# Cooley

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · September 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432783

## Case

- **Full name:** Freddie Williams v. Travis L. Cooley, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** September 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

FREDDIE WILLIAMS, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 26-3186
)
TRAVIS L. COOLEY, et al., )
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional
Center (“Western”), filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint, and through such
process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations
as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649
(7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels are insufficient, however. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff files suit against Lieutenant Travis Cooley, Sergeant Randall Hettinger,
Correctional Officers Henson and D. Flowers, Counselors Jared Pearce, Cole Logsdon, and E.
Shoopman, and John Does (Correctional Officers/Internal Affairs).
On December 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-12-24-5556 stating that five inmates,
including inmate Cody Parsons, were threatening him and falsely stating he was gay.
On December 7, 2024, Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with inmate Parsons.
Plaintiff was charged with “Assault to an Offender” and received fourteen days in segregation.
(Doc. 1 at p. 8). While Plaintiff was in segregation, Plaintiff alleges he spoke with Defendant
Pearce while he was making rounds in the restrictive housing unit. Plaintiff alleges he told

Defendant Pearce that five inmates, including inmate Parsons, had threatened to “kick [his] gay
ass.” Id. at p. 13. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Pearce did not take action and failed to protect him.
During the Adjustment Committee hearing on December 20, 2024, Plaintiff requested a
transfer or to be placed on “keep separate” status from inmate Parsons. Id. Defendant Cooley, the
Adjustment Committee Chairperson, allegedly told Plaintiff a “keep separate” would be done. Id.
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff informed Defendant Sergeant Hettinger that he was not
getting along with his new cellmate. Defendant Hettinger allegedly refused to move Plaintiff or
his cellmate and told Plaintiff: “Fuck or fight. I don’t care, but I’m not moving you to segregation.”
Id. at p. 15. Plaintiff states he walked to segregation for his own safety and received a disciplinary
ticket for refusing housing and disobeying a direct order.

On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-01-25-019 stating that Defendant
Pearce had ignored his concerns about the five inmates who threatened to harm him and failed to
forward his prior grievance (#K25-12-24-5556) to Internal Affairs.
On January 2, 2025, Defendant Counselor Shoopman responded to grievance #K25-01-25-
019 and stated that she spoke with Defendant John Doe #4, an Internal Affairs Officer, about
Plaintiff’s grievances. Defendant Shoopman concluded Plaintiff’s grievance was moot. Plaintiff
alleges two of the inmates who threatened him were moved, but three remained.
On or about July 17, 2025, Plaintiff learned from Defendant Counselor Logsdon that
grievance #K25-12-24-5556 was not received for second level review.
On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-07-25-2726 to inform staff that he was
housed near inmate Parsons, even though Defendant Cooley told Plaintiff they would be kept
separate. While Defendant Logsdon was making rounds in the R4 housing unit, Plaintiff alleges
he personally informed Defendant Logsdon that he was concerned about his safety because inmate

Parsons was housed on same wing, level, and side of the wall as Plaintiff. In response, Defendant
Logsdon told Plaintiff that there was not a “keep separate” in place. Id. at p. 14.
On August 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-08-25-3110 about being demoted from
a work program. Plaintiff states he spoke with Defendant Henson, who was the Placement Officer
at the time, during chow hall and informed her that he had not received a demotion, as the
Adjustment Committee was satisfied with Plaintiff completing fourteen days in segregation in
December 2024. Defendant Henson allegedly told Plaintiff to stop filing grievances against staff,
referring to grievance #K25-01-25-019.
Defendant Henson also allegedly told Plaintiff that Defendant Flowers was not requesting
him to return to work, due to a rumor that Plaintiff was gay. Defendant Henson allegedly stated:

“You know how staff feel about gays and pedophiles.” Id. at p. 17.
On August 20, 2025, Plaintiff was attacked by inmate Parsons, who had an unidentified
object in his hand. Plaintiff suffered a head wound and was bleeding. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Correctional Officer John Doe #1, who was assigned to the walk in front of the R4 housing unit,
saw inmate Parsons attack Plaintiff.
When Defendant Correctional Officer John Doe #2 was informed that inmate Parsons had
attacked Plaintiff, Defendant John Doe #2 allegedly stated: “I don’t have time for this shit, go lock
up or receive[] a ticket.” Id. Plaintiff states John Doe #2 was assigned to the R4 housing unit during
the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift.
Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Correctional Officer John Doe #3 that he had been
attacked by inmate Parsons and needed medical care. Defendant John Doe #3 allegedly told
Plaintiff he would return after he was done with count, but Defendant John Doe #3 never returned.
Plaintiff states John Doe #3 was assigned to the R4 housing unit to conduct the institutional count

during the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift.
In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff also claims Defendants Correctional Officers John Does
#5 and #6 denied him medical care. Id. at p. 16.
ANALYSIS
Defendant Jared Pearce
Plaintiff alleges he was involved in physical altercations with inmate Parsons on December
7, 2024, and August 20, 2025.
Before the first altercation, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-12-24-5556 on December 6,
2024, complaining that five inmates, including inmate Parsons, were threatening to physically
harm him. Plaintiff claims Defendant Pearce failed to forward the grievance to Internal Affairs for

an investigation.
On December 7, 2024, Plaintiff was involved in a physical altercation with inmate Parsons
and placed in segregation. While in segregation, Plaintiff personally informed Defendant Pearce
that inmate Parsons had threatened to “kick [Plaintiff’s] gay ass.” (Doc. 1 at p. 13). Defendant
Pearce allegedly did not take action, and inmate Parsons attacked Plaintiff on August 20, 2025.
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifference
to “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S 825, 837 (1994).
The risk of harm to which the prisoner was subjected must be objectively serious. Sinn v. Lemmon,
911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). “[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single
source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of
attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 843. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.” Id. A plaintiff “normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing
that he complained to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Gevas v. McLaughlin,
798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Generalized, vague, or stale concerns about
one’s safety typically will not suffice. Id. at 480-81.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Pearce for allegedly failing to protect Plaintiff from inmate
Parsons on December 7, 2024, and August 20, 2025.
Defendant Travis Cooley
During an Adjustment Committee hearing on December 20, 2024, Plaintiff asked

Defendant Cooley for a “keep separate” from inmate Parsons. Defendant Cooley allegedly told
Plaintiff a “keep separate” would be done; however, Plaintiff was later housed near inmate Parsons
and attacked again on August 20, 2025. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient
to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Cooley for allegedly failing to
protect Plaintiff from being attacked by inmate Parsons on August 20, 2025.
Defendant Randell Hettinger
On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff told Defendant Hettinger that he was not getting along
with his new cellmate, but Defendant Hettinger refused to separate them. Plaintiff refused the
housing assignment and was placed in segregation. Plaintiff does not allege that he was physically
attacked by his new cellmate. The allegations regarding his new cellmate appear unrelated to his
physical altercations with inmate Parsons. Therefore, Defendant Hettinger is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
Defendants Shoopman and John Doe #4

On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed grievance #K25-01-25-019 stating that Defendant
Pearce had ignored his concerns about the five inmates who threatened him. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Counselor Shoopman responded to his grievance on January 2, 2025. In her response,
Defendant Shoopman stated she spoke with Defendant Internal Affairs Officer John Doe #4 about
Plaintiff’s grievance and concluded it was moot. Plaintiff contends the grievance was not moot
because only two of the inmates had been moved. Plaintiff does not specify if inmate Parsons had
been moved.
While Plaintiff is critical of how his grievance was handled, this is not enough to plead
personal liability under § 1983. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). “[T]he
alleged mishandling of [Plaintiff’s] grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or

participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Defendants
Shoopman and John Doe #4 are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
Defendant Cole Logsdon
On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff informed Defendant Logsdon that he was housed near inmate
Parsons and was concerned about his safety. Defendant Logsdon allegedly failed to take action
and told Plaintiff that there was no “keep separate” in place. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Cooley for
allegedly failing to protect Plaintiff from being attacked by inmate Parsons on August 20, 2025.
Defendants John Does #1, 2, 3, 5, and 6
Plaintiff alleges he suffered a head wound when inmate Parsons attacked him on August
20, 2025, but Defendants John Does #1, #2, #3, #5, and #6 did not provide him with medical care.
It is well established that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is actionable as

a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim
of deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834. To satisfy the objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical
condition is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Id. An objectively serious medical condition is one
that “has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even
a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Hayes, 546 F.3d at 522.
To satisfy the subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the prison official
acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The official must know
of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health; “the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. The prisoner must show that the defendant engaged in more
than negligence and that the defendant’s conduct approached intentional wrongdoing or criminal
recklessness. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant John Doe #1 witnessed the attack. When Defendant John Doe
#2 learned Plaintiff had been attacked and injured, he allegedly stated: “I don’t have time for this
shit, go lock up or receive[] a ticket.” (Doc. 1 at p. 17). When Plaintiff asked Defendant John Doe
#3 for medical care, Defendant said he would return after performing a security count but never
did. Plaintiff does not include any specific allegations about Defendants John Does #5 and #6 in
his Complaint.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendants John Does #1, #2, and #3 for

allegedly denying Plaintiff medical attention for his head wound after he was attacked by inmate
Parsons on August 20, 2025. Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants John Does #5 and #6 are
too sparse to establish how they were personally involved in allegedly denying him medical care.
Therefore, Defendants John Does #5 and #6 are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915A.
Defendants John Does #1, #2, and #3 cannot be served. As such, the Court sua sponte adds
Justin Maher, in his official capacity as the warden of Western, as a party to facilitate the
identification of Defendants John Does #1, #2, and #3. See Donald v. Cook Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 95
F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a court may allow the case to proceed to discovery
against a high-level official with the expectation that he will aid in identifying any Doe

Defendants). Plaintiff may propound written discovery requests upon the warden aimed solely
at identifying the Doe Defendants. After the Doe Defendants have been identified, the warden may
move to be dismissed. Ultimately, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to identify the Doe Defendants
and file a motion to substitute their real names. The failure to do so will result in the dismissal of
the Doe Defendants without prejudice.
Defendant Henson
Plaintiff alleges he was demoted from a work program. On an unspecified date, Plaintiff
questioned Defendant Placement Officer Henson about his demotion and informed her the
Adjustment Committee had not imposed a demotion in December 2024. Defendant Henson
allegedly advised Plaintiff to stop filing grievances and referenced grievance #K25-01-25-019,
which Plaintiff had filed against Defendant Pearce.
To establish First Amendment retaliation, Plaintiff must successfully allege that (1) his
speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech; and

(3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the Defendant’s action. Douglas v. Reeves, 964
F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020). Prisoners have a right to complain of prison conditions and may not
be retaliated against for exercising that right. Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 276 (7th Cir. 1996).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on a First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Henson for allegedly demoting him from a work program for
filing grievance #K25-01-25-019.
Defendant Flowers
Defendant Henson allegedly told Plaintiff that Defendant Flowers, the Supply Supervisor,
did not want Plaintiff to return to work based on a rumor that he was gay. Plaintiff’s sparse
allegations against Defendant Flowers are insufficient to establish personal involvement in a

constitutional violation. See Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1983
creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does
not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.”).
Defendant Flowers is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
and § 1915A.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) According to the Court's Merit Review of Plaintiff's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, this case shall proceed on an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against
Defendants Jared Pearce, Travis Cooley, and Cole Logsdon, an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants John Does #1, #2, and #3, and a First Amendment retaliation
claim against Defendant Henson. Additional claims shall not be included in the case above, except
in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk is directed to ADD John Doe #1 (Correctional Officer), John Doe #2
(Correctional Officer), and John Doe #3 (Correctional Officer) as Defendants.
3) The Court sua sponte adds Justin Maher, in his official capacity as the warden of
Western Illinois Correctional Center, as a Defendant to facilitate the identification of Defendants
John Does #1, #2, and #3. The Clerk is directed to ADD Justin Maher (Warden) as a Defendant.
4) Defendants Randell Hettinger, E. Shoopman, D. Flowers, and John Does #4, #5,
and #6 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and § 1915A. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE Defendants
Hettinger, Shoopman, Flowers, and John Does.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time unless otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service. If
Defendants fail to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within 30 days after the waiver
is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals
Service on Defendants and will require Defendants to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
7) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the Clerk sends the
waiver of service. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses
appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues
and claims stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court

does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore,
no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered. If Defendants have not filed an answer
or appeared through counsel within 90 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After Defendants have been served, the Court will enter a
scheduling order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
8) If Defendants no longer work at the address Plaintiff provided, the entity for whom
Defendants worked while at that address shall submit to the Clerk Defendants’ current work
address, or, if not known, Defendants’ forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of Defendants’ forwarding address shall be retained only by
the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel has
filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does not need to mail to
Defendants’ counsel copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk.
However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and
responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses
directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned
unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin
until Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
10) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s
place of confinement. Counsel for Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately inform the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with prejudice.
12) Plaintiff shall be provided a copy of all pertinent medical records upon request.
13) Within 10 days of receiving from defense counsel an authorization to release
medical records, Plaintiff is directed to sign and return the authorization to defense counsel. The
Clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act.
14) The Clerk is directed to set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this
Order for the Court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines.

ENTERED: 9/1/2026
s/ Michael M. Mihm
Michael M. Mihm
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11432783. Public record. Not legal advice.