# Rodriguez

> District Court, N.D. California · August 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428978

## Case

- **Full name:** Marino Jair Rodriguez, et al. v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** August 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MARINO JAIR RODRIGUEZ, et al., Case No. 23-cv-01379-HSG

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART SUPPLEMENTAL
9 v. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
10 SANTA CLARA VALLEY
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 143, 145
11
Defendants.
12
13 Pending before the Court are the supplemental motions for summary judgment submitted
14 by Plaintiffs and Defendant Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (“VTA”). Dkt. Nos. 143, 145.
15 The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is
16 deemed submitted. L.R. 7-1(b). The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the
17 motions.
18 I. BACKGROUND
19 The Court detailed the factual background underlying this case in a prior order. See
20 Rodriguez v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Auth., No. 23-CV-01379-HSG, 2024 WL 4778049, at *1
21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2024) (“Rodriguez I”). Relevant here, VTA is a special district public
22 transportation provider operating in Santa Clara County. Id. In January 2022, VTA implemented
23 a vaccine policy that sought to “help prevent infection and transmission of COVID-19 within the
24 workplace, at VTA facilities, and to members of the public who depend on VTA services.” Dkt.
25 No. 62-4, Ex. 6. The policy required all VTA employees to be “fully vaccinated against COVID-
26 19, or have received an exemption . . . by no later than April 29, 2022.” Dkt. No. 62-4, Exs. 5, 6.
27 The policy allowed employees who demonstrated a “sincerely held religious belief” to seek
1 initial exemption request form, which asked employees to describe in their own words how their
2 “sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with the requirement that you
3 receive a Covid-19 vaccination.” See Dkt. No. 62-2, Ex. C; Dkt. No. 62-4, Ex. 47. A VTA
4 committee evaluating exemption requests directed most of these employees to complete a
5 clarification form. Dkt. No. 62-2, Ex. C; Dkt. No. 62-4, Ex. 48. The committee evaluated
6 employees’ responses on both the initial response form and the clarification form, using several
7 criteria to assess whether the employee established a sincere religious belief, practice, or
8 observance in conflict with the VTA’s vaccine requirement. Dkt. No. 62-2, Ex. D, F. Over one
9 hundred VTA employees submitted religious exemption requests, the majority of which were
10 granted. Dkt. No. 62 at 7. A subset of employees whose exemption requests were denied sued,
11 alleging violations of their rights under the First Amendment and California law.
12 The parties initially filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2024. Dkt. Nos. 62, 77.
13 With respect to Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court found there was no genuine dispute of material
14 fact that the VTA’s vaccination policy was facially and operationally neutral. Rodriguez I, 2024
15 WL 4778049, at *3–*4. But the Court concluded that “there is a genuine dispute of material fact
16 as to the discretion that the VTA committee exercised and, by extension, to the policy’s general
17 applicability.” Id. at *4. The Court concluded that these issues of material fact would impact the
18 standard of review for Plaintiffs’ federal claim, and therefore declined to address the VTA’s
19 motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims, as well as Plaintiffs’ cross-motion
20 for summary judgment. Id. at *5; see also Dkt. No. 109 at 2. The Court referred the parties to a
21 magistrate judge settlement conference before Judge Beeler. Dkt. No. 101. Although settlement
22 efforts were successful with respect to five of the twelve original Plaintiffs, seven remain in the
23 case.1 After resuming litigation, at the Court’s direction the parties filed supplemental cross-
24 motions for partial summary judgment. Dkt. Nos. 143 (“Mot.”), 165 (“Opp.”), 183 (“Reply”), 145
25 (“Cross Mot.”), 166 (“Cross Opp.”), 182 (“Cross Reply”).
26
27
1 II. LEGAL STANDARD
2 Summary judgment is proper when a “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
3 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
4 A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson
5 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute is “genuine” if there is evidence
6 in the record sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
7 But in deciding if a dispute is genuine, the court must view the inferences reasonably drawn from
8 the materials in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec.
9 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986), and “may not weigh the evidence
10 or make credibility determinations,” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997),
11 overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008).
12 “If, however, a moving party carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must
13 produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos.,
14 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, the nonmoving party “must do more than
15 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
16 Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. A nonmoving party must also “identify with reasonable particularity
17 the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.
18 1996). If a nonmoving party fails to produce evidence that supports its claim or defense, courts
19 enter summary judgment in favor of the movant. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
20 (1986).
21 III. DISCUSSION
22 A. Free Exercise Claims
23 The Free Exercise Clause provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
24 free exercise” of religion. U.S. Const. amend. I. “[A] plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a
25 free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has
26 burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally
27 applicable.’” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022). But “[t]he right of free
1 general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
2 prescribes (or proscribes).’” Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
3 (1990)).2 Neutral and generally applicable rules are subject to rational basis review under which
4 the state action must be “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Stormans, Inc.
5 v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2015). A rule that is either non-neutral or not generally
6 applicable is subject to strict scrutiny, which means that it must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a
7 “compelling” governmental interest. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 525.
8 i. Defendant Is Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs’ Free
Exercise Claims
9
VTA argues as a threshold matter that following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Detwiler v.
10
Mid-Columbia Medical Center, 156 F.4th 886 (9th Cir. 2025), Plaintiffs cannot show any issue of
11
fact as to whether they sincerely hold religious beliefs in conflict with the vaccine mandate. The
12
Court disagrees.
13
In Detwiler, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a plaintiff alleged a “bona fide religious
14
belief” sufficient to state a claim for failure to accommodate under Title VII. 156 F.4th at 892–94.
15
“[A] plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case if the belief motivating her accommodation request is
16
not, in fact, religious.” Id. 156 F.4th at 894. The Ninth Circuit held that “[a] plaintiff seeking a
17
religious exemption must plead a sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in
18
conflict with the work requirement.” Id. at 895. Drawing on Supreme Court guidance in the First
19
Amendment context, the Ninth Circuit concluded that although “a plaintiff need not establish her
20
belief is consistent, widely held, or even rational,” “[i]nvocations of broad, religious tenets cannot,
21
on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction.” Id. Thus, “references to
22
generic religious principles cannot transform a specific secular preference into a basis for a
23

24
2 Plaintiffs suggest that Smith was based on ideas that are “ripe for rejection by the Supreme Court
in an appropriate case.” Reply at 3. To state the obvious, the case remains controlling Supreme
25
Court precedent, and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s musings about the decision’s wisdom or future are
entirely irrelevant. Moreover, the idea that all of us have a fundamental obligation to follow valid
26
and neutral laws of general applicability is hardly radical: instead, it reflects the common-sense
premise that our society would break down if everyone could routinely choose to opt out of
27
following those laws. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (explaining that “the very
1 religious discrimination claim.” Id.at 890. The Ninth Circuit cautioned that its holding “does not
2 direct lower courts to examine the sincerity or the reasonableness of a belief.” Id. at 895.
3 Nonetheless, in assessing a plaintiff’s claim, “a district court must make a determination about the
4 source of a belief to examine a plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Id. at 896.
5 Here, VTA argues that Detwiler’s standard applies with equal force to Plaintiffs’ burden
6 on their Free Exercise claims to establish that they sincerely hold a religious belief inconsistent
7 with the vaccination requirement. Cross Mot. at 9–11. VTA categorizes Plaintiffs into two
8 groups: those who claimed that a “body temple” belief conflicted with the vaccine requirement,
9 and those who claimed that their religious beliefs about the use of fetal cells in vaccine
10 development conflicted with that requirement. VTA asserts that following Detwiler, the Court
11 “need not accept entirely conclusory assertions of religious belief,” and that the remaining
12 Plaintiffs fail to establish sincerely held religious beliefs and therefore “do not merit constitutional
13 protections for religion.” Cross Mot. at 10 (citing Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 894).
14 The Court agrees that to ultimately succeed on their Free Exercise claim, Plaintiffs must
15 demonstrate that their sincerely held religious beliefs conflicted with the vaccine requirement.
16 The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence guides the Court’s analysis of this issue.
17 Determining whether a plaintiff holds a sincerely held religious belief is “a difficult and delicate
18 task,” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). But a defendant is
19 entitled to probe that issue. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833
20 (1989) (Free Exercise Clause only protects religious beliefs that are sincerely held and not secular
21 beliefs, and “States are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for
22 invoking the Free Exercise Clause”); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 (“A way of life, however
23 virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation . . . if it is
24 based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims
25 must be rooted in religious belief.”). The Ninth Circuit has echoed this principle, holding that it is
26 “incumbent on the courts to ensure that a free exercise claim is granted only when the threatened
27 belief is religious in nature.” Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
1 prisoner’s First Amendment claims, “a plaintiff will have stated a free exercise claim if: (1) the
2 claimant’s proffered belief [is] sincerely held; and (2) the claim [is] rooted in religious belief, not
3 in purely secular philosophical concerns.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). These
4 cases also demonstrate that once a plaintiff establishes that he has a sincerely held religious belief,
5 he must also show some connection between that belief and the way it purportedly was burdened
6 by government action. See Callahan, 658 F.2d at 686 (observing, after finding the plaintiff’s
7 beliefs to be sincerely held and religious in nature, that “the appropriate next course [] is to
8 determine the extent to which [those] protected beliefs were burdened by the government’s
9 regulations”). Detwiler is the latest case to affirm these principles (albeit in the Title VII context),
10 requiring at the pleading stage that a plaintiff “connect the requested exemption with a truly
11 religious principle” by alleging a “sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in
12 conflict with the workplace requirement.” Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895.
13 With these principles in mind, the Court considers whether the remaining Plaintiffs have
14 proffered sufficient evidence of a sincerely held religious belief to create a triable issue of fact as
15 to their Free Exercise claims.
16 a. Body Temple Beliefs (Plaintiffs Rolland, Bircher, Poythress, and
Kennedy)
17
Defendant argues that four of the remaining Plaintiffs fail to show a triable issue of fact
18
because their exemption requests were based on “broad invocations” of prayer and/or the belief
19
that their body was the temple of the Holy Spirit. Cross Mot. at 8. Based on the record before it,
20
however, the Court finds that at least one genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs’
21
asserted religious beliefs were sincerely held precludes summary judgment.
22
Each of these Plaintiffs articulated “facially religious objections grounded in Biblical
23
teachings.” See Eshom v. King Cnty., 812 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1199 (W.D. Wash. 2025). For
24
example, Mr. Rolland’s exemption request cited various passages of scripture (including Exodus
25
15:26) and explained that, consistent with his religious beliefs, he had not taken pain medications
26
or the flu vaccine. See Dkt. No. 77-3 (“Rolland Decl.”) ¶ 13, Ex. C at 16. Mr. Rolland also avers
27
that he “ha[s] a deeply held religious belief that my body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, as stated in
1 1 Corinthians 6:19,” which “forms the foundation of my approach to healthcare and medical
2 interventions.” Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Bircher similarly stated in his exemption request that he did not “want
3 to receive any COVID related vaccine because [his] body is the temple of God under the authority
4 of Jesus Christ our Savior,” citing passages from Corinthians, Psalms, and Philippians. Dkt. No.
5 77-10 (“Bircher Decl.”) ¶ 10, Ex. A at 9.
6 Mr. Poythress and Mr. Kennedy rely on similar evidence to support their claims. Mr.
7 Poythress’ religious exemption request invoked Psalm 118:8, explaining that “[a]s a child reading
8 the Bible, this verse sealed my faith in scripture [and] the church,” and cited Title VII of the Civil
9 Rights Act. Dkt. No. 77-4 (“Poythress Decl.”) ¶ 8, Ex. A at 8. Mr. Kennedy attests that he is a
10 Seventh Day Adventist and that his “religious beliefs are deeply rooted in [his] understanding of
11 the body as a temple for God’s spirit,” and that these beliefs guide his healthcare decisions. Dkt.
12 No. 77-11 (“Kennedy Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 4, 6–8. Mr. Kennedy’s exemption request pointed to these
13 beliefs, stating: “I believe the creator gives one body then judgment. My body is a tabernacle for
14 his spirit. I keep it clean. I do not smoke. I do not drink. I do not take drugs. I do not eat pork. I
15 do not tattoo. I am being raped by being forced to vaccinate[.]” Kennedy Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. A at 8.3
16
3 In their briefing, the parties dispute whether Mr. Kennedy’s beliefs are rooted in Seventh Day
17
Adventist doctrine, and whether he ever notified VTA of that belief. Cross Mot. at 8; Cross Opp.
at 11; Cross Reply at 12. Plaintiffs’ opposition refers to “RJN #2,” see Cross Opp. at 11, but no
18
such request for judicial notice was ever filed on the docket. Plaintiffs have filed only one request
for judicial notice of briefs filed in Detwiler concerning the petition for rehearing en banc. Dkt.
19
No. 164. Although those materials may be judicially noticeable, the Court declines the request for
judicial notice because they are unnecessary to the determination of the present motion. See Von
20
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Judicial
notice of legislative facts . . . is unnecessary.”); Lathan v. Ducart, No. 16-16551, 2017 WL
21
3976705, at *1 (9th Cir. June 16, 2017) (denying request for judicial notice of “documents filed in
the district court or orders entered by the district court, or of statutes, regulations, or published
22
opinions” as unnecessary). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has since considered and denied the
request for rehearing en banc. Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Med. Ctr., 172 F.4th 1072 (9th Cir.
23
2026).

24
To the extent Plaintiffs seek judicial notice of the information hyperlinked in their opposition brief
regarding Seventh Day Adventist beliefs, they have not met the standard to do so, and the Court
25
denies that request as well. Newman v. San Joaquin Delta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 272 F.R.D. 505, 516
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (“The party requesting judicial notice bears the burden of persuading the court
26
that the particular fact is not reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and
accurate determination by resort to a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”
27
(internal quotation omitted)). In any event, Mr. Kennedy expressly attested to his Seventh Day
1 Making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor at this stage, a factfinder could conclude that
2 these Plaintiffs asserted beliefs that are sincerely held and religious in their own scheme of things.
3 See U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). This is enough for these claims to survive summary
4 judgment. 4
5 Defendant counters by pointing to evidence that it contends would lead a factfinder to
6 conclude that the asserted beliefs were not sincerely held. But at summary judgment, the Court
7 must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and it may not resolve
8 credibility determinations or weigh competing evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. “Whether
9 Plaintiffs’ professed religious concerns were sincere or merely post-hoc rationalizations for
10 secular concerns presents precisely the type of factual dispute that courts may not resolve on
11 summary judgment.” Eshom, 812 F. Supp. 3d at 1201. And “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to
12 question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
13 litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). See
14 also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“the resolution of [whether a belief is religious] is not to turn upon
15 a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
16 acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
17 protection.”). Instead, under the circumstances presented here, “[t]he legitimacy of these faith-
18 based concerns are factual and credibility issues for the jury—not the Court.” Piccolo v. Mayo
19 Clinic, No. CV-22-02007-PHX-DJH, 2025 WL 821773, at *8 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2025) (citing
20 Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1176, n.3 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We may not . . .
21 question the legitimacy of [Plaintiff's] religious beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccinations.”)); see
22 also Detwiler, 172 F.4th at 1081 (Forrest, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “[a]n alleged belief can
23

24
4 VTA seemingly interprets Detwiler to reject any invocation of a body temple belief as
insufficient to establish a sincerely held religious belief. The Court finds it inaccurate to read
25
Detwiler that broadly. The plaintiff in Detwiler invoked a body temple belief, as well as Christian
beliefs against abortion, and her employer accepted these as sincerely held religious beliefs in
26
conflict with the vaccine mandate. 156 F.4th at 890–91. It was the plaintiff’s accompanying
concern about carcinogenic ingredients in vaccine testing that the Ninth Circuit deemed “personal
27
and secular.” Id. at 895. Unlike the plaintiff in Detwiler or cases following it, Plaintiffs here have
1 be proven insincere as a matter of evidence”). Accordingly, the Court denies VTA’s motion for
2 summary judgment as to these Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claims to the extent the motion is based on
3 their purported failure to identify evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that they
4 sincerely held a religious belief that conflicted with the vaccination mandate. Of course, whether
5 a factfinder will find Plaintiffs’ position credible or persuasive as a factual matter is an issue for a
6 later stage in the case, and the Court does not express any view here.
7 b. Fetal Cell Group (Plaintiffs Rodriguez, Sanchez, and Mena)
8 The Court finds that the Free Exercise claims of the remaining Plaintiffs—Mr. Rodriguez,
9 Ms. Sanchez, and Ms. Mena—also survive VTA’s motion for summary judgment. Here too,
10 factual issues exist as to whether each sincerely held a religious belief inconsistent with the
11 mandate. Each of these Plaintiffs cited opposition to the use of fetal cells in vaccine development
12 as incompatible with specific scripture, articulating a conflict with the vaccination mandate. See
13 Dkt. Nos. 77-7 (“Rodriguze Decl.”) ¶ 17, Ex. A at 10 (Mr. Rodriguez’s exemption request,
14 referencing “Abortion & Fetal ‘therapy’” in vaccine development as incompatible with his
15 religious beliefs), 77-9 (“Mena Decl.”) ¶ 13, Ex. A at 8 (Ms. Mena’s exemption request,
16 expressing her belief that the vaccine was developed using aborted fetal cells and that, as a
17 Christian opposed to abortion, she could not “use any product that takes its origin in abortion”),
18 77-13 (“Sanchez Decl.”) ¶ 21, Ex. A at 12 (Ms. Sanchez’s exemption request, explaining that she
19 believes the vaccines were developed from “fetal stem cells,” and receiving the vaccine “would
20 constitute a complicit action in the act of abortion,” which she believes is “strictly prohibited by
21 the Bible.”).5 This is sufficient at this stage to state a religious objection to COVID-19
22 vaccination. See Callahan, 658 F.2d at 685–86; see also Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 896 n.2.
23 VTA argues that these Plaintiffs’ claims “fail on sincerity or process grounds.” Cross Mot.
24
25
5 The fact that these Plaintiffs’ assertions about the use of fetal cells may be factually
unsubstantiated is not a permissible basis for granting summary judgment against them on their
26 claims. See Keene v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th
Cir. May 15, 2023) (remanding a COVID vaccine case where the plaintiff asserted a religious
27 conflict based on supposed fetal cell lines in the vaccine because “it seem[ed] that the district court
1 at 8. But this argument again invites the Court to engage in credibility determinations that are not
2 appropriate at the summary judgment stage, and does not acknowledge the record showing that
3 each of these Plaintiffs cited a specific religious belief they said conflicted with the mandate. See
4 Bator v. State of Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895
5 (cautioning that the Ninth Circuit’s holding “does not direct lower courts to examine the sincerity
6 or the reasonableness of a belief.”). Accordingly, the Court denies VTA’s motion for summary
7 judgment as to these Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claims to the extent the motion is based on
8 Plaintiffs’ purported failure to show they held a bona fide religious belief at odds with the vaccine
9 requirement. The Court again does not express any view here as to whether a reasonable
10 factfinder would ultimately find Plaintiffs’ position credible or persuasive.
11 ii. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment On Their Free Exercise
Claims
12
13 Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment on the Free Exercise claims, arguing the
14 religious exemption policy was non-neutral and not generally applicable. See Mot. at 4–10.6 But
15 the Court finds that basic disputes of fact regarding the details of the policy preclude summary
16 judgment in their favor.
17 a. Neutrality
18 “Starting with neutrality, ‘[a] government policy will not qualify as neutral if it is
19 specifically directed at religious practice.’” Bacon v. Woodward, 104 F.4th 744, 751 (9th Cir.
20 2024) (citing Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526 (cleaned up)). “A policy can fail this test if it
21 discriminates on its face, or if a religious exercise is otherwise its object.” Id. And “[a]
22 government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it ‘prohibits religious conduct
23 while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar
24 way,’ or if it provides ‘a mechanism for individualized exemptions.’” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526
25 (quoting Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533–34 (2021)); accord Fellowship of
26
6 Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary adjudication on the element of “state action”
27
for their First Amendment claims. Mot. at 9. “VTA does not dispute that it is a state actor.” Opp.
1 Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 686 (9th Cir. 2023).
2 In its prior order, the Court found that VTA’s vaccine mandate policy is facially and
3 operationally neutral. Rodriguez I, 2024 WL 4778049, at *4. Plaintiffs now argue that VTA’s
4 “religious exemption policy,” as opposed to its “vaccination mandate policy,” is non-neutral and
5 not generally applicable, triggering strict scrutiny. Mot at 4–10. Plaintiffs argue that the “VTA’s
6 religious exemption policy is found summarized in three (3) slides.” Mot. at 5 (citing Dkt. No.
7 144-1, Ex. A). The thrust of Plaintiffs’ motion relies on this exhibit to argue that VTA used
8 criteria that impermissibly discriminated against some religious exemption requests. Mot. at 4–10.
9 Based on the record before it, however, the Court concludes that fundamental questions
10 remain as to the exact contours of VTA’s vaccine exemption policy. The three slides that
11 Plaintiffs contend constitute the “religious exemption policy” appear to be part of a larger slide
12 deck detailing a broader exemption process. Lending support to this conclusion, the slides
13 Plaintiffs submit begin by addressing “Group C,” without any reference to the “Group A” or
14 “Group B” that presumably preceded these slides. The Court therefore finds that the more likely
15 inference is that Plaintiffs had a general exemption process for its vaccine mandate that covered
16 multiple kinds of exemption requests (including, for example, medical- or disability-based
17 exemptions), not solely a religious exemption process. Additionally, the first two of these slides
18 appear to list examples of scenarios that the VTA might encounter as it evaluated religious
19 exemption requests. The document does not say—or suggest—that VTA followed up only as to
20 certain assertions of religious beliefs but not others.7 But in any event, the partial document does
21 not conclusively establish what actually happened in practice.8
22
7 The last slide of this deck is somewhat unclear. It states that “Shaw HRC will approve
23
Clarification forms received based on previously discussed criteria.” Dkt. No. 144-1 at 3. This
includes “Consistent application of beliefs” “regarding fetal cells” and “against all preventative
24
medicine because [VTA employees seeking religious exemption] see that as ‘changing’ their
body.” Id. It also includes instances where “God told them directly not to take this specific
25
vaccine.” Id. To the extent that this slide indicates that VTA accepted some, but not all, religious
exemption requests at face value, it arguably could constitute a facially non-neutral policy. But
26
this is a question for trial, because the parties dispute the basic facts of how the vaccine exemption
process even worked in practice.
27
1 At bottom, the parties fundamentally dispute what policy governed the VTA’s exemption
2 process. Setting aside the slide deck, Plaintiffs assert in their reply that a “blueprint” document
3 guided the religious exemption process. Reply at 7–8 (referencing Dkt. No. 144-3, Ex. C at 5–6).9
4 They argue that the “blueprint” is facially non-neutral because it expressly invited the VTA
5 committee to ask applicants with certain beliefs for additional clarification about the sincerity of
6 those beliefs. Id. VTA, for its part, argues that it was not the blueprint document but “EEOC
7 guidance that governed [its religious exemption] process,” Opp. at 11,10 and it presents testimony
8

9
deck that Plaintiffs offer as the purported “religious exemption policy,” is not authenticated and
therefore cannot support Plaintiffs’ motion. Id. Plaintiffs respond with evidence that Exhibit C to
10
the Reinach Declaration was authenticated by VTA’s HR representative Cassandra Leventon in
her deposition. Reply at 7 (citing Dkt. No. 144-3, Ex. C). Plaintiffs’ reply relies on Exhibit C to
11
make further argument about a “blueprint” document that resembles—but does not duplicate—
Exhibit A to the Reinach Declaration. And Plaintiffs point to no testimony authenticating Exhibit
12
A. Although the “blueprint” document in Exhibit C contains information similar to the “policy”
document at Exhibit A, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not properly authenticated Exhibit A.
13
But regardless, based on the entirety of the record, factual issues about what exactly the policy was
preclude summary judgment on this issue.
14

9 This “blueprint” document appears to be an email soliciting feedback, not a clear reflection of a
15
final policy. But if it accurately reflects how VTA eventually handled religious exemption
requests, VTA would face significant constitutional hurdles. For example, for “Criteria #4,”
16
which addresses instances where an employee stated that their “religion says they have a right to
choose/they have a right to follow their conscious [sic],” VTA’s senior human resources analyst
17
wrote in an email that VTA would “[d]eny if the employee cannot show where the religion says so
in writing.” Dkt. No. 144-3 at 5–6. This is the type of requirement that courts have found to be
18
flatly unconstitutional. See Damiano v. Grants Pass Sch. Dist. No. 7, 140 F.4th 1117, 1155 (9th
Cir. 2025) (“[I]n the context of Free Exercise claims, it is well-established that an individual may
19
sincerely hold a religious belief that is not reflected in a biblical passage or scripture.”); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9, (1987) (“So long as one’s faith is
20
religiously based at the time it is asserted, it should not matter, for constitutional purposes,
whether that faith derived from revelation, study, up-bringing, gradual evolution, or some source
21
that appears entirely incomprehensible.”).

22
10 VTA asks the Court to take judicial notice of these EEOC documents. Dkt. No. 146. Federal
Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to
23
reasonable dispute” because they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Under this rule, “[j]udicial notice is appropriate for
24
records and reports of administrative bodies.” United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less
in Fresno Cnty., 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). But “[j]ust because [a]
25
document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within
that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
26
F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, when taking judicial notice of documents, a court should
“identify . . . which fact or facts it is noticing from” the documents. Id. The Court therefore takes
27
judicial notice of the existence of these documents. But to the extent that VTA seeks to show that
1 that the VTA review committee sought to evaluate whether an employee’s religious belief
2 conflicted with the vaccine mandate. See Dkt. No. 62-1, Exhibit C at 88:2–7. In other words, it
3 sought to understand whether the employee had a sincerely held belief that was rooted in religion
4 and that conflicted with the vaccine requirement. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833; Callahan, 658 F.2d
5 at 686. Following up with an employee to ensure that his or her exemption request is based on a
6 sincerely held religious belief is not inherently unlawful: it is necessary to ensure that the Free
7 Exercise Clause is not transformed into “a blanket privilege” for plaintiffs “‘to make [their] own
8 standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.’” Africa v.
9 Com. of Pa., 662 F.2d 1025, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215–16); see also
10 Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 897.
11 Plaintiffs rely on Does 1-11 v. Board of Regents of University of Colorado, 100 F.4th
12 1251, 1269 (10th Cir. 2024), and UnifySCC v. Cody, 2022 WL 2357068 (N.D. Cal. June 30,
13 2022), to assert that the blueprint “is a policy/procedure that is clearly subject to the First
14 Amendment.” Reply at 8. But in those cases, the parties did not dispute the contents of the policy
15 that governed the accommodations process. See Does 1-11, 100 F.4th at 1269–79 (separately
16 analyzing a “September 1 Policy” and “September 24 Policy,” neither of which was in dispute);
17 Cody, 2022 WL 2357068, at *9–*10 (separately analyzing the County’s vaccination mandate and
18 accommodations policies, and finding the latter operationally non-neutral because it was
19 undisputed that it prioritized transfer requests from employees in high-risk roles who had medical
20 or disability exemptions over similarly situated employees seeking religious exemptions). Here,
21 by contrast, there is a fundamental factual dispute regarding the details of what policy actually
22 governed the exemption process. Thus, considering the record in the light most favorable to the
23 nonmoving party, there are material issues of fact as to whether the exemption policy was facially
24 or operationally neutral.
25 b. General Applicability
26 “[A] government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it ‘prohibits
27 religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted
1 104 F.4th at 751 (quoting Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526). “Although ‘[t]he mere existence of an
2 exemption that affords some minimal governmental discretion does not destroy a law’s general
3 applicability, a ‘formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions’ does violate the general
4 applicability requirement.” Rodriguez I, 2024 WL 4778049, at *4 (quoting Stormans, 794 F.3d at
5 1082, and then Fulton, 593 U.S. at 536).
6 Here, the same factual issues precluding summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ neutrality
7 arguments also preclude it as to the general applicability issue. Fundamentally, Plaintiffs have not
8 adduced uncontested evidence about the operation of VTA’s religious exemption policy. VTA
9 submits testimony indicating that the exemption process sought to understand the basis of
10 employees’ claims that “due to their religious beliefs they are prevented from getting the vaccine.”
11 Dkt. No. 62-1, Ex. C at 88:2–4. This kind of inquiry is not inherently impermissible. See
12 Callahan, 658 F.2d at 684–86; see also Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895.
13 Not much about the factual record has changed since the Court’s prior order. As the Court
14 previously noted, the record reflects that VTA’s process in evaluating exemptions may or may not
15 have entailed the kind of discretion required to trigger strict scrutiny. Rodriguez I, 2024 WL
16 4778049, at *5 (observing that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, “an exemption process
17 merits strict scrutiny when it ‘invites’ one individual to exercise ‘sole discretion’ in determining
18 ‘which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude.’” (quoting Fulton, 593
19 U.S. at 537)). That remains true on the parties’ supplemental motions for summary judgment.
20 The record reflects that the VTA committee’s process may have involved “enough individualized
21 discretion to ‘permit discriminatory treatment of religion or religiously motivated conduct.’”
22 Rodriguez I, 2024 WL 4778049, at *5 (quoting Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1082). For example, if the
23 “blueprint” document became VTA’s official policy, it and other evidence in the record could
24 “suggest that the committee evaluated the sincerity of applicants’ religious beliefs based on the
25 perceived consistency of applicants’ statements and ‘proof of consistent adherence over [a] long
26 period of time.’” Id. (citing Dkt. No. 80-1, Exs. C, M). A reasonable factfinder could conclude
27 that this approach impermissibly “passe[d] judgment upon or presuppose[d] the illegitimacy of
1 638 (2018).
2 On the other hand, VTA has presented evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could
3 conclude that the exemption process was “tied directly to limited, particularized, business-related,
4 objective criteria” and therefore “d[id] not create a regime of unfettered discretion that would
5 permit discriminatory treatment of religion.” Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1082. As the Court
6 previously noted, “evidence in the record suggests that the committee frequently denied
7 exemptions for the religiously-neutral reason that applicants did not answer the committee’s
8 questions or participate in the committee’s process.” Rodriguez I, 2024 WL 2778049, at *5. The
9 record suggests, for example, that this religiously neutral reason was cited as the basis for the
10 denial of Mr. Rodriguez’s and Mr. Sanchez’s exemption requests. Dkt. No. 80-1, Ex. M (stating
11 the “Denial Reason” for their requests was, respectively, “Refusal to answer questions” and “Did
12 not want to answer the questions”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of VTA, there
13 remains a genuine dispute of fact as to what discretion the VTA committee exercised and how,
14 and thus also as to the general applicability of both the vaccine mandate policy and the religious
15 exemption policy. The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their
16 claims arising under the Free Exercise Clause.
17 B. Establishment Clause
18 The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
19 of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Both Plaintiffs and VTA argue that they are entitled to
20 summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. The parties also dispute the
21 standard that should govern this claim. Plaintiffs rely on Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244
22 (1982), for the blanket principle that the Establishment Clause supports a claim whenever the
23 government “‘aid[s] one religion’ or ‘prefer[s] one religion over another.’” Reply at 11 (citing 456
24 U.S. at 246). Plaintiffs argue that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to VTA’s vaccine
25 exemption policy, asserting that the “blueprint was a policy or practice that concerned religious
26 beliefs or religious exercise, and subject to the Establishment Clause.” Mot. at 11.
27 As an initial matter, the Court does not read Larson as broadly as Plaintiffs do. “Larson
1 whether the law facially differentiates among religions.” Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 695. In other
2 words, Larson only applies if Plaintiffs can show that VTA had a policy that facially differentiated
3 among religions such that it favored some over others. “If no such facial preference exists,” under
4 prior Supreme Court precedent, courts would “proceed to apply the customary three-pronged
5 Establishment Clause inquiry derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).” Id. But as
6 the Court noted in a prior order, recent Supreme Court precedent instructs that the Lemon test has
7 been abandoned and that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “reference to historical
8 practices and understandings” of the challenged conduct. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 510; see also
9 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014) (framing the Court’s inquiry as
10 determining “whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long
11 followed in Congress and the state legislatures”).
12 Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim therefore faces a fork in the analysis. If they are
13 able to establish that VTA had a religious exemption policy that facially differentiated among
14 religions such that it preferred certain religions over others, the policy would be subject to strict
15 scrutiny under Larson. See Cath. Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Lab. & Indus. Rev.
16 Comm’n, 605 U.S. 238 (2025) (applying Larson’s standard to a facially non-neutral statute). If,
17 on the other hand, Plaintiffs don’t show that the policy was facially non-neutral, their claim would
18 be analyzed under Kennedy with reference to “historical practices and understandings” regarding
19 vaccination exemption policies. Depending on what the facts show, the Court might need to
20 examine, for example, any relevant historical practices and understanding of policies that
21 differentiated among bases claimed for an exemption. See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 510; see also
22 UnifySCC v. Cody, 2025 WL 215524, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2025) (noting and rejecting
23 defendant’s argument that its exemption process, which favored vaccine exemption requests based
24 on disability over those based on religion, had a historical basis in “‘preferential consideration’ to
25 disabled persons [that] has been permitted since at least the Civil War.”).
26 Based on the record before it, and for the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that
27 disputes of fact continue to exist with respect to how VTA’s religious exemption process actually
1 the Establishment Clause claims, because a factual dispute exists as to what the relevant policy
2 even was.
3 As to VTA’s motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that it also fails to meet its
4 burden. Having held that factual issues preclude summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on the as-
5 applied Establishment Clause claims, the Court finds that summary judgment is not warranted in
6 Defendants’ favor either.11 To the extent that Plaintiffs can show that VTA’s exemption process
7 facially “discriminate[s] among religions,” Larson, 456 U.S. at 252, such a policy would appear to
8 express a “denominational preference” that would subject it to strict scrutiny. See Cath. Charities,
9 605 U.S. at 248. In short, identifying the correct standard of review continues to depend on what
10 the facts ultimately show.
11 Additionally, Defendant does not appear to have identified the relevant historical analogue
12 for analysis under Kennedy if that ends up being the applicable test. VTA asserts that its “vaccine
13 policy is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition” because “vaccine mandates are among
14 the most historically grounded exercises of governmental public health authority in American
15 law.” Opp. at 14. But whether the vaccination mandate was lawful as a general matter is not the
16 issue. The issue is whether VTA distinguished some bases for exemptions from others, and if so,
17 why. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (“There exists an overriding
18 interest in keeping the government—whether it be the legislature or the courts—out of the
19 business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that governmental
20 approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another
21 is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.” (cleaned up and
22 quotation omitted)).
23 C. Governmental Immunity from Plaintiffs’ FEHA Claims
24 VTA also moves for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims, arguing it is
25
11 VTA revoked its COVID vaccine requirement, and with it the exemption process for the
26
mandate, in November 2022. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiffs raise a facial challenge under the
Establishment Clause to the vaccine mandate or the religious exemption policy, those claims are
27
moot. See Baker-Pacius v. Dep’t of Educ. Of the City of New York, 2026 WL 693521, at *5
1 immune from liability for decisions intended to promote public health under California
2 Government Code § 855.4. Cross Mot. at 13–14. Plaintiffs argue that § 855.4 immunity does not
3 extend to ministerial decisions implementing public health policies. Cross Opp. at 13.12 In
4 supplemental briefing, they also assert that even if governmental immunity under § 855.4 shields
5 VTA from damages, it does not bar their FEHA claims to the extent they seek injunctive or
6 declaratory relief. See Dkt. No. 207. The Court rejects both of Plaintiffs’ arguments.
7 The California Government Claims Act provides that “public entities are immune from
8 [noncontractual] liability except as provided by statute . . . and that public entities are immune
9 where their employees are immune, except as otherwise provided by statute.” Caldwell v.
10 Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 980 (1995). The purpose of the Act is to “‘assur[e] . . . judicial
11 abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to
12 coordinate branches of government[,]’ because ‘[a]ny wider judicial review . . . would place the
13 court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a
14 coordinate branch of government.’” Greenwood v. City of Los Angeles, 89 Cal. App. 5th 851, 863
15 (2023) (quoting Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793 (1968)).
16 As part of the Government Claims Act, Section 855.4 provides:

17 (a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to
18
promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or
19 controlling the communication of disease within the community if the
decision whether the act was or was not to be performed was the result
20 of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public
employee, whether or not such discretion be abused.
21
(b) Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
22
caused by an act or omission in carrying out with due care a decision
23 described in subdivision (a).
24 Cal. Gov’t Code § 855.4. “By its plain language, section 855.4 . . . immunizes any decision
25 relating to the control of the communication of disease that is the result of the discretion vested in
26
12 Plaintiffs also assert that VTA waived this defense by not raising it in its Answer. Cross Opp. at
27
12. VTA separately moved for leave to file an amended answer to add this defense, which the
1 the public entity. Such a decision is immune, whether or not such discretion [was] abused.” City
2 of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 5th 129, 144 (2021) (internal quotations omitted).
3 Thus, to establish immunity under § 855.4, VTA must show that “any injury resulting from its
4 failure to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs [or resulting from its alleged harassment,
5 retaliation, or discrimination based on those beliefs] was the consequence of a discretionary
6 decision made in service of promoting the public health.” UnifySCC v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, No.
7 22-CV-01019-BLF, 2026 WL 497573, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2026).
8 Allos v. Poway Unified School District, 112 Cal. App. 5th 822 (2025), recently considered
9 the availability of § 855.4 immunity for FEHA claims related to the implementation of workplace
10 COVID-19 policies. In Allos, a school district employee sued for failure to accommodate after her
11 employer refused to allow her to work from home following a return to office mandate. Id. at 829.
12 The plaintiff had several health-related concerns, including an asserted “vaccine allergy” which
13 she contended was a disability that prevented her from working in person. Id. at 837. The Court
14 of Appeal held that the district’s “decisions concerning vaccine requirements” were protected by
15 § 855.4 immunity, barring Plaintiff’s FEHA claims because they stemmed from the district’s
16 discretionary decisions concerning the control of COVID-19. Id. at 834.
17 Allos’ reasoning was applied to a COVID-19 vaccination mandate in UnifySCC v. County
18 of Santa Clara. See 2026 WL 497573, at *4. There, several Santa Clara County employees filed
19 a class action lawsuit against the County, asserting claims for violations of the First Amendment
20 and failure to accommodate their religious rights under FEHA. See UnifySCC v. County of Santa
21 Clara, 22-CV-01019-BLF, Dkt. No. 55 (Amended Complaint) ¶¶ 63–97. The plaintiffs were
22 granted religious exemptions to the County’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement, but were not
23 permitted to work in person and were instead placed on administrative leave. 2026 WL 497573,
24 at *1. The plaintiffs challenged this decision because they had previously been allowed to work in
25 person so long as they masked and tested regularly for the virus, but that practice was no longer
26 permitted after the County’s vaccination mandate went into effect. Id. Finding Allos persuasive,
27 the court held that to the extent that the plaintiffs’ injuries stemmed from “the County’s policy and
1 service of promoting the public health.” Id. at *4. For this reason, § 855.4 immunity barred the
2 plaintiffs’ FEHA claim.
3 The Court likewise finds here that § 855.4 immunity bars Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims for
4 damages. As in Allos and UnifySCC, Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims stem from VTA’s “discretionary,
5 public-health-related decisions.” Id. at *4. VTA proffers undisputed evidence that it implemented
6 its vaccine mandate to “help prevent infection and transmission of COVID-19 within the
7 workplace, at VTA facilities, and to members of the public who depend on VTA services.” Dkt.
8 No. 62-4, Ex. 6 at 12. It did so after “[t]he WHO, CDC, CDPH, and County Health [] determined
9 that vaccination is the most effective way of preventing the spread of COVID-19, protecting
10 against both transmission and serious illness or death.” Id.13; see also Dkt. No. 62-1, Ex. A at
11 20:25–21:5 (“At some point, the decision was made that we would have a mandatory vaccine
12 because, based on available information, that was the safest way to keep the majority of our . . .
13 employees, primarily, well and alive.”). The vaccine policy further indicates that VTA’s “Human
14 Resources Department, or designee, will review all exemption requests on a case-by-case basis
15 and engage in an interactive process with individuals who request an exemption” from the vaccine
16 policy. Dkt. No. 62-4, Ex. 6 at 14. And VTA submits evidence showing that it acted with due
17 care: “it engaged Shaw HR Consulting, developed criteria based on EEOC and DFEH guidance,
18 created a review committee, provided clarification opportunities, and offered an appeal process.”
19 Cross Mot. at 14; see also Dkt. No. 62-1, Ex. D at 20:15-28:10; 39:21-25; Dkt. No. 62-4, Ex. 6 at
20 20; Dkt. No. 62-1, Ex. B at 26:7-27:12 and Ex. C at 11:5-13; Dkt. No. 62-4, Ex. 49 at 107–11;
21 Dkt. No. 62-1, Ex. A at 11:12–23, 30:1–6, 38:18–39:8.
22 Plaintiffs do not contest VTA’s evidence or argument on these points. See Cross Opp. at
23 13–14. They argue only that § 855.4 does not immunize VTA from FEHA damages liability
24 because VTA’s decisions implementing its vaccination policy to evaluate religious exemptions
25 were ministerial, not discretionary. Id. at 13; Dkt. No. 207 (refining Plaintiffs’ arguments to assert
26

27
13 “WHO” refers to the World Health Organization; “CDC” refers to the United States Center for
1 that if § 855.4 applies, it would bar claims for damages but not equitable or declaratory relief). In
2 making this argument, Plaintiffs assert that VTA implemented its religious exemption policy
3 under its mandatory legal duties under FEHA.14
4 The Court finds these arguments unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with
5 the conclusion in UnifySCC that “FEHA liability does not override section 855.4’s grant of
6 immunity.” UnifySCC, 2026 WL 497573 at *5. Plaintiffs’ arguments echo those that were
7 rejected by the courts in UnifySCC and Allos. See UnifySCC, 2026 WL 497573, at *4–*5
8 (addressing arguments by the plaintiffs that the “County is not immune from ‘a mandatory duty
9 required by FEHA to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs”); see also Allos, 112 Cal. App.
10 5th at 835 (rejecting similar arguments as “conclusory” where plaintiff “provide[d] no explanation
11 of how PUSD’s decisions were inconsistent with the duties allegedly violated.”). The Court also
12 rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that the California “Court of Appeal [has] squarely held that
13 governmental discretionary immunity does not protect public entities from direct FEHA liability.”
14 Cross Opp. at 14. Plaintiffs rely on DeJung v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 533 (2008), and
15 Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 989 n.9 (1995), for this argument, but “[t]hose cases are
16 inapposite because they concerned discretionary immunity for public employees under Section
17 820.2 and derivative immunity for public employers under section 815.2.” Jenkins v. Dep’t of
18 Justice, No. F087260, 2025 WL 729659, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2025) (holding that Cal.
19 Gov. Code § 855.6 granted a public entity immunity from FEHA discrimination claims).
20 Plaintiffs assert that although VTA may have immunity for implementing a vaccine policy,
21 it is “not immune from how it handled mandatory FEHA religious exemptions to the policy.”
22 Cross Opp. at 13. But Plaintiffs have not identified any ministerial acts by VTA. Nor could they,
23 because as one California Court of Appeal recognized, unlike an individual, “[a] public entity . . .
24

25
14 VTA argues, and the Court agrees, that there is some tension between Plaintiffs’ contentions
about the level of discretion claimed with respect to the federal versus state claims. Plaintiffs have
26
long argued that VTA exercised “absolute discretion” in implementing the religious exemption
policy as part of its vaccination mandate, triggering strict scrutiny for Plaintiffs’ federal claims.
27
Dkt. No. 80 at 39. Plaintiffs now assert that VTA’s decisions regarding the very same process
1 cannot inadvertently decide something. And absent a legal mandate to take a particular course of
2 action, a public entity also cannot make a decision merely by following instructions.” Greenwood,
3 89 Cal. App. 5th 851, 862. Here, the Court finds that the “determination of whether a particular
4 accommodation could be approved goes to the heart of the public health policy at issue.”
5 UnifySCC, 2026 WL 497573, at *5 (citing Greenwood, 89 Cal. App. 5th at 864). As in UnifySCC,
6 Plaintiffs do not dispute that their request to be exempt from the vaccination requirement
7 “implicate[d] public health policy decisions.” Id. Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that
8 VTA’s actions were ministerial. Id.15
9 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that their FEHA claims are not subject to summary judgment
10 under § 855.4 because they also seek injunctive and declaratory relief, and that the Government
11 Claims Act does not bar these forms of relief. Dkt. No. 207. Assuming without deciding that
12 Plaintiffs are correct, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs would not be entitled to such relief on
13 their FEHA claims. Undisputedly, VTA revoked its COVID vaccine mandate in November 2022.
14 Any challenge to VTA’s vaccination mandate and its accompanying religious exemption process
15 is therefore moot. See Schmidt v. City of Pasadena, No. LA CV21-08769 JAK (JCX), 2024 WL
16 1640913, at *27 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2024) (dismissing claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
17 as “remedies, not independent causes of action,” but noting that even if sought as remedies, a
18 request for such relief would be mooted by the Defendant’s rescinding of its vaccination policy).
19 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to
20 Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to those
21 claims.
22
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15 Plaintiffs do not discuss the “due care” provision of § 855.4(b), and the Court concludes that
24
they have not pointed to anything in the record that establishes any material dispute of fact on that
25 basis. In their opposition to VTA’s motion for leave to amend its answer to add an immunity
defense, Plaintiffs argued that they needed additional discovery on this point. Dkt. No. 192 at 14.
26 The Court gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to submit an offer of proof explaining what, if any,
additional discovery was needed, Dkt. No. 199 at 6, but they did not file one. And as a practical
27 matter, any argument that VTA did not act with due care in how it administered its religions
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's motion for summary
3 || judgment, Dkt. No. 143. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
4 || adjudication as to the element of state action on their federal claims, and otherwise DENIES the
5 || motion. The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 164.
6 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant VTA’s motion for
7 || summary judgment, Dkt. No. 145. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for
8 summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claims, and otherwise DENIES the motion. The Court
9 || also GRANTS Defendant’s request for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 146.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
1] Dated: 8/12/2026
se Maspyrsrd Uh i
B HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428978. Public record. Not legal advice.