# Bishop

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · September 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11433096

## Case

- **Full name:** James K. Bishop v. Ohio Department of Corrections, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** September 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES K. BISHOP, : Case No. 2:26-cv-00025
:
Plaintiff, : District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
: Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
vs. :

:

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF :
CORRECTIONS, et al., :
:
Defendants. :

ORDER AND
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated at the Noble Correctional Institute (“NCI”) who
is proceeding without the assistance of counsel. He has filed a civil rights lawsuit in this
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By separate order, Plaintiff was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and without the prepayment of fees. (ECF No. 3).
This matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct the required
initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). For
the reasons set forth below, the undersigned ORDERS that Plaintiff may PROCEED
with his First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Love and Cobb in their
individual capacities. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the District Judge
DISMISS all remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Requirement To Screen Plaintiff’s Complaint
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner who is seeking “redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” the Court must screen the Complaint to
determine whether it, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A district court is required to

screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the full
filing fee, is a pauper, is pro se, or is represented by counsel as the statute does not
differentiate between various civil actions brought by prisoners”).
The Court is also required to screen the Complaint because Plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, for

the purpose of “lower[ing] judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 5, 31 (1992). However, “Congress recognized that a litigant whose filing fees
and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic
incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis

complaint to the extent it “determines that the action … (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
B. Determining That a Complaint Is Frivolous
A complaint is frivolous if the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or
arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also

Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal
basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a
legal interest that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no
arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of being
irrational or ‘wholly incredible.’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The

Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional,” Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010), or “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.”
Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2009).
C. Determining That a Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief May Be Granted
The Court is also required to dismiss complaints that fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). To avoid
dismissal under this standard, the complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court

must construe the complaint in plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)); see Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to
state a claim under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(20(B)(ii)”). Thus, the complaint must

include factual allegations that are both well-pleaded and plausible.
Factual allegations are well-pleaded if they are specific and support the plaintiff’s
claims. Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (courts need not accept
“non-specific factual allegations and inferences”). “[A] legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation” is not well-pleaded and need not be accepted as true. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; see 16630 Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d

502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[C]onclusory allegations … that the defendant violated the
law” do not state a claim on which relief can be granted); Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (courts need not accept “unwarranted legal conclusions”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also 16630
Southfield Ltd. Partnership v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (“[T]he sufficiency of a complaint turns on its
factual content, requiring the plaintiff to plead enough factual matter to raise a plausible
inference of wrongdoing.”). Whether an inference is plausible “depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for
the defendant’s conduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, a “complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements” of a claim “to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Columbia v. Natural Resources, Inc.
v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original).

D. Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaints
Plaintiff is representing himself pro se – that is, without the assistance of counsel.
This Court is required to liberally construe a pro se complaint and hold it “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This standard may require “active interpretation in some cases [in
order] to construe a pro se petition to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.”

Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must
adhere to the “basic pleading essentials” and the Court “should not have to guess at the
nature of the claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Instead,
the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff sues the following Defendants in their individual and official capacities:
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) Director Annette
Chambers-Smith1; NCI Warden Forshey; NCI C-2 dorm Sergeant T. Love; NCI
Inspector Cobb; NCI third shift C-1 dorm Correctional Officer D. Snyder; and NCI third

shift C-1 dorm Correctional Officer Triplett. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 48-49).

1 Plaintiff refers to this Defendant as Annette Smith-Chambers. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 48, 49,
57). The undersigned takes judicial notice that the last name of this individual, who is a frequent
party to litigation before the Court, is Chambers-Smith.
Plaintiff alleges that on December 18, 2025, Defendant Triplett woke Plaintiff up
during the 12:00 a.m. count and asked Plaintiff to turn off his TV. (ECF No. 4 at PageID#

50). Plaintiff immediately complied. However, Defendant Snyder wrote a conduct report
charging Plaintiff for having his TV on during the 12:00 a.m. count and for disobeying a
direct order—that order was a sign that Snyder posted in the control room window
ordering inmates to turn off TVs during counts. (ECF No. 4-4 at PageID# 68). Plaintiff
explains that he was asleep at the time his TV was allegedly turned on, and that “when
his neighbors turn their TV off/on mine turns off/on.” (Id. at PageID# 50 [cleaned up]).

Plaintiff states that he could not have turned on his TV, or disobeyed a direct order, while
he was asleep.
Plaintiff states that on December 24, 2025, Defendant Love ruled on the conduct
report without complying with due process requirements. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
that: (1) Love failed to give Plaintiff written notification of the nature and date of the

violation within 24 hours as required by Ohio Admin. Code 5120:1-8-12(E); (2) Love
failed to give Plaintiff an opportunity to prepare as required by Ohio Admin. Code
5120:1-8-12(F); and (3) Love failed to investigate the allegations within 24 hours of the
incident as required by Ohio Admin. Code 5120:1-8-12(E). Plaintiff states that Defendant
Love found Plaintiff guilty and seized Plaintiff’s TV for 60 days. (ECF No. 4 at PageID#

50). When Plaintiff stated that he wanted to appeal, Love responded that Plaintiff would
have to take up the matter with the regular Sergeant (Mr. Dearth, not named as a
Defendant) when he returned.
That same day, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint for “unprofessional conduct”
that challenged Defendant Love’s failure to follow due process requirements. Defendant

Cobb denied the grievance a few days later on the grounds that it was the wrong avenue
for appealing Love’s decision, “as conduct reports have their own appeal process.” (ECF
No. 4-3 at PageID# 63). Plaintiff states that the nature of Cobb’s denial foreclosed
Plaintiff’s right to escalate the grievance any further. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 51).
Plaintiff apparently sent multiple kites to Cobb to explain that his intention in filing the
“unprofessional conduct” grievance was to challenge Love’s violations of due process,

not his decision. (ECF No. 4-5 at PageID# 69-73; ECF No. 4-6 at PageID# 74-75).
Plaintiff also appealed to C-1 unit manager Wittekind (not named as a Defendant)
to challenge Love’s failure to follow due process and to inquire what regulation permitted
the seizure of an inmate’s personal property. (ECF No. 4-4 at PageID# 68). Although
Plaintiff states that Wittekind refused to address both complaints, this contention is

contradicted by Plaintiff’s own exhibit, in which Wittekind responded, “It is a privilege
to be allowed to have a TV. When rules are violated, we restrict those privileges. You can
speak with Sergeant Dearth about when you can get your TV back.” (Id.).
On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff discussed the matter with Mr. Dearth, as he had
been advised to do. Defendant Love was present when Plaintiff approached Mr. Dearth.

Plaintiff states that Love tried to “intimidate” him by threatening that Plaintiff would “get
90 days of restrictions across the board” the next time he failed to turn off his TV. (ECF
No. 4 at PageID# 51; ECF No. 4-3 at PageID# 66-67). Plaintiff contends that Love was
“tired of people writing kites and filing grievances for his actions, and that this is his
dorm and he shall rule it, as he sees fit.” (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 51).

Plaintiff filed another grievance to challenge “Love’s misconduct.” (ECF No. 4-6
at PageID# 74). Defendant Cobb denied the grievance but relied, according to Plaintiff,
on the wrong ODRC policy. (Id.; ECF No. 4 at PageID# 51). Plaintiff alleges that Cobb
denied Plaintiff’s right to due process and that Cobb’s “decisions thwart inmates from
taking advantage of the grievance process through Machination, misrepresentation,
and/or intimidation.” (Id. [as in original]).

For relief, Plaintiff seeks: (a) a preliminary and permanent injunction against NCI
staff and their agents that orders them to follow ODRC rules to prevent further injuries to
inmates and to retrain staff on the proper procedures for conducting hearings on conduct
reports; (b) compensatory damages in the amount of $13,000,000 against Defendants’
employer; (c) punitive damages in the amount of $50,000 each against Defendants Love,

Snyder, Chambers-Smith, Cobb, Forshey, and Triplett; (d) all costs involved with this
suit; (e) any other relief that the Court determines to be just, proper, and equitable; and (f)
a trial by jury on all issues triable to a jury. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 58-59).
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff asserts seven claims pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983: (1) in Count One, a claim for unnecessary/unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; (2)
in Count Two, a claim for malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments; (3) in Count Three, a claim for failure to provide notice in
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) in Count Four, a procedural due
process claim based upon a failure to record disciplinary proceedings in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment; (5) in Counts Five and Six, a procedural due process claim
based upon a the failure to train or hire competent employees in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) in Count Seven, a claim of First Amendment retaliation.
(ECF No. 4 at PageID# 51-58). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
ORDERS that Plaintiff may PROCEED with Count Seven and RECOMMENDS that
the District Judge DISMISS the remaining claims.

A. Count One: Seizure of Plaintiff’s Television
In Count One, Plaintiff asserts that the temporary seizure and deprivation of his
TV was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizures), the
Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), and the Fourteenth Amendment (due
process). (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 51-56). All these claims fail as a matter of law.

1. Fourth Amendment
As to the Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff asserts that it was unreasonable for
Defendants to seize his TV because he was asleep when the alleged infractions occurred,
and so could not have committed them. He also argues that NCI does not identify seizure
of an inmate’s TV as a punishment for rules infractions. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 52).

The Fourth Amendment does not aid Plaintiff because it does not prohibit
Defendants from seizing personal property in an inmate’s cell. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected a prisoner’s Section 1983 claim that
challenged the destruction of his legal papers during a search of his cell. In a footnote, the
Supreme Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment does not protect against seizures [of
personal property] in a prison cell” and observed that “[p]rison officials must be free to

seize from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate institutional
interests.” Id. at 528 n.8 (emphasis added). Accord Duskin v. Olson, No. 2:19-cv-155,
2019 WL 4873403, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2019) (applying Hudson to find that the
Fourth Amendment did not prevent corrections officers from confiscating items in
plaintiff’s cell); Henderson v. Lindamood, No. 1:07-55, 2008 WL 4190016, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 5, 2008) (“[W]hile an inmate may have certain rights in relation to his

property such as the right to a post-deprivation hearing, that right is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment.”). Because Plaintiff cannot state a Fourth Amendment claim upon
which relief can be granted with respect to the seizure of his TV from his prison cell, the
undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed.
2. Eighth Amendment

As to the Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff argues that the temporary seizure of
his TV constituted cruel and unusual punishment because he suffered pain, anxiety, and
physical and mental discomfort due to not being able to view his religious shows or to
follow the stock market. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 53).
This claim fares no better. “[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments

which, though not physically barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain, or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (cleaned up). Construing Plaintiff’s claim liberally and
accepting his allegations as true, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Defendant Love’s
seizure of Plaintiff’s TV as a disciplinary measure for the TV being turned on at an
improper time violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. “[A]bsent any

showing that basic human needs were not met, a denial of privileges does not constitute
an Eighth Amendment violation.” Allen v. Alexsander, No. 19-1315, 2019 WL 4667707,
at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2019) (citing Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.
2008)). Even if this disciplinary sanction caused Plaintiff pain, anxiety, and physical and
mental discomfort, watching TV is not a basic human need or a constitutional right. See
Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F. Supp. 284, 288 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1235 (6th

Cir. 1997) (“There is no constitutional right to television while incarcerated.”). Plaintiff
therefore has not stated, and cannot state, an Eighth Amendment claim upon which relief
can be granted, and the undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed.
3. Fourteenth Amendment
Finally, as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff argues that seizure of his

TV violated due process because it was done for malicious reasons and Defendant Love
did not follow the ODRC due process policy. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 53-55).
This claim also fails. “Procedural due process is traditionally viewed as the
requirement that the government provide a ‘fair procedure’ when depriving someone of
life, liberty, or property.” EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir.

2012). To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty or
property interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause. Guba v. Huron Cnty., Ohio,
695 F. App’x 98, 102 (6th Cir. 2017); Jergens v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr. Adult
Parole Auth., 492 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 131
S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011)). Without a protected liberty or property interest, a procedural due
process claim necessarily fails and the court need not consider the remaining elements of

the claim. Hester v. Chester Cnty., Tennessee, 162 F.4th 780, 790 (6th Cir. 2025).
The allegations in the Complaint do not give rise to a protected liberty interest.
Although “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate …. [d]iscipline
by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected
parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
485 (1995). It is only where a prison official “imposes atypical and significant hardship

on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” that the punishment
creates a protected liberty interest that supports a procedural due process claim. Id. at
484. Because the temporary deprivation of TV is not an atypical and significant hardship,
it does not create a protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Vilardo v. Jordan, No. 25-5788,
2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8554, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026) (“A punishment of thirty

days of disciplinary segregation does not implicate a liberty interest”); Walker v. Jones,
No. 23-1022, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 15816, at *4 (6th Cir. June 22, 2023) (“Walker does
not possess a protected liberty interest in minor misconduct proceedings.”).
Plaintiff also cannot identify a protected property interest. “[C]ourts have held that
prisoners do not have a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in keeping

unspecified personal property in their cells.” Blair v. Kentucky State Penitentiary, No.
5:21-cv-75, 2022 WL 660792, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2022) (cleaned up and citations
omitted). Absent a protected liberty or property interest, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff could identify a protected interest, his claim would still
fail because the Complaint shows that he received notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Specifically: (1) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “Snyder wrote Bishop a conduct report”
on December 18, 2025 (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 50), which is confirmed by the Conduct
Report (ECF No. 4-1 at PageID# 60); (2) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Love reviewed
the conduct report on December 24, 2025, and Plaintiff was able to “explain[] he was
sleeping and when his neighbors turn their TV off/on mine turns off/on” (Doc. No. 4 at
PageID# 50 (cleaned up)); and (3) the Hearing Officer’s Report indicated that Plaintiff

attended the hearing, was “informed of his right to be heard in his own defense,” and did
give a statement (Doc. No. 4-2 at PageID# 61). These alleged facts are sufficient to
satisfy constitutional due process. See Shoemaker v. City of Howell, 795 F.3d 553, 560
(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950)) (“To satisfy due process under the Constitution, the notice must be

‘reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,’ and
‘must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.’”).
Further, although Plaintiff cites the ODRC policy in his Complaint, alleged
violations of those rules may not be challenged under Section 1983. See Shine-Johnson v.

Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-3236, 2023 WL 3881754, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8372816 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2023) (“a
§ 1983 claim cannot be based on a violation of state law or [ODRC] policy”); see also
Percy v. Jabe, 823 F. Supp. 445, 447 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (“Violations of state statutory
time limits without more do not violate a prisoner’s federal constitutional rights.”).

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ investigation of the
charge against him and their handling of his grievances, he fails to state a claim. “[A]
prison official’s failure to respond to a prisoner’s letter or grievance does not state a
constitutional claim” because “[a] prisoner does not have a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest in an inmate grievance procedure.” Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d
743, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2009); accord Willis v. ODRC, Director, No. 1:22-cv-264, 2022

WL 2063739, at *5 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2022). Plaintiff therefore has not stated, and
cannot state, a Fourteenth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.
For all these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Count One be
DISMISSED with prejudice.
B. Count Two: Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff sues Defendants Snyder and Triplett for malicious prosecution based on
Snyder’s Conduct Report that his TV was on.2 (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 56-57). Plaintiff
alleges that Snyder conspired to produce a deliberately false and misleading conduct
report and failed to investigate whether another inmate accidentally turned on

2 Malicious prosecution claims in federal court typically arise under the Fourth Amendment. See
King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 582-283 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[I]ndividuals have a clearly
established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution by a defendant who
has ‘made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff’ by, for example,
‘knowingly or recklessly’ making false statements that are material to the prosecution either in
reports or in affidavits filed to secure warrants.”). Although Plaintiff also labels his allegations
against Snyder and Triplett as a cruel and unusual punishment claim and a procedural due
process claim (ECF No. 4 at PageID 56-57), he fails to state these additional claims against
Snyder and Triplett for the same reasons he failed to state them against Love in Count One.
Plaintiff’s TV. Plaintiff further alleges that Triplett found Plaintiff’s TV on during the
12:00 a.m. count and ordered him to turn it off. (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 50).

One “element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is
termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” King v. Harwood,
852 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484
(1994)). Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff can assert a malicious prosecution claim in the
context of prison disciplinary proceedings, he has not pled (and cannot plead) that the
disciplinary proceeding was “resolved in [his] favor.” (Cf. ECF No. 4-2 at PageID# 61).

Although Plaintiff blames others for that result, his argument does not change the fact
that Plaintiff was found guilty of the conduct violation. Because that fact is fatal to
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Count
Two be DISMISSED with prejudice.
C. Counts Three and Four: Failure to Provide Adequate Notice and to
Record the Disciplinary Proceeding
In Count Three, Plaintiff sues Defendants Snyder and Triplett for failing to
provide him with a copy of the December 18, 2025, conduct report. (ECF No. 4, at 57).

In Count Four, Plaintiff sues Defendant Love for failing to record the hearing on that
conduct report. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that these Defendants violated Ohio law, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.). None of these assertions state a
claim on which relief may be granted.
As noted above, Plaintiff cannot sue under Section 1983 to seek a remedy for

alleged violations of state laws or prison policies. See Shine-Johnson v. Chambers-
Smith, No. 2:22-cv-3236, 2023 WL 3881754, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8372816 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2023) (“a § 1983

claim cannot be based on a violation of state law or [ODRC] policy”). Therefore,
Defendants’ alleged violations of prison policies requiring them to provide the conduct
report and record the conduct hearing do not state a federal claim for relief.
Next, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Sixth Amendment because it does
not apply here. See Wood v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:24-CV-165, 2025 WL 3122830, at
*15 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2025) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal

prosecutions, not to prison disciplinary proceedings”) (citing cases).
Finally, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected
liberty or property interest sufficient to state a procedural due process claim.
For all these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Counts Three and
Four be DISMISSED with prejudice.

D. Counts Five and Six: Failure to Train or Hire Competent Employees
In Counts Five and Six, Plaintiff sues ODRC Director Annette Chambers-Smith
and NCI Warden Jay Forshey for failing to train and/or hire competent employees. (ECF
No. 4, at PageID# 57-58). Plaintiff’s allegations are primarily legal conclusions without a
factual basis. The only factual allegation in the Complaint against Defendant Forshey is

that he “is the Warden of [NCI], he is legally responsible for the operation of [NCI] and
the welfare of all inmates of the institution.” (ECF No. 4 at PageID# 49). With respect to
Defendant Chambers-Smith, Plaintiff alleges only that she “is the director of the ODRC
and is in charge of all ODRC employees.” (Id.).
Thus, Plaintiff seeks to hold these Defendants liable solely because of their
positions, not because they allegedly played a role in the incidents challenged in the

Complaint. Such claims are not legally viable. As this Court explained in another case:
Plaintiff names ODRC Director Annette Chambers-Smith as a defendant.
But he provides no facts to support—or even describe—his claims against
her. The only mention of the Director in the body of the Complaint is in the
form of a legal conclusion, as follows: “Director Annette Chamber-Smith is
directly in violation of failure to train and supervise & superior respondeat
of the 1st, 4th, 5th, & 14th Amendment.” (Complaint, PageID 110).
This brief allegation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, a claim consisting only of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff, even one
proceeding pro se, must plead sufficient facts to show how each defendant
allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights. Reid v. City of Detroit, No. 18-13681,
2020 WL 5902597, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2020) (quoting Lanman v.
Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Second, “a supervisor cannot be held liable simply because he or she was
charged with overseeing a subordinate who violated the constitutional
rights of another.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir.
2016) (citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir.
2006)). For such a claim to proceed, “a plaintiff must show that a
supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending
subordinate.” Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 761 (6th Cir.
2021) (quoting Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir.
2020)) (cleaned up). Plaintiff does not allege any facts in the Complaint
that satisfy this requirement.
Third, it is well-settled that “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable
for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hinton v. Skipper, No. 1:21-cv-
480, 2021 WL 4859744, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2021) (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009)).
“Rather, individuals sued in their personal capacity under § 1983 are liable
only for their own unconstitutional behavior.” Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F. Supp.
3d 823, 833 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2020) (citing Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F.
App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011)). There are no allegations here of any
allegedly unconstitutional behavior by the Director. Plaintiff’s listing of
claims against the Director, without providing any facts to support those
claims, are insufficient to state plausible claims against her.
Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 2555446, at *18 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 17, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6065130 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 18, 2023). The Court’s reasoning in Johnson applies equally here. The undersigned
therefore RECOMMENDS that Counts Five and Six be DISMISSED without prejudice.
E. Count Seven: Retaliation/Grievance Procedure
In Count Seven, Plaintiff sues Defendants Love and Cobb for allegedly trying to
thwart him “from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation.” (ECF No. 4, at PageID# 58). The undersigned

concludes that Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The First Amendment prohibits government officials “from subjecting an
individual to retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett,
587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). To
plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that conduct; and (3) there was a causal connection between
elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in
part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). At this early stage of the
litigation, the Court considers only whether Plaintiff has plausibly pled allegations that
can satisfy this prima facie standard of a retaliation claim. Walker v. Baker, No. 23-1232,
2023 WL 6380124, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 25579, at *6-9 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2023).

At this juncture in the proceedings, without the benefit of discovery or briefing by
the parties to this action, the undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes that Plaintiff may
PROCEED with his claims in Count Seven for First Amendment retaliation against
Defendants Love and Cobb. The undersigned emphasizes that the Court has not made any
determination as to the merits of this claim or any defenses that Defendants may assert.
Further, as discussed in the next section, Count Seven shall proceed against Defendants

Love and Cobb solely in their individual capacities.
F. Monetary Damages against Defendants Love and Cobb
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants Love and Cobb. (ECF No. 4 at
PageID# 58-59). As explained below, because Plaintiff is legally barred from recovering
damages from Defendants Love and Cobb in their official capacities, the Court should

limit Plaintiff to seeking damages from these Defendants in their individual capacities.
A claim against an individual defendant in his or her official capacity is in essence
a claim against the entity that employs him. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-
66 (1985) (“Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast,

‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent’”) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Defendants Love and Cobb are employees or agents of the ODRC, an arm of
the State of Ohio. (See Complaint, Doc. No. 4 at PageID# 49.) See also Tolliver v.
Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4566, 2023 WL 6622251, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7926522 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 16, 2023)

(quoting Jones v. Swank, No. 2:11-cv-797, 2012 WL 4107981, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19,
2012) (“The ODRC is an arm of the State of Ohio”); Conant v. Freeman, No. 2:23-cv-
1148, 2026 WL 806761, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2026) (so concluding with respect to
“Noble Correctional Institution (NCI) Corrections Officers” sued under Section 1983).
Claims against Defendants Love and Cobb in their official capacities, then, are
claims against the State of Ohio, which is immune. Put another way:

The Eleventh Amendment3 bars suits for damages against states in federal
court. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (citation omitted).
While states are free to waive that immunity, the State of Ohio has not, as a
general matter, done so. See Johns v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 526
(6th Cir. 1985). Official-capacity claims against a given defendant under §
1983 actually run against that defendant’s employer. Colvin v. Caruso, 605
F.3d 282, 289 (2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th
Cir. 2009) (“[A]n official-capacity suit against a state official is deemed to
be a suit against the state and is thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
absent a waiver.”)). Here, the State of Ohio employs the [Defendant
corrections officers]. So the Eleventh Amendment bars [the plaintiff’s]
official-capacity claims.
Conant, 2026 WL 806761, at *3. Thus, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that claims
against Defendants Love and Cobb in their official capacities be DISMISSED with
prejudice, and that Count Seven PROCEED against them in their individual capacities.

3 The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “The judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, for the reasons set forth above, the undersigned Magistrate Judge allows

one claim to proceed and recommends that the remaining claims be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff may proceed with the development of his First Amendment retaliation
claims in Count Seven against Defendants Love and Cobb in their individual
capacities.

2. The Clerk shall send two blank summons and U.S. Marshal forms to Plaintiff to
complete for service on Defendants Love and Cobb.
3. Plaintiff shall, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, submit completed
summons and U.S. Marshal forms for Defendants Love and Cobb to the Clerk of
Court. Once the Clerk receives the requested forms, the Court will order service of

process and the Complaint by the United States Marshal Service. Plaintiff is
ADVISED that failure to comply with this Order may result in the dismissal
of this action for want of prosecution.
4. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may
occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.

IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts One, Two, Three and Four be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
2. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts Five and Six be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any Order
adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.

Date: September 1, 2026 /s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court
on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11433096. Public record. Not legal advice.