# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · August 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11431078

## Case

- **Full name:** Kaplan v. Bessent
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** August 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11431078

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:26-cv-00541-MCS-RAO Date August 18, 2026
Title Kaplan v. Bessent

Present: The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge

Stephen Montes Kerr Not Reported
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMIss (ECF NO. 67)

Plaintiff Charles Kaplan, a self-represented litigant, brings this action against
federal and state tax authorities. (FAC, ECF No. 28.) The Court previously dismissed
the claims against the state defendants. (Order, ECF No. 52.) The United States of
America, on behalf of itself and the named defendants sued in their official federal
capacities, Mr. Larochelle and Scott Bessent,! moves to dismiss the claims against
the federal defendants. (Mot., ECF No. 67.) Plaintiff filed a brief opposing the
motion, (Opp’n, ECF No. 68), and the United States filed a reply, (ECF No. 69).?
The Court deems the motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. R. 7-15.
Mr. Bessent was Acting Commissioner of the IRS, but his service in that capacity
ended in March 2026. Update on IRS Commissioner Position, Internal Revenue
Serv. (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/update-on-irs-commissioner-
position [https://perma.cc/FK85-9XNX]. This development is immaterial to the
disposition of this Order.
The Court considers the parties’ briefs on the merits despite myriad procedural
deficiencies. E.g., C.D. Cal. R. 7-3 (requiring a movant to submit a declaration
confirming compliance with the prefiling motion requirement); (Initial Standing
Order § 9(b), ECF No. 7 (setting briefing deadlines departing from the local rules)).
Page 1 of 4 CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk SMO

I. BACKGROUND

According to the operative complaint, Plaintiff receives compensation from
nonparty Entertainment Partners, LLC, for creating digital artwork, but he is not
personally involved in commerce. (FAC ¶ 4.) As relevant to the federal defendants,
Plaintiff claims the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and its officer, Mr. Larochelle,
are wrongfully retaining Plaintiff’s compensation from Entertainment Partners. (Id.
¶¶ 3, 10.) Plaintiff demanded return of that compensation, and although the IRS
adjusted his account and returned some money for some tax years, it purportedly
failed to return all Plaintiff is owed. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 15.) Further, in November 2025, Mr.
Larochelle sent five letters to Plaintiff concerning tax years 2018–2022 warning of
penalties if Plaintiff failed to correct his returns. (Id. ¶ 18; see FAC Ex. I.) Plaintiff
asserts a claim for trespass against Mr. Larochelle, (FAC ¶ 30), and claims for
trespass and case against the IRS (although Mr. Bessent, not the IRS, is named as a
defendant), (id. ¶¶ 26, 32).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which is the only rule relevant to
the disposition here, authorizes a party to seek dismissal of an action for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. “Although sovereign immunity is only quasi-
jurisdictional in nature, Rule 12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign
immunity from suit.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015). Rule
12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges can be either facial or factual. Safe Air for
Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When, as here, a motion to
dismiss attacks subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the court
assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.
2009). The proponent of jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject-matter
jurisdiction exists. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122
(9th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

The United States first argues that only the United States, not the named
defendants Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent, is an appropriate defendant to this
lawsuit. (Mot. 1.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff identifies Messrs. Larochelle and
Bessent as defendants by reference to their capacity as officers of the IRS. (FAC
¶¶ 9–10.) “[A] suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a
suit against the United States.” Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.
1985). Notably, Plaintiff names the IRS rather than Mr. Bessent in his statement of
the claims. (FAC ¶¶ 26, 32.) This further evinces that the United States is the proper
party to Plaintiff’s claims, as not even the IRS can be sued. See Devries v. IRS, 359
F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Federal agencies may not be sued in their
own name except to the extent Congress may specifically allow such suits. Congress
made no provisions for suits against . . . the IRS . . . . Where taxpayers are
authorized to sue on matters arising out of IRS actions, the United States is the proper
party defendant.” (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that Messrs. Bessent and Larochelle operated ultra vires,
outside their official capacities, in undertaking the conduct alleged in the complaint.
(Opp’n 2, 5.) But Plaintiff pleaded no allegations in his complaint to support that
assertion. And even if Plaintiff had pleaded something to the effect that the IRS
officers “ignore[d] the laws,” (id. at 5), he would not raise an inference that their
conduct related to tax collection, even if wrongful, was unconstitutional or otherwise
exceeded the scope of their roles as federal officers, see Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230,
1235 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e have never recognized a constitutional violation arising
from the collection of taxes.”); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th
Cir. 1993) (“An official does not act outside her jurisdiction simply because she
makes an unconstitutional or unlawful decision. Rather, the inquiry focuses on
whether the subject matter of the decision was within the official’s power, and
whether the official was acting in her official capacity at the time of decision.”).

The Court also credits the United States’ argument that it—and, by extension,
Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent—has sovereign immunity from this lawsuit. (Mot.
2–4.) “In sovereign immunity analysis, any lawsuit against an agency of the United
States or against an officer of the United States in his or her official capacity is
considered an action against the United States.” Balser v. DOJ, 327 F.3d 903, 907
(9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it
consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that
court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1195
(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). “[A]
waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in
favor of the sovereign.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1088
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)).
The party suing the United States bears the burden to demonstrate an unequivocal
waiver of immunity. Id.
Plaintiff offers no cogent factual allegations or legal arguments indicating the
United States waived sovereign immunity from suits like this one. (See Opp’n 5–6
(relying on irrelevant California law and broad constitutional propositions divorced
from the immunity issue at bar).) Indeed, the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives
immunity for some tort claims against the United States, see Valadez-Lopez v.
Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011), expressly excludes from its scope “[a]ny
claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty”
(with limited exceptions to the exclusion not relevant here), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
This raises an inference that the United States is immune as a matter of law from tort
claims like the ones asserted here, where an individual seeks to recover from federal
tax authorities monetary compensation retained by the United States under the
auspices of the tax code. See Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States,
859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.) (“We have ‘broadly construed’ § 2680(c) to
encompass actions taken during the scope of the IRS’s tax assessment and collection
efforts.” (quoting Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983))),
amended by, 868 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2017); (see also, e.g., FAC Ex. I, at 40 (“Based
on Internal Revenue Code Section 6702, Frivolous Tax Submissions, we determined
the information you filed as a purported tax return, on Aug. 19, 2021 is frivolous and
there is no basis in the law for your position.”)).

For these reasons, the claims against Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent are
dismissed.3 Leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be freely granted unless
the complaint clearly could not be saved by any amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
Here, “amendment would be legally futile in light of the government’s sovereign
immunity.” Halgat v. United States, No. 24-2771, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22058, at
*4 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend). The Court
denies Plaintiff leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court grants the motion and dismisses the claims against Messrs.
Larochelle and Bessent without leave to amend. As all claims against all named
parties have been dismissed without leave to amend, the Court concurrently enters a
judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3 The Court does not reach the United States’ other arguments for dismissal.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11431078. Public record. Not legal advice.