# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · September 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11433870

## Case

- **Full name:** Angelos Washington v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** September 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

ANGELOS WASHINGTON, )
) Case No. 1:26-cv-107
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger
CENTURION OF TENNESSEE, LLC, et )
al., )
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Angelos Washington, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of
Correction (“TDOC”) currently incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex
(“MCCX”), filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law (Doc. 1), a motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 6), a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 7), a
motion to correct the names of Defendants (Doc. 9), a motion to reenter the motions from his
miscellaneous case into this action (Doc. 10), a motion to effect service of process (Doc. 11), and
a motion for a ruling on his pending motions (Doc. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; DENY his motion for
counsel; GRANT his motion to correct names; DENY his motion to reenter motions as moot;
GRANT his motion to effect service of process insofar as it will order the United States
Marshals Service (“USMS”) to serve any process in this action; GRANT his motion for a ruling
on his pending motions; permit certain claims to PROCEED against Centurion of Tennessee,
LLC (“Centurion”) and Defendants Jones, Human, Wyrick, and Hill in their individual
capacities; and DISMISS all remaining claims and Defendants.
I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may
apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A
review of Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 6) demonstrates that he lacks sufficient financial resources to

pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion (id.)
will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 900
Georgia Avenue, Suite 309, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402 as an initial partial payment,
whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account
shall submit twenty percent (20%) of his preceding monthly income (or income credited to his
trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars
($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) has been paid to the
Clerk. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial
deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure
compliance with payment of the filing fee.
B. Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff moves the Court to appoint counsel, maintaining that court-appointed counsel is
necessary given his indigency, physical disability, limited access to legal materials, and the
case’s complexity (Doc. 7).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any
person unable to afford counsel” (emphasis added). However, “[a]ppointment of counsel in a

civil case is not a constitutional right[,]” but a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances.” Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F. 2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citations
omitted). In determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the Court considers “the
complexity of the case and the ability of the plaintiff to represent himself.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t
of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Lavado, 992 F.2d 601). Like Cavin, this case
does not contain complex legal issues and it appears that Plaintiff has adequately represented
himself. Further, indigency, limited access to legal materials, and unfamiliarity with the law are
conditions common among prisoners, and these do not constitute exceptional circumstances
warranting the appointment of counsel at taxpayer expense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for
the appointment of counsel (Doc. 7) will be DENIED.
C. Motion to Add Full Names of Defendants
Plaintiff has filed a motion to add the full names of certain Defendants (Doc. 9). The
motion is well taken and will be GRANTED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to update the

docket to correctly reflect Nurse Deniece as “Deniece Davis”; Nurse Beth as “Bethany Wyrick”;
Nurse Elizabeth as “Elizabeth Byrd”; Nurse Sharp as “Darla Sharp”; and Nurse Amanda as
“Amanda Hill.”
D. Motion to File Motions from Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Case
Plaintiff’s complaint and initial motions were originally opened in a miscellaneous case,
because Plaintiff did not submit the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See
Washington v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:26-MC-12. But that case, and documents
filed in it, were transferred to this civil action when Plaintiff submitted his motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. Therefore, this motion (Doc. 10) will be DENIED as moot.

E. Motion to Effect Service of Process
Plaintiff asks the Court to order process to issue and USMS to serve process in this case,
so that service may be timely completed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 11).
Because the Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff’s motion will be
GRANTED insofar as the USMS will be ordered to attempt service of process on Plaintiff’s
behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
F. Motion for a Ruling on Pending Motions
Plaintiff’s motion for the Court to rule on his pending motions (Doc. 13) will be
GRANTED insofar as this Order resolves those requests.
II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
A. Screening Standard
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss
any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th
Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals
for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an
initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them
to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later
establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible
claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the
elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
To state a claim against any Defendant, Plaintiff must establish that a “person” acting
“under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations1

A 2001 gunshot wound left Plaintiff partially paralyzed from the waist down and mostly
dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility. (See Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff has “very little
movement” in his legs and has no control over his bladder or bowels, which requires him to use

1 Plaintiff’s attached grievance records form part of the complaint. See Commercial Money Ctr.,
Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]ocuments attached to the
pleadings become part of the pleadings[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c))). Thus, the Court
includes the allegations contained in those records in its factual recitation. And, to the extent
these exhibits contradict the complaint, “the exhibit trumps the allegations.” Brown v.
Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 135 F.4th 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Kaplan v.
Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2021)).
catheters to urinate and adult diapers to contain his bowel movements and cover the bedsore on
his right buttock. (Id. at 5–6.)
Plaintiff entered TDOC custody in 2022, after he was sentenced to 30 years of
incarceration for first-degree murder. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was initially housed at the Bledsoe
County Correctional Complex2 (“BCCX”) before he was transferred to MCCX on June 4, 2024.

(Id.) Plaintiff “received fair medical treatment” at MCCX until December 4, 2024, “when
things . . . took a turn for the worse.” (Id.)
During breakfast service on the morning of December 4, 2024, Plaintiff asked Warden
Stacey Oakes if he could “go to the old compound clinic” for bedsore wound treatment, noting
that he had a clinic pass form and was already almost three hours behind the original scheduling
time. (Id. at 6–7.) Warden Oakes told Plaintiff that things were “kind of slow this morning and
that if it[’]s not an emergency, you can wait and you’ll be just fine.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff advised
Warden Oakes that if he did not receive “wound[]care treatment in the next [10] minutes, [he
would] file a grievance about it and add this matter to [his] lawsuit.” (Id.) Warden Oakes
replied, “What[’]s your name, pack your shit, I’m moving your ass back across the field to the
triangle.” (Id.) The triangle is “the more dangerous side of the prison.” (Id.) When Plaintiff
began writing down these events, Warden Oakes slapped Plaintiff in the face and slapped the pen

and paper out of Plaintiff’s hand. (Id.) Warden Oakes ordered an officer to escort Plaintiff to
high security, and he falsely charged Plaintiff with creating a disturbance. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a
grievance about the incident and appealed it through the proper channels, but he never received a
final grievance response. (Id.) During his incarceration, at least ten doctors employed by

2 Plaintiff’s medical care at BCCX was the subject of a separate lawsuit, see Washington v.
Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:24-CV-284-CEA-MJD.
TDOC’s contract medical provider, Centurion of Tennessee, LLC (“Centurion”), have diagnosed
Plaintiff with paralysis without consulting Plaintiff’s outside medical records. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff also has neuropathy, a painful nerve condition, but none of Centurion’s medical
providers have scheduled Plaintiff for an appointment with a spinal cord specialist or neurologist
to verify the disease. (Id. at 10.) On November 19, 2024, Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Caleigh

Cline prescribed Plaintiff gabapentin, a non-formulary drug designed to treat neuropathy. (Id.)
The medication was approved by Medical Director Dr. Emma Rich and the Offender
Management Office of TDOC. (Id.) On the same date, NP Cline ordered Plaintiff some adult
diapers (i.e., Depends) and catheter supplies. (Id.)
In January 2025, NP Raelan Duncan renewed orders for Plaintiff to receive Depends and
catheter supplies for 6 months. (Id. at 10, 11.) On January 21, 2025, NP Duncan discontinued
Plaintiff’s Depends order without meeting with Plaintiff or advising him why she was
discontinuing the order. (Id. at 11.) “All of the nurses did not know” why NP Duncan
discontinued Plaintiff’s Depends order, but “all of the nurses kept on giving [him] a pack of
briefs every week.” (Id.)
One month later, on February 19, 2025, Dr. Racheal3 Agard and Medical Assistant
(“MA”) Teniesha Dvorak came to Plaintiff’s cell in the high-security unit. (Id.) After Plaintiff

was handcuffed by Correctional Officer (“CO”) Thorton, Dr. Agard conducted a rectal
examination of Plaintiff. (Id. at 11–12.) After determining that Plaintiff could not move his
prostate and had no control over his bladder or bowels, Dr. Agard ordered Plaintiff to receive
adult diapers for 6 months. (Id. at 12.)

3 Plaintiff spells this provider’s name both as “Racheal” (see Doc. 1, at 1) and “Rachael” (see id.
at 11).
Sometime between January 1, 2025, and February 20, 2025, Medical Director Dr. Caleb
Jones approached Plaintiff’s cell and inquired whether Plaintiff would be interested in taking the
medication Pamelor (“nortriptyline”) instead of gabapentin, because gabapentin was “to[o]
expensive.” (Id. at 13, 37.) Plaintiff declined, stating that gabapentin worked “just fine for [his]
nerve pain.” (Id. at 13.) Dr. Jones stated, “We need to try a fucken [sic] cheaper medication!”

(Id.) When Plaintiff asked Dr. Jones not to curse at him, Dr. Jones stated, “I can say what the
fuck I want and talk how I want.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about this incident as soon as
Dr. Jones left Plaintiff’s cell door. (Id.) Cpl. Harris told Plaintiff that the grievance was
forwarded to Heath Services Administrator (“HSA”) Pete Wright, who did not respond to the
grievance. (Id.)
On March 6, 2025, NP April Barton requested Plaintiff receive another 30-day order for
gabapentin, and that request was approved the following day by Dr. Rich. (Id. at 14, 55.) But on
April 2, 2025, NP Barton discontinued the gabapentin “for no apparent reason” and without
notice or substitution. (Id. at 14.) HSA Wright responded to Plaintiff’s grievance about the
discontinuation by noting that Plaintiff was non-complaint with the medication, Dr. Jones and
NP Barton had discussed the possibility of discontinuation with Plaintiff if the behavior
persisted, and that lab test results on March 27, 2025, showed an “almost undetectable” level of

the medication in Plaintiff’s system, which indicated diversion. (Id. at 55.) In an order, NP
Barton wrote that she would “discuss Pamelor/[C]ymbalta[,]” even though Pamelor had
previously been prescribed to Plaintiff and is less effective than gabapentin. (Id. at 14.) NP
Barton wrote an order for Plaintiff to receive Pamelor on April 4, 2025. (Id. at 15, 55.)
On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff’s prescription for Pamelor was discontinued due to its
ineffectiveness and side effects, which NP Barton already knew would be the case. (Id. at 15.)
Dr. Jones had Plaintiff removed from his cell and escorted to the front of the pod on May
9, 2025, for a follow-up visit. (Id. at 16.) There, in front of entire pod, Dr. Jones began
discussing Plaintiff’s medical and “private” issues. (Id.) Plaintiff signed a treatment plan at the
beginning of the meeting, and Dr. Jones asked why Plaintiff needed Depends if he used
catheters. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he needed the Depends due to bladder leakage and his

inability to control his bowel movements. (Id. at 16–17.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Jones that he
had used both catheters and Depends for the previous 24-year period. (Id. at 17.) Nonetheless,
Dr. Jones told Plaintiff it was too expensive for him to use both Depends and catheters, and that
he did not need both. (Id.) Dr. Jones also stated, “[S]ince you want to file grievances on
me, . . . I’m gonna [sic] perform a test study” to determine whether Plaintiff actually required
catheters, Depends, and a wheelchair. (Id.) Plaintiff tried to refuse the test study, but Dr. Jones
told him he could not refuse and stated his intention to enter an order for Plaintiff to go to the
main clinic’s infirmary. (Id. at 18.) When Plaintiff told Dr. Jones he had the right to refuse the
test study, Dr. Jones threatened to have officers come to Plaintiff’s cell with tasers and use force
to get him to the infirmary. (Id.) Dr. Jones then exited the pod, and Plaintiff was returned to his
cell. (Id.)
At approximately 1:30 to 2:15 p.m. on the afternoon of May 9, 2025, Sgt. Caleb Armes

and Cpl. Evans arrived at Plaintiff’s cell to escort him to the infirmary, but Plaintiff stated, “No, I
refuse.” (Id.) Sgt. Armes told Plaintiff that he would be tased unless he got into his wheelchair
and let them escort him to the infirmary. (Id. at 18, 19.) Plaintiff informed both Sgt. Armes and
Cpl. Evans that the study was a retaliatory act by Dr. Jones, but Plaintiff was nonetheless
compelled to comply out of fear that he would be tased if he continued to refuse. (Id. at 19.)
Plaintiff was then transported to the main clinic infirmary. (Id.)
Upon arriving at the infirmary, Plaintiff was placed in Room 106, and his vital signs were
taken by Nurse Tyler Trout. (Id.) Nurse Trout had Plaintiff transfer himself from the wheelchair
to the bed, and Nurse Trout removed the wheelchair from the room and told Plaintiff that Dr.
Jones had discontinued his wheelchair order. (Id. at 19–20.) Dr. Jones then entered Plaintiff’s
room and told Plaintiff that he was discontinuing the wheelchair to see how well Plaintiff could

walk without it, and that he was discontinuing Plaintiff’s Depends and catheter orders to assess
Plaintiff’s bladder control. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff told Dr. Jones he could not urinate without a
catheter, that his bladder otherwise leaks, and that he could not “walk that good [sic] due to”
weakness in his legs, osteoarthritis in his right knee, an “expired” knee replacement in his left
knee. (Id.) Dr. Jones told Plaintiff he would be fine and left the room. (Id. at 20–21.) Dr. Jones
wrote an order for the on-shift nurses to assess Plaintiff for bladder distension every 6 hours and
to notify Dr. Jones if there was concern for bladder distension. (Id. at 21.) Dr. Jones
discontinued Plaintiff’s catheter orders and told all nurses not to provide Plaintiff with Depends
or his wheelchair. (Id.)
At around 3:45 p.m., Plaintiff realized his bladder was getting full, so he pressed the call
button in his room to alert the nurse’s station. (Id.) Nurse Tyler responded to Plaintiff’s room at
3:57 p.m., and Plaintiff told him he needed a catheter to urinate. (Id.) Nurse Tyler told him the

catheter order had been discontinued and to try to urinate on his own. (Id.) When Plaintiff told
Nurse Tyler that he could not urinate without a catheter, Nurse Tyler advised him that “there’s
nothing he can do without an order.” (Id. at 21–22.) At 5:02 p.m., Plaintiff told Nurse Tyler that
his bladder was painfully full and that he needed a catheter. (Id. at 22.) Nurse Tyler denied his
request. (Id.) Plaintiff pressed the call button again at 5:48 p.m. and requested a new Depends,
as the one he was wearing was soiled from leaked urine. (Id.) Nurse Tyler again denied
Plaintiff’s request based on Dr. Jones’ instructions to the nurses. (Id.) He also denied Plaintiff’s
request for his wheelchair for the same reason. (Id.)
At 7:30 p.m. on May 9, 2025, Nurse Brad came to Plaintiff’s cell door and asked Plaintiff
if he needed anything. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff told Nurse Brad that his bladder was full, that he
only had one kidney, and that he would have kidney failure if he did not empty his bladder soon.

(Id.) Nurse Brad stated he would need to contact the on-call physician and obtain an emergency
order. (Id. at 24.) Nurse Brad subsequently told Plaintiff that Dr. Jones ordered Nurse Brad to
examine Plaintiff to see how full his bladder was. (Id. at 24–25.) Dr. Jones purportedly told
Nurse Brad that if Plaintiff’s bladder felt “like a water balloon, then go ahead and give [Plaintiff]
a catheter and a urinal” and record the output. (Id. at 25.) After Nurse Brad examined Plaintiff
and discovered his bladder extremely full, he issued Plaintiff a catheter and urinal. (Id.) Plaintiff
“put out over 1,000 cc[]s of urine[,] which is about 50–60 ounces.” (Id.) Plaintiff then asked for
a Depends, because the one Plaintiff was wearing was leaking from the sides. (Id.) Nurse Brad,
without obtaining an order, “went and got a large adult [D]epend[s] and gave it to” Plaintiff.
(Id.)
Plaintiff remained in the clinic’s infirmary for approximately 2 weeks. (Id.) He was
issued one catheter every six to eight hours and one large Depends every 6 to 8 hours, as needed.

(Id.) But Plaintiff was denied his wheelchair for 2 weeks “out of staff retaliation.” (Id. at 25–
26.)
On May 23, 2025, Dr. Jones wrote an order for Plaintiff to be discharged back into
“security’s custody[,]” to continue an order for Plaintiff’s catheters as needed; and to discontinue
Plaintiff’s Depends order. (Id. at 26.) He also ordered a neurology consult, nerve conduction
studies, and a “CT monogram.” (Id.) Before he left the infirmary, Plaintiff asked Dr. Jones why
his Depends order was being discontinued, and Dr. Jones informed him that, due to Centurion’s
“budget cut[s] to reduce the amount of money being spent on inmates[’] medical needs[,]” it was
too expensive to keep Plaintiff on both Depends and catheters. (Id.) Plaintiff pushed his
wheelchair to intake to receive his property. (Id.) Plaintiff was “still able to take two packs of
adult [D]epends and a box of 30 catheters with [him] to general population.” (Id.)
Plaintiff wrote a grievance against Dr. Jones about the test-study observation period, and

he requested a response from Grievance Officer Cpl. Delk. (Id. at 27–28.) Eight days later, he
completed the third step of the grievance process but never heard a response. (Id. at 28.) Cpl.
Delk “never checks the grievance boxes in the units.” (Id.)
On June 18, 2025, Plaintiff noticed he only had four Depends left. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff
sent a request to NP Duncan for a renewed order for Depends and the results of his HIV and
Hep-C tests. (Id.) On June 24 or 25, 2025, NP Duncan, NP Carrie White, and MA Dvorak came
to Plaintiff’s unit for a follow-up appointment. (Id.) Sgt. Scott Brisk retrieved Plaintiff from his
cell and pushed Plaintiff in his wheelchair to see NPs Duncan and White “for the same
complaint.” (Id. at 29–30.) NP Duncan told Plaintiff that he had tested negative for both HIV
and Hep-C and inquired whether Plaintiff had any questions. (Id. at 30.) When Plaintiff
requested additional Depends and told NPs Duncan and White he “was completely out” of
Depends, NP Duncan stated she would not order any Depends because Plaintiff was using

catheters. (Id.) NP White then informed Plaintiff that Dr. Jones did not want Plaintiff using both
Depends and catheters due to the cost, and that he could “only have one or the other.” (Id.)
Plaintiff cursed at both of them and was escorted to high security for assault on staff. (Id.)
Once Plaintiff arrived at high security, he filed a grievance on NPs Duncan and White.
(Id. at 31.) Plaintiff exhausted the process, even though he never heard anything back from the
grievance department. (Id.)
Between 7:00 and 8:50 p.m. on the same day, Plaintiff requested a Depends from Nurse
Deniece, who stated, “I’m not giving you anything because you spitted [sic] on my fellow staff
member Provider Duncan.” (Id.) Plaintiff removed the Depends he was wearing, because he
had a bowel movement. (Id. at 31–32.) He also did not have any catheters, because they had
been taken by Lt. Carl Gaskin when Plaintiff was put into a room in intake. (Id. at 32.) Once

Plaintiff was in the intake room, Lt. Gaskin and Cpl. Carol allowed Dr. Jones to remove a brown,
poisonous spider from a small black container he retrieved from his pocket and throw it on
Plaintiff’s left shoulder. (Id.)
At 9:55 p.m. on June 24, 2025, Cpl. Payne came to Plaintiff’s cell in high security with
catheters sent by Nurse Josey, who had heard about the incident between Plaintiff and NP
Duncan. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Cpl. Payne to ask Nurse Josey for some Depends. (Id.) Cpl.
Payne left and returned at 10:20 p.m. (Id.) Cpl. Payne reported that Nurse Josey could not give
Plaintiff a Depends because he did not have an order for them. (Id. at 32–33.)
Between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. on June 25, 2025, Nurse Rhaylan Bowlin gave Plaintiff
medications in his cell, and Plaintiff asked her if she could bring Plaintiff back some Depends,
because his bladder had leaked all over his bed sheets and blanket. (Id. at 33.) Nurse Bowlin
stated she would not return to the unit unless it was a medical emergency and walked away. (Id.)

That night, between 7:00 and 8:45 p.m., Nurse Amanda was passing medications when
Plaintiff asked her to bring him some Depends and catheters. (Id.) Nurse Amanda responded,
“Screw you” and walked away. (Id.) At this point, Plaintiff was forced to put a bath towel
around his penis and buttocks. (Id.)
During the morning medication pass on June 26, 2026, Plaintiff asked Nurse Beth to
provide him with catheters and Depends, showing her that he was wearing a bath towel as a
makeshift diaper. (Id. at 34.) He also told her he was having to reuse the same catheter. (Id.)
Nurse Beth stated she would not return to the unit absent a medical emergency, but that she
would “tell the charge nurse.” (Id.) At the night shift medication pass that evening, Plaintiff
made a similar request of Nurse Kristy, who stated she was not returning to the pod but would
tell “them” to bring Plaintiff’s catheters in the morning. (Id.) By this time, Plaintiff was wearing
a plastic bag underneath his towel to stop urine from leaking on his wheelchair seat and pants.

(Id.)
At morning medication pass the following day, June 27, 2025, Nurse Beth gave Plaintiff
a box of 30 catheters. (Id.) When Plaintiff requested a Depends, Nurse Beth told Plaintiff that
she was not coming back to the unit because she was tired and her knees were hurting, but that
she would “tell the night nurse.” (Id. at 35.) Plaintiff mailed a grievance on Nurses Beth, Kristy,
Amanda, “and all of the other nurses.” (Id.) Plaintiff pursued the grievance through the third
step but has not heard anything in response to his grievance. (Id.) But the grievance box in the
unit only gets checked once every two to three weeks. (Id.)
On June 28, 2025, Plaintiff requested a Depends from Nurse Elizabeth, who stated she
could not provide Plaintiff one without an order. (Id.) On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff mailed letters to
HSA Wright and Dr. Jones requesting an order for Depends, but he did not hear back from either
of them. (Id.) On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff placed a sick call to Nurse Jesse about needing

Depends, and although Nurse Jesse stated she would “try and bring some back,” she never did.
(Id. at 35–36.)
On July 4, 2025, Nurse Whitney gave Plaintiff his morning medications and asked what
the nurses had been doing to treat Plaintiff’s bedsore. (Id. at 36.) When Plaintiff informed her
that he had not received wound care in two weeks, Nurse Whitney said she would look at the
orders and be back at noon. (Id.) At 12:35 p.m., Nurse Whitney came to Plaintiff’s cell, stated
she did not feel like coming into Plaintiff’s cell to perform wound care, and provided Plaintiff
with “mediplex dressing” to place on the wound. (Id.) She did not provide Plaintiff anything
with which to clean the wound. (Id.)
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff placed a sick call request with Nurse Bowlin for antibiotics,
because his “bladder, bedsore, and whole body” had developed a methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) infection. (Id.)

Plaintiff received new catheters on July 10, 2025. (Id.) At 7:45 a.m. on July 11, 2025,
Plaintiff told Nurse Beth that he “had a large MRSA infection knot under [his] left arm pit that
came from wearing the same bath towel for almost 3 weeks” because of medical providers’
failure to order him Depends. (Id. at 36–37.) Between July 12 and 30, 2025, NP Cline examined
Plaintiff’s MRSA knot in front of the pod. (Id. at 37.) She diagnosed Plaintiff with an MRSA
infection and ordered Plaintiff a seven-day course of antibiotics. (Id.). Plaintiff informed NP
Cline that the infection was caused by wearing a towel and a plastic bag for weeks, which caused
a build-up of bacteria, but NP Cline stated she would not order Plaintiff Depends because of Dr.
Jones’ instructions. (Id.)
Sometime between 10:00 and 10:45 a.m. on August 9, 2025, Sgt. Paul Pappas came to
Plaintiff’s cell and asked him if he wished to attend a telehealth appointment in the medical
clinic. (Id. at 67–68.) Plaintiff stated he did, and Sgt. Pappas told Plaintiff he would return in

ten minutes to escort him to the clinic. (Id. at 68.) At 11:00, Cpl. Allen came to escort Plaintiff
to the clinic, and Plaintiff stated he needed a Depends due to leakage. (Id.) Cpl. Allen
dispatched Sgt. Pappas about the request and stated he would check with medical. (Id.) He left
and returned approximately ten minutes later with a refusal form. (Id.) Since Plaintiff was not
refusing the appointment, he declined to sign the form. (Id.) At 11:47 a.m., Cpl. Allen again
approached Plaintiff’s cell and asked whether Plaintiff wanted to move to general population, to
which Plaintiff responded, “Yes, but I need an adult [D]epend[s] from medical” and new pants,
because both his Depends and pants were soiled with urine. (Id.) Cpl. Allen stated he would see
what he could do but returned at 12:15 p.m. with a disciplinary write up for refusing a cell
assignment (“RCA”). (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the issue, to which HSA Wright
responded. (Id. at 70.) HSA Wright responded that: (1) Plaintiff does not have a supporting
diagnosis for Depends to be ordered; (2) a provider’s diagnosis is not grievable; (3) Plaintiff does

not have a diagnosis of paralysis; (4) Plaintiff “has been observed and noted in his chart as able
to ambulate”; and (4) Plaintiff “refused the CT to determine any degree of injury and has refused
physical therapy to help rebuild strength.” (Id.)
On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff received a chronic-care visit in the medical triage room.
(Id. at 77–78.) Plaintiff “was being seen” by NP White, Dr. Jones, MA Dvorak, and Nurse
Assistant (“NA”) Christia Dickerson. (Id. at 78.) Plaintiff maintains that during this visit, he
became afraid for his life and “assaulted” NA Dickerson. (Id.) Plaintiff was pulled out of the
room and the door shut behind him, “for the safety of them both.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that
while he was waiting in his wheelchair for the door to be opened so that CO Huffman could push
Plaintiff back to his cell, Dr. Jones rushed out and pushed Plaintiff in the face, even though
Plaintiff was restrained and sitting in his wheelchair at the time. (Id.)
Dr. Jones responded to Plaintiff’s grievance about the incident. (Id. at 75.) Dr. Jones

stated that when Plaintiff arrived to the clinic, he was asked to step on the scale. (Id.) Plaintiff
stated, “I am paralyzed. I can’t stand up[,]” to which NA Dickerson replied, “We have all seen
you walking.” (Id.) Dr. Jones noted that Plaintiff had “been observed during a previous
infirmary admission standing up, ambulating freely around his room as well as dragging his
furniture around his room.” (Id.) At the end of the visit, Plaintiff purportedly stated, “I got
something coming for you and that bitch Raelan” and spit on NA Dickerson. (Id.) Plaintiff
rolled himself out of the clinic, and Dr. Jones “jumped up and confronted [Plaintiff] about
assaulting CNA Dickerson by spitting on her.” (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to spit on Dr. Jones and
grabbed Dr. Jones by the collar of his shirt and attempted to pull Dr. Jones toward himself. (Id.)
Plaintiff was handcuffed in the wheelchair at the time, so Dr. Jones braced himself on the armrest
of the wheelchair to avoid falling onto Plaintiff. (Id.) COs “Deluca and Hoffman were present
and helped de-escalate the situation.” (Id.) Dr. Jones’ shirt was “pried free of [Plaintiff’s] grip[,]

and [Plaintiff] was returned to his cell.” (Id.)
Dr. Jones reported that neither NA Dickerson nor any other medical staff was ever
threatening toward Plaintiff, and he was never shoved in the face while Dr. Jones was present.
(Id.) Dr. Jones was informed that Plaintiff had refused to make a statement to Internal Affairs
(“IA”) regarding the incident. (Id.) Dr. Jones also recorded that Plaintiff “has an extensive
history of assault and offence against medical staff.” (Id.) Dr. Jones noted it was the third
incident of Plaintiff spitting on medical staff during his tenure, and that since Plaintiff was
“known to be a carrier of a highly infectious disease[,]” his spitting attempts should be
considered assault. (Id.) He also noted that since Plaintiff has accessed his medical records on
many occasions, he has knowledge of his diagnosed infectious disease and has made an “obvious
attempt to transmit infection.” (Id.)
IA investigated the incident and determined that Plaintiff assaulted NA Dickerson. (Id.)

On November 13, 2025, HSA Wright noted that Plaintiff “continues to be combative and
aggressive toward providers and staff when he does not receive the desired results from his
complaints despite relevant clinic data.” (Id.)
At 6:12 a.m. on October 9, 2025, Officer A. Delvin approached Plaintiff’s cell and asked
whether he was “ready to go to special needs for an outside appointment.” (Id. at 37.) Officer
Delvin did not know the reason for the appointment. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff stated he wanted to go
but realized that he did not have any towels to use as a Depends, and he “needed emergency
assistance because the towel that [he] had on was completely covered in urine” and had a strong,
foul odor. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff asked Officer Delvin if he would call medical and inform them
that Plaintiff was having a medical emergency and needed a Depends so that he could get to his
appointment. (Id.) Officer Delvin stated, “You don’t look like you’re having a[n] emergency,
but I’ll call medical and see if someone could come and talk to you.” (Id.) Officer Delvin came

to Plaintiff’s cell at 6:48 a.m. and stated that someone would be by to speak to Plaintiff “shortly.”
(Id.)
At 7:30 a.m., Officer Delvin and Nurse Whitney came to Plaintiff’s cell and administered
Plaintiff’s morning medications. (Id.) Nurse Whitney told Plaintiff “that the appointment at
special needs was for a test study and a CT monogram scan of [his] spine[,]” but that Dr. Jones
told transportation to “refuse [Plaintiff] and go without [him], all because [Plaintiff] needed an
adult [D]epend[s] to put on” for the appointment. (Id. at 38–39.) Nurse Whitney told Plaintiff
he would be charged with a $10 fee for refusing the outside appointment, to which Plaintiff
objected. (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff refused to sign the inmate personal withdrawal for the $10 refusal
fee, so Nurse Whitney signed it, and Officer Delvin witnessed it. (Id.) The fee was paid on
November 4, 2025. (Id.)
Sometime before noon on October 13, 2025, a Medical Consultant Elbert Springs came

to Plaintiff’s cell asking Plaintiff to sign a personal withdrawal trust-fund form for the $10
refusal fee. (Id.) Plaintiff told Mr. Springs that Nurse Whitney had already turned in a
withdrawal form, but Mr. Springs told Plaintiff to sign his form, and that he would ensure the
other form was disposed of if he saw it. (Id. at 39–40.) Mr. Springs also told Plaintiff he should
have gone to his appointment. (Id. at 40.) Plaintiff refused to sign the form, and Mr. Springs put
“refuse to sign” on the form, witnessed it, and submitted it. (Id.) On November 4, 2025, this
$10 was also deducted from Plaintiff’s account, so Plaintiff paid twice for one missed
appointment. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the matter on October 14, 2025, but he never
heard anything back from the grievance department. (Id. at 40–41.)
On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff was transferred to Unit 21-C, cell 109. (Id. at 42.)
Plaintiff was without Depends “all this time” and wore a bath towel and a plastic bag in lieu of
Depends. (Id.) The only medical provider who consistently performed her duty and brought

Plaintiff Depends despite him not having an order for them was Nurse Sharp. (Id.) Plaintiff
requested Depends from Nurse Sharp on January 7, 2026, and she gave him a pack of Depends
that evening—the first pack he had received in 7 months. (Id.)
On January 18, 2026, Plaintiff requested Depends from Nurse Sharp after evening
medication pass, and she provided Plaintiff with a pack of Depends that she had stored in the
bottom drawer of the medication cart. (Id. at 43.) She provided Plaintiff Depends again on
February 14, 2026. (Id.) Nurse Sharp approached Plaintiff’s cell on February 27, 2026, and
asked if he needed anything. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Nurse Sharp that he had only one Depends
left and asked if she could bring him some more. (Id.) Nurse Sharp stated that MA Dvorak told
Nurse Sharp not to provide Plaintiff additional Depends because he did not have an order for
them. (Id.)
On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff noticed he had developed another painful MRSA

infection—this time under his right arm pit—because he had to revert to wearing a bath towel
and a plastic bag as a makeshift Depends. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff would vomit when he ate because
of the infection. (Id.) So, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff turned in a sick call. (Id.) No one ever
came to assess him. (Id.)
On March 18, 2026, NP Carrie White and NA Christia Dickerson approached Plaintiff’s
cell, and NP White asked to see the MRSA knot Plaintiff had been complaining about to the
nursing staff. (Id.) Plaintiff showed NP White the knot, and NP White said, “Ooh, that looks
awful” and that she would order Plaintiff a 7-day course of antibiotics. (Id.) She inquired
whether Plaintiff had any additional complaints, and Plaintiff said that he needed an order for
Depends. (Id. at 44–45.) Plaintiff informed her that wearing a towel and plastic bag in lieu of
Depends caused him to develop the MRSA infection and sores between his thighs and in his
genital area. (Id. at 45.) NP White stated she could not order Depends because of Dr. Jones’

instructions, but that she would talk to him about it. (Id.)
Because of these events, Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging violations of his civil
rights under § 1983 and Tennessee law against Centurion and 27 individual Defendants in both
their official and individual capacities, seeking monetary damages, the award of costs and
attorney fees, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 1, 3, 49–50.)
C. Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly raises claims that: (1) Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs (see, e.g., id. at 14, 15,16,17, 21, 22–24, 26); (2) Dr.
Jones and staff retaliated against him (id. at 17, 18, 33); (3) Defendants Armes and Evans
threatened him with excessive force (id. at 19); (4) his constitutional right to be free from
involuntary servitude was violated (id. at 28–29); (5) his grievances are met with deliberate
indifference (id. at 35); (6) Defendants’ conduct gives rise to claims of negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law (id. at 27–29, 33, 36, 41, 45);
and (7) Defendants have violated the Tennessee Constitution’s prohibition against “intimidation,
harassment, and abuse” in the “Tennessee state prison system”4 (id. at 28).
However, with liberal construction of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court also finds that he
has alleged facts implicating: (1) a failure-to-protect claim against Gaskin, Carol, and Dr. Jones

4 Plaintiff cites Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 13 for this claim (Doc. 1, at 28).
(id. at 32); and (2) a due process claim related to the deprivation of funds in his inmate account
(id. at 39–40). The Court addresses Plaintiff’s constitutional claims first.
1. Section 1983 Claims
a. Time Barred Claims
Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year
statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim). When the statute
begins to run is an issue of federal law. Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510
F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Under federal law, a cause of action accrues,
and the limitations period begins to run, when the injury forming the basis of the claim is
discoverable. See Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Plaintiff “filed” this action by submitting it to prison authorities for mailing on April 2,
2026 (Doc. 1, at 79). See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988) (finding pro se prisoner’s

notice of appeal filed at moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to district court).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Warden Oakes’ conduct on December 4, 2024; NP
Duncan’s discontinuation of his Depends in January 2025; Dr. Agard’s rectal examination and
subsequent Depends order in February 2025; and Dr. Jones’ cursing at Plaintiff and his attempts
to get Plaintiff to take a medication less expensive than gabapentin are all time-barred. Any
injuries from these events were discoverable at the time they occurred, but they were not asserted
within the one-year limitations deadline. Accordingly, these claims are properly dismissed as
untimely. See In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc., 652 F. App’x 330, 339–40 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting
that “courts have no authority” to modify “statute-of-limitations deadlines”). And as these
claims form the only factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Oakes5 and/or Dr. Agard,
they will be DISMISSED from this action.
b. Threat of Force
Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Armes and Cpl. Evans threatened to tase Plaintiff unless he
complied with Sgt. Armes and Cpl. Evans’ orders to move to the infirmary for Dr. Jones’ test

study. (See Doc. 1, at 18, 19.) Had they carried out their threat, Plaintiff maintains, their
conduct would have constituted excessive force. (See id. at 19.) However, the threat of force is
not the equivalent to an actionable use of force. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Barnes, No. 3:14-CV-
591-J-32JBT, 2018 WL 1496929, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Mattingly v.
Duval Cnty. Jail, 777 F. App’x 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting “Plaintiff’s allegation that
Defendant Khan threatened to ‘taze’ him” failed to state a claim, as “verbal threats and
harassment are generally not actionable under § 1983”); Hamilton for J.H. v. Fort Wayne, No.
16-cv-132, 2017 WL 5467038, *8 (N.D. Ind. 2017) (“The Court finds that a verbal warning
about a particular use of force that never transpires is not the same as actually using the force.”);

see also Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he action of a police officer in
pointing a gun at a person is not, in and of itself, actionable[.]”). And the Sixth Circuit “has
never found that pointing a taser, as opposed to actually discharging one, constitutes the use of
excessive force.” Evans v. Plummer, 687 F. App’x 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, any
claims against Defendants Armes and Evans related to their alleged threatened use of force will
be DISMISSED.

5 Insofar as Plaintiff seeks hold Warden Oakes liable for subsequent events merely because, as
Warden, he is in charge and responsible for his subordinates, such claims are impermissible in a
§ 1983 action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that Government
officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior.”).
c. Failure to Protect/Exposure to Harm
Plaintiff contends that in June 2025, Lt. Carl Gaskin and Cpl. Carol “st[oo]d[] by
watching” Dr. Jones remove a poisonous spider from a container in his pocket and throw it on
Plaintiff’s shoulder. (Doc. 1, at 32.) The Court finds this claim rises “to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible” and thus is factually frivolous. Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992); see also Huey v. Raymond, 53 F. App’x 329, 330–31 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing as frivolous and finding plaintiff’s claim that he was being poisoned “undoubtedly”
presents a claim that is clearly baseless and “may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic,
delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational”); Turner v. Yolo Cnty. Mayor, No. 2:24-CV-2803 DC
AC P, 2025 WL 2799733, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (dismissing as factually frivolous
complaint alleging, in part, that defendants “left poisonous spiders and snakes” at plaintiff’s
home to cause death of family members); McGee v. Warden F/N/U Hayward, No. SA-24-CV-
00035-XR, 2025 WL 625694, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2025) (denying motion for
reconsideration of dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous where it “asserted fantastic

or delusional scenarios” of inmates injecting him with substances and “throwing scorpions or
spiders on him” at the Warden’s instructions).
And the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are not otherwise sufficient to state a plausible
claim. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” “places duties”
on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Those duties require officials
to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of” inmates. Id. (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). But for a failure-to-protect claim to lie against a prison
official, the plaintiff must show that: (1) objectively, he was incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) the official acted with deliberate indifference to
inmate safety, meaning the official was subjectively aware of the risk and fail[ed] to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations and
quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
Here, Plaintiff does not explain how he knows the spider allegedly thrown on him was
poisonous. But more importantly, he does not allege that Defendants Gaskin and/or Carol—or

Dr. Jones, for that matter—knew the spider was poisonous. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegation that
the spider was poisonous is not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Smith v. Gen. Motors,
LLC, 988 F.3d 873, 885 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding complaints made “on information and belief”
cannot rest on conclusory allegations, but rather, “must set forth a factual basis for such belief”).
Nor does Plaintiff allege that he was injured by the exposure to the spider. That is, he
does not allege facts suggesting that the mere exposure to a spider deprived him of his
constitutional rights. And “[a] § 1983 claim only occurs when the threats or threatened conduct
result in a constitutional deprivation.” Branham v. Grinage, No. 88-1611, 1989 WL 11070, at *1
(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1989) (citing Macko v. Byron, 760 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly,

any claims against Defendants Armes, Evans, and/or Jones based on this alleged incident will be
DISMISSED.
d. Property
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Nurse Whitney and Elbert Springs each charged him a
$10 medical fee for the same refused medical visit, which is both an “excessive fee and a
violation of [TDOC] [p]olicy.” (Doc. 1, at 39–40.) But these Defendants’ alleged failure to
follow TDOC policy does not give rise to a constitutional claim, as TDOC’s policies and
procedures do not create constitutionally protected interests. See McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-
23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (holding failure to follow policy
directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy directive does not
create a protectible liberty interest); see also Stanley v. Vining, 602 F. 3d 767, 769 (6th Cir.
2010) (“It has long been established that the violation of a state statute or regulation is
insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983.”).
Neither can Plaintiff sustain a § 1983 claim because his property interest in his inmate

account was infringed by the alleged double billing. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a government
employee deprives an individual of property, provided that the state provides a post-deprivation
remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending
Parratt’s holding to intentional deprivations of property). Tennessee law provides for the
recovery of personal property. See McQuiston v. Ward, No. 2001-201-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL
839037, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (citing to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-30-101 and
§ 29-30-201). Plaintiff has not pled that Tennessee’s procedures are inadequate for addressing

the alleged wrong, as is necessary to sustain his § 1983 claim. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d
1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for the deprivation of property
against Defendants Whitney and Springs will be DISMISSED.
e. Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Jones performed a retaliatory “test study” on Plaintiff in May
2025, whereby he took Plaintiff’s catheters, adult diapers, and wheelchair because Plaintiff filed
grievances on Dr. Jones in January–February 2025 (see Doc. 1, at 17), and he was denied his
wheelchair for two weeks by Dr. Jones and the nursing staff “out of staff retaliation” (see id. at
25). Plaintiff also claims that he was denied adult diapers out of “staff retaliation.” (Id. at 31,
33.)
A retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to show three things: (1) he “engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between

elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s
protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). “[C]onclusory
allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to
state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)).
An inmate has a right to file non-frivolous grievances on his own behalf. See Herron v.
Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Jones stated he
intended to subject Plaintiff to a study where he would be stripped of purportedly medically
necessary supplies because Plaintiff filed an allegedly non-frivolous grievance against Dr. Jones.

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not find that this allegation is “frivolous or
malicious” or that it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim will PROCEED against Dr. Jones in his individual capacity.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged, however, that Dr. Jones’s actions were taken pursuant to or in
furtherance of a custom or policy of Centurion, any claim against Dr. Jones for retaliation in his
official capacity will be DISMISSED. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity”); Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011)
(holding plaintiff must allege “a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving
force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not set forth any facts to support his remaining
allegations of “staff retaliation,” and his subjective belief that he has been retaliated against is
insufficient to state a claim. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); see also

Cantley v. Armstrong, 391 F. App’x 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s holding
that a prisoner’s complaint was insufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship between
protected activity and adverse action because “‘bare allegations of malice on the defendants’
parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims’ that will survive § 1915A screening”
(quoting Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001))). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
remaining retaliation claims will be DISMISSED as conclusory. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”); Quisenberry v. Valentine, No. 3:23-CV-P393-JHM, 2024 WL
1261911, at *2, 5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2024) (holding that the plaintiff’s assertion that a

defendant housed a dangerous inmate near him “because I filed grievance” was conclusory and
therefore did not state a plausible § 1983 retaliation claim).
f. Grievances
Plaintiff alleges that the non-response to his grievances and the failure to regularly check
the grievance box in Unit 26-D “is deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 1, at 35.) However, inmates
have no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430
(6th Cir. 2003) (providing that a prisoner has “no inherent constitutional right to an effective
prison grievance procedure”); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir.
2005) (“All circuits to consider this issue have . . . found that there is no constitutionally
protected due process right to unfettered access to prison grievance procedures.”). Thus, inmates
have no attendant interest in having their grievances addressed or resolved. See LaFlame v.
Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding jail staff’s
disregard of grievances did not state a § 1983 claim “because there is no inherent constitutional
right to an effective prison grievance procedure”) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir. 1996))). Therefore, Plaintiff’s grievance-related claims fail to state a § 1983 claim
and will be DISMISSED.
g. Thirteenth Amendment
Plaintiff alleges that, by denying him medical supplies to address his serious medical
needs, Defendants’ conduct violates his Thirteenth Amendment “right to be free from
involuntary servitude.” (Doc. 1, at 28–29.) The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, “except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. Plaintiff
does not allege any facts suggesting that he is subjected to involuntary servitude. Therefore, this

conclusory claim will be DISMISSED.
h. Medical Care
The cornerstone of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he has been denied constitutionally
adequate medical care. (See generally Doc. 1.) The Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual
punishments” clause, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962), requires the government “to provide medical care
for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
This does not require a prisoner “unqualified access to healthcare.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Instead, it proscribes acts or omissions that produce an “unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
An Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of adequate medical treatment is composed
of two parts: (1) an objective component, which requires a plaintiff to show a “sufficiently
serious” medical need; and (2) a subjective component, which requires the plaintiff to show the

defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 842 (1994). The subjective component is met when officials know “of the facts that show
the serious medical need” and they “personally conclude that this need exists.” Phillips v.
Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). Under this standard, officials do not act with
deliberate indifference when they reasonably respond to a serious medical need after they learn
of it, even if the harm is not ultimately adverted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. “In fact, a response
does not exhibit deliberate indifference unless it reaches a culpability level higher ‘than ordinary
negligence.’” Pearson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 170 F.4th 1027, 1037 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing
Campbell v. Riahi, 109 F.4th 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2024)).

Accordingly, a prisoner cannot state a claim of deliberate indifference by suggesting that
he was misdiagnosed or not treated in a manner he desired. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151,
154-55 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding provider possibly negligent but not deliberately indifferent when
unaware of prisoner’s serious heart condition); Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL
160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997) (finding “misdiagnoses, negligence, and malpractice” are
not “tantamount to deliberate indifference”). “Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
In his complaint, Plaintiff lodges § 1983 medical-care claims against Centurion, and all
individual TDOC and Centurion Defendants in both their official and individual capacities (see
Doc. 1, at 3). The Court addresses the official-capacity claims first.
i) Official-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff seeks to hold all Defendants liable in their official capacities as employees of

Centurion or TDOC. (See Doc. 1, at 3.) By seeking relief against any individual Defendant in
his/her official capacity, Plaintiff is actually seeking suit against the entity “of which an officer is
an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity
suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”).
A. TDOC Defendants
Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against any of the TDOC Defendants in their
official capacities. TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee. See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs.,

196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”). And “a state
is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
64 (1989).
Also, the Eleventh Amendment typically “bars all suits, whether for injunctive,
declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Thiokol Corp. v. Mich.
Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984)). Because there has not been congressional abrogation
or waiver of immunity, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are
otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345
(1979) (finding § 1983 does not waive state sovereign immunity); Berndt v. State of Tennessee,
796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding Tennessee has not waived immunity to suit under
§ 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain an official-capacity suit against any of the TDOC
Defendants, and all official- capacity claims against the individually named TDOC Defendants
will be DISMISSED.6

B. Centurion & Centurion Employees
As noted above, suit against the medical-provider employees in their official capacities is
suit against Centurion itself. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. But
Centurion cannot be subject to § 1983 liability merely because it has employed someone who
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (noting § 1983 does not
permit liability on a “respondeat superior theory”). Rather, to maintain a claim against
Centurion, Plaintiff must identify a policy or custom of the entity and show that his particular
injury was incurred due to the execution of that policy. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t,
8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Braswell v.

Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding plaintiff must allege “a
policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged
deprivation” of his rights).

6 The Ex Parte Young doctrine allows a prisoner to obtain relief from an ongoing violation of
federal law from a state official sued in his or her official capacity. See Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). To determine if the exception is applicable, courts “need only conduct
a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412
(6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law by any TDOC employee, and
thus, his claims do not fall within the Ex Parte Young exception.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that although he needs both diapers and catheters, he was only
permitted orders for one of the items in order for Centurion to reduce expenses and cut costs.
(Doc. 1, at 17, 26.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has arguably stated a non-frivolous
claim against Centurion for the denial of constitutionally adequate medical care, and this claim
will PROCEED. But insofar as Plaintiff has sued the individual Centurion employee

Defendants in their official capacities, all such claims will be DISMISSED as redundant to the
claims against Centurion itself. See Jackson v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 07-6356, 2008 WL
4915434, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008) (affirming dismissal of redundant official-capacity
claims).
ii) Individual-Capacity Claims
To state a claim against any named Defendant in his or her respective individual capacity,
Plaintiff must adequately plead that the Defendant, through his or her own actions, has violated
the Constitution. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally

involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted). The Court addresses Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims topically, rather than
Defendant by Defendant.
A. Gabapentin
Plaintiff complains that NP Barton discontinued his gabapentin prescription in April 2025
and placed him on an alternative, Pamelor (i.e. nortriptyline) that she already knew would be
ineffective. (See Doc. 1, at 14–15.) But the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s complaint
demonstrate that Plaintiff’s gabapentin, a controlled substance7, was discontinued only after
Plaintiff’s noncompliance with and suspected diversion of the medication. (Id. at 55.) NP
Barton’s substitution of another (even if allegedly less effective) medication considering these
circumstances is not deliberate indifference. Instead, the substitution was a reasonable response
to Plaintiff’s medical needs while taking into account his noncompliance and suspected misuse

of the controlled medication. Therefore, any medical-care claims based on the denial of the
prescription gabapentin will be DISMISSED.
B. Wound Care
Plaintiff contends that during medication pass on July 4, 2025, Nurse Whitney asked
Plaintiff how his bedsore had been treated, stated she would consult his chart to review the
orders, and return to his cell. (See id. at 36.) Plaintiff maintains that when she returned, she
stated she did not feel like entering Plaintiff’s cell to perform wound care and provided Plaintiff
with a dressing to place on the wound himself, though she failed to provide him anything with
which to clean the wound. (Id.)

These allegations are insufficient to state a deliberate-indifference claim against Nurse
Whitney related to Plaintiff’s wound care. Plaintiff maintains that Nurse Whitney: (1) initiated
the conversation into whether Plaintiff’s bedsore had been treated while performing medication
pass, (2) stated her intention to consult Plaintiff’s chart, and (3) returned to Plaintiff’s cell with
supplies with which to cover Plaintiff’s wound. And while Plaintiff complains that she did not
provide him “anything” to clean the wound, it is apparent from Plaintiff’s complaint that he was
permitted to keep medical supplies in his cell. He does not allege that he told Nurse Whitney he

7 Gabapentin is a controlled substance in Tennessee. See https://www.drugs.com/medical-
answers/gabapentin-narcotic-controlled-substance-3555993/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2026).
did not have any means to clean his wound, nor does he advance any facts suggesting that Nurse
Whitney knew that Plaintiff did not have any means to clean his wound. Therefore, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim against Nurse Whitney related to his wound care.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against any Defendant for the
approximate two weeks he allegedly went without wound care, he fails to name any individual

who denied him wound care. And, as noted above, § 1983 liability lies only for one’s own
involvement in the alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has not stated a claim related to the denial of wound care, and this claim will be
DISMISSED.
C. Medical Supplies
Plaintiff maintains that after Dr. Jones decided to perform a “test study” on Plaintiff in
May 2025, he was temporarily deprived of access to his wheelchair and thereafter routinely had
trouble getting consistent access to catheters and adult diapers, despite his partial paralysis and
incontinence. (See, e.g., Doc. 1, at 19–45.) He contends that he developed at least two MRSA

infections because of Defendants’ refusal to provide him supplies to manage his incontinence.
(Id. at 36–37, 44–45.) And he alleges that all Defendants’ refusals originated from Dr. Jones’
orders discontinuing Plaintiff’s orders for adult diapers. (Id. at 19–45.) Therefore, the Court
finds Plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Jones related
to the denial of constitutionally adequate medical treatment, and this claim will PROCEED
against Dr. Jones individually.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff has stated non-frivolous claims of deliberate
indifference against Nurses Amanda, Beth, and Kristy, as he alleges that each of these
Defendants denied (at least temporarily) his requests for catheters, despite Dr. Jones entering
orders for Plaintiff to be provided catheters as needed. This claim will PROCEED against
Defendants Nurses Amanda, Beth, and Kristy in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff cannot, however, state a plausible deliberate-indifference claim against Nurse
Tyler, Nurse Brad, Nurse Deniece, Nurse Bowlin, Nurse Elizabeth, Nurse Jesse, Nurse Sharp,
and MA Dvorak. Plaintiff alleges that these medical personnel failed to provide him with

Depends upon his request. However, Plaintiff notes throughout his complaint that he did not
have an active order for Depends during the relevant times.8 And the nursing staff cannot be
deemed deliberately indifferent for reasonably following the orders entered by Plaintiff’s
treatment physicians. See Bauer v. Kramer, 424 F. App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
“[a] nurse is not deliberately indifferent when she reasonably follows a doctor’s orders”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against these Defendants will be
DISMISSED.
Plaintiff also asserts deliberate-indifference claims against NPs Duncan, Cline, and
White, for their failure to renew Plaintiff’s order for Depends. (See Doc. 1, at 29–30, 37.) These

medical Defendants, unlike members of the nursing staff, can enter orders for treatment, albeit
such orders must be in collaboration with a licensed physician.9 But Plaintiff states that NP
Duncan stated she did not believe Plaintiff needed adult diapers since he used catheters, NP
White stated that Dr. Jones did not want the staff to order Plaintiff both catheters and Depends,
and NP Cline also stated that Dr. Jones did not want Depends ordered for Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, at

8 The same is true as to Plaintiff’s allegation that staff denied him a wheelchair for a two-week
period. (Id. at 25–26.) Dr. Jones discontinued Plaintiff’s wheelchair order for that two-week
“test study” period. (Id. at 21, 22.)

9 See American Ass. of Nurse Practitioners, State Policy Fact Sheet: Tennessee,
https://storage.aanp.org/www/documents/no-index/state-fact-sheets/tennessee.pdf (last visited
Aug. 18, 2026).
29–30.) Plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest that Defendants personally knew that Plaintiff
had a serious medical need for Depends in addition to catheters but withheld treatment in
disregard of that need. And Plaintiff’s allegations otherwise indicate that the NP Defendants’
treatment of Plaintiff was curtailed—not by deliberate withholding of medical supplies—but by
the instructions of their supervising physician, Medical Director Dr. Jones. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against these Defendants will be DISMISSED.10
Plaintiff has also named HSA Wright as a Defendant, but his only allegations against this
Defendant are that he failed to respond to Plaintiff’s letter, and that he responded to Plaintiff’s
grievances. (See Doc. 1, at 35, 55, 70.) However, Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional
claim related to a grievance response, see LaFlame, 3 F. App’x at 348, and § 1983 liability
cannot be based on a failure to act, see Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding “liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be
based upon a mere failure to act”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Wright will be DISMISSED.

Plaintiff also implies that TDOC staff met his medical needs with deliberate indifference.
Specifically, he notes that: (1) Officer Delvin sent medical personnel to Plaintiff’s cell to
address Plaintiff’s “emergency” request for Depends so that he could attend his special needs
appointment (see Doc. 1, at 37–38); (2) Sgt. Pappas was involved in the events that resulted in
Plaintiff missing his telehealth appointment because he did not have a Depends (see id. at 67–
68); and (3) Cpl. Allen was also involved in the missed telehealth appointment and stated he
would check with medical concerning Plaintiff’s requests for Depends and new pants but did not

10 The Court notes that NPs Cline and White, on separate occasions, diagnosed Plaintiff with
MRSA and ordered antibiotics to treat the condition. (Id. at 37, 44.)
provide them, instead returning to Plaintiff’s cell’s cell with a disciplinary write up for refusing a
cell assignment (see id.)
However, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim against these
officers, because he contends that these Defendants contacted medical following Plaintiff’s
request for Depends. And TDOC personnel are not responsible for whether medical care is

ultimately rendered by medical staff. See Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. County of
Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding it is not “unconstitutional for
municipalities and their employees ‘to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals
responsible for prisoner care’”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against
these Defendants will be DISMISSED.11
2. State-Law Claims
Plaintiff maintains that by ignoring his medical need for catheters, adult diapers, and a
wheelchair, Defendants violated the Tennessee Constitution, as well as Tennessee laws
governing intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and negligence. (See Doc. 1, at

28–29.)
First, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s IIED claim. Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff states
an IIED claim by alleging intentional or reckless conduct by the remaining Defendants “so
outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society” that “resulted in serious mental injury to
the plaintiff.” Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn. 2012). But in his

11 Further, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against Cpl. Allen for the allegedly
false disciplinary write-up for refusing a cell assignment, such an allegation fails to state a claim.
See Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 564–71 (1974) (finding inmates possess no right to be free
from convictions for disciplinary offenses); Person v. Campbell, No. 98–5638, 1999 WL
454819, at *1 (6th Cir. June 21, 1999) (“[T]he filing of false disciplinary charges against an
inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983.”).
complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that he has a right to be free from IIED, “which is also hard to
endure and falls also under serious depression.” (Doc. 1, at 28–29), and that Defendants’
conduct “caus[ed] the plaintiff unnecessary emotional and physical pain and suffering” (id. at
47). These are conclusions of injury. And even though Tennessee employs a liberal pleading
standard, a plaintiff is still required “to state the facts upon which a claim for relief is founded.”

Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). Here,
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he has endured serious mental injury as a
result of any named Defendants’ allegedly outrageous conduct. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IIED claim
will be DISMISSED.
Second, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for violation of the Tennessee Constitution, as
it provides no private right of action. See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir.
1996); Wooley v. Madison Cnty., 209 F. Supp. 2d 836, 844 (W.D. Tenn. 2002). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims for a violation of his rights under the Tennessee Constitution will be
DISMISSED.

This leaves Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Inasmuch as the Court will permit certain
federal claims to proceed against Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Human, Wyrick,
and Hill, it will likewise permit Plaintiff’s state-law negligence claim to PROCEED against
these Defendants. Plaintiff has not, however, stated sufficient facts to render it plausible that any
remaining Defendant breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff that was both the factual and legal
cause of injury to Plaintiff to state a negligence claim under Tennessee law. See Downs ex rel.
Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tenn. 2008). Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim will
be DISMISSED against the remaining Defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 6) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the
filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 7) is DENIED;

5. Plaintiff’s motion to correct Defendants’ names (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, and the
Clerk is DIRECTED to update the docket to correctly reflect Nurse Deniece as
“Nurse Deniece Davis”; Nurse Beth as “Nurse Bethany Wyrick”; Nurse Elizabeth
as “Nurse Elizabeth Byrd”; Nurse Sharp as “Nurse Darla Sharp”; and Nurse
Amanda as “Nurse Amanda Hill”;

6. Plaintiff’s motion to re-file motions from his miscellaneous case (Doc. 10) is
DENIED as moot;

7. Plaintiff’s motion to effect service of process (Doc. 11) is GRANTED insofar as
the USMS will be directed to effect service in this case;

8. Plaintiff’s motion for a ruling on his pending motions (Doc. 13) is GRANTED by
entry of this Order;

9. The following claims are non-frivolous and will PROCEED: (1) Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim against Dr. Jones; (2) Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims
against Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Amanda Hill, Kristy Human, and
Bethany Wyrick; and (3) Plaintiff’s State-law negligence claims against
Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Amanda, Kristy, and Beth;

10. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff service packets (a blank summons and
USM 285 form) for Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, Nurse Amanda, Nurse
Kristy, and Nurse Beth;

11. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to the
Clerk’s Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order;

12. At that time, the summonses will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded
to the U.S. Marshal for service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;

13. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he fails to timely return the completed service
packets, this action will be dismissed;
14. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one
(21) days from the date of service. If any Defendant fails to timely respond to the
complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against that Defendant;

15. All other claims and Defendants are hereby DISMISSED;

16. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendant or her
counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule
83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other
parties to the proceedings of any change in his address, to monitor the progress of
the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13.
Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any
change in address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11433870. Public record. Not legal advice.