion, but a renewed Rule 50(a) motion.”). “A party cannot raise
18 arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not
19 raise in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761
20 (9th Cir. 2003).
21 A party seeking judgment as a matter of law has a “very high” standard to meet. Costa v.
22 Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 859 (9th Cir. 2002). When the court addresses legal questions
23 in a Rule 50(b) motion, the “test applied is whether the evidence permits only one reasonable
24 conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d
25 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). In other words, the court can “overturn the jury’s verdict and grant
26 such a motion only if ‘there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find for that
27 party on that issue.’” Costa, 299 F.3d at 859 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc.,
28 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000)).
1 B. Motion for a New Trial
2 A party may also move for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 50(b)(2). Through Rule 59, the court may order a new trial if “the verdict is against the
4 weight of the evidence, [] the damages are excessive, or [], for other reasons, the trial was not fair
5 to the party moving.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). “The
6 authority to grant a new trial . . . is confided almost entirely to the exercise of discretion on the
7 part of the trial court.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); see Jorgensen
8 v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a district court enjoys
9 “considerable discretion” in granting or denying a motion for new trial). “[A] district court may
10 not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict.” Silver Sage
11 Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, the court
12 must have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” after “having given
13 full respect to the jury's findings.” Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365,
14 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
15 ANALYSIS
16 In his renewed motion, Plaintiff contends the court erred in permitting the jury to
17 determine whether Defendants used excessive force against him because it conflicts with the law
18 of the case doctrine and the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that the force used against him was excessive
19 in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. No. 188-1 at 3–6.) In the alternative, Plaintiff
20 contends a new trial is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). (Id. at 7–8.) The
21 court first addresses Plaintiff’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and then
22 addresses Plaintiff’s alternative motion for a new trial.
23 A. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
24 Under the “law of the case” doctrine, a court is generally precluded “from reconsidering
25 an issue decided previously by the same court or by a higher court in the identical case.” Hall v.
26 City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012); Milgard Tempering v. Selas Corp. of
27 Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). “For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must
28 have been ‘decided explicitly or by necessary implication in [the] previous disposition.’” Lower
1 Elwha Band of S’Klallams v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
2 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 691 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1982)).
3 “The rule of mandate is similar to, but broader than, the law of the case doctrine.” United
4 States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Herrington v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 12 F.3d
5 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). “A district court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate court
6 ‘cannot vary it or examine it for any other purpose than execution.’” Id. (quoting In re Sanford
7 Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895)). At the same time, the rule of mandate allows a
8 lower court to decide anything not foreclosed by the mandate. Herrington, 12 F.3d at 904. A
9 district court is limited on remand when the scope of the remand is clear. Mendez-Gutierrez v.
10 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). Violation of the rule of mandate is a jurisdictional
11 error. United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
12 In his motion, Plaintiff argues “[t]he Ninth Circuit did not limit itself to whether there
13 were questions of material fact in dispute.” (Doc. No. 188-1 at 4.) Instead, Plaintiff argues the
14 Ninth Circuit held, in its opinion on the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
15 Defendants, that the district court erred in finding the force against him was not excessive and
16 that “the intrusion on [Plaintiff’s] liberty was simply too great in the context of detaining a non-
17 suspect witness.” (Id.) (quoting Doc. No. 65 at 28).
18 In opposition, Defendants argue the jury verdict should stand because the Ninth Circuit’s
19 opinion does not compel judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on his excessive force claim. (Doc. No. 189
20 at 1, 3–7.) Specifically, Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit on appeal was required to view
21 the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and “assumed that [Plaintiff’s] description of the
22 force used against him was true.” (Id. at 4.) Defendants argue that the denial of a summary
23 judgment motion is “never law of the case.” (Id.) (citing Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1088
24 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)). Rather, “the denial of summary judgment is simply ‘a ruling that a
25 party could hypothetically prove some set of facts that would support his claim,’ not a conclusive
26 determination of that claim.” (Id.) (citations omitted).
27 In support of their arguments, Defendants rely on the decision in Chism v. Gardner, No.
28 09-cv-00025-JLQ, 2012 WL 1945476 (E.D. Wash. May 30, 2012), which the court finds
1 persuasive. (Id. at 6.) In Chism, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
2 judgment on the defense of qualified immunity. 2012 WL 1945476, at *1. On appeal, the Ninth
3 Circuit, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, reversed the district court’s
4 grant of summary judgment. Id. at *1–2. In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion for declaratory
5 judgment contending “that a list of 18 different factual findings and legal conclusions were
6 conclusively determined by the Ninth Circuit and are now the law of the case.” Id. The district
7 court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the Ninth Circuit was making any factual findings
8 that were now the law of the case when it reversed its order granting the defendant’s motion for
9 summary judgment. Id. at 3. Instead, the district court recognized “[t]he Ninth Circuit stated at
10 least twice that it was viewing the factual evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiffs]”
11 and a jury could still make factual findings that could support the defendants’ defense of qualified
12 immunity. Id. The district concluded that plaintiffs’ proposed factual findings and legal
13 conclusions were not the law of the case and denied plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment.
14 Id.
15 Like Chism, here the Ninth Circuit did not make factual findings on Plaintiff’s excessive
16 force claim. At the outset, the Ninth Circuit recognized its review on Defendants’ motion for
17 summary judgment was limited to “viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
18 moving party.” (Doc. No. 65 at 13.) The Ninth Circuit emphasized seven separate times that it
19 was applying that standard of review to Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force. (Id. at 28, 30, 32, 36,
20 37, 39, n. 3.) As a result, the Ninth Circuit was required to accept Plaintiff’s version of the story,
21 that he did not hit any of the officers, and Defendants used “significant,” substantial,” and/or
22 “escalat[ed]” force to “violently,” “harsh[ly],” and/or “forcibly” restrain him. (Id. at 21, 28–29,
23 32, 34, 36–37, 40.) The Ninth Circuit provided no instruction and no direction that judgment on
24 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims should be entered in his favor on remand. Consequently, the
25 court finds the Ninth Circuit only reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
26 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. (Id. at 41.)
27 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s unambiguous language that it was only reversing the district
28 court’s grant of summary judgment order as to Plaintiff, Plaintiff argues the Ninth Circuit
1 intended its ruling to be a final decision on his excessive force claim. (Doc. No. 188-1 at 4–6.) In
2 support of his argument, Plaintiff identifies two passages where he alleges the Ninth Circuit
3 accepted Defendants’ account of the events and still ruled against them. (Id. at 4.) Specifically,
4 Plaintiff first points to the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “even taking the Deputies’ account as
5 true, the Deputies were not entitled to forcibly restrain [Plaintiff] because of his purportedly
6 reaching into the duffel bag.” (Id.) (quoting Doc. No. 65 at 32.) Second, Plaintiff points to the
7 Ninth Circuit’s statement that “[w]e conclude that the Deputies violated clearly established law
8 whether we accept the Bernals’ or the Deputies’ account of events.” (Id.) (quoting Doc. No. 65 at
9 39.)) However, the court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on these two out-of-context statements is
10 misplaced.
11 The Ninth Circuit accepted Defendants’ account of the events as true only on the disputed
12 fact of whether or not Plaintiff had reached into the duffel bag. (See Doc. No. 65 at 32–33, 40–
13 41.) The Ninth Circuit still relied on Plaintiff’s version of the story—that Defendants forcibly,
14 aggressively, and violently restrained him—to hold that the deputies were not entitled to use the
15 force they used and that they violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law in doing so. (Id.
16 at 33, 40.) Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was still viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
17 to Plaintiff and was only addressing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, not ruling on the
18 merits of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
19 In summary, Plaintiff’s arguments fall short. The Ninth Circuit did not make a ruling on
20 the merits of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Instead, the Ninth Circuit left that determination
21 for trial. See Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. July 21, 1997) (finding
22 that “[t]he reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.”). Thus, the
23 court concludes that the law of the case doctrine and/or rule of mandate do not apply.
24 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate judgment as a matter of law is appropriate for his
25 excessive force claim. Therefore, the court will deny Plaintiff’s renewed motion for judgment as a
26 matter of law.
27 /////
28 /////
1 | B. Plaintiff’s Alternative Motion for a New Trial
2 Plaintiff also argues the court should grant a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil
3 | Procedure 59(a) because “[a] defense verdict on the excessive-force issue is contrary to the law of
4 || the case.” (Doc. No. 188-1 at 6-7.) However, the court already rejected this argument that the
5 | Ninth Circuit’s opinion compels judgment in his favor on his excessive force claim.
6 | Consequently, the court will deny Plaintiffs alternative motion for a new trial.
7 CONCLUSION
8 For the reasons explained above:
9 1. Plaintiff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative
10 motion for a new trial (Doc. No. 188) is DENIED; and
11 2. This case shall remain closed.
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14 IT IS SO ORDERED. :
15 | Dated: _ August 5, 2026 Qe
Dena Coggins
16 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434491. Public record. Not legal advice.