# HAMLIN

> District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania · September 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432964

## Case

- **Full name:** Serena Hamlin v. Arcosa, Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SERENA HAMLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 2:25-cv-01801
v. )
) Chief Judge Cathy Bissoon
ARCOSA, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. MEMORANDUM
For the reasons that follow, costs and attorney fees will be awarded to Defendants
McConway & Torley and William DelTondo (together, the “M&T Defendants”) in the amount
of $15,014.19, and to Defendant Arcosa, Inc. (“Arcosa”) in the amount of $6,473.50.
A. Relevant Background
Upon Plaintiff failing to appear for her June 22, 2026 deposition, M&T Defendants filed
a Rule 37(d) Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 36). Arcosa filed a combined Motion to Join M&T
Defendants’ Rule 37(d) Motion for Sanctions and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
(Doc. 38) the following day. After Plaintiff responded to the motions and the Court conducted a
hearing on July 13 and 17, the Court granted Defendants’ motions, in part, to the extent that they
sought from Plaintiff (1) attorney fees and other costs incurred in connection with Defendants’
appearance at the June 22 deposition, (2) the court reporter’s wasted appearance fee and (3) fees
associated with the sanction motions. See July 6 Order (ECF No. 39); July 13 Order (ECF
No. 43); July 17 Order (ECF No. 47). To determine the sanction award amounts, the Court
ordered Defendants to file adequately-supported petitions identifying qualifying fees and costs.
M&T Defendants’ Petition for Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. 49) (the “M&T
Petition”) and Arcosa’s Petition for Attorney Fees (Doc. 48) (the “Arcosa Petition”), along with
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 51), followed.
The M&T Petition, accompanied by the Declaration of Katerina P. Vassil attaching
invoices from the law firm Babst, Calland, Clements & Zomnir, P.C (“Babst Calland”) and
Quality Court Reporting, seeks a $17,902.12 sanctions award. M&T Pet. (Doc. 49) ¶¶ 13-15;

Vassil Decl. (Doc. 49-2) ¶ 3. The Arcosa Petition seeks an additional $8,107.00 award,
supported by the Declaration of Terri Imbarlina Patak, which attached invoices from the firm of
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. (“Ogletree Deakins”) to Arcosa. Arcosa Pet.
(Doc. 48) ¶ 5; Patak Decl. (Doc. 48-1) ¶ 3. Plaintiff objected to $10,418.12 of Defendants’
cumulative request, also asking the Court to reduce the final award amount by an across-the-
board percentage “to account for block billing, the volume of intra-firm communications, client
reporting[] and the rates Defendants have not supported . . . .” Resp. (Doc. 51) at 12-13.
B. Hourly Rates of Defendants’ Attorneys
The invoices attached to the Vassil Declaration show that the Babst Calland attorneys—
including Vassil, Stephen Antonelli and Janet Meub—bill at hourly rates ranging from $270.00
to $465.00.1 Patak’s hourly rate in the Ogletree Deakins invoices was $605.00. With regard to

attorney experience, Patak has been admitted to the Pennsylvania bar for over 30 years, Antonelli
and Meub both for over 20 years, and Vassil for approximately 22 months.2

1 Antonelli bills at $465.00 per hour, Meub bills at $425.00 per hour and Vassil bills at $270.00
per hour.
2 To determine years of experience, the Court took judicial notice of each attorney’s “Public
Information” page published by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at
the following webpages: https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/for-the-public/find-
attorney/attorney-detail/65610 (for Patak); https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/for-the-
public/find-attorney/attorney-detail/202133 (for Antonelli);
https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/for-the-public/find-attorney/attorney-detail/88724 (for
Meub); https://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/for-the-public/find-attorney/attorney-detail/335989
(for Vassil). See Feingold v. Graff, 516 F. App’x 223, 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the
“A party seeking attorney fees bears the ultimate burden of showing that its requested
hourly rates . . . are reasonable.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694,
703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1117, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990)). Babst
Calland made a prima facie showing that its rates were reasonable by representing that they were
“commensurate with hourly rates of attorneys with similar experience specializing in the areas of

labor and employment law in the relevant market.” Vassil Decl. ¶ 4. The same representation is
also stated in the Arcosa Petition concerning Patak’s rate. Arcosa Pet. ¶ 4. Given the relative
experience of the attorneys at issue, the Court considers the rates utilized in the invoices to be
reasonable. Therefore, and because Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence contrary to the
representations by Defendants’ counsels, the Court generally will not disturb the reasonable rates
appearing in the submitted invoices.3 See Washington v. Phila. Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89
F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Where, as here . . . the opposing party has not produced
contradictory evidence, the district court may not exercise its discretion to adjust the requested
rate downward.”).
C. Arcosa’s Unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute

Plaintiff objects to Arcosa receiving attorney fees in connection with Arcosa’s
unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Resp. at 5-6. The Court agrees with
Plaintiff that, given the Motion to Dismiss’s failure, time spent on it was irrelevant and
unnecessary to Arcosa’s successful Motion to Join M&T Defendants’ Rule 37(d) Motion for
Sanctions and, therefore, not now recoverable. Accordingly, the Court will not award sanctions

District Court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of an attorney’s disciplinary
history available on the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in connection
with a motion to dismiss).
3 Although the hourly rates reflected in the invoices are reasonable, the Court still will exercise
its discretion to reduce Meub’s hourly rate for certain tasks as is discussed in section I.E, infra.
for time that was spent preparing or otherwise litigating Arcosa’s Motion to Dismiss and, to the
extent that Patak’s invoice time entries did not distinguish between the Motion to Join and the
Motion to Dismiss, only half the time for those block-billed entries will be awarded. See Pub.
Int. Rsch. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The district court
should review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out were reasonably expended for

each of the particular purposes described and then exclude those that are ‘excessive, redundant[]
or otherwise unnecessary.’” (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983))). The
below Ogletree Deakins time entries are impacted:
Hours
Date Timekeeper Description
Claimed Awarded
Strategize regarding motion for sanctions
6/30/26 Patak 0.50 0.25
and/or failure to prosecute.
Draft motion to join motion for sanctions and
7/1/26 Patak 2.50 1.25
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
Communicate with Josh Ward regarding
7/6/26 Patak 0.40 0.00
Motion to Dismiss Arcosa.
Strategize with co-counsel regarding motion
7/6/26 Patak 0.20 0.10
for sanctions and Motion to Dismiss Arcosa.
Review and analyze Plaintiff’s Omnibus
7/10/26 Patak Response to Defendants’ Motion for 1.00 0.50
Sanctions and Motion to Dismiss.

D. Duplicative Hearing Attendance
Two attorneys—Antonelli and Vassil—appeared on behalf of M&T Defendants at each
day of the sanctions hearing. Plaintiff now objects to M&T Defendants’ recovery of fees for
Vassil’s time spent preparing and attending the sanctions hearing, arguing that Vassil and
Antonelli’s efforts were redundant. Resp. at 9-10. Having reviewed the challenged time entries,
the Court agrees that Antonelli and Vassil’s preparation and hearing attendance efforts were not
adequately distinguished to warrant recovery of both attorneys’ fees—especially given
Antonelli’s more than two decades of experience.4
Because Antonelli and Vassil’s preparation and appearances at the sanctions hearing were
unreasonably duplicative, the sanctions award will not include Vasil’s duplicative entries. The
below time entries will be adjusted:

Hours
Date Timekeeper Description
Claimed Awarded
Review motions for sanctions and billing
7/10/26 Vassil records in preparation for upcoming 0.40 0.00
sanctions hearing.
Review motions for sanctions,
7/12/26 Vassil correspondence, and case information in 1.20 0.00
preparation for sanctions hearing.
Attend hearing on pending motions for
7/13/26 Vassil 2.00 0.00
sanctions, including travel to and from court.
7/16/26 Vassil Prepare documents for sanctions hearing. 0.20 0.00
Prepare and review documents for sanctions
7/17/26 Vassil 0.30 0.00
hearing.
Travel to and from and attend sanctions
7/17/26 Vassil 2.20 0.00
hearing.

Notwithstanding the above adjustments, there is no basis for applying an overarching
“percentage reduction” to Antonelli’s hearing preparation fees, as Plaintiff suggests.
E. Preparation of M&T Defendants’ Rule 37(d) Sanctions Motion
Plaintiff asserts that Babst Calland’s total 18.4 hours spent preparing M&T Defendants’
Rule 37(d) Motion are unreasonable and should be reduced for the purposes of the sanctions

4 For the portion of the sanctions hearing held on July 13, Antonelli’s one hour to “[p]repare for
hearing on sanctions motion” cannot be differentiated from Vassil’s 24 minutes “[r]eview[ing]
motions for sanctions and billing records in preparation for upcoming sanctions hearing” and 72
minutes “review[ing] motions for sanctions, correspondence, and case information in preparation
for sanctions hearing.” Vassil Decl. Ex. 1 at 12-13. Similarly, for the July 17 appearance, the
Court has no basis to distinguish Antonelli’s half-hour spent “[p]repar[ing] for continued hearing
on sanctions motion” from Vassil’s 12 minutes “prepar[ing] documents for sanctions hearing”
and 18 minutes “[p]repar[ing] and review[ing] documents for sanctions hearing.” Id. at 13.
Having presided over the sanctions hearing, the undersigned also observed no indicia that these
two attorneys’ roles were compartmentalized or otherwise not redundant.
award. Resp. at 8. The Court’s review of the implicated time entries revealed problematically
redundant efforts amongst the Babst Calland attorneys.5 In particular, the billing records reveal
overlap in “review” efforts by Meub and Antonelli. Given each of these attorneys’ extensive
experience, “it would not have been unreasonable to expect” one of them to prepare the motion
“alone or with the help of an associate.” Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2001).

Consistent with the guidance of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in such situations,
although Antonelli’s drafting and review fees will be awarded in full, the Court will reduce
Meub’s rate to be commensurate with Vassil’s associate rate for the motion’s preparation. See
Evans v. Port Auth., 273 F.3d 346, 362 (3d Cir. 2001) (“For those tasks where it is abundantly
clear that the time of two attorneys was reasonably required, we have suggested that ‘awarding
fees for one partner’s time multiplied by an associate’s rate may be justifiable.’” (quoting Lanni,
259 F.3d at 151)). The following four time entries are impacted:
Awarded
Date Timekeeper Description Hours
Rate
Prepare Motion for Rule 37(d) Sanctions and
6/26/26 Meub 5.30 $270.00
Order of Court.
Research available sanctions for party’s
6/26/26 Meub failure to attend deposition to include in 1.00 $270.00
Motion for Sanctions
Review additional drafts of motion for
6/29/26 Meub sanctions to confirm conversations with 0.70 $270.00
plaintiff’s counsel.
Review e-mails for communications with
plaintiff’s counsel that we may want to
6/29/26 Meub 0.70 $270.00
attach to motion for sanctions and forward to
K. Vassil.

5 For example, Meub spent 5.30 hours on June 26 “[p]repar[ing] [the] Motion for Rule 37(d)
Sanctions and Order of Court” but then, on June 28, Antonelli spent an additional 1.3 hours
“[r]eview[ing] and revis[ing] [the] draft motion” and Vassil spent an additional 3.70 hours the
next day “[r]eview[ing] and revis[ing] [the] motion for sanctions.” Vassil Decl. Ex. 1 at 7.
Vassil yet again returned to the document on June 30 to “[r]evise, finalize[] and file motion for
sanctions.” Id. at 8.
F. Other Specific Objections
Plaintiff challenges time spent by Patak for “follow up strategy” tasks and
“[c]oordinat[ing] strategy for next steps” with M&T Defendants’ counsel. Resp. at 4-6. These
fees are directly attributable to Plaintiff’s actions, i.e., Plaintiff’s nonappearance for her
deposition and the subsequent need to prepare the sanctions motion. Plaintiff’s argument that
Arcosa should not be compensated for these reasonable fees, therefore, is not well taken. The
Court nevertheless agrees with Plaintiff that time expended “[s]trategiz[ing] regarding next steps
in light of counsel termination” arises from circumstances other than Plaintiff’s failure to appear
for her deposition and fees will not be awarded for the 12 minutes Patak incurred on that task.

See Patak Decl. Ex. A (Doc. 48-2) at 4.
Plaintiff argues that the 6.6 hours billed by M&T Defendants’ counsel in connection with
the preparation of the M&T Petition were unreasonable. Resp. at 10-11. Having carefully
reviewed the individual time entries associated with the M&T Petition’s preparation, which
included time spent collecting and redacting the invoice exhibits, drafting the petition and
internal conferral, see Vassil Decl. Ex. 1 at 13-14, the Court is convinced that these fees were
reasonable and otherwise compensable as billed.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants should not be permitted to recover fees incurred to
reschedule court-ordered mediation in this case. Resp. 6-7. The Court disagrees. Mediation in
this case was originally ordered to occur on or before June 10, 2026. See Mar. 20 Order (ECF

No. 23). The parties agreed that Defendants would have an opportunity to depose Plaintiff
before mediation. See Joint Mot. to Extend (Doc. 28) ¶¶ 6. Indeed, the Court permitted
extension of the mediation deadline to accommodate Plaintiff’s June 22 deposition. See id. ¶¶ 7,
10; June 11 Order (ECF No. 30). After Plaintiff failed to appear at the June 22 deposition, the
parties were, again, required to arrange a new mediation date. See Joint Mot. to Extend
(Doc. 52) ¶¶ 5-10. Because it was Plaintiff’s failure to be deposed that caused this otherwise-
unnecessary expenditure of fees by Defendants—including communications with clients, whose
attendance at the mediation was mandatory—these reasonable fees will be included in the
Court’s sanction award.

G. Costs
Plaintiff objects to M&T Defendants’ attempt to recoup a $65.72 Westlaw charge that
Vassil claims was necessary for legal research in support of M&T Defendants’ Rule 37(d)
Motion. Resp. at 8; Vassil Decl. ¶ 3; Vassil Decl. Ex. 1 at 8. Notwithstanding that this Westlaw
charge appears on Babst Calland’s contemporaneous client invoice, Plaintiff posits, without
evidentiary support, that such research charges are “ordinarily treated as overhead subsumed
within the hourly rate.” Resp. at 8. Bordering on non sequitur, Plaintiff also speculates that,
despite M&T Defendant’s representation that the Westlaw charge was incurred in connection
with the Rule 37(d) Motion, it was not “caused by” Plaintiff’s failure to appear and is therefore
not compensable. Id. Plaintiff’s unsupported speculation about this reasonable cost is

inadequate to disqualify it.
The Court also disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the court reporter’s $15.40
original transcript fee should be excluded from the sanction award. Resp. at 8; see also Vassil
Decl. Ex. 2 (Doc. 49-4). Under the circumstances, the Court has no reason to doubt that the
production of an original transcript was reasonable and necessary here—especially given the
possibility of disputes following the Rule 37(d) motion. Plaintiff shall reimburse M&T
Defendants for the Quality Court Reporting invoice in its full $196.97 amount.
H. Lodestar Calculation
Courts typically apply the lodestar method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees
awarded as discovery sanctions under Rule 37. See, e.g., Conexus Metals, LLC v. CRH Can.

Grp., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-01770, 2026 WL 1593208, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2026), report and
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1593184 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2026); Donaldson v.
Informatica Corp., No. 2:09-cv-00804, 2011 WL 3360200, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2011); Swain
v. Encore Med. Corp., No. 3:04-cv-00174, 2006 WL 3692593, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2006).
The lodestar formula “requires multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a
reasonable hourly rate.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted). Except as otherwise held above, counsels’ rates were reasonable and, upon
the Court’s line-by-line review of the invoices, the claimed time was reasonably expended. The
total lodestar for M&T Defendants’ fees is $14,751.50, calculated as follows:
Time (in hours) Hourly Rate Lodestar
Antonelli 16.4 $465.00 $7,626.00
Meub 1.9 $425.00 $807.50
Meub 7.7 $270.00 $2,079.00
Vassil 15.7 $270.00 $4,239.00

For Arcosa, the total lodestar is $6,473.50, accounting for the 10.7 hours that Patak reasonably
incurred at her $605.00 rate.
“A District Court has substantial discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable
rate and reasonable hours, but once the lodestar is determined, it is presumed to be the reasonable
fee.” Lanni, 259 F.3d at 149 (citing Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183). Beyond excluding unreasonably
expended time, which was already achieved by the Court’s adjustments in the proceeding
sections of this Memorandum, Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving that a further
percentage reduction of the lodestar is appropriate. Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (“The party seeking
adjustment has the burden of proving that an adjustment is necessary.”). Accordingly, the
lodestar will be awarded to each defendant, with M&T Defendants also awarded $262.69 in
costs.
II. ORDER

For the above reasons, M&T Defendants’ Petition For Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs (Doc. 49) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and Arcosa’s Petition for
Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 48) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is further
ORDERED that M&T Defendants be paid attorney fees and costs in the total amount of
$15,014.19 and Arcosa be paid attorney fees in the total amount of $6,473.50. Plaintiff shall
remit payment of the full awarded amounts within 90 days of the entry of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 1, 2026 s/Cathy Bissoon
Cathy Bissoon
Chief United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):
All Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432964. Public record. Not legal advice.