# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · August 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11430422

## Case

- **Full name:** Nicol A. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** August 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 NICOL A.,1 Case No. 5:25-cv-01959-MAR
11 Plaintiff,
12 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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FRANK BISIGNANO,
14 Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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18 Plaintiff Nicol A. (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the final decision of the
19 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner” or “Agency”)
20 denying her applications for Title II Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits
21 (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the
22 jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
23 636 (c).
24 For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED, and
25 this action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
26

27 1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the
recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial
1 I.
2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
3 Plaintiff was found to be not disabled in a final decision by an Administrative
4 Law Judge (“ALJ”) dated August 7, 2024. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 34. In
5 December 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset
6 beginning July 30, 2017. AR 209–35. Plaintiff’s claim was denied at the initial and
7 reconsideration levels, and on January 30, 2024, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
8 ALJ. AR 68–152. A hearing was held on July 25, 2024. AR 40–67. At the hearing
9 Plaintiff amended her onset date to July 21, 2019. AR 40–67. In a decision on August
10 7, 2024, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims. AR at 17–34.
11 Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals
12 Council. AR at 7–11. Subsequently, the Appeals Counsel denied the request and
13 affirmed the ALJ’s decision. AR at 1–6.
14 Thereafter, on July 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant case. ECF Docket No.
15 (“Dkt.”) 1. This matter is before the Court after both parties consented to proceed
16 before a Magistrate Judge, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkts. 6, 8.
17 II.
18 PLAINTIFF’S BACKGROUND
19 Plaintiff was forty-two years old on the alleged onset date and forty-nine years at
20 the time of the hearing.2 AR at 32. Plaintiff has a high school education. AR 344. She
21 has work history as a mental health assistant and a nursing assistant. AR 345. She
22 alleges disability based on (1) blind or low vision; (2) arthritis; (3) sciatica; (4) bulging
23 disc; (5) knee replacement (left); (6) carpal tunnel syndrome; (7) asthma; (8) sleep apnea;
24 (9) depression; and (10) anxiety. AR 343.
25 III.
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27 2 Accordingly, Plaintiff was considered a “younger person” on her alleged onset date and at the
hearing. AR at 81; see Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010)
1 STANDARD FOR EVALUATING DISABILITY
2 To qualify for benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable
3 physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful
4 activity, and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at
5 least twelve (12) months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(a); Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
6 721 (9th Cir. 1998). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing
7 the work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial
8 gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A);
9 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
10 To decide if a claimant is disabled, and therefore entitled to benefits, an ALJ
11 conducts a five-step inquiry. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2020); 20
12 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The steps are:
13 (1) Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the
14 claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.
15 (2) Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If not, the claimant is found not
16 disabled. If so, proceed to step three.
17 (3) Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific
18 impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so,
19 the claimant is found disabled. If not, proceed to step four.3
20 (4) Is the claimant capable of performing work she has done in the past? If so,
21 the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
22 (5) Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, the claimant is found
23 disabled. If so, the claimant is found not disabled.
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3 “Between steps three and four, the ALJ must, as an intermediate step, assess the claimant’s [residual
27 functional capacity],” or ability to work after accounting for her verifiable impairments. Bray v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222–23 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)).
1 See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098–99; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)–(g)(1); Bustamante
2 v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2001).
3 The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the
4 Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148;
5 Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953–54. Additionally, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist
6 the claimant in developing the record at every step of the inquiry. Id. at 954. If, at step
7 four, the claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform past work,
8 the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some other work that
9 exists in “significant numbers” in the national economy, accounting for the claimant’s
10 residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.
11 § 404.1520(g)(1); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098–99, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721.
12 IV.
13 THE ALJ’S DECISION
14 A. STEP ONE
15 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful
16 activity since July 21, 2019, the amended alleged onset date[].” AR 19.
17 B. STEP TWO
18 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the following severe impairments; (1)
19 “obesity”; (2) “internal derangement of the right knee”; (3) “status post left knee
20 replacement”; (4) “lumbar spondylosis”; (5) “osteoarthritis of the right shoulder”; (6)
21 “major depressive disorder (MDD)”; and (7) “adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety
22 and depressed mood.” AR 20.
23 C. STEP THREE
24 At step three, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not “have an impairment or
25 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
26 listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),
27 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).” AR 21.
1 D. RFC DETERMINATION
2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform light work[4],” with the
3 following limitations:
4 [C]an occasionally climb ramps, and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
5 she can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, work at unprotected
heights, or work around dangerous moving machinery; she can frequently
6 reach with the right upper extremity; and she can understand, remember
7 and carry out simple instructions.
8 AR 24-25.
9 E. STEP FOUR
10 At step four, the ALJ noted that transferability of “job skills is not an issue
11 because the claimant does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968)”.
12 AR 31.
13 F. STEP FIVE
14 At step five, the ALJ found that, “considering the claimant’s age, education, work
15 experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
16 economy that the claimant can perform.” AR 32. With the assistance of a vocational
17 expert’s’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform occupations
18 such as marking clerk (DOT 209.587-034), cashier II (DOT 2.11.462-010), and cleaner
19 (DOT 323.687-014). AR 33. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not
20 been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act [(“SSA”)], from July 21,
21 2019, through the date of this decision.” AR 33-34.
22 ////
23 ////
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25 4 “Light work” is defined as:
26 [L]ifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles
like docket files, ledgers and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one
27 which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required
1 V.
2 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS
3 Plaintiff presents five disputed issues: (1) whether the ALJ failed to properly
4 consider Plaintiff’s subjective statements; (2) whether the ALJ erred by failing to
5 properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. Furman; (3) whether the ALJ erred by
6 failing to properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. Gumbs; (4) whether the ALJ
7 erred by failing to properly evaluate the medical opinion of Dr. McDaniel; and (5)
8 whether the ALJ erroneously omitted mental work restrictions assessed by Dr.
9 Fahnbulleh from Plaintiff’s RFC. 5 Dkt. No. 14 at 6–7.
10 VI.
11 STANDARD OF REVIEW
12 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s
13 decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision should be upheld if they are
14 free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole.
15 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th
16 Cir. 2007).
17 “Substantial evidence” is evidence that a reasonable person might accept as
18 adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir.
19 2007) (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). It is more
20 than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial
21 evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court “must review the administrative record
22 as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts
23 from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; see also Hill v. Astrue,
24 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] reviewing court . . . may not affirm simply by
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26 5 The Court finds the medical opinion issues dispositive of this matter, and thus declines to address
the remaining issues. See Hiller v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand
27 the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach [Plaintiff’s] alternative ground for
remand.”).
1 isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence’.” (quoting Robbins, 466 F.3d at
2 882)). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the
3 reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment” for that of the Commissioner.
4 Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720–21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.
5 2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,
6 we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn
7 from the record.”), superseded by regulation on other grounds as stated in Thomas v.
8 Saul, 830 F. App’x 196, 198 (9th Cir. 2020).
9 The reviewing court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his
10 decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn
11 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). If the ALJ erred, the error may only be
12 considered harmless if it is “clear from the record” that the error was “inconsequential
13 to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 885 (citation
14 omitted).
15 VII.
16 DISCUSSION
17 A. THE ALJ DID NOT PROVIDE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR
18 FINDING THE MEDICAL EXPERT’S OPINION UNPERSUASIVE
19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons for
20 finding the opinions of Dr. Furman, Dr. Gumbs, and Dr. McDaniel unpersuasive. Dkt.
21 No. 14 at 7-20.
22 1. Dr. Furman’s opinion
23 On October 14, 2020 Dr. Furman completed a primary treating physician’s initial
24 evaluation report. AR 5511-17. Dr. Furman examined Plaintiff and found she was
25 alert and oriented, deep bending reflexes were normal and equal bilaterally, and her
26 sensation was grossly intact. AR 5513-14. When testing Plaintiff’s range of motion,
27 Dr. Furman noted that cervical compression and shoulder depression caused pain. AR
1 acromioclavicular joint, anterior shoulder, lateral shoulder, and posterior shoulder. AR
2 5514. Dr. Furman noted Plaintiff had crepitus of the right knee, antalgic gait, and
3 tenderness to palpation of the lateral knee and medial knee. As for Plaintiff’s left knee,
4 which had been replaced in 2019, Dr. Furman noted tenderness to palpation of the
5 anterior knee, lateral knee, medial knee and posterior knee. AR 5515.
6 Dr. Furman concluded that Plaintiff could “return to modified work on
7 10/14/2020 with the following restrictions: [Plaintiff] may return to semi-sedentary
8 work with no heavy lifting greater than 15 pounds, no ascending or descending stairs,
9 squatting, kneeling, prolonged standing or walking.” AR 5516.
10 2. Dr. Gumbs’s opinion
11 On June 23, 2020, Dr. Gumbs completed a “Panel Qualified Medical
12 Evaluation.” AR 5303. Dr. Gumbs examined Plaintiff and found she had an erect
13 posture and normal gait. AR 5313. He noted there was tenderness in Plaintiff’s left
14 trapezius, scalene, and rhomboid muscles with “1+ spasm and guarding noted.” AR
15 5313. Dr. Gumbs found Plaintiff’s compression, traction, Spurling sign and Adson
16 tests were negative. AR 5313. He found there were no sensory deficits in her upper
17 extremities. AR 5313. Dr. Gumbs found Plaintiff was positive for Retropatellar
18 crepitus in both knees, and negative for McMurray test, Apley grind test, Lachman test,
19 lateral pivot shift test, patellofemoral compression test, apprehension sign, anterior
20 cruciate drawer sign, and posterior cruciate drawer sign. AR 5315.
21 Dr. Gumbs concluded Plaintiff would be in constant moderate pain when
22 working at and above shoulder level, and when carrying more than fifteen to twenty
23 pounds. AR 5317. Plaintiff’s left knee would be in constant moderate-to-severe pain
24 with repetitive and prolonged standing, walking, squatting, kneeling, and climbing and
25 descending stairs. AR 5317. Her right knee would be in constant slight-to-moderate
26 pain with prolonged standing, squatting, kneeling, and when ascending and descending
27 stairs. AR 5317.
1 ////
2 3. Dr. McDaniel’s opinion
3 On June 2, 2021, Dr. McDaniel remotely evaluated Plaintiff and completed a
4 psychiatric assessment. AR 5391. Dr. McDaniel had Plaintiff complete the Beck
5 Anxiety Inventoryand found her to have moderate anxiety. AR 5427-28. Plaintiff then
6 completed the Beck Depression Inventory, which indicatedsevere depression. AR
7 5428. Plaintiff also completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
8 (“MMPI”). AR 5428. The MMPI found Plaintiff was likely over-reporting her
9 symptoms. AR 5429. Plaintiff then took the Hamilton Psychiatric Rating Scale for
10 Depression. AR 5433. It found she had moderate depression. AR 5434. The Hamilton
11 Psychiatric Rating Scale for Anxiety found Plaintiff had moderate anxiety. AR 5434.
12 Ultimately, Dr. McDaniel opined Plaintiff would need three fifteen-minute breaks daily
13 due to her anxiety. AR 5439.
14 4. ALJ Opinion
15 The ALJ considered the foregoing medical opinions and discounted each as
16 unpersuasive. When discussing Dr. Gumbs’s and Dr. Furman’s opinions, the ALJ
17 found “unpersuasive” the limitation of, “no heavy lifting over fifteen pounds, no
18 ascending or descending stairs, squatting, kneeling, or prolonged standing or
19 walking.(AR 30). Specifically, the ALJ asserted:
20 This limitation is just not consistent with the record as a whole, which
showed that she reported a history of pain right shoulders[sic], lower back,
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bilateral hips and bilateral knees pain which radiates into the bilateral hip
22 region and right leg; she underwent a left total knee arthropathy, had
repeated inconsistencies with her pain agreement and was no longer
23
prescribed opiate medications; she repeatedly had a normal gait and
24 station, tenderness to palpation in the lateral patella and calf of the right
lower extremity with no tenderness in the tibial plateau, no swelling or
25 ecchymosis, positive apprehension test, 5/5 motor strength and intact
26 sensation from L1-S2, normal range of motion and no edema but had a
L5-S1 interlaminar lumbar epidural injection with more than fifty percent
27 improvement for weeks. She did not use a cane, brace, walker, or
lumbosacral spine, at midline, with bilateral hamstring tightness but there
1
was no muscle spasm and negative Babinski Lasegue, and Faber with
2 normal EMG/NCS findings in the lumbar spine; and there was suspected
biceps tenodesis, moderate supraspinatus tendinosis, and mild
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degenerative AC osteoarthropathy in the right shoulder, total knee
4 arthroplasty of the left knee, moderate osteoarthritis of the right knee,
mild to moderate diffuse disc bulge, narrowing of bilateral lateral recess
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and bilateral neuroforamina with edema in the soft tissue posterior to the
6 spinous processes at L5-S1 on imaging.
7 AR 30.
8 The ALJ then found Dr. McDaniel’s opinion unpersuasive “because of its lack
9 of supportability and inconsistency with the evidence of record.” AR 31. He noted the
10 need for the three fifteen-minute breaks was not supported by the record as there was
11 “no evidence of any mental health hospitalizations, no crisis calls, and no suicidal
12 ideation needing urgent or emergency care. The record also shows that the mental
13 status evaluations by her medical providers were within normal limits.” AR 30.
14 5. Applicable Law
15 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations apply that change
16 the framework for how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence. Revisions to
17 Rules Regarding Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-
18 01 (Jan. 18, 2017); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c. The new regulations provide the
19 ALJ will no longer “give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,
20 to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those
21 from [a claimant’s] medical sources.” Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg.
22 5844-10, at 5867-68; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).
23 Instead, an ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical
24 opinions or prior administrative medical findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b),
25 416.920c(b). The factors for evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions and
26 prior administrative medical findings include: supportability, consistency, relationship
27 with claimant (including length of treatment, frequency of examinations, purpose of the
1 specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion
2 or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to, “evidence
3 showing a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an
4 understanding of [the Agency’s] disability program’s policies and evidentiary
5 requirements”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
6 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore, the
7 ALJ is required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§
8 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Supportability and consistency are explained in the
9 regulations as follows:
10 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
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his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
12 the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
13 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
14 administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
15 persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative finding(s) will
16 be.
17 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2), 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
18 The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how “the factors in paragraphs (c)(3)
19 through (c)(5),” i.e. “[r]elationship with the claimant,” “[s]pecialization,” and “other
20 factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative
21 medical finding,” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
22 However, when two or more medical opinions or prior administrative findings “about
23 the same issue are both equally well-supported . . . and consistent with the record . . .
24 but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is required to explain how “the other most
25 persuasive factors” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
26 Finally, in fashioning a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant
27 evidence in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and “the effects of
1 Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 (citation omitted). An ALJ is not obligated to discuss “every
2 piece of evidence” when interpreting the evidence and developing the record, see
3 Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted),
4 or discuss every word of a doctor’s opinion or include limitations not assessed by the
5 doctor, see Fox v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-4738-JPR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118129, 2017
6 WL 3197215 at 5 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017); Howard, 341 F.3d at 1012. However, an
7 ALJ must discuss significant and probative evidence that is contrary to the ALJ’s
8 findings and explain why it has been rejected. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883; Vincent
9 v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (the ALJ must discuss significant and
10 probative evidence and explain why it was rejected).
11 6. Analysis
12 Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ does not “give any specific evidentiary
13 weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. §
14 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must weigh several factors, particularly “the extent to
15 which a medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant
16 objective medical evidence” and “the extent to which a medical opinion is ‘consistent .
17 . . with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.’”
18 Woods v. Kijikazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
19 404.1520c(c)(2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). When rejecting a
20 medical source’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “an explanation supported by
21 substantial evidence.” Id. at 792.
22 Here, the ALJ did not adequately discuss the supportability and consistency
23 factors in evaluating the medical opinions. As an initial matter, the ALJ erred in
24 evaluating the doctors’ opinions together. AR 30-31. The regulations require an ALJ
25 to analyze medical opinions on a source-by-source basis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).
26 This means that the ALJ must offer a separate explanation for each medical source who
27 has provided an opinion. Here, instead, the ALJ grouped Dr. Gumbs’s and Dr.
1 perform “heavy lifting over fifteen pounds,” among other limitations, “because of [the
2 opinions’] lack of supportability and inconsistency with the evidence of record.” AR
3 30. The ALJ then went on to summarize “the record as a whole,” listing a series of
4 Plaintiffs’ test results, complaints, and medical procedures. Id. Nowhere, however,
5 did the ALJ cite to any specific findings by Dr. Gumbs or Dr. Furman or actually explain
6 how those particular findings were inconsistent with other evidence before concluding
7 that the other evidence “does not suggest the claimant cannot lift twenty pounds
8 occasionally.” AR 30 (emphasis added). Further, the ALJ made no mention of the fact
9 that Dr. Furman’s and Dr. Gumbs’s separate opinions were consistent with one
10 another.
11 By the same token, having elided any discussion of specific findings
12 underpinning Dr. Gumbs’s or Dr. Furman’s conclusions, the ALJ did not adequately
13 explain why or how those findings failed to support the resulting conclusions. The
14 same is true of the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. McDaniel’s opinion. Once again, the ALJ
15 rejected this opinion “because of its lack of supportability and inconsistency with the
16 evidence of record.” AR 31. Although the ALJ did point to some specific other
17 evidence in the record, such as the lack of suicidal ideation, as inconsistent with Dr.
18 McDaniel’s opinion, the ALJ once again did not point to any specific inconsistent
19 finding by Dr. McDaniel or, accordingly, explain how any such finding failed to support
20 Dr. McDaniel’s conclusion that Plaintiff required occasional breaks due to anxiety. AR
21 31.
22 In short, as the ALJ did not properly articulate how he considered the supportability
23 and consistency factors, he failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for finding Dr.
24 Furman’s, Dr. Gumbs’s, and Dr. McDaniel’s opinions unpersuasive.6
25

26 6 A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless. Stout v. Comm’r of Soc.
27 Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burch, 400 F.3d at 679). Given the
significant differences between the doctors’ opinions and the ALJ’s RFC finding, this Court cannot
1 VIII.
2 RELIEF
3 A. APPLICABLE LAW
4 “When an ALJ’s denial of benefits is not supported by the record, ‘the proper
5 course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
6 investigation or explanation.’” Hill, 698 F.3d at 1162 (citation omitted). “We may
7 exercise our discretion and direct an award of benefits ‘where no useful purpose would
8 be served by further administrative proceedings and the record has been thoroughly
9 developed’.” Id. (citation omitted). “Remand for further proceedings is appropriate
10 where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be
11 made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the
12 claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated.” Id.; see also Reddick,
13 157 F.3d at 729 (“We do not remand this case for further proceedings because it is clear
14 from the administrative record that [c]laimant is entitled to benefits.”).
15 B. ANALYSIS
16 Here, remand for further proceedings is warranted. The ALJ’s inadequately-
17 explained rejection of multiple medical opinions was central to the fashioning of the
18 RFC. Because it is unclear, considering these issues, whether Plaintiff is in fact disabled,
19 remand here is on an “open record.” See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495; Bunnell v.
20 Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2003).
21 ///
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27 ///
1 IX.
2 CONCLUSION
3 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered
4 | REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this action for
5 | further proceedings consistent with this Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
6 | the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both
7 | parties.

9 | Dated: August 13, 2026
10 HONORABLE MARGO A. ROCCONI
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11430422. Public record. Not legal advice.