# MONROE

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · August 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428356

## Case

- **Full name:** Da’Jwan Quintaj Monroe v. Corporal Rodriguez, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** August 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DA’JWAN QUINTAJ MONROE,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25CV35

CORPORAL RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case arises from events that took summary judgment. Further, because
place during Da’Jwan Quintaj the defendants have not met the
Monroe’s pre-trial detention at the requisite sealing standard, their
Moore County Detention Center in motion to seal is denied.
2023 and 2024. Monroe, the plaintiff
in this Section 1983 civil action, I. FACTS
alleges that Corporal Rodriguez and
Officer Wilkes, both with the Moore The undisputed facts1 show the
County Sheriff’s Office, assaulted him following:
without provocation, in violation of
A. December 1, 2023 Incident:
his right under the Fourteenth
Use of the Drive Stun Weapon.
Amendment to be free from pre-trial
punishment.
On December 1, 2023, Monroe was a
pre-trial detainee at the Moore
The defendants have moved for
County Detention Center (MCDC) in
summary judgment and to seal
the green area. See generally Docket
certain documents provided in
Entry 28, Ex. C, Declaration of Justin
support thereof. Because the
Wilkes (hereinafter Wilkes Decl.) ¶ 8.
undisputed facts show that the
At the time, the MCDC was divided
defendants are entitled to judgment
into color-coded areas (red, blue,
as a matter of law, it is recommended
yellow, green) and security levels
that the Court grant their motion for

1 Monroe did not respond to the motion declarations and accompanying exhibits
for summary judgment and filed an the defendants submitted in support of
unverified complaint. Accordingly, the their motion.
facts are taken from the sworn
ranging from maximum to low. See id. Monroe did not. See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 11.
¶ 4. Wilkes then deployed his drive stun
(conducted energy) weapon into
At approximately 8:45 am, Wilkes, Monroe’s right arm for approximately
then a detention officer (DO) at the one to two seconds. See id.; see
MCDC, was conducting property pick Sheffield Decl. ¶ 16. Monroe pulled his
up in administrative segregation with arm back into his cell. See Wilkes
DO Sheffield. Monroe was standing Decl. ¶ 11; see Sheffield Decl. ¶ 16. His
handcuffed outside of his cell at the shoulder was not dislocated, see
door; as Wilkes was collecting Wilkes Decl. ¶ 18, but he sustained
property in the cell, Monroe moved in injuries to his wrists from the
front of the doorway and told Wilkes handcuffs, see Docket Entry 28, Ex. D
to stop searching his cell. See id. ¶ 8; (documenting injuries through
see also Docket Entry 28, Ex. F, photographs). Shortly thereafter, a
Declaration of Mary Sheffield nurse at the MCDC visited Monroe.
(hereinafter Sheffield Decl.) ¶ 9. See id. ¶ 13.
When Wilkes finished, Monroe was Sheffield reported the incident, and
supposed to return to his cell. See MCDC personnel charged Monroe
Wilkes Decl. ¶ 8. But, as Monroe did with a number of violations, including
so, he yelled, “Fuck you! Fuck this tampering with or destruction of any
place!” and something about a “bitch locking device, interfering with
ass.” See Sheffield Decl. ¶ 13. Wilkes lockdowns or searches, failure to obey
began to remove Monroe’s handcuffs and follow orders, and use of profane
through the food pass of the cell door. language and/or gestures, or
See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 9. Once Wilkes excessive noise. See Docket Entry 28,
removed the left cuff, Monroe began Ex. D.
to try to jerk away. See id.; see
Sheffield Decl. ¶ 13. Wilkes used the B. April 9, 2024 Incident: Code
tether to gain control of Monroe so he Red and Use of the Restraint
could remove the other handcuff. See Chair.
Wilkes Decl. ¶ 9.
Monroe was still a pre-trial detainee
Before Wilkes could close the food at the MCDC on April 9, 2024. At
pass door, Monroe put his arm approximately 8:03 pm that evening,
through it and held it open. See id. Corporal Rodriguez, DO Stanley, and
¶ 10; see Sheffield Decl. ¶ 14. Wilkes DO Connor entered MCDC cell block
told Monroe multiple times to put his blue levels 1 and 2 to return inmates
arm back in the cell, but Monroe to their cells post-exercise. See Docket
refused. See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 10. Wilkes Entry 28, Ex. G, Declaration of
then gave Monroe two direct orders to Abraham Rodriguez (hereinafter
pull his arm back or else he would be Rodriguez Decl.) ¶ 7.
drive stunned. See id.; see Sheffield
Decl. ¶ 15.
At the time, detention officers at the different secured sections of the
MCDC used the term “code red” to facility. See id. ¶ 6. It is two
refer to the highest-level emergency, interlocking doors or gates that are
indicating “a serious disturbance never opened at the same time,
requiring immediate response. It ensuring that one door is fully closed
signals a major incident . . . and and locked before the next opens. See
typically triggers a full lockdown of id.
the Detention Center.” See id. ¶ 5.
Monroe continued to curse at
Rodriguez told Monroe, who was Rodriguez and Brogan, at which time
detained in this area, to pack his Rodriguez placed him on the ground
belongings, turn around in his cell, on his stomach using “control
and place both hands through the trap techniques.” See id. ¶ 12. Monroe then
on the door. See id. ¶ 8. Monroe said, “on God you about to get this
questioned why he was being moved, fucking lawsuit on your ass! You ain’t
initially refused to comply, but even have to slam me Rodriguez! You
ultimately acquiesced to being just a bitch ass nigga on God! Fuck off
handcuffed and shackled. See id. ¶ 9. nigga!” See id. ¶ 13. Brogan called for
Rodriguez began to escort Monroe to a Code Red while assisting Rodriguez
green levels 1 / 2. See id. When they in subduing Monroe. See id. Monroe
arrived at 102B green, Monroe yelled, “Call the code! Call the code
attempted to wrestle out of nigga! Call the code!” See id.
Rodriguez’s grip and yelled,
“RODRIGUEZ! DON’T TOUCH ME DOs Freeman and James arrived;
MAN! ON GOD YOU NEED TO TAKE Rodriguez directed them to use a
YOUR HANDS OFF ME BRUH!” See four-point carry to take Monroe out of
id. ¶ 10. Rodriguez told Monroe to the sally port. See id. ¶ 14. Freeman
stop moving evasively. See id. and James carried Monroe out of the
Monroe, in response, tried to push sally port and placed him onto the
himself away from Rodgriguez and floor outside of the exercise day room
Brogan. See id. ¶ 11; see also Docket of green levels 1/ 2. See id. ¶ 15.
Entry 28, Ex. J, Declaration of Connor Rodriguez helped the other officers
Brogan (hereinafter Brogan Decl.) ¶ 11 place Monroe in a temporary restraint
(“[Monroe] would stop or try to turn system consisting of a shoulder
until Corporal Rodriguez told him to harness, leg restraints, and an ankle
stop, then he would stop.”). Rodriguez strap that secures the person in an
ordered Monroe to stop, but he did upright seated position, reducing the
not. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 11. risk of potential asphyxia and
Rodriguez then placed Monroe preventing the occupant from
against the sally port door. See id. harming himself or others. See id.
Rodriguez took Monroe, in these
The sally port door in the MCDC is a restraints, into an area for a two- hour
secure, controlled entry area used to cool down period. See id. ¶ 16.
move inmates or staff between Rodriguez confirmed that he could fit
at least one finger between the you can wait. I can pack my stuff. I
handcuffs. See id. He advised Monroe don’t trust you CO’s.” See id. ¶ 24.
that he would be monitored four Monroe then continued to refuse,
times an hour for danger to others. saying, “fuck no.” See id.
See id.
Rodriguez then deployed a two-
As he was doing so, Monroe lodged second burst of his OC spray can into
various slurs at Rodriguez, telling him Monroe’s right eye and the side of his
that he was a “fucking gay ass nigga” face. See id. ¶ 25. Monroe replied,
and telling him to “[g]o and suck some “you a jackass for that! You a real hoe
dick.” See id. ¶ 17. for that shit!” See id. Sergeant Danley
arrived to help Rodriguez, who again
Rodriguez prepared an incident instructed Monroe to place both arms
report documenting what took place through the food pass. See id. ¶ 26.
and MCDC personnel charged Again, Monroe refused, saying, “I’m
Monroe with a number of infractions not going anywhere with you alone!
arising from it, including threatening . . . You need to call your back up right
staff, participation in a disturbance, now!” See id.
failure to obey and follow orders,
disorderly conduct, use of profane After Rodriguez threatened to use the
language and/or gestures, or OC fogger, Monroe complied. See id.
excessive noise, and code red. See While Rodriguez was taking Monroe
Docket Entry 28, Ex. H. to red level 1, Monroe would jerk away
and say, “[D]on’t fucking push me!”
C. The November 19, 2024 See id. ¶ 27. Rodriguez instructed
Incident: Use of the OC Spray Monroe to be quiet, but he refused.
Can. See id. Once at red level 1, cell 113,
Rodriguez asked Monroe if he wanted
On this day, at approximately 1:20 to be decontaminated, and Monroe
am, Rodriguez learned about an indicated he did. See id. ¶ 28.
ongoing situation with Monroe and Rodriguez then used the pump
DO Holder in the yellow level of the sprayer to decontaminate Monroe
MCDC. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 22. and secured him in the cell. See id.
Rodriguez went to yellow level 1, cell A short time later, around 1:50 am,
114 and directed Monroe to put on his when Rodriguez returned to the lower
jumpsuit and place both hands housing unit with fresh clothes for
through the food pass so he could be Monroe, he heard a loud banging
handcuffed. See id. ¶ 23. Instead, noise coming from cell 113. See id.
Monroe began packing up his items ¶ 29. When he arrived at the cell, he
and continued to do so even after saw the door being rattled. See id.
Rodriguez directed him to stop. See ¶ 30. Rodriguez told Monroe to turn
id. Rodriguez told Monroe to come to around and place both hands through
the door; Monroe responded: “Nah, the food pass to be handcuffed. See id.
¶ 31. At the time, Rodriguez intended staff, kicking/beating cell door, failure
to take him out of the cell block and to obey and follow orders, and
place him in the restraint participation in a disturbance. See
management chair. See id. Docket Entry 28, Ex. P.
Rodriguez and DO Holder worked D. The December 31, 2024
together to place Monroe in the chair Incident: Contraband in
once they escorted him out of the cell Monroe’s Cell.
block. See id. ¶ 33. Monroe attempted
to jerk his left arm away during the On this date, Monroe was still a pre-
process. See id. In response, trial detainee at the MCDC. At
Rodriguez applied pressure approximately 10:30 pm that evening,
underneath Monroe’s jawline, using DOs Edmonds and Hudson were
both his middle and index finger returning property in green levels 1 /2
while keeping away from his throat. during routine facility operations. See
See id. ¶ 34. Monroe yelled, “GET Docket Entry 28, Ex. R, Declaration of
YOUR FUCKING HANDS AWAY Dalton Edmonds (hereinafter
FROM MY THROAT! GET YOUR Edmonds Decl.) ¶ 7. Hudson was
FUCKING HANDS OFF MY searching each cell while Edmonds
THROAT!” See Docket Entry 28, Ex. watched. See id. ¶ 8. At green 110,
P. Rodriguez stopped as soon as Monroe’s cell, Edmonds watched
Monroe was secured. See id. Monroe Monroe while Hudson searched the
was taken to the exercise room for a cell. See id. ¶ 9. While she was running
two-hour cool down period. See her handcuff key between the support
Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 36. He continued to bar for the desk and the wall,
yell once there, stating (among other Edmonds heard an object hit the
things): “I’m coming after everyone in floor. See id. Hudson then handed
here! God has a plan and im [sic] Edmonds a mustard packet
going to sue everyone in this bitch.” containing three red circular pills. See
See id. id. ¶ 10.
MCDC personnel advised the nurse in Monroe began repeating that Hudson
the facility both when Rodriguez planted the pills there. See id.
sprayed Monroe and when he was Edmonds showed the pills to
placed in the restraint chair. See Rodriguez and Danley; Rodriguez
Docket Entry 28, Ex. O, Declaration of identified them as 200 mg ibuprofen
Seth Danley (hereinafter Danley pills and noted that the nurse typically
Decl.) ¶¶ 18, 19. provides Monroe with white-colored
600 mg ibuprofen tablets. See id. ¶ 11.
Rodriguez prepared an incident Hudson filled out an incident report
report documenting what took place related to the search, and MCDC
and MCDC personnel charged personnel charged Monroe with
Monroe with a number of infractions various infractions, including
arising from it, including threatening hoarding of medications, lying to
staff, contraband, and misuse or “cruel/unusual punishment.” See id.
abuse of authorized medications or at 3-4.
possession of unauthorized
medications. See Docket Entry, Ex. S. The defendants answered, see Docket
Entry 15, and the magistrate judge set
E. Monroe’s Disciplinary Record. a discovery schedule, see Docket
Entry 16. The defendants moved for
In addition to the incident reports summary judgment and to seal
provided in connection with the exhibits provided in connection
events described above, the therewith, see Docket Entries 26 and
defendants have also submitted 29, and Monroe requested an
Monroe’s full disciplinary record from extension of time to respond, see
his tenure at the MCDC, which spans Docket Entry 31, which the magistrate
357 pages. See Docket Entry 28, Ex. A. judge granted, see Docket Entry dated
02/02/2026.
II. PROCEDURAL
HISTORY The Clerk mailed Monroe the
standard Roseboro letter informing
Monroe filed this Section 1983 suit, him of the motion and his right to
alleging in an unverified complaint respond. The letter warned Monroe
that Rodriguez (sued in his individual that if he failed to respond to the
and official capacities), a “Major motion, the Court may “conclude that
Flint” (sued in his official capacity),2 the defendant[‘s] contentions are
Edmonds (sued in his individual and undisputed” and grant judgment in
official capacities), and Wilkes (sued their favor. Docket Entry 30. See also
in his individual capacity) violated his M.D.N.C. Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no
constitutional rights. See Docket response brief is filed within the time
Entry 2 (hereinafter Compl.). Monroe required by this rule, the motion will
detailed a “statement of claims” be considered and decided as an
describing his version of the events uncontested motion, and ordinarily
above and cites the violated rights as will be granted without further
“medial treatment/physcological [sic] notice.”). Despite the Court’s
Medicine,” “Phonecall/ warning, Monroe has not responded
communication,” “Food to the motion,3 nor did he verify the
Nourishment,” “Harassment,” and

2 While the undisputed facts reference a the Court should dismiss all claims
MCDC employee named William Flint against “Major Flint.”
and contain an affidavit from him
authenticating the exhibits filed in 3 There is also no entry on the docket of
support of the motion for summary the Roseboro letter being returned as
judgment, see generally Docket Entry 28 undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed
and see id., Ex. X, there is no evidence of that Monroe received it.
his involvement in any of the incidents
referenced in the complaint. Accordingly,
factual allegations in his Complaint, there is no genuine dispute as to any
see Docket Entry 2, such that they material fact and the movant is
could be considered as more than entitled to judgment as a matter of
mere allegations, see Gowen v. law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th dispute of material fact exists “if the
Cir. 2025). evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the
Nevertheless, the Court cannot nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
summarily grant the motion because Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
Monroe’s failure to respond “does not (1986). In analyzing a summary
fulfill the burdens imposed on moving judgment motion, courts
parties by Rule 56 [of the Federal “must construe all facts and
Rules of Civil Procedure].” Custer v. reasonable inferences in the light
Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 most favorable to the nonmoving
(4th Cir. 1993). “Rule 56 requires that party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59
the moving party establish, in F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).
addition to the absence of a dispute
over any material fact, that it is The moving party bears the burden of
‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of establishing the absence of a genuine
law.’” Id. Thus, although Monroe’s dispute of material fact by
failure to respond may leave the “identifying those portions of ‘the
defendants’ facts uncontroverted, pleadings, depositions, answers to
they “must still show that the interrogatories, and admissions on
uncontroverted facts entitle [them] to file, together with the affidavits, if any’
‘a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. which it believes demonstrates the
See also Campbell v. Hewitt, absence of a genuine issue of material
Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 F.3d 52, fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that, U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule
even if the absence of a response, “the 56).
court should look at the movant’s own
papers . . . [and] determine if the “Where, as here, the nonmoving party
record of filed depositions, answers to bears the ultimate burden of proof at
interrogatories, admissions, and trial, the moving party may discharge
affidavits[] demonstrates that a its initial burden at summary
genuine issue exists as to any material judgment by ‘showing – that is,
fact”). pointing out to the . . . court – that
there is an absence of evidence to
These matters are ripe for disposition. support the nonmoving party’s case.’”
Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,
III. STANDARD OF LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)
REVIEW (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
325). “If the moving party carries this
A court “shall grant summary initial burden, the burden then shifts
judgment if the movant shows that to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go
beyond the pleadings and by [his] 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit
own affidavits, or by the depositions, pursuant to § 1983 must show that a
answers to interrogatories, and person acting under color of state law
admissions on file, designate specific violated a constitutional or other
facts showing that there is a genuine federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487
issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
A. Excessive Force
“An affidavit or declaration used to
support [summary judgment] must Here, the first constitutional right at
be made on personal knowledge, set issue is the right to be free from an
out facts that would be admissible in officer’s use of excessive force, derived
evidence, and show that the affiant or from the Fourteenth Amendment. See
declarant is competent to testify on Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. n.10 (1989) (noting that the
56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. Fourteenth Amendment “protects a
Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, pretrial detainee from the use of
962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. excessive force that amounts to
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. punishment”); see also Short v.
1991)). Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir.
2023) (“[T]his Court extended Estelle
Finally, a party cannot rely on from Eighth Amendment claims to
statements in a brief to support a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
motion for summary judgment, Due Process Clause claims, reasoning
because they are not evidence. City of that ‘due process is at least as co-
Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of extensive as the guarantees of the
Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL [E]ighth amendment.’”) (quoting and
11488724, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, citing Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d
2017) (collecting cases); see also Hill 1291, 1294 (4th Cir. 1978)).
v. Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022
WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, To succeed on such a claim, a pretrial
2022). detainee must show only that the
force “purposely or knowingly used
IV. GOVERNING LAW against him was objectively
unreasonable.” See Kingsley v.
Title 42, United States Code, Section Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397
1983 “is a federal statutory remedy (2015). “[O]bjective reasonableness
available to those deprived of rights turns on the ‘facts and circumstances
secured to them by the Constitution of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting
and, in a more sharply limited way, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). And courts
the statutory laws of the United make this determination “from the
States” by persons acting under color perspective of a reasonable officer on
of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l the scene, including what the officer
Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. knew at the time, not with the 20/20
vision of hindsight[] . . . account[ing] B. Deliberate Indifference
for the legitimate interests that stem to Serious Medical Needs
from [the government’s] need to
manage the facility . . . .” See id. Monroe’s claim also sounds in
(internal quotation and citation deliberate indifference, also derived
omitted) (alteration in original). from the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause.
Courts may consider the following in
weighing the reasonableness or In Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160,
unreasonableness of the force 164 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit
exerted: “the relationship between the Court of Appeals adopted an objective
need for the use of force and the test for Fourteenth Amendment
amount of force used; the extent of the claims of deliberate indifference to
plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by serious medical needs, derived from
the officer to temper or to limit the the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell v.
amount of force; the severity of the Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979),
security problem at issue; the threat wherein the Court held that “[i]n
reasonably perceived by the officer; evaluating the constitutionality of
and whether the plaintiff was actively conditions or restrictions of pretrial
resisting.” See id. detention . . . the proper inquiry is
whether those conditions amount to
The United States Supreme Court punishment of the detainee.” “The
recognized in Kingsley that “[o]fficers Court in Bell explained that whereas
facing disturbances ‘are often forced the Eighth Amendment only protects
to make split-second judgments—in post-conviction detainees from ‘cruel
circumstances that are tense, and unusual punishment,’ the
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Id. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
(quoting and citing Graham, 490 U.S. Clause protects pretrial detainees
at 397). Therefore, it has directed from being punished at all.” Short, 87
courts to judge the reasonableness of F.4th at 606 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at
the force applied “from the 535-37).
perspective and with the knowledge of
the defendant officer. We have also Thus, “deliberate indifference to
explained that a court must take serious medical needs violates the
account of the legitimate interests in Fourteenth Amendment even in the
managing a jail, acknowledging as absence of subjective intent to punish
part of the objective reasonableness because no legitimate nonpunitive
analysis that deference to policies and goal is served by a denial or
practices needed to maintain order unreasonable delay in providing
and institutional security is medical treatment where the need for
appropriate.” See id. at 399-400. such treatment is apparent.” See id.
(internal quotation and citation
omitted).
Thus, obvious that even a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a
To state a claim for deliberate doctor’s attention.” Scinto v.
indifference to a medical need, Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th
the specific type of deliberate Cir. 2016).
indifference claim at issue in
this case, a pretrial detainee V. DISCUSSION
must plead that
As the moving party seeking summary
(1) they had a medical condition judgment, the defendants bear the
or injury that posed a initial burden of demonstrating the
substantial risk of serious absence of a genuine issue of material
harm; fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
(2) the defendant intentionally, There is no dispute that MCDC
knowingly, or recklessly acted personnel exerted force in the three
or failed to act to appropriately instances detailed in the complaint:
address the risk that the specifically, the deployment of the
condition posed; drive stun weapon on December 1,
2023, the use of the restraint chair on
(3) the defendant knew or April 9, 2024, and the deployment of
should have known (a) that the the OC spray can on November 19,
detainee had that condition and 2024.
(b) that the defendant’s action
or inaction posed an As noted above, the Kinglsey Court
unjustifiably high risk of harm; directed courts to consider, in
and weighing excessive force claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment, “the
(4) as a result, the detainee was relationship between the need for the
harmed. use of force and the amount of force
used; the extent of the plaintiff’s
Short, 87 F.4th at 611.4 injury; any effort made by the officer
to temper or to limit the amount of
A serious medical need is one that has
force; the severity of the security
been “diagnosed by a physician as
problem at issue; the threat
mandating treatment” or is “so

4 In Short, the Fourth Circuit found that in harm. . . . Now, it is sufficient that the
in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate plaintiff show . . . that the defendant
indifference claims, “[t]he plaintiff no should have known of that condition and
longer has to show that the defendant that risk, and acted accordingly.” See 87
had actual knowledge of the detainee’s F.4th at 611.
serious medical condition and
consciously disregarded the risk that
their action or failure to act would result
reasonably perceived by the officer; officer]’s use of force to subdue
and whether the plaintiff was actively Plaintiff was directly proportional to
resisting.” 576 U.S. at 397. Plaintiff’s refusal to follow commands
and comply with officer directives in
A. The Court Should Grant the accordance with the policies and
Defendants’ Motion for protocols of the Detention Center to
Summary Judgment as to the maintain security and order. Thus,
December 1, 2023 Incident. there was a clear relationship between
the need for the use of force and the
As to the use of the drive stun weapon, amount of force used.” See Brewton v.
it is well-settled in this Circuit that Wright, No. 8:24-CV-07655-RMG-
“[d]eploying a taser is a serious use of WSB, 2026 WL 2087978, at *14
force. The weapon is designed to (D.S.C. June 12, 2026), report and
caus[e] . . . excruciating pain[.]” See recommendation adopted, 2026 WL
Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong 2086996 (July 20, 2026) (granting
v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, summary judgment to officer
902 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal defendant who tased resistant
quotation and citation omitted) plaintiff in detention center).
(alteration in original). And the
Fourth Circuit has determined that As to the extent of Monroe’s injury,
“tasers are proportional force only there is no evidence that he sustained
when deployed in response to a one from the use of the drive stun.
situation in which a reasonable officer See, e.g., Jones v. Henderson Cnty.
would perceive some immediate Det. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-132-FDW, 2017
danger that could be mitigated by WL 581324, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13,
using the taser.” See id. 2017) (finding Kingsley injury prong
not satisfied where the plaintiff
Under Kingsley, then, the need for the “suffered only minimal injuries from
use of the taser must be the use of the TASER, including a hole
commensurate with its impact. And where the barb of the TASER pricked
here, the undisputed facts are that, him and the pain . . . from getting
preceding the drive stun, Monroe electrocuted. Plaintiff did not require
tried to prevent Wilkes from any medication from these injuries.”)
searching his cell, screamed (internal quotation and citation
obscenities at him, attempted to jerk omitted). And while Monroe was
away while having his handcuffs inside of a cell at the time Wilkes used
removed through the food pass door, the drive stun weapon, limiting the
and then held the food pass door open weight of the security factor and the
despite multiple commands to stop. reasonably perceived threat, Monroe
See Wilkes Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14. Thus, was actively resisting officer
“[a]s to the first Kingsley factor—the commands.
relationship between the need for the
use of force and the amount of force Weighing all of the Kingsley factors
used—the Court notes that [the then, the undisputed facts establish
that Wilkes’ exertion of force on to comply with staff’s orders required
December 1, 2023 was not excessive. some type of force to restore
And courts evaluating the use of force discipline and order.”).
where plaintiffs obstruct food flaps
have concurred. See, e.g., id.; see also, And to the extent Monroe advances a
e.g., Diamond v. Odedere, C/A No. deliberate indifference claim based on
1:22-cv-287, 2024 WL 230113, at *6 any medical care not provided to treat
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2024) (granting the effects of the drive stun weapon,
summary judgment for defendant there are no facts by which any
officers on excessive force claim reasonable jury could find in his favor.
where they used a short burst of There is no evidence he sustained any
chemical munitions to gain injury at all, let alone met any of the
compliance of inmate blocking food other factors set forth in Short, 87
flap), report and recommendation F.4th at 611.
adopted, 2024 WL 1014123 (Mar. 8,
2024); Jackson v. DeAngelo, C/A No. Further, qualified immunity protects
6:15-cv-3725-TMC-KFM, 2016 WL Wilkes from suit. This doctrine
4154688, at *4 (D.S.C. June 29, 2016) “‘balances two important interests,’
(granting summary judgment for namely, the need to hold accountable
defendant officers in food flap public officials who exercise power
encounter, finding that the officer was irresponsibly, and the need to shield
“authorized to restore order and officials who perform their duties
discipline when faced with a responsibly from ‘harassment,
noncompliant inmate and to use distraction, and liability.’” Byers v.
appropriate force in relation to the Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.
level of noncompliance if necessary”), 2026) (quoting Peason v. Callahan,
report and recommendation 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To
adopted, 2016 WL 4123900 (Aug. 3, determine if qualified immunity
2016); Lloyd v. MacNeish, C/A No. protects an officer, the court asks two
5:12-CT-3163-FL, 2015 WL 1391476, questions: “(1) whether a statutory or
at *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2015) constitutional violation occurred, and
(granting summary judgment for (2) whether the right was clearly
defendant officers on excessive force established at the time of the
claim, finding there was no evidence violation.” Harrold v. Hagen, 174
the officers “used force maliciously F.4th 393, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2026). “If
and sadistically” where they “engaged the answer on either question is ‘no,’
in a brief struggle with plaintiff to the officer being sued is entitled to
close the food slot door”); Karavias v. qualified immunity.” Id. at 402.
Virginia, C/A No. 7:12-cv-624, 2013
Here, because there was no
WL 3879701, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 26,
constitutional violation, Wilkes is
2013) (“Plaintiff’s arms did not belong
entitled to qualified immunity.
outside of his cell when returning the
lunch tray, and his persistent refusal
B. The Court Should Grant the Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir.
Defendants’ Motion for 1996). “‘Plaintiff’s placement in a
Summary Judgment as to the restraint chair . . . does not in and of
April 9, 2024 Incident. itself constitute an excessive use of
force, as the use of devices such as
This incident also involves Monroe restraint chairs or four-point bed
defying orders. At approximately 8:03 restraints have repeatedly been found
pm, Rodriguez went to Monroe’s cell to be constitutional when used
and directed him to pack his appropriately.’” Battle v. Richland
belongings and place both hands Cnty., No. CV 8:23-CV-2653-RMG-
through the food flap door for WSB, 2025 WL 2918280, at *11
handcuffing. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 8. (D.S.C. July 30, 2025), report and
Monroe questioned why he was being recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
moved, initially did not comply, but 2754050 (Sept. 29, 2025) (quoting
ultimately did as ordered. See id. ¶ 9. Rodriguez v. Taylor, C/A No. 9:08-
cv-01027-RBH, 2008 WL 5244480,
While Rodriguez was moving Monroe at *8 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2008)). As the
to a different level in the facility, Fourth Circuit noted in Williams,
Monroe attempted to wrestle out of though, the length of time a detainee
his grip and began yelling at him. See is restrained bears on the
id. ¶ 10. When Rodriguez told him to constitutionality of the force. See 77
stop, Monroe tried to push himself F.3d at 764. There, the plaintiff stated
away from Rodriguez and Brogan, a viable claim of excessive force after
who was assisting. See id. ¶ 11; see also eight hours so confined. See id.
Brogan Decl. ¶ 11. Monroe continued
to curse at both officers; Rodriguez Here, MCDC personnel placed
then placed him on the ground using Monroe in the restraint chair for a
“control techniques.” See Rodriguez two-hour cool down period with no
Decl. ¶ 12. Brogan called for a code red further application of force, in
while helping Rodriguez subdue response to disruptive behavior and
Monroe. See id. ¶ 13. Two other failure to follow commands.
officers arrived and Rodriguez
directed them to use a four-point As to the first Kingsley factor,
carry to take Monroe out of the sally measuring the need for the force
port to the exercise room, where against the force exerted, Monroe had
officers put him in the temporary defied officer orders to be cuffed, then
restraint chair. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. He attempted to wrestle away from
remained there for two hours. See id. officers, requiring the officers to
¶ 16. restrain him on the ground and call a
code red to summon other officers to
Officers may confine detainees in assist. Under these circumstances,
restraints to maintain “order and where neither verbal commands nor
control” without per se violating the handcuffs had managed Monroe’s
Constitution. See Williams v. behavior, the use of the restraint chair
was not disproportionate to the need. 942177 (Mar. 10, 2017), aff’d, 714 F.
As to the second Kingsley factor App’x 307 (4th Cir. 2018)
regarding the injury suffered, there is (unpublished); Mackey v. Anderson
nothing in the record indicating Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CA 6:06-1180-
Monroe was injured. Both of these GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1656231, at *1
factors weigh in the defendants’ favor. (D.S.C. June 6, 2007) (“Restraint in a
chair for twelve hours is not a per se
The same is true for the effort the violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth
officers made to temper the amount of Amendment rights.”); Blakeney v.
force; they did not make use of any Rusk Cnty. Sheriff, 89 F. App’x 897,
chemical spray, drive stun weapons, 899 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)
or physical force beyond that required (holding that pre-trial detainee’s
to move Monroe from the floor to the rights were not violated when he was
restraint chair. While the record does placed in restraint chair for twenty
not shed much light on any specific hours after he disobeyed orders and
threat posed to the restraining engaged in unruly, destructive
officers, the general security issue was practices, since the purpose was not
real, as evidenced by the need to call punishment).
the code red, and it is undisputed that
Monroe was resisting. Thus, the third, As referenced earlier, there is no
fifth, and sixth Kingsley factors weigh evidence that Monroe suffered any
in the defendants’ favor. injury, so any deliberate indifference
claim would fail, as well. Moreover,
And courts have repeatedly found no because there was no constitutional
constitutional violation in similar violation, Rodriguez is entitled to
scenarios. See, e.g., Evans v. S.L.R. qualified immunity.
Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-CV-2731-HMH-
TER, 2019 WL 1026362, at *8 (D.S.C. This leaves the official capacity claim
Jan. 24, 2019) (finding no violation against Rodriguez. At all times
where plaintiff spent approximately relevant herein, he was serving as a
two hours in restraint chair after corporal in the MCDC upon the
officer found him biting his wrist sheriff’s direction. See Rodriguez
under suicide watch), report and Decl. ¶ 2. An official capacity claim
recommendation adopted sub nom., against Rodriguez is, therefore, a
Evans v. Abraham, 2019 WL 1022141 claim against the sheriff. See
(Mar. 4, 2019); Singleton v. Brown, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
No. CV 9:15-2723-JMC-BM, 2016 WL 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of
11200707, at *16 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
2016) (holding that restraint in a chair (1978) (noting that official capacity
for six hours was not a constitutional lawsuits “generally represent only
violation where no pepper spray had another way of pleading an action
been used and there was no evidence against an entity of which an officer is
of injuries), report and an agent”)); Wong v. Guilford Cnty.
recommendation adopted, 2017 WL Sheriff Dep’t, No. 1:23cv223, 2024
WL 85548, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Ja. 8, Carolina law, the sheriff . . . has final
2024) (finding the § 1983 official policymaking authority over hiring,
capacity claims against deputies supervising, and discharging
redundant of the § 1983 claim against personnel in the sheriff’s office.”
the sheriff), report and Parker, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
5372414 (Jan. 30, 2024); Parker v. Here, there are no genuine issues of
Bladen Cnty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, material fact wherein a reasonable
739 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“[U]nder North jury could find that Rodriguez, as an
Carolina law, a sheriff’s deputy is an employee of the sheriff, was acting
employee of the sheriff . . . .”) (citation according to the sheriff’s official
omitted). policy of some nature. Accordingly,
the Court should dismiss the claim
But a sheriff cannot be vicariously against him in his official capacity, in
liable for his deputy’s actions under addition to his individual capacity.
§ 1983. See Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); Monell, 436 C. The Court Should Grant the
U.S. at 691. A local government’s Defendants’ Motion for
“liability under Section 1983 attaches Summary Judgment as to the
only to ‘action [taken] pursuant to November 19, 2024 Incident.
official . . . policy of some nature.’”
Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 897 Here, the force at issue involves
F.3d 538, 554 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting MCDC officers deploying a two-
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 second OC spray can burst into
U.S. 469, 477 (1986)) (alteration in Monroe’s face and putting pressure
Hunter). A single decision may create under his jaw while placing him in a
an official policy “so long as that restraint chair soon thereafter.
governmental unit possessed ‘final
The encounter began when Rodriguez
authority to create official policy.’” Id.
went to Monroe’s cell based on an
(quoting Semple v. City of
“ongoing situation” involving another
Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th
officer. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 22. He
Cir. 1999)).
told Monroe to put on his jumpsuit
In other words, for the sheriff to be and put his hands through the food
liable under § 1983, the deputy must pass for handcuffing. See id. ¶ 23.
have been “acting pursuant to an Monroe did not do so. He began
unconstitutional policy, practice, or packing up his items, even after
custom of the [sheriff] during this Rodriguez told him to stop, telling
time.” See Mashore v. Naves, No. Rodriguez: “fuck no.” See id. ¶ 24.
1:24CV420, 2025 WL 1698479, at *3 Rodriguez then deployed a two-
(M.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2025), second burst of his OC spray can in
recommendation and report Monroe’s face. See id. ¶ 25.
adopted, 2025 WL 1697088 (June 17,
2025). Indeed, “under North
Monroe still would not put his arms in sprayed Monroe and when he was
the food pass. See id. ¶ 26. Once placed in the restraint chair. See
Rodriguez threatened to use the OC Danley Decl. ¶¶ 18, 19.
fogger, Monroe complied. See id. As
Rodriguez and Sergeant Danley were 1. The OC spray
taking Monroe to red level 1, Monroe
jerked away, said, “don’t fucking push As to the OC spray, “[i]t is generally
me,” and continued to make noise recognized that it is a violation of the
after Rodriguez told him to be quiet Eighth Amendment for prison
(this was at approximately 1:20 am). officials to use mace, tear gas or other
See id. ¶¶ 26-27. Once they were in the chemical agents in quantities greater
red level, Rodriguez used the pump than necessary or for the sole purpose
sprayer to decontaminate Monroe of infliction of pain.” See Iko v.
and secured him in cell 113. See id. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 240 (4th Cir.
¶ 28. 2008) (citation modified). Prison
officials can lawfully use certain
Minutes later, Monroe began rattling chemical substances, including OC
the door of his cell, which made a loud spray or mace, though, to regain
banging noise. See id. ¶¶ 29-30. “order and discipline and to maintain
Rodriguez decided to take him off the institutional security.” Hudson v.
cell block and place him in the McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). See
restraint chair. See id. ¶ 33. Rodriguez also Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d
and DO Holder worked together to 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ace can
place Monroe in the chair once they be constitutionally used in small
escorted him off of the cell block. See quantities to . . . control a recalcitrant
id. ¶ 33. Monroe attempted to jerk his inmate.”) (internal quotation
left arm away during the process. See omitted). “Furthermore, because a
id. In response, Rodriguez applied limited use of mace constitutes a
pressure underneath Monroe’s relatively mild response compared to
jawline, using both his middle and other forms of force, the initial
index finger while keeping away from application of mace indicates a
his throat. See id. ¶ 34. Rodriguez tempered response by the prison
stopped as soon as Monroe was officials.” See id. (internal quotations
secured. See id. Monroe was taken to omitted).
the exercise room for a two-hour cool
down period. See id. ¶ 36. He As with the two earlier incidents,
continued to yell once there, stating Kingsley requires a comparison
(among other things): “I’m coming between the force exerted and the
after everyone in here! God has a plan need for it. And the court should
and im [sic] going to sue everyone in consider this from the vantage point
this bitch.” See id. of what the officer knew at the time,
taking into account the need to
MCDC personnel advised the nurse in manage the facility where Monroe
the facility both when Rodriguez was detained. Here, as documented
above, Monroe had a pattern of Rodriguez acted unreasonably in
disruptive behavior. He would securing Monroe’s compliance.
repeatedly disobey orders. Rodriguez
witnessed some of these incidents. It Likewise, there are no facts by which
was almost 2 am in a detention center. a reasonable jury could find that he
Reasonably, Rodriguez had every was deliberately indifferent to
reason to believe that simple Monroe’s medical needs, either.
commands would not be obeyed (and Rodriguez promptly decontaminated
indeed, here, they were not). He him, and there is no evidence that
administered a brief burst of the OC Monroe suffered any injury from the
spray (which, it should be noted, still encounter. Any Fourteenth
did not deter Monroe). The force was Amendment claims arising from the
commensurate with the need, and this OC spray incident fail.
factor weighs in favor of granting the
motion. See, e.g., Boose v. Adkins, No. Accordingly, because there were no
3:18-cv-1480, 2020 WL 3086885, at constitutional violations, Rodriguez is
*13 (S.D. W. Va. May 20, 2020) also entitled to qualified immunity
(explaining that “[c]ourts in this and the claim against him in his
Circuit have routinely held that law individual capacity does not survive
enforcement and correctional officers summary judgment. Likewise, there
may deploy force in response to are no facts by which a reasonable
threatening, disruptive, or assaultive jury could find that he was acting
behavior”) (collecting cases), report pursuant to a policy of the sheriff, so
and recommendation adopted, 2020 any claims against him in his official
WL 3078333 (June 10, 2020). capacity are equally doomed.
As the extent of the injury, there is no 2. Hands on the jawline and the
evidence in the record that Monroe restraint chair
suffered one. This, too, weighs in
As referenced earlier, Monroe
favor of the defendants. However,
struggled when Rodiguez and Holder
Rodriguez did not appear to make
were attempting to secure him in the
many attempts to limit the amount of
restraint chair, and so Rodriguez
force, nor was the severity of the
applied pressure to his jawline to gain
problem paramount. The fourth and
his compliance. The record contains
fifth factors thus weigh in Monroe’s
no information about how long
favor. The sixth does not: as with the
Rodriguez maintained his hold; it
two earlier incidents, he was actively
only indicates that he stopped as soon
resisting. And continued resisting
as Rodriguez submitted. There is also
after Rodriguez deployed the two-
no information about any injuries
second burst of OC spray. Overall,
Rodriguez may have suffered from the
under Kingsley, based on these facts,
encounter.
no reasonable jury could find that
Under the first Kingsley factor, it was injury therefrom, any deliberate
appropriate for Rodriguez to exert indifference claim fails, as well.
some measure of force; Monroe was
actively struggling with him and Again, because there were no
another officer. And there is no constitutional violations, Rodriguez is
evidence of injury. In fact, the record also entitled to qualified immunity,
contains definitive evidence that and the Court should grant summary
Monroe’s airway was not constricted; judgment as to the claim against him
as Rodriguez applied force to his in his individual capacity. Likewise,
jawline, he yelled, “GET YOUR there are no facts by which a
FUCKING HANDS AWAY FROM MY reasonable jury could find that he was
THROAT! GET YOUR FUCKING acting pursuant to a policy of the
HANDS OFF MY THROAT!” See, e.g., sheriff, so the Court should grant the
Martin v. Shaw, No. 7:19CV00760, motion against him in his official
2021 WL 650891, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. capacity.
19, 2021) (“The officers and Martin
also offer evidence that he was able to D. There Are No Viable
talk during the wheelchair ride, Constitutional Claims Arising
making it unreasonable for any fact from the December 31, 2024
finder to be persuaded . . . that Lt. Encounter.
Shaw’s grip [] significantly restricted
Monroe appears to allege in his
his breathing.”). The first two factors
unverified complaint that officers,
thus weigh in the defendants’ favor.
including named defendant
Rodriguez did make an effort to limit
Edmonds, planted contraband in his
the force – he did not make use of the
cell during a search of it on this date.
OC spray or the drive stun weapon –
Even if it was undisputed that any of
and he only used force until
the named defendants did so, that
Rodriguez complied. This weighs in
conduct does not give rise to any
the defendants’ favor.
recognized constitutional claim. The
Likewise, both the threat to the officer closest fit is a First Amendment
and the security threat were real, as retaliation claim, i.e., that the
Monroe was physically struggling defendants planted the contraband in
with two officers. Finally, he was Monroe’s cell in retaliation for
actively resisting. Thus, the fourth, protected conduct. See, e.g., Rollins v.
fifth, and sixth Kingsley factors all Bond, No. CV 5:25-CV-P78-JHM,
support Rodriguez’s actions here. 2025 WL 2734655, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
Accordingly, based on the undisputed Sept. 25, 2025) (recognizing that
facts, no reasonable jury could find prison officials planting contraband
that Rodriguez acted unreasonably in for retaliatory purposes could give
this application of force. rise to a Section 1983 claim if properly
pled). But the Court is not required to
And because the record is devoid of advance Monroe’s claims for him. As
any evidence of Monroe suffering any the Fourth Circuit recently reiterated:
[W]hen the thrust of a E. The Defendants Have Not Met
complaint points to an the Requisite Standard for
“essential grievance,” courts Sealing.
are not required to scour
pleadings for stray phrases that Contemporaneous to filing their
could, with the benefit of motion for summary judgment, the
hindsight, be consistent with defendants filed a motion to seal
another theory, and then Exhibit Y5 in support of the motion,
construe those phrases to assert Monroe’s medical records. See Docket
separate claims. After all, Entry 29. In support thereof, the
district courts are not the legal defendants simply cite “Local Civil
advocates of pro se litigants. Rules 26.1(a)(1) and 79.2,” neither of
Nor are courts required to which address the sealing process.
anticipate all arguments or This is insufficient.
“explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se It is well-settled that the public has a
plaintiff” that are not readily long-established right of access to
apparent from the allegations. judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner,
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597
See Jackson v. Dameron, 171 F. 4th (1978); Va. Dep’t of State Police v.
641, 650 (4th Cir. 2026) (internal Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th
citations omitted). Cir. 2004). The right derives from two
sources, the common law and the
And even if he had properly pled this First Amendment. United States ex
claim, the undisputed facts – based on rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th
the sworn affidavits the defendants 161, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2024). However,
submitted in support of their motion the right of access is not absolute and
– give no indication that any officer can be rebutted. See Rushford v. New
placed the contraband in Monroe’s Yorker, Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253
cell or, even if they had, that there was (4th Cir. 1988). The burden of
any retaliatory motive related thereto. establishing a right to limit public
Accordingly, there would be no access is on the party claiming the
genuine dispute of material fact, and need for confidentiality. Id.
Edmonds would be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, in any The common law right of access
capacity. applies to all judicial records but can
be rebutted if “countervailing
interests heavily outweigh the public
interests in access.” Id. The First

5 While the defendants moved only to than redacting Exhibit Y of that
seal Exhibit Y, they filed every exhibit in document.
support of their motion under seal rather
Amendment right of access is constitute a compelling interest that
narrower and applies only to outweighs the First Amendment right
particular judicial records and of access to documents, even if the
documents. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 documents are medical records.” See
F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014). To Johnson v. City of Fayetteville,
overcome the right of access based on No.:12–cv–456, 2014 WL 7151147, at
the First Amendment a party must *11–12 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2014). As
show “a compelling governmental the court noted in Musgrove in
interest” and that the restriction is denying such a motion to seal in a
“narrowly tailored.” Id. deliberate indifference case:
When documents are filed in While the Court recognizes that
connection with a dispositive motion, medical records are ordinarily
as here, the “more rigorous First kept confidential, that is not
Amendment standard ... appl[ies].” always the case when those
Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at records are important to a
576 (explaining that once documents lawsuit the patient himself has
produced in discovery are “made part brought. Mr. Musgrove has
of a dispositive motion, they [have] neither joined in the motion to
lost their status as being raw fruits of seal nor expressed any
discovery”) (internal quotation and concerns about the
citation omitted). Thus, the confidentiality of the materials,
defendants “must present specific indicating he has no
reasons in support of [their] confidentiality concerns about
position.” See id. at 575. the limited records at issue.
This they do not do, only making 2022 WL 19977408, at *2.
cursory reference to the nature of the
documents and two inapplicable local Like Musgrove, Monroe has placed
rules. See Musgrove v. Moore, No. his medical condition at issue in his
1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at complaint. He has not joined in the
*2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (“The motion to seal, and the defendants
defendants’ conclusory references to have not identified with the specificity
an assortment of statutes and required the justification therefor.
regulations does not establish these Accordingly, the motion to seal is
records are confidential or show a denied.
compelling interest to justify
sealing.”) (citing Va. Dep’t of State VI. CONCLUSION
Police, 386 F.3d at 575). And
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED
“[f]ederal courts have recognized . . .
that the Court GRANT the motion for
that where a party voluntarily puts his
summary judgment filed under
or her medical information or status
Docket Entry 26.
into issue, it is more difficult to find
that the party’s privacy interests
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
defendants’ motion to seal, Docket
Entry 29, is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to unseal Docket
Entry 28.

J i Gibson { cFadden
United States Magistrate Judge
August 27, 2026

21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11428356. Public record. Not legal advice.