# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · August 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428680

## Case

- **Full name:** Joel Alexander Salazar Gutierrez v. United States District Court, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** August 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428680

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOEL ALEXANDER SALAZAR )
GUTIERREZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-1210-G
)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, )
et al., )
)
Respondents. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Joel Alexander Salazar Gutierrez, a noncitizen1 and El Salvadorean
national proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), Doc. 1,
challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). United States District Judge Charles B. Goodwin referred this
matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-
(C). Doc. 4. The undersigned set an expedited briefing schedule, Doc. 6, and the Petition
is at issue. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss
the Petition in part as moot, deny the Petition in part, and dismiss the Petition in part due
to a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over particular claims.2

1 Unless quoting, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 Although Respondents filed a “Response in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” not a motion, they seek dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
I. Background
Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States on August 19, 2021,
without inspection or admission near Hidalgo, Texas, and was taken into immigration

custody on the same day. Doc. 9-1 at 1-2 (August 2021 ICE Encounter Summary). On
September 17, 2021, Petitioner was released on an Order of Release on Recognizance.
Doc. 9-2 at 3 (March 2024 ICE Encounter Summary); Doc. 9-9 at 2 (Hunt Decl.).3
On March 4, 2024, Petitioner was re-detained by ICE due to his arrest by Tulsa
County law enforcement. Doc. 9-2 at 2; Doc. 9-9 at 2 (Hunt Decl.). The charges against

Petitioner were dismissed, and he was again released by ICE on an Order of Release on
Recognizance on May 15, 2024. Doc. 9-2 at 3; Doc. 9-9 at 2. Petitioner alleges he “filed
a I-485 Application” for Permanent Resident Status, which was approved in September
2025. Doc. 10 at 1.
On November 17, 2025, ICE issued an administrative warrant for Petitioner’s

removal after his arrest by Tulsa County law enforcement on new charges. Doc. 9-4 at 2
(December 2025 ICE Encounter Summary); Doc. 9-9 at 2-3. He pleaded guilty to six

Procedure 12(b)(6). Resp. 3-4. The undersigned treats Respondents’ filing as a response
to the Petition because it was not styled as a motion and, as a result, Petitioner reasonably
may not have understood a need to respond to it. The parties also filed supplemental
information, Docs. 10, 12-13, which the undersigned has reviewed and considered.
3 Mr. Hunt’s Declaration recounting ICE’s records does not indicate Petitioner was placed
into removal proceedings before the Immigration Court in August 2021. Doc. 9-9 at 1-2.
But the ICE Encounter Summary, dated August 20, 2021, states Petitioner “was processed
for Warrant of Arrest/Notice to Appear per section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act” at that time. Doc. 9-1 at 2. To the extent a factual discrepancy exists, it
is not dispositive of the undersigned’s analysis.
counts in Tulsa County on December 11, 2025, and received a deferred sentence. See
OSCN Docket, State v. Salazar Gutierrez, No. CF-2025-4323 (Tulsa Cnty.), at

https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=tulsa&number=CF-2025-
4323&cmid=3834026 (last accessed Aug. 27, 2026).
Petitioner was taken into ICE custody on December 12, 2025, and he has since
remained in ICE detention. Doc. 9-3 (Warrant for Arrest); Doc. 9-4 at 4; Doc. 9-5 at 1
(Notice of Custody Determination); Doc. 9-9 at 2-3. The same day, ICE placed Petitioner

into removal proceedings before the Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a
through the issuance of a Notice to Appear, and charged him with being inadmissible under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without inspection.
Doc. 9-5 at 1; Doc. 9-9 at 3.
On April 28, 2026, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed and
denied his request for asylum. Doc. 9-7 at 1 (Order of IJ); Doc. 9-9 at 3. The IJ also denied

withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and denied withholding and deferral
of removal under the Convention against Torture. Doc. 9-7 at 1. No evidence in the record
indicates Petitioner timely appealed the decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) by the deadline of May 28, 2026. Doc. 9-7 at 4 (showing the appeal deadline);
Doc. 9-9 at 3. See EOIR, Automated Case Information, at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/
(last accessed Aug. 27, 2026) (showing no appeal received by the BIA). Therefore, his
removal order is final under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.4

When Petitioner filed his Petition, he was detained at Cimarron Correctional Facility
in Cushing, Oklahoma. Pet. at 1. The undersigned presumes he remains detained there,
though his location is no longer indicated by the ICE Online Detainee Locator System. See
Doc. 12 at 1; Doc. 13-2 (filing by Petitioner on August 19, 2026, indicating his detention
at Cimarron Correctional Facility); ICE Online Detainee Locator System, at

https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last accessed Aug. 27, 2026).5
II. Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts four counts in his Petition.
• Count I: Violation of Due Process. Petitioner alleges he was
approved for a visa in September 2025 but not allowed to use that
approval in his removal proceeding before an IJ. Pet. at 6.
• Count II: Violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”). Petitioner alleges his continued detention without an
individualized bond hearing violates the INA. Id.

4 Petitioner provided evidence that he transmitted to the BIA a Motion to Accept Late
Appeal on June 8, 2026. Doc. 10-1 at 3. It is unclear whether the BIA has addressed his
motion. Id. (showing receipt on June 15, 2026, of Petitioner’s motion by the Clerk of the
BIA). This Court lacks jurisdiction to intercede in BIA procedures regarding timeliness of
appellate filings. Negrete-Ramirez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-1227, 2026 WL 375961, at *2-3
(D.N.M. Feb. 10, 2026) (holding, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), that subject-matter
jurisdiction did not exist to review the BIA’s decision to accept a late appellate filing from
an order by an IJ).
5 The undersigned also ordered Respondents to “file written notice at least forty-eight hours
before removing, transferring, relocating, or otherwise moving Petitioner,” and no notice
of removal has been filed. Doc. 7 at 2.
• Count III: Violation of the INA. Petitioner alleges ICE’s failure to
provide him with the warrant on the day he was taken into custody in
December 2025 violates the INA. Id.
• Count IV: Lack of bond hearing. Petitioner alleges he is eligible
for, but was not provided with, a bond hearing. Id. at 7.
Petitioner asks the Court to order his “immediate release” through an order of supervision,
a bond, or another alternative. Id. In a supplemental filing, Doc. 10, Petitioner asks the
Court to prevent his deportation.
III. Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. Analysis
A. Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing.
The two sections of the INA that govern detention of noncitizens pending removal
proceedings are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. If a noncitizen is detained under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), he or she is not entitled to a bond hearing. On the other hand, § 1226(a)

more generally authorizes detention of a noncitizen pending removal proceedings and
entitles the noncitizen to a bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306
(2018) (“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond
hearings at the outset of detention.” (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1))). Both
§ 1225 and § 1226 apply during the period before a removal order from an IJ becomes final
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.

Once an IJ’s order of removal becomes final, a different statute controls: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231. Carbajal v. Holder, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1188 (D. Colo. 2014) (“After the pre-
removal period concludes, the statutory authority to detain an alien shifts to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231.”). This shift from the pre-removal period of § 1225 and § 1226 to the “removal
period” under § 1231 is triggered by the latest of three events:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final;
(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay
of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order;
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii). During the 90-day removal period to remove a noncitizen
from the United States, the noncitizen is subject to mandatory detention. Id.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A).
Here, Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively final on May 28, 2026,
when the 30-day period to appeal the IJ’s determination ended without an appeal being
filed with the BIA. See id. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). Petitioner has not provided evidence that
the order of removal is being judicially reviewed to trigger § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). See also
EOIR, Automated Case Information, at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last accessed Aug.
27, 2026) (showing no appeal received by the BIA). Nor has he provided evidence that he
is otherwise detained via a non-immigration process to trigger § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii).
Accordingly, on May 28, 2026, Petitioner’s potential entitlement to a pre-removal bond
hearing ended, as he moved to the “removal period” under § 1231. As a result, Petitioner’s
request for a bond hearing should be dismissed as moot.

“Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and
‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2). This means “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of
review, not merely at time the [petition] is filed.” Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 67 (1997). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the [petitioner] of a personal

stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during litigation, the action can no longer
proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S.
66, 72 (2013) (citation modified). “A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps.
Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation modified).
Here, a bond hearing is no longer available to Petitioner because he has moved from

the pre-removal period to the statutory scheme of § 1231.6 As a result, that portion of his
habeas challenge requesting a bond hearing is moot. See Carbajal, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1189
(finding a bond hearing request moot under similar circumstances). The relief Petitioner
requests is no longer available and cannot be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss as moot Petitioner’s request
for a bond hearing under the INA. Cf. Quintanilla v. Figueroa, No. CIV-26-797-G, 2026

6 None of the mootness exceptions apply to Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing. Ind v.
Colo. Dep’t of Corr. 801 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (listing four exceptions to
mootness).
WL 2302459, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 10, 2026) (dismissing a habeas petitioner’s claims
as moot because the petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1231).

B. Petitioner is not otherwise entitled to release based on the Petition.
Petitioner also seeks “immediate release.” Pet. 7. In some circumstances, a Court
can order release once a noncitizen’s 90-day removal period has ended, if the noncitizen
has not been removed. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 687-88 (2001).
There is no express limitation on the length of an alien’s post-removal-period
[of] detention under § 1231(a)(6). But in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court
interpreted § 1231(a)(6) narrowly and imposed an implicit reasonable time
limitation on such detention to avoid any Fifth Amendment due process
issues that could arise from indefinite detention. After Zadvydas, an alien
can be detained only until it has been determined that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Babakhani v. Gantt, No. CIV-26-705-SLP, 2026 WL 1822995, at *3 (W.D. Okla. June 24,
2026) (citation modified). If Petitioner’s order of removal became final on May 28, 2026,
his 90-day removal period under § 1231(a) ended on August 26, 2026.
Here, Petitioner made no allegations in the Petition utilizing the Zadvydas analytical
framework. Nor has there been a request to submit an amended petition. Instead,
Petitioner’s allegations and requests for relief are specific to the pre-removal period that
has ended. See Pet. at 2 (relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)); id. at 3, 6-7 (asserting
eligibility for a bond hearing, which is only available to a noncitizen during the pre-removal
period). The undersigned recommends the Court decline to construe the Petition as
requesting release under Zadvydas, though Petitioner may request such relief in a future
action if circumstances entitle him to such relief at that time.
To the extent the undersigned liberally construes the Petition to raise a claim under
Zadvydas, Petitioner’s detention has not extended beyond the presumptively reasonable

six-month period set in Zadvydas. He has also failed to meet the Zadvydas requirement to
establish “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner has not alleged any institutional
barriers to his removal; nor has he shown any obstacles particular to his circumstances that
would prevent or delay his removal. See, e.g., Abiodun v. Mukasey, 264 F. App’x 726, 729

(10th Cir. 2008) (finding a petitioner was not entitled to relief because there had been “no
showing” he would “not be accepted by his homeland of Nigeria”). Accordingly, to the
extent the Petition could be construed to seek release under Zadvydas, Petitioner has failed
to show there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
C. No relief is available for Petitioner’s warrantless arrest claim.

Petitioner also asserts the INA was violated because he was not “given a copy of the
issued warrant from the attorney general” when his current detention began.7 Pet. 6. Under
§ 1226(a), a noncitizen may only be arrested and detained “on a warrant issued by the
Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (citation modified). However, Respondents
submitted a copy of the warrant dated December 12, 2025, which is the date Petitioner’s

7 Respondents did not substantively respond to either (a) Petitioner’s claim that he was
arrested without a warrant or (b) his claim that the process afforded to him in his removal
hearing by the IJ was insufficient. Still, because Petitioner failed to adequately support
these claims, the undersigned recommends the Court deny both claims.
detention began. Doc. 9-3 at 1. He has not demonstrated any deficiency in the warrant.
As such, the Court should deny Petitioner’s claim for relief based on a warrantless arrest.

D. The Court should dismiss Petitioner’s due process claim.
Finally, Petitioner appears to assert he was prevented from using his September
2025 visa approval in his removal proceedings. Pet. at 6. The undersigned liberally
construes this as an allegation that Petitioner’s rights to procedural due process were
violated because he did not have sufficient opportunities before an IJ to argue against
removal. However, a challenge to evidentiary determinations made in a removal hearing

must be brought via direct appeal, not in habeas.
Section 1252(b)(9) channels “judicial review of all questions of law and fact” from
IJ removal proceedings to “judicial review of a final order” for removal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9). Issues of law—including evidentiary rulings—are to be considered via
appeal of the IJ’s order to the BIA and later to the appropriate Court of Appeals. See

Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 510 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (channeling
“procedural due process claims” regarding “difficulties in calling witnesses and in
presenting evidence” during “removal proceedings” to the direct, administrative appeal
process under § 1252(b)(9)); Onuwa v. Field Off. Dir., Civ. No. 26-2403, 2026 WL
772435, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2026) (indicating, under § 1252(b)(9), the IJ is the

“determiner of appropriate evidence” in a removal proceeding). As a result of § 1252(b)(9),
this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to review an IJ’s determinations about what
materials a noncitizen may submit in a removal proceeding. Because the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider this issue, the undersigned recommends that it be
dismissed.
V. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court (1) DISMISS

as moot the Petition to the extent Petitioner seeks a bond hearing, (11) DENY the Petition
to the extent he seeks release via means other than a bond hearing, and (iii) DISMISS for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction his claim regarding the IJ’s_ evidentiary
determinations in his removal hearing.
The parties are advised of their nght to object to this Report and Recommendation.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later than September 10, 2026. See
id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Ifa party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than September 17, 2026. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual
and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 27* day of August, 2026.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428680. Public record. Not legal advice.