# Victor

> District Court, S.D. Florida · July 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428732

## Case

- **Full name:** Zephyrin Victor v. El Tiesto Cafe Group Corp
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Florida
- **Decided:** July 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
CASE NO. 25-61437-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT

ZEPHYRIN VICTOR,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EL TIESTO CAFE GROUP CORP,
a Florida Corporation,

Defendant.
________________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Bill of Costs, ECF No.
32, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Non-Taxable Expenses and Costs, ECF
No. 34. The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District Judge, referred the
Motions to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for appropriate disposition.
ECF Nos. 33; 35; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); S.D. Fla. L.R., Mag. R. 1. Upon thorough
review of the Motion, the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the
undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Bill of Costs be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART and that the Motion for Attorney’s Fees be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12181–12189 (“ADA”). Plaintiff Zephyrin Victor (“Plaintiff”), a blind and visually
disabled person, sued Defendant El Tiesto Cafe Group Corp (“Defendant”), the operator
of three Dominican-Japanese fusion food restaurants, for violating Title III of the ADA
through the operation of Defendant’s website. ECF No. 1. Defendant defaulted, and this
Court issued a final judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. ECF No. 31. Now, Plaintiff seeks an
award of reasonable attorney’s fees, non-taxable expenses, and costs. ECF Nos. 32; 34.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moves under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 for attorney’s fees in the amount of

$6,417.50 and non-taxable expenses in the amount of $1,500.00. Plaintiff also moves
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for taxable
costs in the amount of $525.50. It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a prevailing party because
a final default judgment was entered in his favor against Defendant.
A. Attorney’s Fees
Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.”
42 U.S.C. § 12205. “[A] prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees
in all but special circumstances.” Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 951
(11th Cir. 1999) (applying Title VII standard for awarding prevailing party attorney’s fees

to ADA fee disputes (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978))).
There are no “special circumstances” present here under which this Court should
not award Plaintiff his fees and costs. Herrera v. Guaca-Mole-Texmex-Mim LLC, No. 25-
22974-CIV-BECERRA, 2025 WL 2790605, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2025) (awarding
attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to plaintiff who won on default judgment). Thus,
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and non-taxable litigation
expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees,
multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. See
Norman v. House. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A
reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating “the prevailing
market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)); see also Barnes, 168 F.3d at 438 (“The significant disparity in their
experience should be reflected in the rates awarded.”); Brown v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty.,
No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL 3282584, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2010)
(reducing the requested hourly rate).
The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with
prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In addition to evidence presented by
the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own
knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an
independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303
(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the power to
make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which the
district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the
reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the
outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of
counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters
over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise.
Plaintiff seeks an attorney’s fees award in the total amount of $6,417.50. Plaintiff
requests an hourly rate of $425.00 for 15.1 hours of work done by one attorney,
Aleksandra Kravets. The Motion is supported by an affidavit from Ms. Kravets and billing
records. ECF No. 34-1.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
When “determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of
compensable hours is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must consider twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”
of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market
rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and
reputation. The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing
the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own
experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s
fees.

Meyrowitz v. Brendel, 16-81793-CIV-MARRA, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
17, 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Generally, “[a] reasonable hourly
rate is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel in the relevant legal market, but
yet does not produce a windfall to that attorney.” Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 10-
21418-CIV-TORRES, 2011 WL 9364952, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2011), subsequently
aff’d, 492 F. App’x 73 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95
(1984)).
This Court has considered Ms. Kravets’ affidavit and the twelve factors. Ms.
Kravets has over nine years of litigation experience, including specialized experience in
ADA civil rights cases. Based on that and her practice, reputation, and legal experience,
Ms. Kravets’s typical hourly rate for this type of ADA case is $450.00 per hour. However,

Plaintiff indicates that he and his counsel will accept “an across-the board reduced rate”
of $425.00 per hour for the time incurred in this particular litigation. ECF No. 34 at 11.
Comparable fee awards indicate that $425.00 is a reasonable rate. See, e.g.,
Ariza v. Earth’s Goddess Holistics & Juicebar, LLC, No. 22-23522-CIV-MOORE, 2023
WL 6419426, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2023) (awarding experienced litigators an hourly
rate of $425.00). Other judges in this District have already recognized that a higher
hourly rate of $450.00 for similar work in ADA cases is reasonable. See Fernandez v.
Elevate Ent. Grp. LLC, No. 24-81060-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 2024 WL 5152159, at *10
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2024) (“The reasonableness of a $450.00 hourly rate is supported by
other Southern District of Florida ADA decisions.”). Accordingly, the requested “reduced”

hourly rate of $425.00 is approved.
2. Hours Reasonably Expended
Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable
number of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of
“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable
to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or
experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (cleaned up). Fee applicants must
exclude hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be
“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434. “If the court concluded that the number of claimed hours is excessive,
it may engage in ‘an across-the-board cut,’ so long as it provides adequate explanation
for the decrease.” Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2001).

Courts need not become “green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838
(2011). The essential goal for the court is to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing
perfection.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, Ms. Kravets spent 15.1 hours working on the case. The
billing records reflect a reasonable amount of time spent doing compensable tasks, such
as preparing a Motion for Default Judgment. See Ariza v. Pei Wei Asian Diner, LLC, No.
25-23210-CIV-ALTONAGA/REID, 2025 WL 2791431, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2025)
(finding that 13.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time to litigate an ADA case through
default judgment). The undersigned finds the number of hours claimed to be reasonable.

3. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment
“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that
presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does
not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining
a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). The Supreme Court
has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify a deviation from the
lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in
the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value,
as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s performance includes
an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; and 3)
when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves
exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–56.
Here, the undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar calculation in
this case. Therefore, Plaintiff should be awarded for 15.1 hours of work by Ms. Kravets

at a rate of $425.00 per hour. A straightforward calculation reaches the total attorney’s
fee award of $6,417.50.
B. Non-Taxable Expenses
As stated above, the ADA allows a court to award “litigation expenses” and “costs”
to a prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Here, Plaintiff seeks “non-taxable litigation costs
and/or expert expenses in the amount of $1,500.00.” ECF No. 34 at 13. Plaintiff requests
these expenses to cover “WebNG’s services rendered in connection with auditing and
testing [Defendant’s] website and confirming the existence of significant deficiencies prior
to this lawsuit being filed.” Id. Plaintiff submits an invoice and other documentary exhibits
to support his request. ECF No. 34-2.

“[E]xpert witness fees are ordinarily not taxable costs; however, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 12205 such fees may be taxed as litigation expenses in ADA cases.” Herrera v.
APQ Coconut Grove FL, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2025) (citations
omitted). The undersigned finds that the requested amount for expert services in this
case is reasonable and should be awarded. See Fernandez v. GS Aventura LLC, No. 22-
80653-CIV-SMITH, 2024 WL 1044972, at *9 (awarding expert fees of $4,275.00 as
“reasonable and recoverable” litigation expense in ADA case). Accordingly, Plaintiff
should be awarded $1,500.00 in non-taxable litigation expenses.
C. Taxable Costs
Plaintiff seeks $525.50 in costs awarded to the prevailing party. Rule 54(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a
court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to

the prevailing party.” Rule 54 “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the
prevailing party which [the opposing party] must overcome.” Manor Healthcare Corp. v.
Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court may tax costs for the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters,
and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services
under section 1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920.
In the instant case, Plaintiff represents that he incurred taxable costs in the amount
of $525.50, consisting of the case filing fee in the amount of $405.00, service of process
fees in the amount of $75.00, and costs for copies of documents that were obtained for
use in this case for $45.50. The undersigned finds that the filing fee and copying fee are
recoverable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
As to the service of process fee, the costs of service are routine expenses in
litigation and compensable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. However, when a Plaintiff uses a
private process server such costs are recoverable “provided the rate charged does not
exceed the cost of having a U.S. Marshal effect service.” EEOC v. W & O, Inc., 213 F. 3d
600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000). The current rate is “$65 per hour (or portion thereof) for each
item served by one U.S. Marshals Service employee, agent, or contractor, plus travel
costs and any other out-of-pocket expenses.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3).
In this case, “Plaintiff provides no explanation why the Court should award costs
for service above that amount.” Watson v. Sea Grill of Coral Gables, LLC, No. 22-20601-

CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 2022 WL 18108547, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 22-20601-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 2023 WL 34690 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 4, 2023); see also Caplan v. C4S LLC, No. 22-20285-CIV-ALTMAN/REID, 2023
WL 3026619, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2023) (awarding over $163.00 in process server fees
only where plaintiff explained that process server was forced to make two different
delivery attempts), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-20285-CIV-
ALTMAN/REID, 2023 WL 3026057 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2023). As these fees were incurred
for service of one file including the summons and complaint, see ECF No. 32-1 at 5, the
undersigned recommends that the service fees be reduced to $65.00. See Kennedy v.
Omegagas & Oil, LLC, No. 17-80103-CIV-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2019 WL 6040301,

at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2019) (reducing $279.00 service fee request to $180.00), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 17-80103-CIV-ROSENBERG/BRANNON, 2019 WL
6040306 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2019). In sum, Plaintiff should be awarded taxable costs in
the amount of $515.50, consisting of the case filing fee in the amount of $405.00, service
of process fees in the amount of $65.00, and copying costs that were obtained for use in
this case for $45.50.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion
for Bill of Costs, ECF No. 32, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART such that
Plaintiff be awarded $515.50 in taxable costs. The Motion for Bill of Costs should
otherwise be DENIED. The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion
for Attorneys Fees, ECF No. 34, be GRANTED such that Plaintiff be awarded attorney’s
fees in the amount of $6,417.50 and non-taxable expenses in the amount of $1,500.00.
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any Party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
finding and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The Parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
DONE and SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 28th day of July 2026.
Pe bn I
PATRICK M. HUNT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas
All Counsel of Record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428732. Public record. Not legal advice.