# Iravanian

> District Court, N.D. California · August 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427474

## Case

- **Full name:** Hanieh Iravanian v. Transperfect Translations International, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** August 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 HANIEH IRAVANIAN, Case No. 22-cv-09157-JST

8 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
9 v. DISMISS IN PART AND DENYING IT
IN PART
10 TRANSPERFECT TRANSLATIONS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Re: ECF No. 94
11
Defendant.

12
13 Before the Court is Defendant Transperfect Translations International, Inc.’s motion to
14 dismiss the fourth amended complaint (“4AC”). ECF No. 94. The Court will grant the motion in
15 part and deny it in part.
16 I. BACKGROUND
17 Iravanian filed the complaint in this matter in Santa Clara County Superior Court. ECF
18 No. 1. Defendant filed a notice of removal on December 29, 2022. Id. On March 5, 2024,
19 Iravanian filed a first amended complaint pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. ECF No. 42. On
20 October 11, 2024, the parties stipulated to allow a second amended complaint, which Iravanian
21 filed on October 17. ECF No. 50. On May 29, 2025, the Court consolidated this case with a
22 related suit involving the same parties. ECF No. 57. On July 16, 2025, the Court granted the
23 parties’ stipulation permitting Iravanian to file a third amended complaint (“TAC”) consolidating
24 claims from both actions. ECF No. 65. Iravanian filed the TAC that same day. ECF No. 66.
25 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the TAC in part on August 15, 2025 and the Court granted
26 that motion in part with leave to amend some claims on March 17, 2026. ECF Nos. 70, 85. On
27 April 9, 2026, Iravanian filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court’s dismissal with
1 2026. ECF Nos. 90, 100.
2 Iravanian filed the fourth amended complaint (“4AC”) on April 7, 2026. ECF No. 89.
3 Like the prior complaints, the 4AC alleges that Defendant misclassified her as an independent
4 contractor and, as a result, failed to comply with various California employment laws. Id. On
5 April 21, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to strike improper allegations and requests for relief pursuant to
7 Rule 12(f). ECF No. 94. Iravanian opposed on May 5, 2026. ECF No. 98. Defendant replied on
8 May 12, 2026. ECF No. 99.
9 II. JURISDICTION
10 The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
11 III. LEGAL STANDARD
12 “The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal
13 sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.
14 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of
15 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901
16 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
17 The complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
18 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed
19 factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
20 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v.
21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
22 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
23 for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a
24 claim on which relief may be granted, the court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint
25 as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953
26 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020).
27 Under Rule 12(f), the Court may strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
1 of Rule 12(f) is to avoid the expenditure of time and money litigating spurious issues. Id. at 973
2 (citing Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993)).
3 IV. DISCUSSION
4 A. Class Allegations
5 Although district courts generally decline to resolve Rule 23 issues at the pleading stage,
6 Riva v. Pepsico, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Gillibeau v. City of
7 Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 1969)), they may dismiss class allegations under Rule
8 12(b)(6) where the complaint “lacks any factual allegations and reasonable inferences that
9 establish the plausibility of class allegations,” see Mish v. TForce Freight, Inc., No. 21-cv-04094
10 EMC, 2021 WL 4592124, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2021) (emphasis in original).
11 Where a plaintiff defines a class encompassing employees or contractors performing varied
12 roles, the complaint must allege facts plausibly supporting an inference that individuals across
13 those roles were subject to the same allegedly unlawful policies or practices. Webb v. Rejoice
14 Delivers LLC, No. 22-cv-07221-BLF, 2025 WL 2259007, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2025);
15 Rubalcaba v. R&L Carriers Shared Servs., L.L.C., No. 23-cv-06581-HSG, 2025 WL 722442, at
16 *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2025). Conclusory allegations of “de facto policies” or common practices,
17 without factual detail explaining how those practices operated across differing job functions, are
18 insufficient to plausibly plead class-wide claims. Mish, 2021 WL 4592124, at *9.
19 The Court’s prior order found that “the TAC’s factual allegations are limited almost
20 entirely to Iravanian’s own experience” and that it “contains no specific factual allegations
21 describing the work conditions, compensation practices, or wage experiences of any other putative
22 class or subclass member, nor any facts plausibly supporting an inference that individuals
23 performing different services were subject to the same challenged practices.” ECF No. 85 at 6.
24 Defendant argues that Iravanian has failed to cure these deficiencies because she “alleges no facts
25 showing that her own experience is similar to the varied experiences of the putative class
26 members, and her class allegations remain devoid of specifics and consist only of recitations of
27 statutory elements.” ECF No. 94 at 16.
1 subject to common work and pay conditions by virtue of Defendant’s standard form Independent
2 Contractor Agreements (“ICAs”) containing common provisions concerning equipment and
3 reimbursement of expenses and containing no provisions concerning overtime, meal and rest
4 periods, or paid sick leave. ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 37–38. It also alleges that Defendant’s 30(b)(6)
5 corporate designee testified about common practices including failure to provide wage statements,
6 meal and rest periods, reimbursement, and sick leave affecting all class members, and that he was
7 not aware of any variation in such policies according to the type of work performed. Id. ¶¶ 69,
8 72–73, 75–77. The 4AC finally adds allegations that Defendant’s compensation and work records
9 show no evidence of work hour tracking, overtime pay, meal periods, reimbursement for phone or
10 internet, or sick leave. Id. ¶¶ 70–72, 75–76. These allegations are sufficient to support the claim
11 that the alleged wage and hour violations resulted from corporate policies affecting the entire
12 class. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the class claims is denied.
13 B. Compliant Wage Statements
14 Section 226 requires employers to keep accurate itemized pay statements setting forth
15 gross wages, the actual number of hours and minutes worked, and all applicable hourly rates of
16 pay. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). To recover damages under Section 226, an employee must allege
17 that he or she “suffer[ed] injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to
18 comply” with the statute. Id. § 226(e)(1). Although the statute provides that an employee is
19 “deemed to suffer injury” when an employer fails to provide a wage statement entirely, id.
20 § 226(e)(2)(A), or when the employee cannot “promptly and easily determine” the relevant wage
21 information, id. § 226(e)(2)(B), “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context
22 of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016), as revised (May 24,
23 2016). “[T]he plausible pleading of a flat-out violation of a statutory provision” will not suffice in
24 federal court “since ‘a bare procedural violation . . . divorced from any concrete harm’ does not
25 constitute an injury in fact.” Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th
26 Cir. 2018) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340). Thus, despite California’s minimal statutory
27 requirement for showing injury under Section 226(e), a plaintiff in federal court must still
1 records. Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 18-02318-AB (KKx), 2018 WL 5024919, at *9–
2 10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2020).
3 The Court’s prior order found that Iravanian had failed to plead such injury. ECF No. 85
4 at 8. The 4AC adds new allegations that Iravanian “experienced confusion and uncertainty about
5 her wage payments” because she “could not tell if she had been correctly paid all wages due.”
6 ECF No. 89 ¶ 52. It further alleges that she spoke with other class members who also expressed
7 uncertainty about whether they were being paid correctly. Id. ¶ 63. These allegations suffice to
8 establish confusion and inability to verify wages. See Godhigh c. Savers, LLC, No., 16-cv-02874-
9 WHO, 2016 WL 4585778, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (finding the plaintiffs pleaded a
10 concrete injury alleging in general terms “that as a result of the non-compliant wage statements
11 they were ‘confused about whether they were paid properly and/or they were misinformed about
12 how many total hours they worked in each pay period’”).
13 The Court’s prior order also noted that the class claims failed because they did not identify
14 “any specific deficiency in the wage statements allegedly provided to class members, nor . . . at
15 least one pay period during which TransPerfect issued a non-compliant wage statement to a class
16 member.” ECF No. 85 at 8. These deficiencies have been cured by the complaint’s new
17 allegations establishing that, based on records and Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, no wage statements
18 were provided to any class members. ECF No. 89 ¶ 69. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the wage
19 statement claims is denied.
20 C. Failure to Pay Overtime
21 To state an overtime claim, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a plausible inference
22 that she worked compensable hours for which she was not properly paid during at least one work
23 week. Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2014). While
24 precise calculations are not required, conclusory allegations of generalized underpayment are
25 insufficient. Id.; see also Haralson v. United Airlines, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 928, 942 (N.D. Cal.
26 2016) (applying the Landers standard to California Labor Code violations). For class claims, it is
27 insufficient to allege that other class members “routinely” worked overtime. See Cortez v. United
1 Defendant again moves to dismiss Iravanian’s class claims, but not her individual claims,
2 for unpaid overtime. ECF No. 94 at 18–19. The 4AC adds new allegations that (1) the volume of
3 work Defendant assigned caused Iravanian and other class members to work overtime, ECF No.
4 89 ¶¶ 45–46; (2) Iravanian observed another Class Member working overtime during the week of
5 August 1, 2021, id. ¶ 48; (4) Defendant’s ICAs uniformly lack any overtime pay provisions, id. ¶
6 38(a); and (4) Defendant’s records indicate that Defendant did not track the number of hours
7 worked by Class Members and paid them straight time only, with no overtime premiums, id.
8 ¶¶ 70–71. Taken together, these allegations suffice to render Iravanian’s classwide unpaid
9 overtime claims plausible.1 Defendant’s motion to dismiss the overtime claims is denied.
10 D. Unpaid Minimum Wages
11 To state a claim for failure to pay minimum wages under California law, a plaintiff must
12 allege facts that support a plausible inference that, in at least one work week, she was not paid the
13 applicable minimum wage for all compensable hours worked. Landers, 771 F.3d at 645–46; Tan
14 v. Grubhub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Although a plaintiff need not plead
15 precise calculations or identify an exact calendar week, conclusory allegations of underpayment,
16 untethered to factual context, are insufficient. Id. Iravanian brings only an individual minimum
17 wage claim. ECF No. 98 at 12 n.7.
18 The Court’s prior order noted that “[w]hile Iravanian alleges uncompensated work prior to
19 April 5, 2021, she does not plead facts supporting a reasonable inference that her effective hourly
20 rate fell below the minimum wage in any workweek.” ECF No. 85 at 10. In doing so, the Court
21 erroneously misapplied the standard applicable to federal Fair Labor Standards Act claims to
22 minimum wage claims brought under the California Labor Code. See Armenta v. Osmose, Inc.,
23 135 Cal. App. 4th 314, 323 (2005) (explaining that the language of the Labor Code and applicable
24 wage orders “expresses the intent to ensure that employees be compensated at the minimum wage
25
1 The Court does not intend its prior order to be understood to require that unnamed class members
26
satisfy the Landers rule at this stage. See ECF No. 85 at 8. As Iravanian correctly notes, other
courts have not gone so far, instead requiring only the named plaintiff to do so. ECF No. 98 at
27
11–12; see Cortez, 2019 WL 955001, at *12; Boggs v. Onity, Inc., No. 6:21-CV-00842-MK, 2022
1 for each hour worked. The averaging method utilized by the federal courts for assessing a
2 violation of the federal minimum wage law does not apply here.”); see also Oman v. Delta Air
3 Lines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 762, 781, 466 P.3d 325, 336 (2020) (“State law prohibits borrowing
4 compensation contractually owed for one set of hours or tasks to rectify compensation below the
5 minimum wage for a second set of hours or tasks, regardless of whether the average of paid and
6 unpaid (or underpaid) time exceeds the minimum wage.”).
7 As Iravanian argues, she has adequately pleaded a minimum wage claim by alleging that
8 she performed work without any compensation between March 30, 2021 and April 5, 2021, during
9 the period between her hire date and her start date, ECF No. 89 ¶ 43, and that she performed
10 unpaid work during her software testing projects, id. ¶ 44. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
11 minimum wage claim is denied.
12 E. Meal and Rest Period Breaks
13 California law requires employers to provide a 30-minute meal period for shifts longer
14 than five hours and a second meal period for shifts longer than ten hours. Cal. Lab. Code § 512.
15 State wage orders also require employers to authorize and permit a 10-minute rest period for every
16 four hours worked. See 8 Cal. Code Regs. § 11040(12). Employers who fail to provide compliant
17 meal or rest periods must pay one additional hour of pay for each workday a required break is not
18 provided. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(c). At the pleading stage, it suffices to allege entitlement to
19 breaks and explain the circumstances wherein breaks were not provided. See Cook v. Matrix
20 Absence Mgmt., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 3d 885, 889 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (holding that allegations of
21 misclassification and a heavy workload preventing compliant breaks, about which the plaintiff had
22 complained to her employer, were sufficient at the pleading stage).
23 The Court’s prior order found that Iravanian had adequately stated an individual claim, but
24 not a class claim, “because she fails to state with any specificity that other class members worked
25 shifts requiring meal and rest breaks or that they were subject to a corporate policy or practice
26 preventing them from taking such breaks.” ECF No. 85 at 15. The 4AC attempts to cure this
27 deficiency by alleging that Defendant’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified that Defendant had no
1 reflect any meal or rest breaks. ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 72–73; ECF No. 98 at 14. Iravanian, however, has
2 again failed to allege (1) that other class members worked qualifying shifts and (2) that they did
3 not take breaks because they were unaware they had the right or were prevented by their
4 workload, the schedule or structure of their work, their supervisors, etc. The class claims for
5 failure to provide meal or rest breaks are dismissed for a second time.
6 F. Expense Reimbursement
7 Under California Labor Code Section 2802(a), an employer shall indemnify employees for
8 all necessary expenses incurred by the employee as a direct consequence of his or her duties.
9 “Merely alleging failure to reimburse unspecified work-related expenses is insufficient to state a
10 Section 2802 claim.” Tan, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 1005. “Instead, Section 2802 claims are sufficiently
11 pled where the complaint identifies the particular expenses that were not reimbursed and
12 affirmatively alleges that those expenses were part of the plaintiff’s job duties.” Id.; see also USS–
13 Posco Industries v. Case, 244 Cal. App. 4th 197, 205 (2016) (holding that “the elements of a
14 [S]ection 2802 claim are: (1) the employee made expenditures or incurred losses; (2) these were
15 incurred in direct consequence of the employee’s duties or obedience to the employer’s directions;
16 and (3) the expenditures or losses were necessary” (internal quotation marks and citations
17 omitted)).
18 In the Court’s prior order, it observed that while Iravanian had alleged “that Defendant
19 required her and class members to use personal cell phones, laptops, internet services, and related
20 equipment to perform their work and failed to reimburse those expenses,” she had “plead[ed] no
21 factual allegations explaining how those items were necessary to her duties.” ECF No. 85 at 16.
22 The 4AC adds a description of Iravanian’s and other class members’ duties, ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 32, 33,
23 44, 46, and some context showing why phones, laptops, and internet services were necessary to
24 those duties, including because work “required at a minimum internet and computer access” since
25 class members “routinely worked remotely,” id. ¶¶ 33, 51, 75(a). The 4AC also pleads that
26 Defendant’s pay records reflect no reimbursement for personal internet or computer use. Id.
27 ¶ 75(c).
1 courts have persuasively concluded that such allegations are not required. See Stuart v.
2 RadioShack Corp., 641 F. Supp. 2d 901, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[A] fair interpretation of §§ 2802
3 and 2804 which produces ‘practical and workable results,’ consistent with the public policy
4 underlying those sections, focuses not on whether an employee makes a request for reimbursement
5 but rather on whether the employer either knows or has reason to know that the employee has
6 incurred a reimbursable expense. If it does, it must exercise due diligence to ensure that each
7 employee is reimbursed.” (citation omitted)). At this stage, the 4AC’s allegation that the class
8 members’ ICAs stated that they would not be reimbursed for expenses incurred, combined with
9 the allegation that Defendant’s records reflected no reimbursements to any class member, suffice
10 to show that the employer had reason to believe they were incurring reimbursable expenses and
11 failed to reimburse them. ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 37(c), 75(c).
12 Iravanian’s individual and class claims for failure to reimburse expenses survive the
13 motion to dismiss.
14 G. UCL Claim
15 1. Injunctive Relief
16 The Court’s prior order dismissed Iravanian’s claim under the Unfair Competition Law
17 (“UCL”), California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., in part because she
18 lacked standing to seek injunctive relief as a former employee. ECF No. 85 at 18. Iravanian
19 asserts that the 4AC drops any request for injunctive relief under the UCL, see ECF No. 98 at 24–
20 25, but the 4AC in fact still claims that Plaintiff and class members “are entitled . . . to injunctive
21 relief, as well as all other equitable relief required” under the UCL, ECF No. 89 ¶ 176. To the
22 extent that the UCL claim seeks injunctive relief, it is dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
23 Procedure 12(b)(6) and stricken under Rule 12(f).
24 2. Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act
25 In her opposition to the first motion to dismiss, Iravanian sought leave to amend the
26 complaint to add UCL claims for unpaid sick leave under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy
27 Families (“HWHF”) Act of 2014, California Labor Code Section 245 et seq., which the Court
1 insufficiently pleaded and that it seeks forms of relief unavailable under the UCL. ECF No. 94 at
2 22–23.
3 The HWHF “[e]nsure[s] that workers in California can address their own health needs and
4 the health needs of their families by requiring employers to provide a minimum level of paid sick
5 days including time for family care.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Su, 41 F.4th 1147, 1151 (9th
6 Cir. 2022) (quoting A.B. 1522, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Cal. 2014) (enacted legislative
7 findings)). “[T]he Act generally requires employers to provide a minimum of twenty-four hours
8 ‘paid sick leave’ or three ‘paid sick days’ per year to every employee working in California.” Id.
9 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 246(a)(1), (b)).
10 The 4AC alleges (1) that Defendant’s ICAs uniformly fail to provide information about
11 sick leave, ECF No. 89 ¶ 38(d); (2) that Defendant failed to provide any sick leave to class
12 members, id. ¶ 76; (3) that Defendant had no sick leave policies that applied to class members, id.;
13 and (4) that Defendant’s records do not provide any evidence that Defendant provided sick leave
14 to class members, id. Defendant argues that Iravanian “does not identify a pay date, pay period,
15 wage statement, accrued balance, request, denial, or decisionmaker involved in any alleged failure
16 to provide sick leave, but cites no authority establishing that any of those details are required,
17 particularly in light of Iravanian’s claims that no sick leave whatsoever was provided to any class
18 member. ECF No. 94 at 22. Under the circumstances, Defendant has not demonstrated that the
19 underlying HWHF violation was inadequately pleaded.
20 The UCL only provides for equitable relief. See Mish, 2021 WL 4592124, at *5. The 4AC
21 seeks liquidated damages and other remedies available under Labor Code § 248.5. See ECF No.
22 89 ¶¶ 179, Prayer for Relief (15). As a preliminary matter, damages remedies are not available
23 under the UCL, including those set forth under Section 248.5. And in any case, Section 248.5
24 provides remedies uniquely available upon enforcement by the Labor Commissioner or the
25 Attorney General, which are unavailable to Iravanian as a private plaintiff. See Cal. Lab. Code
26 § 248.5(a). Any request for damages under the UCL is stricken.
27 3. Other Predicate Violations
1 underlying labor code violations that were dismissed. ECF No. 85 at 17–18. While it remains
2 true that claims under the unlawful prong of the UCL rise and fall with the underlying violation,
3 Iravanian has cured the deficiencies previously identified in many of her labor code claims, for the
4 reasons set forth above. See Tan, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 1010–11.
5 H. Equal Pay Act
6 “To prove a prima facie case of wage discrimination [under California’s Equal Protection
7 Act, Cal. Lab. Code § 1197.5], ‘a plaintiff must establish that, based on gender, the employer pays
8 different wages to employees doing substantially similar work under substantially similar
9 conditions.’” Allen v. Staples, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 5th 188, 194 (2022) (quoting Hall v. County of
10 Los Angeles, 148 Cal. App. 4th 318, 323 (2007)). “[A] plaintiff must show ‘not only that she
11 [was] paid lower wages than a male comparator for equal work, but that she has selected the
12 proper comparator.’” Id. (quoting Hall, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 324). Assessing the similarity of
13 work requires identifying a “common core of tasks” and then asking whether any additional tasks
14 are sufficient to make the jobs “substantially different.” See Freyd v. Univ. of Oregon, 990 F.3d
15 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 2021).
16 “The California Equal Pay Act is nearly identical to the federal [Equal Pay Act] and
17 subject to the same analysis.” 2 Sangster v. Hewlett Packard Enter. Co., No. 23-CV-05438-HSG,
18 2024 WL 3408216, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2024). Interpreting the federal Equal Pay Act, the
19 Ninth Circuit held that “the proper test for establishing a prima facie case in a professional setting
20 . . . is whether the plaintiff is receiving lower wages than the average of wages paid to all
21 employees of the opposite sex performing substantially equal work and similarly situated with
22 respect to any other factors, such as seniority, that affect the wage scale.” Hein, 718 F.2d at 916.
23 While the Ninth Circuit “look[s] critically upon the use of a single comparator to make out a prima
24 facie case, doing so is not clearly erroneous “unless an appropriate comparator is wrongly
25 excluded from comparison with the plaintiff.” Id. at 918.
26

27
2 Although the state statute, California Labor Code Section 1197.5, refers to “substantially
1 The Court faulted Iravanian’s TAC because it relied on the bare allegation that her male
2 replacement was paid more than she was. ECF No. 85 at 21. It did “not describe Iravanian’s job
3 duties, the responsibilities of the identified male employee, or facts showing that the two positions
4 involved substantially similar job performance requirements.” Id. The 4AC explains Iravanian’s
5 job duties, states that the comparator’s job description shows that he is a “direct replacement” for
6 her, and alleges that the comparator did not perform any significant additional duties beyond those
7 Iravanian performed. ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 33, 44, 46, 65. This suffices to allege a prima facie Equal
8 Pay Act violation. See Duke v. City Coll. of San Francisco, 445 F. Supp. 3d 216, 230 (N.D. Cal.
9 2020) (“Duke alleges that his Latina counterpart was hired for the same position as he was. . . . It
10 is reasonable to conclude that two associate vice chancellors overseeing the same area of
11 responsibility (i.e., student affairs) would have the same job responsibilities. . . . [F]or purposes of
12 a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the two jobs were
13 substantially equal.”).
14 I. Wrongful Termination
15 “The elements of a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy under
16 California law are 1) the existence of a public policy and 2) a nexus between the public policy and
17 an employee’s termination.” Burtch v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., No. CV 22-6513-GW-RAOX,
18 2024 WL 994568, at *15 n.16 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2024), adopted, No. CV 22-6513-GW-RAOX,
19 2024 WL 993900 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2024) (citing Dep’t of Fair Employment & Housing v. Lucent
20 Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2011)). Iravanian asserts a relevant public policy in
21 California Labor Code Section 98.6, which states that an employer may not discharge “or in any
22 manner discriminate, retaliate, or take any adverse action against any employee” for “ma[king] a
23 written or oral complaint that they are owed unpaid wages.”3
24 Iravanian has failed to identify a nexus between her identified public policy, which protects
25 employees complaining about wage and hour violations, and any constructive termination. She
26

27
3 The 4AC also suggests that Defendant violated California Labor Code Section 1102.5(a), but
1 states only that “[t]he FAC alleges constructive termination, plausibly connected to Plaintiff’s
2 complaints,” but does not describe any plausible connection or otherwise provide any reason to
3 surmise that “Defendant’s refusal to classify and pay properly”—the conduct that allegedly
4 induced her to resign—resulted from her exercise of her right to complain. ECF No. 98 at 17.
5 The wrongful termination claim is dismissed. The Court’s prior order also dismissed this claim
6 because Iravanian conceded that it was insufficiently pleaded and asked for leave to amend. ECF
7 No. 85 at 5. Having provided Iravanian with a second opportunity to plead an adequate wrongful
8 termination claim, the Court now dismisses it with prejudice.
9 J. PAGA Claim
10 Defendant moves to dismiss Iravanian’s PAGA claim because it is untimely and overbroad
11 and because the LWDA notice was directed to the wrong entity.4 ECF No. 94 at 23–26. On the
12 record and briefs before the Court, the Court cannot conclude that the PAGA claim was untimely.
13 It is also not overbroad, and to the extent that the initial LWDA notice was directed to the wrong
14 entity, this deficiency was cured by a subsequent amended notice. The PAGA claim survives the
15 motion to dismiss.
16 1. Timeliness
17 “The statute of limitations for PAGA claims is one year.” Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
18 28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 839 (2018). “PAGA provides for a tolling period of up to 65 days after an
19 aggrieved employee files notice with the [California Labor & Workforce Development Agency
20 (“LWDA”)] to allow for exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Carter v. Golden Gate
21 Freightliner Inc., No. 19-CV-02034-JSC, 2019 WL 5864576, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019)
22 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(2)(A), (d)). “Thus, as a practical matter, the statute of
23 limitations for the filing of the LWDA letter is one year, and the statute of limitations for the filing
24 of the PAGA lawsuit is one year and sixty five days (or 430 days total).” Harper v. Charter
25

26
4 Defendant also seeks to dismiss or strike Iravanian’s PAGA claims predicated on violations of
Labor Code Sections 204 and 210 because the Court previously dismissed those claims with
27
prejudice. ECF No. 94 at 23–24. As the Court acknowledged in granting Iravanian’s subsequent
1 Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-00902 WBS DMC, 2021 WL 603724, at *21 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2 2021). “Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues, meaning
3 when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements. Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal.
4 App. 5th 42, 59 (2019), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 28, 2019) (citing Pineda v. Bank of
5 America, N.A., 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1397 (2010)).
6 Iravanian argues that “[s]ince Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on November 8, 2022, her
7 PAGA claim is timely as long as she suffered at least one Labor Code violation after September 4,
8 2021 (one-year and 65 days prior).” ECF No. 98 at 18. Her position tracks “the plain language of
9 the statute,” under which “an aggrieved employee need only suffer one of the Labor Code
10 violations alleged against his or her employer to be able to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of
11 himself or herself and current or former employees who suffered any Labor Code violation at the
12 hands of the employer.” Holak v. K Mart Corp., No. 1:12-CV-00304-AWI-MJ, 2015 WL
13 2384895, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2015) (citing Jeske v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 2012 WL
14 78242, *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan.10, 2012)); see also Huff v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 23 Cal.
15 App. 5th 745, 754 (2018) (“[A]ny Labor Code penalties recoverable by state authorities may be
16 recovered in a PAGA action by a person who was employed by the alleged violator and affected
17 by at least one of the violations alleged in the complaint. Indeed, we cannot readily derive any
18 meaning other than that from the plain statutory language.”).5
19 Defendant does not contest that statutory standing under PAGA requires the plaintiff to
20 have suffered only one of the underlying violations. ECF No. 99 at 17. However, it argues that
21 statutory standing ought not be confused with timeliness, and that “timeliness remains a separate
22 prerequisite that must be satisfied under the one-year limitations period as to the violations for
23 which penalties are sought.” Id. This position makes little sense: if Iravanian need not establish
24 that she suffered each violation she seeks to redress under PAGA at all, then she consequently
25

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5 Some courts have subsequently suggested that Article III imposes additional restrictions on the
standing requirements of the PAGA statute, such that “in federal court, a ‘[p]laintiff is unable to
27
pursue a PAGA claim in a representative capacity if his own claim is time-barred.’” Clark v. QG
1 need not establish that she timely suffered those violations.
2 The cases Defendant cites do not support requiring Iravanian to establish that she timely
3 suffered each predicate violation. Williams v. Alacrity Sols. Grp., LLC holds merely that “the
4 PAGA plaintiff must bring a PAGA action . . . within one year of the last Labor Code violation he
5 or she individually suffered,” as opposed to “within one year of the last Labor Code violation
6 suffered by any of the aggrieved employees covered by the lawsuit,” without addressing how the
7 statute of limitations requirement interacts with the Huff rule that the plaintiff need only have
8 personally suffered one of the underlying violations. 110 Cal. App. 5th 932, 942 (2025). Esparza
9 considered the plaintiff’s argument that her untimely PAGA claims related back to an original
10 complaint asserting only labor code violations, before which no LWDA notice had been filed.
11 Esparza, 36 Cal. App. 5th at 60–64 (2019). The Court held that allowing PAGA claims to go
12 forward in the absence of a timely LWDA notice would frustrate the legislature’s purpose to
13 provide LWDA with “the opportunity to decide whether to allocate scarce resources to an
14 investigation.” Id. at 61 (citation omitted). Esparza, like Williams, did not consider whether the
15 named plaintiff needs to have timely suffered each violation alleged. Given the holding from Huff
16 and the absence of contrary authority identified by Defendant, the Court adopts the rule proposed
17 by Iravanian: her PAGA claims are timely as long as she personally suffered one underlying
18 violation within the statutory window.
19 Iravanian identifies two violations as occurring within one year and 65 days prior to the
20 filing of the complaint. ECF No. 98 at 19. Namely, Defendant failed to provide her with a wage
21 statement and failed to pay her overtime when it issued its final payment to her on October 20,
22 2021.6 That Iravanian’s overtime claim accrued when her final paycheck was due is sensible. The
23 problem with Iravanian’s position, however, is that her final paycheck was due long before
24

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6 The parties dispute whether this date, which appears only in the PAGA notice attached to the
complaint, is properly considered to have been alleged for the purpose of a motion to dismiss. See
26
ECF No. 99 at 16. As Defendant concedes, however, the Court properly considers exhibits
attached to the complaint. Id.; Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030
27
(9th Cir. 2008). And even if the Court were not authorized to consider documents appended to the
1 October 20, which was two months after her separation from Defendant. An employee’s final
2 paycheck is due on her last day, or, if she did not give 72 hours’ notice of her resignation, within
3 72 hours of her last day. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201(a), 202(a); see Smith v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.
4 4th 77, 92 (2006). Iravanian’s overtime claim therefore accrued on August 20, 2021 (or 72 hours
5 later) and does not fall within the statute of limitations period.
6 The cases Iravanian cites do not support her position that her overtime claim accrued when
7 her final wages happened to be paid, notwithstanding when they were due. For instance, Aubry v.
8 Goldhor held that “a separate cause of action for overtime compensation accrues on each regular
9 payday immediately following the work period during which the services were rendered and for
10 which overtime compensation is claimed,” but it addressed the rule for timely paychecks during
11 employment, not after separation. 201 Cal. App. 3d 399, 406 (1988). And even if Aubry could be
12 applied to post-separation wages, in no sense is October 20 the “regular payday immediately
13 following the work period during which the services were rendered” where Iravanian stopped
14 working for Defendant on August 20. Iravanian’s other cases, which also refer to accrual of
15 overtime claims on regular paydays, fail to support her position for the same reasons. See Ray v.
16 California Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. CV 17-04239 PA (SKx), 2020 WL 5498060, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
17 July 10, 2020), aff’d sub nom. Ray v. Los Angeles Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 52 F.4th 843
18 (9th Cir. 2022); Van v. Language Line Servs., Inc., No. 14-CV-03791-LHK, 2016 WL 3143951, at
19 *8 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2016), aff’d in part, 733 F. App’x 349 (9th Cir. 2018).
20 Labor Code Section 226, meanwhile, provides that an employer must furnish wage
21 statements “semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages.” Iravanian cites Carter v.
22 Golden Gate Freightliner for the proposition that “[t]he obligation to provide a wage statement
23 arises when a final payment is issued, or at a later semimonthly date, but not at separation.” ECF
24 No. 98 at 19 (citing 2019 WL 5864576, at *4–6). In that case, the plaintiff had been paid his final
25 paycheck on the date of termination of September 18, 2017 and argued that the wage statement
26 claim accrued on the regular semimonthly date when the defendant distributed its wage
27 statements, which fell on September 27, 2017. Id. Noting the statute’s use of the disjunctive “or,”
1 paid when the statute required, but two months later. And Iravanian does not allege any “regular
2 semimonthly date” on which the defendant typically provided wage statements.
3 Notwithstanding Carter’s inapplicability, the plain language of the statute states that wage
4 statements are due “at the time of each payment of wages.” Iravanian’s last payment of wages
5 was October 20, untimely though that payment may have been. It is Defendant’s burden to justify
6 dismissal at this stage and they have marshaled neither persuasive authority nor argument
7 sufficient to convince the Court that Iravanian’s wage statement claim accrued before October 20.
8 Because Iravanian personally suffered one timely Labor Code violation, her PAGA claims are
9 timely.
10 2. Relation Back
11 Iravanian’s initial LWDA notice, submitted on August 16, 2022, erroneously identified the
12 defendant as “Translations.com, Inc.” ECF No. 89 ¶ 192; ECF No. 89 at 40. An amended LWDA
13 notice, submitted on August 27, 2024, correctly named the present defendant as “TransPerfect
14 Translations International, Inc.” Id. ¶ 193; ECF No. 89 at 45. Translations.com is a subsidiary of
15 TransPerfect Translations International and shares the same business address and officers and is
16 represented by the same attorneys. ECF No. 98 at 21–22; ECF No. 89 at 40, 45.
17 The parties cite several cases, all of which point in the same direction: application of the
18 relation back doctrine is appropriate here because the original LWDA notice fulfilled the statutory
19 purposes of affording the LWDA the opportunity to decide whether to investigate and giving the
20 defendant the opportunity to respond. The August 2024 LWDA notice relates back to the one
21 submitted in August 2022.
22 In Smith v. 9W Halo W. OpCo L.P., plaintiff sought to relate back an untimely amended
23 LWDA notice to include defendants unearthed through discovery, arguing that the later-added
24 defendants were joint employers with the original defendants. No. 20-CV-01968-PJH, 2023 WL
25 3047383, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023). Because the plaintiff had failed to establish that the
26 new defendants were in fact his joint employers, the amended LWDA notice did not relate back to
27 the original notice. Id. at *6. But the court noted pointedly that “if plaintiff is able to establish in
1 that the late-added defendant was effectively put on notice by the original LWDA notice, then the
2 amended LWDA notice will relate back.” Id.
3 Smith cited Atiqi v. Acclaim Tech. Servs., Inc., an earlier case from the Central District of
4 California that also addressed this issue. No. EDCV1400628VAPSPX, 2015 WL 13914845, at *4
5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2015). The Court in Atiqi held persuasively that:
6 Although no court appears to have addressed the relation back
doctrine in a circumstance like this one, where the untimely notice to
7 additional defendants relates back to an earlier, timely notice, the
Court finds it appropriate to apply the relation back doctrine.
8 Plaintiff’s PAGA claim against the New Defendants alleges
violations of the same Labor Code provisions, and alleges the same
9 underlying facts and theories as against the first Defendant, Acclaim.
If the New Defendants were, in fact, in a joint employment
10 relationship with Acclaim, then the first January 2014 letter to
Acclaim should have placed them on notice of the alleged wrongs,
11 given the close relationship.
12 Id. Although the typical scenario in which application of the relation back doctrine is appropriate
13 therefore appears to be one in which a joint employer is added later, the same reasoning applies
14 here—perhaps with more force. While Translations.com and Translations Transperfect
15 International are not alleged to have been Iravanian’s joint employers, they are joined by a close
16 corporate relationship as parent and subsidiary sharing office space, and notice to the former
17 undoubtedly provided notice to the latter.
18 When courts find relation back inappropriate, they do so because the original notice
19 omitted substantive aspect of the claims, such that allowing the amended notice to relate back
20 would deprive the agency of the chance to decide whether to investigate.
21 In Sanchez v. Gruma Corp., the plaintiff argued that an amended LWDA notice letter
22 asserting claims on behalf of the plaintiff and a group of other aggrieved employees related back
23 to an earlier notice asserting claims on behalf of the plaintiff alone. No. 19-CV-02015-WHO,
24 2019 WL 2716539, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2019). The Court held that “[a]lthough the relation
25 back doctrine can apply to LWDA notices, the ‘doctrine cannot be used to frustrate the intent of
26 the Legislature to require compliance with administrative procedures as a condition to filing an
27 action.’” Id. at *4 (citing Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 841–42). Because the original notice letter
1 LWDA of the opportunity to consider whether to allocate its scarce resources to investigating
2 those representative claims, and deprive the employer of the opportunity to respond to the
3 representative claims. Id.
4 In Ovieda v. Sodexo Operations, LLC, the plaintiff requested the opportunity to send an
5 amended notice to the LWDA “alleging all of the details alleged in Plaintiffs’ SAC.” No. CV 12-
6 1750-GHK SSX, 2013 WL 3887873, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2013). The court denied the request
7 because “allowing an amended notice to be submitted after the civil action has already been filed
8 defeats the very purpose of the exhaustion requirement, which is to give the LWDA the
9 opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to pursue the matter itself.” Id.
10 Likewise, in Ortiz v. Amazon.com LLC, the plaintiff sought to amend an LWDA notice to allege
11 new theories of the defendant’s labor code violations. No. 17-CV-03820-JSW, 2017 WL
12 11093812, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017). Citing Ovieda and its reasoning, the Court declined.
13 Id.
14 Defendant also cites Hutcheson v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 5th 932, 939, 947–50
15 (2022), for the proposition that “California appellate authority likewise treats section 2699.3
16 notice as a mandatory precondition to suit that cannot be salvaged by post-hoc relation back.”
17 ECF No. 99 at 18. As a preliminary matter, the opinion ends at page 945; pages 947 to 950 do not
18 exist. More fundamentally, Hutcheson does not support Defendant’s position. That court held
19 that a subsequent complaint substituting a new named plaintiff could relate back to the original
20 complaint, which predated the subsequent plaintiff’s LWDA notice, because the original LWDA
21 notice and complaint provided the requisite notice of the facts and theories underlying the claims.
22 Id. at 941–42.
23 Here, the agency has not been deprived in any way of the opportunity to decide whether to
24 investigate. The defendant plainly had notice of the original claim because its subsidiary was
25 provided notice at its common business address. To foreclose Iravanian’s suit because she named
26 “Translations.com, Inc.” instead of “TransPerfect Translations International, Inc.” would be
27 manifestly unfair. And to allow her later LWDA notice to relate back does no harm to
1 time.
2 3. Overbreadth
3 Although a PAGA plaintiff need not satisfy the requirements of a Rule 23 class action, she
4 must allege facts demonstrating that the challenged practices plausibly extend beyond her own
5 circumstances to the broader group on whose behalf she seeks penalties. See Wood v. N. Am. Van
6 Lines, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-02092-JLS-ADS, 2022 WL 16894838, at *2 (C.D. Cal Aug. 16, 2022)
7 (requiring plaintiff to narrow PAGA allegations where the complaint’s definition of “aggrieved
8 employees” extended beyond the workers described in the factual allegations); Luna v. New
9 Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 2021 WL 4539740, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2021) (dismissing
10 PAGA claim where the complaint included an overly broad scope of aggrieved employees).
11 The Court’s prior order concluded that Iravanian had failed to justify the breadth of the
12 PAGA group, which included “all independent contractors who performed any services for
13 Defendant during the class period, regardless of job function, contractual terms, or factual
14 similarity.” ECF No. 85 at 24–25. Defendant argues that the 4AC remains deficient for the same
15 reason. ECF No. 94 at 26. But the 4AC adds allegations explaining that the ICAs were form
16 contracts containing common terms, and that Defendant’s policies applied across the board to its
17 independent contractors. See ECF No. 89 ¶¶ 37–38, 31–32, 69, 71–73, 75–77. These new
18 allegations show that the PAGA group is not overbroad. Iravanian’s PAGA claim is not
19 dismissed.
20 CONCLUSION
21 The motion is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons set forth above. Because
22 Iravanian has previously been given the opportunity to amend each of the claims dismissed in this
23 order, those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Mullins v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 23-CV-
24 03939-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 807959, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2025) (“The dismissal is with
25 prejudice because the Court previously gave Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the claim, but the
26 claim is still deficient.”); Media.net Advert. FZ-LLC v. Netseer, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1088
27 / / /
] (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Because the Court previously gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend but it did
2 || not cure the deficiency when given the opportunity, the dismissal is with preyudice.”).
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 || Dated: August 6, 2026
5
JON S. TIGA
6 nited States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427474. Public record. Not legal advice.