# Kurtz

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434201

## Case

- **Full name:** Thomas Kurtz v. State of Pennsylvania, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS KURTZ, : CIVIL NO. 3:25-CV-2320
:
Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley)
:
v. :
: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the pro
se plaintiff’s pleadings. The plaintiff, Thomas Kurtz, appears to be currently confined
in a civil commitment at a mental health facility in New York state. (Doc. 10). Kurtz
has filed a civil complaint with this Court which, frankly, is largely
incomprehensible. (Doc. 2). However, to the extent that this pleading can be
understood, it seems that Kurtz is attempting to bring federal civil rights claims
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a Hyundai care dealership in Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, and a woman who owned a Hyundai that was serviced at this
dealership. (Id.)
While Kurtz’s complaint demands a great deal from the reader, it seems to
allege that faulty maintenance of this car, which was owned by another and was
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of great moment to Kurtz because he was apparently charged with arson in New York
state based upon this conflagration. (Id.) Kurtz’s complaint alleges that these charges
violate his Constitutional rights and asks that this Court enjoin the defendants from

blaming him for this 2017 vehicle fire. (Id.)
Along with this complaint, Kurtz sought, and obtained, leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. However, Kurtz was placed on notice that the Court would conduct
a preliminary screening review of the legal sufficiency of this pleading. (Doc. 9).

This case has now been referred to the undersigned for the purpose of
conducting this review. Upon review, for the reasons set forth below, we find that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Therefore, we recommend that the complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion

A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review
of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the
complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a
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granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving

standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently
with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from
simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring
a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion
to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not
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Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions
will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which
relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of
the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
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allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of
mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-
step analysis:
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to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.” Id.

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which
may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is
recommended that this complaint be dismissed.

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In our view, this complaint is flawed in several different ways.
1. These Claims Seem Time-Barred
At the outset, the civil rights claims advanced by the plaintiff seem time-barred

by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. When conducting a screening review
of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the
complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently explained when it affirmed the

screening dismissal of a pro se complaint on statute of limitations grounds:
Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal
injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year
statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d
360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff
knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the
federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256
Fed.Appx. 563, 564-65 (3d Cir. 2007). Although we have not addressed
the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district court may
sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is
obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is
required.

Smith v. Delaware County Court 260 F. App’x. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008).
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principle
federal civil rights statute, are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal
injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the
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calculating this limitations period, a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations
purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes
the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of

Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of
Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
To be sure, this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a
continuing wrong theory. However, the plaintiff must make an exacting showing to

avail himself of this ground for tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, it is well settled
that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the
limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of

action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir.
1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:

The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the
timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,
754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a
continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing
the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an
instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would
otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991). In
order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the
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acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry,
we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1)
subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2)
frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated
incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of
permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty
to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would
continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See
id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree
of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d
at 981.

Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).

In this case, when we focus upon the most important of these factors, the
plaintiff’s perceived degree of permanence of injury, it is readily apparent that the
injury claimed by Kurtz would have been apparent at the time he was charged with
arson based upon what he alleges was the failure of the defendants to properly
maintain a Hyundai automobile. Yet, the complaint avers that this fire and arson
charge in New York took place in 2017, some nine years ago, well beyond the
limitations period set by law. Kurtz provides no justification for this delay, and we
can perceive of no reason why Kurtz’s complaint should not be barred by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, this tardy claim fails.
2. The Complaint Violates Rule 8

In addition, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because this pleading fails
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must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that
each averment be ‘concise, and direct,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon
County, 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible
or incomprehensible[,]” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length,

but it is also largely unintelligible[,]” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785, 787
(3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate.
See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State

Superior Court, 260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen, supra;
Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d
448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants

having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”
Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when
the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441

F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in
which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible
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110 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quotations omitted)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir.
2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is

simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical
Center, 375 F. App’x 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Moss v. United States, 329 F. App’x 335
(3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App’x 431
(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which

parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., Civ. No. 05-5509, 2006
WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of
approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of

Philadelphia Police, Civ. No. 06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006)
(dismissing illegible complaint).
In its current form, Kurtz’s complaint is largely unintelligible. Kurtz complains
about a criminal arson charge he faces in New York; yet he sues the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, a Pennsylvania car dealership, and a Pennsylvania resident. The role
of these named defendants in Kurtz’s New York state criminal case is entirely
unclear. Thus, the complaint leaves “the defendants having to guess what of the many

things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack, 438 F. App’x at 158. In
such settings, Rule 8 calls for the dismissal of this complaint which is “so confused,
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disguised.” Tillio, 441 F. App’x at 110.
3. Kurtz’s Complaint Fails on Its Merits

Finally, this complaint fails on its merits on several scores. For example, to the
extent that the plaintiff seeks to sue private parties alleging federal civil rights
violations, he fundamentally misconstrues the reach of the federal civil rights statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well established that § 1983 does not, by its own force, create new and

independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983 simply
serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate violations of
separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution

and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of the legal
sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment of the
validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the

plaintiff.
In this regard, it is also well settled that:
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two
essential elements of a §1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally
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Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d
122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim
brought under § 1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were

acting under color of law when those defendants allegedly violated the plaintiff’s
rights. To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged
civil rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
since the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors. Am.

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). These principles also
apply here and compel the dismissal of any federal civil rights claims lodged against
the private parties named in Kurtz’s complaint.

Finally, beyond noting that this automobile was registered in Pennsylvania,
Kurtz’s complaint is bereft of any facts which would support a claim against the
Commonwealth. This is significant since “the Supreme Court has long recognized a
state's right to use its police powers to ‘require the registration of such vehicles and

the licensing of their drivers,’” Earl v. Harris, No. 23-1063, 2023 WL 3580700, at *1
(3d Cir. May 22, 2023) (quoting Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622
(1915)). Therefore, the fact that the state performed a function that is well within its

rights by registering this car does not give rise to any form of legal liability against
the Commonwealth and Kurtz’s § 1983 claim against Pennsylvania should be
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4. Kurtz’s Complaint Should Be Dismissed With Prejudice

We recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be
afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in
its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result
in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, the
plaintiff’s complaint is profoundly flawed in many ways which cannot be cured by

any more artful form of pleading. Therefore, granting further leave to amend would
be futile and would result in undue delay. Accordingly, the complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the
Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 2), be DISMISSED.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file
with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the
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made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set
forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however,
need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where
required by law, and may consider the record developed before the
magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of
that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.

Submitted this 3rd day of August 2026.

S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11434201. Public record. Not legal advice.