# Davison

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · September 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432890

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeremiah A. D. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432890

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEREMIAH A. D.1 )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Civil No. 25-cv-1792-RJD2
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final agency
decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in
2022, alleging a disability onset date of July 15, 2022. (Tr. 4). He alleged a variety of physical and
mental conditions, including depression, anxiety, and Meniere’s disease. (Tr. 248). Plaintiff failed
to prove disability at the initial and reconsideration levels and requested a hearing before an ALJ,
which was held in July 2024. (Tr. 4, 38). On August 30, 2024, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled,
and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, thereby making the ALJ’s decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 4–21, 27).

1 Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum and Order due to privacy concerns. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.
2 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). (Doc. 9).
Page 1 of 13
Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following issues:
1. Whether the ALJ’s assessment of the psychological consultative examiner’s
opinion violated 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c and the logical bridge requirement;

2. Whether the ALJ’s symptom evaluation violated SSR 16-3p; and

3. Whether the ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Assessment
Violated SSR 96-8p.

Applicable Legal Standards

To qualify for DIB, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the applicable
statute.3 Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a).
To determine whether a plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions
in order: (1) Is the plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment?
(3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments enumerated
in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the
plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the plaintiff is
disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of disability. The

3 The statutes and regulations pertaining to DIB are found at 42 U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. The
statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. Pt. 416.
As is relevant to this case, the DIB and SSI statutes and regulations are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925
detailing medical considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB regulations.
Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.

Page 2 of 13
plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform
past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in
other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d
881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).
Importantly, the Court’s scope of review is limited. “The findings of the Commissioner of

Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must determine not whether Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the
relevant time but whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 139 S. Ct.
1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) (internal citations omitted).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into
consideration, but the Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of

credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d
507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court
does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th
Cir. 2010), as amended on reh'g in part (May 12, 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ

The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. The ALJ found that
Plaintiff had severe cervical degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy, psoriasis/psoriatic
arthritis, diabetes mellitus with peripheral neuropathy, obesity, Meniere’s disease, major
Page 3 of 13
depressive disorder without psychotic features, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder with
agoraphobia, and social anxiety disorder. (Tr. 7). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except he should
never climb ladders, ropes, of scaffolds, but he can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He should avoid concentrated
exposure to vibrations and hazards as they are defined in the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations (SCO) of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(DOT). He is further limited to working in no more than a class III moderate noise
environment. The claimant can understand, remember, and carry out detailed but
not complex tasks. He can deal with occasional interactions with the public,
coworkers, and supervisors.

(Tr. 11). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as a significant number
of jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform, at positions including marker,
garment sorter, and laundry classifier. (Tr. 20).
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in formulating this
Memorandum and Order. The following summary is directed to the points raised by Plaintiff.
Additional relevant records are also detailed in the Court’s discussion of the ALJ’s decision.
1. Plaintiff’s Agency Forms and Testimony
Plaintiff testified via video at a hearing before the ALJ on July 11, 2024. (Tr. 40-79).
Plaintiff is currently married and lives with his spouse in a rental home. (Id.; Tr. 11). He has a
driver’s license, but he rarely drives and only for short distances due to dizziness. (Id.). He has
health insurance. (Id.). He has not worked for two years due to complications with his physical
and mental health after an injury and a mental health episode requiring hospitalization (Id.).
Page 4 of 13
Plaintiff testified he is currently unable to work because of his Meniere’s disease that
causes him a “multitude of issues,” including daily dizziness that affects his ability to stand or be
on his feet for long periods. (Id.). He has good days and bad days. (Id.). On good days, he just has
a bit of stumbling, but for two to three days a week he struggles to get out of bed, and he will
stumble just getting to the bathroom. (Id.). If he falls, he has trouble getting back up. When he

experiences the “drop attacks,” he blacks out and loses all sense of balance. (Id.). These episodes
occur one to two times a month and can last from two hours to all day. (Id.). He said the vertigo
can get so bad he is unable to stand. He said his dizziness makes it hard for him to focus.
He reported doing “light housework,” such as cooking, dishes, or sweeping, three days a
week when he is able, but one day per week he cannot get out of bed beyond going to the bathroom.
(Tr. 63, 272). He testified that when he does those chores he “can spend 30 minutes and then take
an hour long break . . . to sit down and recover.” (Tr. 63). He “tri[es] to cook dinner as part of [his]
light housework, usually something simple,” four to five times a week, which takes him over an
hour even for simple meals. (Tr. 273). Further, on bad days, he needs help from his wife to bathe

and dress due to dizziness. (Tr. 272). Plaintiff testified that he drives “very rarely and short
distance,” because he is scared to drive due to his dizziness. (Tr. 50-51). In those rare cases, he
drives “a couple blocks down a back road to the grocery store.” (Id.). He testified that the farthest
he walked the year before the hearing was “maybe a quarter mile” to his local Dollar General to
get groceries. (Tr. 62). He added that once he arrived there, he had to take a ten-minute break
outside, do the shopping, and then walk back. (Id.).
Mentally, Plaintiff testified he struggles with depression that worsens his anxiety and
insomnia. (Tr. 11; 40-79). It can affect his sleep and focus. (Id.). He has constant ruminating

Page 5 of 13
thoughts, and his anxiety can get so bad that he fears leaving his home. (Id.). His focus and ability
to stay on task are affected by his anxiety. (Id.). He has issues interacting with others due to social
anxiety. (Id.).
He takes Effexor and Wellbutrin for his depression and Gabapentin for his anxiety and
neuropathy (Id.). He has a prescription for Valium that he takes when he is having a panic attack.

(Id.). He takes 800 milligrams of Ibuprofen for pain, and occasionally uses cannabis to help
manage his pain and anxiety. (Id.).
2. Medical Opinions
In June 2023, Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation with Ana A. Gil, M.D. (Tr. 772-77.)
Dr. Gil observed that Plaintiff’s affect was sad and restricted and his mood was moderately depressed.
(Tr. 774). Dr. Gil opined that Plaintiff had moderate to severe impairment in socially interacting with
others and in adapting to changes in his environment. (Tr. 776-77).
At the initial level in July 2023, non-examining State agency psychological consultant
Margaret DiFonso, Psy.D., opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in carrying out detailed
instructions, maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods, interacting appropriately
with the general public, and accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from
supervisors. (Tr. 87.) He was capable of simple as well as more than simple but not complex duties
with modified social demands. (Tr. 87.) Moderate social limitations were recommended. (Tr. 87.)
Reviewer Robert Vautrain, M.D. also opined in July 2023 that Plaintiff could lift 50 pounds

occasionally and 25 pounds frequently and could sit, stand, and walk for six hours out of the workday.
(Tr. 86.) At the reconsideration level in January 2024, Steven Fritz, Psy.D., affirmed Dr. Difonso’s
opinion. (Tr. 108.) Jennifer Western, M.D. affirmed Dr. Vautrain’s opinion. (Tr. 106.)

Page 6 of 13
Analysis
Plaintiff challenges several aspects of the ALJ’s decisions. Having reviewed the record,
the Court finds that remand is warranted at least as to the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s symptoms
related to dizziness and unbalance and the formulation of Plaintiff’s RFC on that ground.

Accordingly, the Court will not need to discuss the remaining grounds for reversal.
An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s reports regarding the “intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of” her subjective symptoms will not be disturbed unless it is “patently wrong,”
meaning that it “lacks any explanation or support.” Weber v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2990, 2021 WL
3671235, at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the
same time, when that assessment rests on “objective factors or fundamental implausibilities rather
than subjective considerations,” such as the demeanor of the claimant, the court has “greater
freedom to review” that assessment. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000), as
amended (Dec. 13, 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An ALJ must

“adequately explain” whether the claimant’s report of subjective symptoms is persuasive or not
and discuss “specific reasons supported by the record.” Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367 (7th
Cir. 2013); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016) (superseding SSR 96-7p). Although an
ALJ does not need “to address every piece of evidence,” some legitimate reason must be articulated
to establish an “accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] conclusion.” Clifford, 227
F.3d at 872 (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ found:
The claimant testified that currently he is unable to work due to significant dizziness
and balance issues caused by his Meniere’s disease. He said he has several days a
Page 7 of 13
week that are so bad he is unable to move and that he has “drop down” episodes 1-
2 times a month where he blacks out and falls over (Hearing Testimony). However,
the claimant does not relate this level of extreme limitation to his own treating
physicians and has not presented with any sequelae of falls. He reports increasing
dizziness in October 2023 and was prescribed Meclizine and referred to an ENT,
who apparently put the claimant on a diuretic he was unable to continue taking.
Despite suggesting that stopping the diuretic increased his dizziness, he never
followed up with his ENT, strongly suggesting the symptoms were not as severe as
alleged, and he never mentions his dizziness being so bad he is incapable of
functioning or is blacking out (See Exs. 20F; 21F). Moreover, the claimant suggests
this dizziness occurs daily, but he is still able to cook and complete household
chores. He is able to walk to the Dollar General and sometimes drive (Hearing
Testimony). He informed Dr. Gil in June 2023 that he spent much of his time on
the computer playing video games and talking with friends (Ex. 9F). Dr. Feinerman
does not observe any balance issues on examination, and the claimant’s own
medical sources, including the neurologist, have not observed balance issues. His
gait was normal at his May 2024 neurology consultation (Ex. 20F). The
undersigned acknowledges the positive finding on Rinne Testing at the claimant’s
consultative examination, and his diagnosis for Meniere’s, and has limited the
claimant’s exposure to ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, his postural activity, including
balance, and his exposure to hazards as a precautionary measure against his
complaints of dizziness.

However, greater limitation is not supported by the objective evidence, which fails
to back up the claimant’s extreme subjective complaints, and greater limitation is
not consistent with his demonstrated ability to engage in a wide variety of daily
activities.

(Tr. 17-18). Accordingly, the ALJ relied on the following evidence to assess Plaintiff’s subjective
reports related to Meniere’s disease: (a) lack of support by the medical records as to the severe
reported impairments; (b) failure to comply with treatment or follow up with his ENT; (c)
inconsistency with ability to engage in wide variety of daily activites; and (d) lack of objective
medical evidence. The Court finds that the ALJ misrepresented the record on many of those
categories, and that the compound effect of those misrepresentations warrants remand.
First, the ALJ was only partially correct in his conclusion that Plaintiff did not relay to his
providers the reported severe impairments associated with Meniere’s disease, dizziness, and
Page 8 of 13
balance issues. It is true that Plaintiff’s medical records do not show “drop down” episodes one to
two times a month with blackouts and falls. However, a fair review of the record shows that
Plaintiff's testimony as to daily dizziness with need to lie down does not conflict with his reports
to his providers. The ALJ failed to acknowledge Plaintiff’s reports to his provider in October 2023
that he was having dizziness almost daily, for which he needed to lie down, and that he sometimes

took Dramamine for motion sickness. (Compare Tr. 16, with Tr. 810). Likewise, while the ALJ
referenced Plaintiff’s complaints of dizzy episodes in April 2024 that returned two years ago, he
omitted Plaintiff’s specific reports of “often aural fullness with dizzy episodes on his right ear” as
well as spinning vertigo. (Compare Tr. 16, with Tr. 731, emphasis added). This is important
because, while an ALJ does not need to mention every piece of evidence, he also “cannot simply
cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a
disability finding.” Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Myles v. Astrue,
582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009)).
The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s reports in June 2024 of increased dizziness and

imbalance that made it hard for him to stand, drive, or function. (Tr. 965, 980). He also noted that
Plaintiff was thereafter referred to an ENT who put the claimant on a diuretic to address his
dizziness. (Tr. 16). Yet, the ALJ completely discredited that evidence because thereafter Plaintiff
discontinued the diuretic due to nausea and vomiting but failed to follow up with his ENT despite
reporting intensified dizziness without the medication. He concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to
follow up “strongly suggest[ed] the symptoms were not as severe as alleged.” (Tr. 16). This is
speculative and even more problematic as the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly cautioned against
drawing any inferences as to a claimant’s symptoms from a lack of care unless the ALJ explores

Page 9 of 13
the claimant’s explanations. See Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); White ex rel.
Smith v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Speculation is, of course, no substitute for
evidence, and a decision based on speculation is not supported by substantial evidence”).
Here, as Plaintiff correctly points out, the record shows that due to his mental health issues,
he struggled to call back and reschedule medical appointments and that, in the past, he had

struggled with the motivation to follow up with his providers. (Tr. 66). The record shows that in
2022, he reported that leaving home made him very anxious, and he was out of medications for
four days as he felt unable to call for refills. (Tr. 595). Further, in January 2023, Plaintiff reported
not returning to his counselor as he had trouble with his finances and transportation. (Tr. 837). Yet,
the ALJ did not consider those reasons when he concluded that Plaintiff’s failure to follow up with
his ENT “strongly suggest[ed the] symptoms were not as severe as alleged.” This not only goes
against the Seventh Circuit’s established precedent but also contravenes the agency’s regulations.
See SSR 16-3p (directing SSA to not find a claimant’s symptoms inconsistent with the record
without considering possible reasons for treatment noncompliance, and requiring the SSA to

“consider and address reasons for not pursuing treatment that are pertinent to an individual’s case”
and “explain how [it] considered the individual’s reasons in evaluation of the individual's
symptoms).
The Commisioner counters that any such error was harmless because the ALJ also relied
on other forms of evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s reported symptoms. (Doc. 21, p. 21, n.4, citing
Kittelson v. Astrue, 362 F. App'x 553, 558 (7th Cir. 2010); Nicholson v. Astrue, 341 F. App’x 248,
252 (7th Cir. 2009)). While this is correct, as already indicated and will be further detailed below,
the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s Meniere’s disease-related symptoms contained several errors

Page 10 of 13
that, in combination, deprived the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s reports of dizziness and
unbalance of an adequate explanation or support.
The ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s reported daily activities to discredit his reports as to
the severity of his dizziness is also erroneous in that the ALJ failed to assess the qualifications of
Plaintiff’s daily activities. “An ALJ cannot disregard a claimant’s limitations in performing

household activities.” Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Craft, 539 F.3d at
680; Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Here, the ALJ noted that despite Plaintiff’s reports of daily dizziness, he is “still able to
cook and complete household chores,”[h]e is able to walk to the Dollar General and sometimes
drive,” and “in June 2023 that he spent much of his time on the computer playing video games and
talking with friends.” (Tr. 17). But Plaintiff stated that he did “light housework,” such as cooking,
dishes, or sweeping, three days a week when he had the ability, but one day per week he could not
get out of bed beyond going to the bathroom. (Tr. 63, 272). He testified that when he does those
chores he “can spend 30 minutes and then take an hour long break . . . to sit down and recover.”

(Tr. 63). He “tri[es] to cook dinner as part of [his] light housework, usually something simple,”
four to five times a week, which takes him over an hour even for simple meals. (Tr. 273). Further,
on bad days, he needed help from his wife to bathe and dress due to dizziness. (Tr. 272). Plaintiff
testified that he drives “very rarely and short distance,” because he is scared to drive due to his
dizziness. (Tr. 50-51). In those rare cases, he drives “a couple blocks down a back road to the
grocery store.” He testified that the farthest he walked within a year from the hearing was “maybe
a quarter mile” to his local Dollar General to get groceries. (Tr. 62). He added that once he arrived
there, he had to take a ten-minute break outside, do the shopping, and then walk back. (Id.).

Page 11 of 13
Likewise, Plaintiff reported that he “has a few close friends whom he talks with on the computer,”
that he “sits at the computer most of his days, [h]e listens to some music,” and “[h]e’ll play video
games.” (Tr. 774). This again is materially different from the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff “spent
much of his time on the computer playing video games and talking with friends.” (Tr. 16).
Overall, the ALJ materially mischaracterized Plaintiff’s daily activities. Taking into

account the reported qualifications, those activities are not necessarily inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
reports of daily dizziness: Plaintiff never reported constant dizziness throughout the day. He
explained that he has good and bad days, with his symptoms on the good days being limited “to a
bit of stumbling.” (Tr. 12). Likewise, the ALJ did not explain why sitting at his computer was
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s dizziness-related symptoms on his good days. See Bauer v. Astrue,
532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that ALJs need to assess evidence of periods of good
and poor functionality); Danniel W. B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 4290771, at *8 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2021) (“Once again, the ALJ has improperly focused on the records that reflect Plaintiff’s
good days”).

Contrary to the Commissioner’s assertion, this is not a harmless error. Based on the above
discussion, the only possible articulation left to support the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
dizziness-related symptoms was the lack of objective findings. Yet, the fact that the medical
providers did not observe unbalance or observed normal gait during their examinations is not
inherently inconsistent with Plaintiff’s report of his more limited symptoms during good days.
Further, the ALJ emphasized his consideration of Plaintiff’s “ability to engage in a wide variety
of daily activities” in formulating his RFC and rejecting the need for “greater limitations” relating
to Plaintiff’s dizziness. (Tr. 17; see also Tr. 16, noting that [t]he claimant’s testimony and reports

Page 12 of 13
of daily activities do not clearly support a finding that his functioning is reduced below the
functional level indicated in the residual functional capacity.”). But as explained, the ALJ
materially mischaracterized and overstated those activities of daily living. The Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly criticized ALJs “for equating activities of daily living with an ability to engage in full-
time work.” Shumaker v. Colvin, 632 F. App'x 861, 866 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting relevant cases).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s reports regarding the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s reported dizziness and imbalance was
patently wrong, and that the ALJ failed to build an accurate and logical bridge between his findings
and the RFC formulation.
Because remand under those grounds is warranted, the Court does not need to reach
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. On remand, the ALJ should consider all arguments raised afresh,
taking into account the entire record.
Conclusion
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income is REVERSED and REMANDED to the
Commissioner for rehearing and consideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 1, 2026

Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 13 of 13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432890. Public record. Not legal advice.