# Walls

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · August 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11431620

## Case

- **Full name:** Nirin Walls v. Dr. Khan, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** August 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NIRIN WALLS,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 26-cv-00334-SPM
v.

DR. KHAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:
This case is before the Court on several motions filed by Plaintiff Nirin Walls. For the
following reasons, all motions are denied.
I. Motions to Reconsider (Doc. 16, 19)
Plaintiff has filed two Motions to Reconsider asking the Court to reconsider the Merit
Review Order (Doc. 14). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Court may revise any
order adjudicating fewer than all the claims at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Motions to reconsider an order under
Rule 54(b) are judged largely by the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment under
Rule 59(e), “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or
arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse
Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff first seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of Count 6 against Dr. Boose, Director
Hughes, Warden Brown, and Dr. Reister. (Doc. 16). In the Merit Review Order, the Court
delineated Count 6 as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Khan, Boose,
Hughes, Brown, Wexford, and Reister for failing to provide Plaintiff adequate mental health care

while he was at Lawrence Correctional Center. (Id. at p. 5). Count 6 was only allowed to proceed
against Dr. Khan based on Plaintiff’s assertions that he has schizophrenia and that Dr. Khan
disregarded a serious risk to his health by failing to ensure that he received food with the Geodon
medication and/or by failing to prescribe an alternative treatment when Dr. Khan discovered that
Plaintiff had stopped taking the Geodon medication because it hurt Plaintiff’s stomach. (Id. at p.
8). The Court dismissed Count 6 against the other Defendants and against Dr. Khan regarding
Plaintiff’s assertion that he was denied group therapy sessions. (Id.).
Plaintiff argues that the Court incorrectly dismissed Count 6 against Defendants Dr. Boose,
Director Hughes, Warden Brown, and Dr. Reister. He states that when he was transferred from
Joliet Treatment Center to Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), he signed a document

stating that he would receive continued care in a “step down fashion.” (Id.). Once at Lawrence,
however, he received no mental health care, and someone needs to be held liable. (Id.).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court committed an error of fact or law in dismissing
Count 6 against Dr. Boose, Director Hughes, Warden Brown, or Dr. Reister. Although Plaintiff
alleges in the Complaint that Dr. Reister, “Dr. Boose, Dr. Khan, Director Latoya Hughes, Warden
Brown are liable for [providing] zero mental health care,” (see Doc. 1, p. 11, 13, 14), this
conclusory statement is too “sparse to plausibly support a finding that the [Defendants] acted
recklessly or intentionally disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.” Messel v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., No. 25-2191, 2026 WL 2114509, at *2 (7th Cir. 2026). It is not sufficient for

Plaintiff to allege that Director Hughes is “in charge” or that he was “under the care of” Dr. Boose
to plead liability under Section 1983. Id. (finding that the phrase “while under the care of the
defendants” insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff does not describe any of
Defendants’ actual conduct in relation to his mental health care, which makes it impossible to
determine from the body of the Complaint which of the Defendants had sufficient knowledge and

personal involvement to support a claim that they were deliberately indifferent. As mentioned in
the Merit Review Order, an upper-level official cannot be liable simply because he or she was in
a supervisory position. (Doc. 14, p. 9). Additionally, an upper-level official does not have “a free-
floating obligation to put things to rights.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).
Thus, the Court did not misapply the facts or law in finding that Plaintiff had failed to state an
Eighth Amendment claim against Hughes, Reister, Boose, and Brown, and the request to
reconsider the dismissal of Count 6 is DENIED.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court wrongfully dismissed claims against Dr. Cole and
HCUA Cunningham for failing to ensure he received needed medications, specifically blood
pressure and seizure medication, when he arrived at Lawrence. (Doc. 20). While it is true that

Plaintiff clearly alleges in the Complaint that he went without needed medication for four days
after he was transferred to Lawrence (see Doc. 1, p. 10, 12), he does not sufficiently assert these
allegations against either Dr. Cole or HCUA Cunningham. Again, the Court cannot plausibly infer
liability solely based on their positions as medical staff at the facility. Deliberate indifference
requires a showing of personal involvement. See Burks, 555 F.3d at 596. Plaintiff’s assertion that
he sent several request slips to Dr. Cole and HCUA Cunningham “requesting wheelchair, cane,
and pain medication,” (Doc. 1, p. 10), is not sufficient to state a claim against Dr. Cole and HCUA
Cunningham for the denial of seizure and blood pressure medication for the four days following
his transfer. He has not shown an error of fact or law in the Court’s Merit Review Order and the

second Motion to Reconsider is DENIED. (Doc. 19).
In the first Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 16), Plaintiff also seeks to amend his request for
preliminary injunctive relief. He states that now that he had been transferred from Lawrence to
Menard Correctional Center (Menard), not only has he been denied wheelchair access, but he also
is not housed in an ADA cell, he is not receiving Tramadol for back pain, and he is not receiving

a snack bag with Geodon medication. (Doc. 16, p. 4). The request is DENIED.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that following his transfer to Lawrence in 2025, he was
mistreated, he received constitutionally inadequate medical care, and he was denied ADA
accommodation, specifically mobility assistant. He is proceeding on the following claims:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for
the use of excessive force against Plaintiff on May 25, 2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against White for the use of excessive
force against Plaintiff sometime around May 26 or 27, 2025.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for
subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by leaving
Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted for hours on May 25,
2025.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against White, Wilson, Hundley, and
Reid for subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by
leaving Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted sometime around
May 26 or 27, 2025.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Simpson,
Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for failing to provide Plaintiff access
to a mobility device.

Count 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Khan for
failing to provide Plaintiff with adequate mental health care,
specifically medication to treat his schizophrenia.

Count 8: ADA/RA claim against Director Hughes for denying Plaintiff access
to mobility assistance from May 25, 2025, through June 7, 2025.

(Doc. 14). While there are commonalities between conditions Plaintiff experienced at Lawrence
and what he is again currently experiencing at Menard, Plaintiff’s new assertions are outside the
scope of this lawsuit. Plaintiff cannot use a preliminary injunction motion to amend allegations in
the Complaint concerning his medical care, which currently are limited to events that occurred at
Lawrence. See Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 644 F.3d 353, 356 (7th
Cir. 2011) (a plaintiff “must still ground its right to relief on events described in the complaint, not

on matters that arise later”). The Court has allowed Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction
concerning his ADA and lack of mobility assistance to be briefed because, as pled, it appears to
stem from a system-wide policy and so his transfer has not mooted his ADA claim. See Lehn v.
Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff request to
order Director Hughes to respond to assertions that he is currently being denied adequate medical
and mental health care now that he has been transferred to Menard.
II. Motion to Intervene (Doc. 20)
Plaintiff asserts that at Menard, he continues to be assaulted and thrown from his
wheelchair and subjected to excessive force. (Doc. 20, p. 1). He states that a correctional officer
named Rickleman spit on his face and told him that Director Hughes told “us” to kill Plaintiff.

(Id.). Plaintiff asks the Court for help. (Id.).
The Motion to Intervene is DENIED. As stated above, the Court will not issue a
preliminary injunction based on facts that are separate and distinct from the claims Plaintiff is
prosecuting in this case. Plaintiff’s assertions that he is being mistreated now that he is housed at
Menard are not related to the claims at issue in this litigation. The request to intervene is denied.
III. Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32)
Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against Defendant Director Hughes is DENIED.
(Doc. 32). Hughes successfully returned her waiver of service on August 31, 2026, and despite
Plaintiff’s assertions, there is no evidence that she is acting intentionally to delay this case.
IV. Motion for a Hearing on Request for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 34)
The Motion for a Hearing is DENIED. (Doc. 34). As Plaintiff was previously informed,
once Director Hughes has been successfully served and filed a response to the request for a
preliminary injunction, the Court will then determine the need for a hearing. (Doc. 14, p. 14).

The Court understands that Plaintiff is unhappy with the speed at which this case is
progressing. Plaintiff, however, has chosen to pursue litigation in federal court to resolve his
dispute with Defendants, which often progresses slowly. Plaintiff is to refrain from continuing to
file unnecessary filings, as they waste scarce judicial resources and only serve to delay the
resolution of his claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11431620. Public record. Not legal advice.