# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · August 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434312

## Case

- **Full name:** Zulmy Revolorio Ramirez v. Joshua Johnson
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** August 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ZULMY REVOLORIO RAMIREZ, Case No. 5:26-cv-03691-KES

12 Petitioner,

13 v. ORDER GRA NTING THE PETITION
AND ORDERING PETITIONER’S
14 JOSHUA JOHNSON, RELEASE FROM CUSTODY

15 Respondent.

16

17

18 I. INTRODUCTION

19 Zulmy Revolorio Ramirez (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas

20 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition” at Dkt. 1), challenging Petitioner’s
21 detention by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Immigration and
22 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of
23 the Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 18.) The Petition is granted and Respondents are
24 directed to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
25 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
26 On July 1, 2026, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition (Dkt. 1), a supporting
27 memorandum of law (Dkt. 3 at 1-9), and a declaration signed under penalty of
28
1 perjury (Dkt. 3 at 10-11).1 The Petition raised the following claims:
2 Ground 1: Petitioner “has been detained for thirty days without the bond
3 hearing to which she is entitled under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the Fifth
4 Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” (Pet. at 2.) “The Ninth Circuit has squarely
5 held that a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a) is entitled to a bond hearing at
6 which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
7 evidence that she is a danger to the community or a flight risk.” (Pet. at 3 (citing
8 Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2011)).
9 Ground 2: “[B]ecause her [Board of Immigration Appeals or “BIA”] appeal
10 automatically stays removal” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6, “and no BIA decision is
11 expected in the foreseeable future, her detention pending removal … raises the
12 serious constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
13 (2001).” (Pet. at 2.)
14 Ground 3: “ICE’s simultaneous release of her mother under identical
15 circumstances, without explanation, constitutes arbitrary agency action in violation
16 of the Administrative Procedure Act [“APA”].” (Pet. at 2.)
17 The Petition sought either release from custody or a bond hearing. (Pet. at
18 2.)
19 Respondent answered the Petition on July 10, 2026. (“Answer” at Dkt. 11.)
20 The Answer argues: (1) ICE had authority to detain Petitioner based on a January
21 2026 arrest for domestic violence; (2) “whatever procedural deficiencies may have
22 hypothetically occurred during Petitioner’s re-detention do not warrant [her]
23

24 1 Petitioner also moved for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
25 injunction. (Dkt. 2.) The District Judge denied this motion on July 10, 2026, “for
failure to comply with the procedural requirements of General Order No. 26-05
26
(Dkt. 6 at 5-6) or to establish imminent, irreparable harm that cannot be addressed
27 through the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) and supporting
memorandum (Dkt. 3).” (Dkt. 10.)
28
1 release and indeed could be cured by means well short of release”; (3) “to the
2 extent Petitioner would be entitled to any remedy, at most it would be ordering a
3 bond hearing to be held before an Immigration Judge [“IJ”] under Section
4 1226(a)”; and (4) “[t]o the extent a bond hearing is ordered here,” the Court should
5 order it “to be provided in seven days, where Petitioner has the burden of proof to
6 show they are not a danger or flight risk.” (Id. at 2.)
7 Based on a referral order from the Court, the Federal Public Defender
8 (“FPD”) appeared on Petitioner’s behalf. (Dkt. 13, 14.) Petitioner filed a
9 counseled Reply on August 14, 2026. (“Reply” at Dkt. 16.) The Reply raises a
10 new ground for relief:
11 Ground 4: Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated
12 when she was detained without a pre-deprivation hearing. (Reply at 3.)
13 Because this claim was not raised in the initial Petition, the Court ordered
14 Respondents to file a supplemental brief responding to it. (Dkt. 19.) Respondents
15 did so on August 25, 2026. (“Resp’ts Suppl. Br.” at Dkt. 20.) They argue that the
16 Reply “states no statutory, regulatory, or other binding authority that a non-citizen
17 receive a ‘pre-detention hearing’ before they are detained.” (Id. at 2.) They also
18 argue that, under current DHS regulations, immigration judges (“IJs”) lack
19 authority to conduct these sorts of hearings. (Id. at 2-3.) They argue that “the
20 appropriate remedy, if any, is for Petitioner to receive a bond hearing” now, after
21 her arrest. (Id. at 4.)
22 III. FACTUAL RECORD
23 Petitioner is a citizen and national of Guatemala who has resided in the U.S.
24 for approximately 3 years. (Pet. at 1.) She entered the U.S. on September 3, 2023,
25 seeking political asylum. (Pet. at 1; Pet’r Decl. / Dkt. 3 at 10.) Removal
26 proceedings were initiated against her shortly after her arrival, on or about October
27 17, 2023. See Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), Automated
28 Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (A# 245-159-741 (Guatemala),
1 last accessed Aug. 27, 2026). It appears that, upon her arrival or shortly thereafter,
2 immigration authorities detained and then released her. (See Answer at 2
3 (referring to Petitioner’s current arrest as a “re-detention”).)
4 On May 21, 2025, an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered her removed from
5 the U.S. Id. On June 20, 2025, she appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of
6 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and that appeal remains pending. Id. There is
7 currently no deadline set for either Petitioner’s brief or the government’s brief. Id.
8 In January 2026, Petitioner was arrested on suspicion of domestic violence.
9 (Pet’r Decl. / Dkt. 3 at 10.)2 Petitioner states that she “was detained overnight
10 following a domestic dispute,” but “no criminal charges were ever filed,” and
11 “there is no open or pending criminal case against” her. (Id.) Petitioner also states
12 she has “never been convicted of any crime.” (Id.) Respondent does not dispute
13 these assertions.3
14 On May 26, 2026, Petitioner and her mother appeared voluntarily at an
15 immigration office in Los Angeles for a scheduled appointment. (Pet. at 1-2.) ICE
16 detained Petitioner. (Id. at 2.) Her mother, “who was present under identical
17 circumstances,” was not detained. (Id.) “No individualized determination was
18 articulated explaining why Petitioner presented a greater risk than her mother who
19 was permitted to leave.” (Id.)
20 Respondent’s Answer asserts that Petitioner’s detention was based on the
21 January 2026 arrest for domestic violence. (Answer at 2.) However, the Answer
22 does not attach any written paperwork notifying Petitioner of the reasons for her
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2 The record does not reflect whether the suspected domestic violence was
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against her mother, a romantic partner, or some other cohabitant.
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3 Although the Answer cites a Form I-213, Record of Deportable/
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Inadmissible Alien as proof of the arrest, the Answer fails to attach a copy of the
27 Form I-213. Respondent’s Answer does not allege that the arrest resulted in
criminal charges or a conviction.
28
1 detention, any declarations, or any other evidence to support this assertion.
2 Petitioner remains in ICE detention in Adelanto, California. See ICE
3 Detainee Locator, https://locator.ice.gov/odls/ (A# 245-159-741 (Guatemala), last
4 accessed Aug. 27, 2026). She has never had a bond hearing before an IJ. (Pet. at
5 3.)
6 IV. DISCUSSION
7 A. Petitioner is Entitled to Relief on Ground 4, Her Due Process
8 Claim.4
9 1. Legal Standard.
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal
11 government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due
12 process of law[.]” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The right to due process extends to “all
13 ‘persons’ within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence
14 here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
15 678, 693 (2001).
16 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
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4 As discussed above, Ground 4 was raised in Petitioner’s counseled Reply
18 but not in her pro se Petition. Ordinarily, the Court does not allow petitioners to
19 raise new grounds for relief in their replies. However, leave to amend must be
liberally granted and would be appropriate here. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P.
20 15(a)(2) (providing that courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice
21 so requires”); 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“[An] [a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus ....
may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable
22 to civil actions.”). Given that Petitioner’s due process claim is fully explained in
23 the Reply, requiring Petitioner to file a new, amended Petition reiterating the same
allegations would be inefficient and result in unnecessary delay. See generally
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (providing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be
25 construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
26
Respondents have not been prejudiced by this Court’s consideration of Ground 4,
27 because the Court gave them an opportunity to file supplemental briefing
responding to this claim.
28
1 ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
2 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
3 “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Constitution may require greater procedural
4 protections than a statutory or regulatory scheme provides when freedom from
5 imprisonment is at stake.” Perez Bueno v. Janecka, No. 25-cv-03376-CAS-BFM,
6 2026 WL 309934, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24644, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5,
7 2026). To determine what procedural protections an individual is owed in the
8 event of a government deprivation of a protected liberty interest, courts balance
9 three factors: (a) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
10 (b) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest and the value of additional
11 procedural safeguards; and (c) the countervailing government interest. Mathews,
12 424 U.S. at 335.
13 2. Analysis.
14 a. Liberty Interest and Private Interest Affected.
15 Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
16 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.”
17 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). “Even individuals who face
18 significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields
19 significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem,
20 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Many district courts in this circuit
21 have held that noncitizens previously released from custody have a protected
22 liberty interest in remaining out of custody, because “the government’s decision to
23 release [them] creates an implicit promise, upon which that individual may rely,
24 that their liberty will be revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of
25 release.” Ramos-Maldonado v. Semaia, No. 26-cv-01202-SSS-AS, 2026 WL
26 790788, at *2, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57088, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026);
27 see also Domingo v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05893, 2025 WL 1940179, at *2, 2025 U.S.
28 Dist. LEXIS 133824 at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (collecting cases); Omer G.
1 G. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-01471, 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22,
2 2025).
3 Although neither party has provided specific facts about when or why
4 Petitioner was released from custody while her removal case was pending, such
5 release means DHS necessarily determined that she was not a danger to the
6 community or flight risk. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing that DHS
7 may detain a noncitizen “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
8 from the United States” or may release them on bond or conditional parole); 8
9 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in
10 the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the
11 Act, under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the
12 alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not
13 pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any
14 future proceeding.”). Petitioner was required to comply with some conditions of
15 release, since she voluntarily appeared at an ICE office on the day her current
16 detention began. Petitioner possessed a liberty interest in remaining out of
17 custody, and her private interest in remaining at liberty is strong.
18 b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Value of Additional
19 Procedural Safeguards.
20 “[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is high absent the procedural
21 safeguard of a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to determine
22 whether Petitioner’s detention bears a reasonable relation to the authorized
23 statutory purposes of civil immigration detention: to ensure appearance at future
24 immigration proceedings or to prevent danger to the community.” Perez Bueno,
25 2026 WL 309934, at *4, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24644, at *9 (citing Zadvydas,
26 533 U.S. at 693-94).
27 As noted above, Petitioner’s prior release indicates that ICE found she was
28 not a flight risk or danger to the community in 2023. When ICE re-detained her in
1 2026, there is no evidence that ICE served Petitioner with written notice of why
2 she was being re-detained or gave her any opportunity to dispute the reasons for
3 her re-detention. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l)(1), 241.13(i)(3) (DHS
4 regulations requiring that a noncitizen be (a) “notified of the reasons for revocation
5 of his or her release,” and (b) given “an initial informal interview promptly after
6 his or her return to Service custody to afford the [noncitizen] an opportunity to
7 respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification”).
8 In the current proceedings, Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s January 2026
9 arrest for domestic violence “constitutes changed circumstances allowing
10 Respondent to detain her.” (Answer at 2.) Yet Petitioner contends that she was
11 never charged with or convicted of any crime following this arrest. (Pet’r Decl. /
12 Dkt. 3 at 10.) This dispute over whether Petitioner’s arrest violated the terms of
13 her release or renders her a danger to the community underscores the need for
14 notice and an opportunity to be heard. A pre-deprivation hearing would require the
15 government to produce its evidence of changed circumstances and give Petitioner
16 an opportunity to challenge that evidence. Requiring the government to do so
17 before Petitioner’s arrest gives her an opportunity to retain counsel and collect
18 evidence. This is a significant procedural safeguard.
19 c. Countervailing Government Interest.
20 As many other courts have recognized, there is no meaningful countervailing
21 government interest that supports detaining previously released noncitizens like
22 Petitioner without a pre-detention hearing. Ramos-Maldonado, 2026 WL 790788,
23 at *4, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57088, at *11 (collecting cases); Gudavasov v.
24 Marin, No. No. 26-cv-00541-AH-MBK, 2026 WL 712827, at *2, 2026 U.S. Dist.
25 LEXIS 49484, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026) (same). Additionally, the burden of
26 a pre-detention hearing is low. In immigration court, custody hearings are routine
27 and impose a minimal cost. In the undersigned’s experience, the government is
28 routinely able to comply with orders requiring that such a hearing be held within
1 seven days. Respondent has presented no evidence to the contrary.
2 In sum, all three Mathews factors weigh in favor of finding that due process
3 required a pre-deprivation hearing prior to Petitioner being re-detained by ICE.
4 d. The Appropriate Remedy is Release, Not a Post-
5 Deprivation Bond Hearing.
6 Releasing Petitioner is narrowly tailored to the specific wrong, because it
7 restores the status quo that was in effect before Respondents violated Petitioner’s
8 due process rights. Moreover, allowing the government to “cure” such a violation
9 by providing a post-detention hearing would effectively render any holding that a
10 pre-detention hearing is required meaningless; the government could always wait
11 until a habeas petition is filed and then offer to hold a hearing.
12 Many courts have found that a post-detention bond hearing is insufficient in
13 this context. See Gudavasov v. Marin, No. 26-cv-00541-AH-MBK, 2026 WL
14 712827, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026) (collecting cases finding that release, rather
15 than a post-detention bond hearing, is the appropriate remedy); Sachin v. Warden,
16 No. 26-cv-00707-MWC-ADS, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36819, at *9-11 (C.D. Cal.
17 Feb. 21, 2026) (granting TRO ordering Petitioner’s release, instead of a post-
18 deprivation bond hearing, finding “Respondents … fail to recognize that a bond
19 hearing constitutes post-deprivation relief, which has no bearing on whether
20 Respondents provided the requisite pre-deprivation relief.”); see also Morales v.
21 U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 5:26-cv-01404-DOC-MAR (C.D.
22 Cal. Apr. 15, 2026) (Dkt. 17); Changoluiza Corrales v. Marin, No. 5:26-cv 01716-
23 KK-RAO (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2026) (Dkt. 15).5
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5 Aguilar v. Semaia, No. 26-cv-00023-MCS-SSC, 2026 WL 166906 (C.D.
25
Cal. Jan. 16, 2026)—a case in which the court found that a post-deprivation
26 hearing was sufficient relief—is factually distinguishable because Aguilar
“received significantly more process than in other cases in which courts have
27
granted relief under Mathews,” including appointment of counsel in his
28 immigration case (due to incompetency) and a recent, post-arrest hearing before an
1 In fact, courts have most frequently found that this type of due process
2 violation warrants both immediate release from custody and an injunction
3 preventing further violations of Petitioner’s due process rights. See, e.g.,
4 Medrano-Rocha v. Santacruz, 817 F. Supp. 3d 871, 882-83 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23,
5 2026); Nieves v. Mullin, No. 5:26-cv-01471-DOC-DSR, 2026 WL 931143, at *4
6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2026); Fernandez v. Semaia, No. 25-cv-03412-SPG-MBK, 2026
7 WL 136229, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026). Based on the weight of this
8 persuasive authority, the Court will enter both types of relief here.
9 Respondents argue that it is somehow improper or illegal for the Court to
10 order this type of relief because current DHS regulations do not give IJs authority
11 to hold these types of hearings. (Resp’ts Suppl. Br. at 2-3.) But “the Due Process
12 Clause of the Constitution may require greater procedural protections than a
13 statutory or regulatory scheme provides when freedom from imprisonment is at
14 stake.” Perez Bueno, 2026 WL 309934, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24644, at
15 *7. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. See U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2.
16 If necessary, DHS may need to amend its regulations to comport with what the
17 Constitution requires. See, e.g., Pham v. Warden, 833 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1103
18 (E.D. Cal. 2026) (“Section 241.13 of Title 8 was added to the Code of Federal
19 Regulations after the decision in Zadvydas to incorporate the constitutional
20 limitations on detention of noncitizens after the expiration of the 90-day removal
21 period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).”).
22 B. The Other Claims Are Dismissed as Moot.
23 Because this order grants relief on Ground 4, there is no further relief the
24 Court can grant on Grounds 1-3. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed as moot.
25 //
26 //
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IJ. Id. at *5.
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1] V. CONCLUSION
2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
3 l. Ground 4 of the Petition (as raised in Petitioner’s Reply) is granted.
4 2. Grounds 1-3 of the Petition are dismissed without prejudice as moot.
5 3. Respondents shall immediately release Zulmy Revolorio Ramirez
6 (A# 245-159-741) from custody.
7 4. If Respondents have not released Petitioner within three (3) days of
8 the date of this order, Petitioner may file a request for an order to
9 show cause re contempt.
10 5. Respondents shall not re-detain Petitioner without providing
11 Petitioner a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker
12 where Respondents bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and
13 convincing evidence that (a) Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger such
14 that Petitioner’s physical custody is required, or (b) on account of
15 changed circumstances, there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner
16 may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.°

18 | DATED: August 28, 2026 Om YU, Scot
19 KAREN E. SCOTT
50 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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26 ° To the extent the Petition seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
27 | Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), Petitioner’s counsel would need to file a post-
judgment motion that complies with 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434312. Public record. Not legal advice.