# ZIMMERMANN

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427442

## Case

- **Full name:** E. Edward Zimmermann v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

E. EDWARD ZIMMERMANN, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs,
NO. 26-CV-281
v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Marston, J. August 26, 2026
For the twenty-second time in ten years, pro se Plaintiff E. Edward Zimmermann
(“Plaintiff” or “Zimmermann”) has brought a suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc.
No. 18 at 1.) This time, Plaintiff submitted a six-page bare-bones Complaint against the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (“Government” or “HHS”), requesting
declaratory judgement regarding the passage of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 (“the ACA”). (Doc. No. 7.) The Government moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and frustrated by Plaintiff’s successive lawsuits,
moves to designate Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
(Id.) Plaintiff opposes the Government’s motion on both grounds. (Doc. No. 21.) For the
reasons below, we grant the Government’s motion in its entirety.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges he is the owner and operator of a commercial construction company, and
as such, is an employer under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). (Doc. No. 7 at 3.)
Plaintiff is responsible for his employees, which includes instituting the terms and conditions of
their employment and establishing their working conditions. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff is engaged in
commerce under the NLRA and is responsible for enforcing the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).1
(Id. at 3.)2

Plaintiff asserts that Congress enacted the ACA pursuant to its necessary and proper
authorities. (Doc. No. 7 at 4.) He pontificates that “if health insurance is appropriate subject
matter for bargaining (collectively or individually) and if bargaining is by and between Plaintiff
and Plaintiffs Employees then the [ACA] is neither necessary nor is it proper.” (Id.) Plaintiff
further sermonizes “if health insurance is appropriate subject matter for bargaining and if health
insurance resides within an individual or collective regulatory scheme[] (sic) of bargaining, then
the [ACA] must be preempted by Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendments rights to procedural due
process. Rendering the [ACA] void.” (Doc. No. 7 at 5.)
Plaintiff asserts two claims. First, Plaintiff requests declaratory judgment determining
whether “Congress’s use of its ‘necessary and proper’ authorities in enacting [ACA] . . . was

constitutionally proper.” (Doc. No. 7 at 1.) Second, Plaintiff also requests a determination about
whether the ACA “is preempted by the regulatory scheme of collective bargaining found in the
National Labor Relations Act . . . as well as preempted by the common law regulatory scheme of
individual bargaining.” (Id.) He claims that “[i]njury in fact goes to the original sin (enactment
of the [ACA]) and prior restraint of rights.” (Id. at 2.) And that following the ACA’s passage,
“through the doctrine of conversion [the Government] took over Plaintiff’s (sic) dominion over

1 Plaintiff incorrectly refers to the Affordable Care Act as the Affordable Health Care Act
throughout his Amended Petition. (Doc. No. 7 at 1, 2.)

2 Plaintiff also baselessly and inappropriately asserts that the ACA was derived from Communist
and Nazi ideology. (Doc. No. 7 at 3.) The Court does not engage with this groundless rhetoric.
health insurance and converted it to the federal government’s dominion over Plaintiff’s (sic)
health insurance.” (Id. at 2–3.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 15, 2026, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Government in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Amended Petition
for declaratory relief. (Doc. No. 7.) He paid the filing fee in this case to proceed in forma
pauperis two days later. (Doc. No. 6.) Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Declaratory
Judgment against the Government on April 15, 2026. (Doc. No. 12). On April 21, 2026, the
Court issued an Order warning Plaintiff that he must make service on the Government by April
24, 2026 or his case could be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m). (Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff subsequently served the Government and then filed a
Motion for Default on June 10, 2026. (Doc. No. 17.)
On June 11, 2026, the Government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
for a pre-filing injunction. (Doc. No. 18.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition the next day

but did not address the merits of the Government’s motion. (Doc. No. 19) On June 15, 2026,
the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default and ordered Plaintiff to show cause why
the Court should not impose a pre-filing injunction as set forth in the Government’s proposed
order attached to its motion. (Doc. No. 20.) Plaintiff filed a substantive response to the
Government’s motion on June 24, 2026, and an amendment on July 3, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22.)
As this matter is fully briefed, it is ripe for resolution.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Rule 12(b)(1) governs jurisdictional challenges to a complaint.” Williams v. Litton Loan
Servicing, No. 16cv5301, 2018 WL 6600097, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2018). “In deciding a

motion under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must first determine whether the movant presents a facial or
factual attack, because that distinction determines how the pleadings are reviewed.” Orden v.
Borough of Woodstown, 181 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2015); see also Gould Elecs.
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be
treated as either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”). Here,
the Government brings a facial challenge because it “contests the sufficiency of the complaint
because of a defect on its face.” Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, 2018 WL 6600097, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2018) (quotation marks omitted). “Thus, we consider whether Plaintiffs’
allegations, attached documents, and referenced proceedings establish the necessary jurisdiction
. . . .” Myers v. Caliber Home Loans, Seterus, Inc., 2019 WL 4393377, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13,

2019).
“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider
matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1426 (3d Cir. 1997). But “an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). The Court
may also “consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items
appearing in the record of the case.” Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631
F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
As Zimmermann is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. See
Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). But he “still must allege sufficient facts” in his
complaint “to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir.
2013).

B. Designation as a Vexatious Litigant Pursuant to the All Writs Act
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, allows a district court to restrict “abusive,
groundless, and vexatious litigation.” Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). The All Writs Act
permits the Court to “issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose
manifold complaints raise claims identical or similar to those that already have been
adjudicated.” In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). However, a court’s ability to
enjoin vexatious litigation is limited both by a litigant’s right to access the courts, as well as due
process protections. Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038. Thus, for a court to properly issue such an
injunction, a district court must: “(1) not restrict a litigant from filing claims ‘absent exigent

circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless
and repetitive actions,’ (2) ‘give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive
relief should not issue’ and (3) ‘narrowly tailor’ the injunction ‘to fit the particular circumstances
of the case before the Court.’” 325 S. 18th St., LLC v. Philadelphia Cmty. Dev. Coal., No.
25cv6867, 2026 WL 482850, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2026) (citing Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038)).
The Third Circuit has clearly established that “a pattern of groundless and vexatious
litigation will justify an order prohibiting further filings without permission of the court.”
Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989) (first citing Gagliardi v.
McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987); and then citing In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d
Cir. 1982). A court order limiting future filings should be narrowly tailored to the specific
matters a petitioner or plaintiff has been filing repeatedly. Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73. But “a
district court has authority to require court permission for all subsequent filings once a pattern of
vexatious litigation transcends a particular dispute.” Id.

IV. DISCUSSION
The Government first moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and then moves to enjoin Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant under the All Writs
Act. (Doc. No. 18.) We address each of the Government’s arguments in turn below.
A. Government’s Motion to Dismiss
First, the Government moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, specifically asserting that the Plaintiff has not alleged any concrete and
particularized injury that he has suffered because of the existence of the ACA, and therefore,
lacks standing. (Doc. No. 18 at 10.) Second, the Government contends that the United States
and its agencies are immune from lawsuits unless they consent to be sued, and that Plaintiff has

failed to present a waiver of sovereign immunity. (Id.) Plaintiff does not address either of these
arguments in either of his oppositions to the Government’s motion to dismiss.3, 4 (Doc. No. 21.)
(Doc. No. 22.)

3 Instead, Plaintiff spends most of his energy in his responses defending his Amended Petition.
He writes, for example, “[m]aybe Plaintiff is constitutionally brilliant, and the government is frivolous
and meritless” and “[w]ith all due respect and without being self-serving, every real attorney was wrong,
and with all due respect and without being self-serving Plaintiff is right.” (Doc. No. 21 at 2-3).

4 Plaintiff further argues that “[t]he [ACA] can never be constitutionally pure because it was
derived directly from the confines of the Communist Manifesto and Mein Kampf.” (Doc. No. 7 at 3.).
Again, the Court will not address these deeply disturbing allegations, as we have already determined that
Plaintiff’s claims fail for standing and sovereign immunity rationales.
The Court agrees with the Government that Plaintiff lacks standing. To establish Article
III standing, a Plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) redressability by a favorable
court decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). To survive the injury

requirement, a Plaintiff must show an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and an “actual
or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate a concrete or particularized injury. (Doc. No. 7.) At no point in Plaintiff’s
Amended Petition does he point to a method by which the ACA, and its alleged
unconstitutionality, would cause an injury to him specifically. The Court agrees with the
Government that Plaintiff’s assertion that the ACA is an “original sin” (Doc. No. 7 at 2) is
“insufficient [to establish standing] as there is no ‘generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance’ that can be enforced through judicial action.” Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482 (1982). Rather, a
plaintiff must be affected “in a personal and individual way” to show he has standing, which

Plaintiff has not alleged here. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiff lacks standing, the Court need not
address the Government’s immunity argument.5 Thus, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.

5 Though the Court need not get to the Government’s second argument, the Court also agrees
with the Government that the United States is immune from suit here. “It is a fundamental principle of
sovereign immunity that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against the United States unless
Congress, via a statute, expressly and unequivocally waives the United States’ immunity to suit.” United
States v. Bein, 214 F. 3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212
(1983)). Moreover, when the Government does consent to be sued, “the terms of [the] waiver of
sovereign immunity define the extent of the court's jurisdiction.” United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834,
841 (1986). “[W]aivers of the Government's sovereign immunity, to be effective, must be ‘unequivocally
expressed,’” and any such waiver must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1992). The Court agrees with the Government that no waiver
of sovereign immunity has attached to Zimmermann’s claims against the Government. See F.D.I.C. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Treasurer of N.J. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir.
B. Government’s Motion to Enjoin Plaintiff as a Vexatious Litigant
Second, the Government moves to enjoin Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant pursuant to the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. (Doc. No. 18 at 16.) The Government moves to enjoin
Plaintiff from filing any new case against the United States in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania without leave of Court. In any request by Plaintiff for leave to submit further
filings in this matter or any new case he attempts to initiate, the Government moves for an order
that he “be required to first certify to this Court that the claims being presented do not concern
the validity of federal laws or regulations and are unrelated to any prior claim Plaintiff has
brought against the United States.” (Doc. No. 18 at 1.) The Government argues that all three
requirements for a pre-filing injunction are present and Zimmerman “has continually abused the
judicial process by filing at least 19 meritless complaints over the past 10 years.” (Id.) Plaintiff
has filed all of these Complaints in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which the Government
contends all “generally seek advisory opinions regarding federal statutes without alleging any
concrete injury.” (Doc. No. 18 at 8.)

In response to the Government’s motion to enjoin Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant,
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he constitutional challenges Plaintiff has brought before the Eastern
District are anything but vexatious. Rather, they are without a doubt landmark and are some of
the largest, most significant, far-reaching constitutional challenges to have been brought before
the independent judiciary (all be it procedurally incorrect) since the enactment of the
constitution.” (Doc. No. 21-1 at 2.) Plaintiff also reasons that “litigation that is most likely to
gain the attention of the Supreme Court cannot for any reason be considered meritless, frivolous

2012) (“Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over
claims against federal agencies or officials in their official capacities.”). Since there is no waiver of
sovereign immunity for Plaintiff’s claims against the Government, Plaintiff’s claims may not proceed.
or burdensome.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also notes that “of course the Government does not like my
challenges. Every challenge takes governments ill-gotten powers away and returns every ‘GOD
GIVEN RIGHT OF FREEDOM’…back to Plaintiff and we the people. Constitutional challenges
that return freedoms to their rightful owners cannot be vexatious.” (Id. at 4.)

The Court does not find Plaintiff’s reasoning compelling. For the reasons described
below, the Court agrees with the Government that Zimmerman has a “a pattern of groundless and
vexatious litigation [that] justify an order prohibiting further filings without permission of the
court.” Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73.
1. Plaintiff’s History of Lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
First, the Court briefly describes Plaintiff's prior Complaints filed against the United
States in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.6
Beginning in 2016, Plaintiff brought claims against the U.S. Department of Labor
(“DOL”), the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of General Services. (Doc. No. 18 at 8–9.) His first suit challenged

the “requirements set by the federal government for the wages he pays his employees.” (Id.)
That suit was ultimately dismissed with prejudice, and on appeal, the District Court’s ruling was
affirmed by the Third Circuit. (Id.)
Undeterred by his losses in both the District and Circuit Court, in 2020, Plaintiff filed two
new Complaints. The first Complaint was filed against DOL, NLRB, and the United States, and
Plaintiff argued that he “was being denied access to unspecified federal contracting opportunities
because he failed or refused to meet federal requirements for his employees’ working and
employment conditions.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff requested $425,000,000 in damages. See

6 A list of Plaintiff’s dismissed lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is laid out
chronologically in a chart in Appendix A of this memorandum.
Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 20-cv-0755 (Feb. 10, 2020). That
suit was dismissed, as it was barred by res judicata. (Doc. No. 18 at 10.) Zimmerman’s second
suit in 2022 was filed against the Attorney General of the United States. (Id. at 11.) After being
transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, it was dismissed for lack of proper service.

(Id.)
In 2021, Plaintiff filed a remarkable eight new Complaints against the United States, four
of which he ultimately withdrew. (Id. at 11–12.) The other four were dismissed by Judge
Baylson. (Id.) In total, four of those Complaints challenged the Davis Bacon Prevailing Wage
Act (“PWA”). One of those Complaints was dismissed because of res judicata, lack of standing,
and failure to state a plausible claim while another was dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Id.)
In one of these Complaints, Plaintiff argued that he could not fulfill his “duty in law because the
(sic) Governments Prevailing Wage Statute is in conflict with the regulatory scheme of the
NLRA.” Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 21-cv-1768 (Apr. 14,
2021). That year, three of Plaintiff’s Complaints posited concerns with the Federal Marshal’s

office, including that they entered his “private property without a warrant” and “interrogated”
him regarding “the subject matter of this litigation.” Zimmermann v. The United States
Government, ECF No. 1, 21-cv-4124 (Sept. 12, 2021). Finally, Plaintiff also filed a Complaint
against the United States that year for retaliating against him when he asked a District Court
Judge a constitutional question. See Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1,
21-cv-5344 (Nov. 22, 2021).
Unmoved by the six motion to dismisses already filed against Plaintiff (not including the
four Complaints Plaintiff also withdrew), Plaintiff filed four additional Complaints against the
United States in 2022. (Doc. No. 18 at 13.) One of those Complaints was dismissed for failure
to prosecute, and the other three were withdrawn by Plaintiff. (Id.) All of those Complaints
raised concerns about the NLRA. See Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No.
1, 22-cv-220 (Jan. 10, 2022); Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 22-cv-
1025 (Mar. 15, 2022); Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 22-cv-3512

(Aug. 30, 2022); Zimmermann v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 22-cv-4537 (Nov.
8, 2022). Two of them addressed issues with the PWA, and the other two focused on the ACA.
Id. Then, in 2023, Plaintiff again filed two suits against the Federal Marshals Service. (Doc. No.
18 at 13.) Both were withdrawn by Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff continued unabated, filing two
additional Complaints in 2025. (Id.) The first was filed broadly against the “United States
Government” and the second was filed against DOL specifically. (Id. at 13–14.) The first
Complaint requested a writ of mandamus about the ACA, and the second concerned the PWA.
(Id.) Again, both were ultimately withdrawn by Plaintiff. (Id.) Finally, in 2026, Plaintiff filed
two additional Complaints, in addition to the Complaint that is the focus of this memorandum.
(Id. at 15.) Both Complaints were filed against DOL and were dismissed for lack of proper

service. See Zimmermann v. U.S. Department of Labor, ECF No. 17, 26-cv-597 (June 24, 2026);
Zimmerman v. U.S. Department of Labor, ECF No. 11, 26-cv-1366 (July 20, 2026).
2. Injunction of Zimmermann as a Vexatious Litigant
Plaintiff’s significant and patterned number of Complaints, which are oriented around
substantially similar subject matter and are directed against largely the same Defendants,
persuades this Court that enjoining him as a vexatious litigant is necessary. The Court agrees
with the Government that the three factors necessary for a filing injunction are present here.
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff is continuously filing “meritless and repetitive actions”
that constitute “abuse of the judicial process.” 325 S. 18th St., LLC, 2026 WL 482850, *4. The
Court’s own review of Plaintiff’s prior Complaints shows that Plaintiff has brought five
Complaints pursuant to the ACA, nine Complaints pursuant to the PWA, and fifteen Complaints
pursuant to the NLRA. See supra section IV.B.1. Plaintiff has sued the DOL four times and the
“United States Government” over fifteen times. Id. Plaintiff explicitly requested damages in
only five of his Complaints; nonetheless, his aggregate requests for relief exceed $700 million.7

And, although Plaintiff has withdrawn eleven of his Complaints, the court resources required to
assess them remain significant, and Defendants have often still been required to respond before
Plaintiff decides to withdraw. (Doc. No. 18 at 14.) See Jaye v. Shipp, No. 17cv5257, 2018 WL
2278100, at *1 (D.N.J. May 18, 2018) (entering an injunction against a pro se litigant to stop
“abuse of the system and futile expense, as Defendants are forced to repeatedly defend against
ultimately frivolous lawsuits”). Critically, Plaintiff has yet to file one case which has been
successfully found to be meritorious. Instead, every case that Plaintiff has not withdrawn or
failed to serve or prosecute has been dismissed, and several have been barred by res judicata.
(Doc. No. 18 at 11–12.) Courts have consistently enjoined Plaintiffs for groundlessly abusing

the judicial process, especially to file Complaints that are repetitive or are frequently directed to
the same Defendants. See Mina v. Montgomery, No. 18cv5556, 2019 WL 2060111, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. May 8, 2019) (finding that a Plaintiff who filed ten of the same, or substantially similar
subject matter actions over a six-year period will be restricted from raising any claims that were
previously asserted).

7 See Zimmerman v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 20-cv-755 (Feb. 10, 2020);
Zimmerman v. The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 21-cv-4716 (Oct. 22, 2021); Zimmerman v.
The United States Government, ECF No. 1, 21-cv-2336 (May 29, 2021); Zimmerman v. The United States
Government, ECF No. 1, 21-cv-5344 (Nov. 22, 2021); Zimmerman v. The United States Government,
ECF No. 1, 23-cv-3232 (Aug. 21, 2023).
Second, Zimmerman was “given notice of the potential injunction and an opportunity to
oppose it.” Grossberger v. Ruane, 535 F. App’x 84, 86 (3d Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) (citing Brow,
994 F.2d at 1038). On June 15, 2026, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the Government’s
motion to enjoin Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant and show cause why the Court should not

impose a filing injunction as set forth in the Government’s Proposed Order attached to its
motion. (Doc. No. 20 at 1.) Plaintiff opposed the Government’s motion. (See Doc. Nos. 19, 21,
22.)
Third, the Government’s proposed injunction is “narrowly tailored to fit the specific
circumstances of [Zimmerman’s] repetitive filings.” Grossberger, 535 F. App'x at 86 (citing
Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993)). Here, Plaintiff will be enjoined from
filing any claims against the United States Government that have already been asserted,
including, but not limited to, lawsuits regarding the ACA, the PWA, and the NLRA. Given
Plaintiff’s repetitive, non-meritorious, and dilatory chronology of filings that all target similar
government agencies, this injunction is narrowly tailored to Plaintiff’s historical litigation

narrative against the Government. See Foster v. Slomsky, No. 23-1298, 2024 WL 1574920 at *3
(3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2024) (upholding an injunction against a Plaintiff as narrowly tailored because
“[t]he injunction restricted only Foster’s ability to file documents on the existing dockets or any
new case related to the same underlying claims, while also providing that Foster could seek leave
of court to make such new filings if they are not frivolous or do not seek relief previously
denied.”)
The Court will not prohibit Plaintiff from filing lawsuits; instead, going forward,
Plaintiff must request permission of the court to safeguard the judicial resources that have been
strained in responding to Plaintiff’s frequent, successive complaints.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Government’s motion to dismiss is granted and
Plaintiff’s request to enjoin Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant is granted. An accompanying Order
follows.
Appendix A
Year Outcome Civ No.

2016 Dismissed with Prejudice 16-cv-4564
Dismissed sua sponte and with prejudice, as
2020 the Complaint was barred by res judicata 20-cv-0755
Transferred to MDPA and dismissed for
2020 lack of proper service 20-cv-3218
Dismissed as Complaint was barred by res
judicata, lacked standing, and failed to state
2021 a plausible claim 21-cv-194
2021 Dismissed for failure to prosecute 21-cv-1768
2021 Dismissed sua sponte 21-cv-2009
2021 Plaintiff withdrew 21-cv-2336
2021 Plaintiff withdrew 21-cv-4124
2021 Plaintiff withdrew 21-cv-4716
2021 Dismissed 21-cv-5344
2021 Plaintiff withdrew 21-cv-5237
2022 Plaintiff withdrew 22-cv-220
2022 Plaintiff withdrew 22-cv-1025
2022 Dismissed for failure to prosecute 22-cv-3512
2022 Plaintiff withdrew 22-cv-4537
2023 Plaintiff withdrew 23-cv-1076
2023 Plaintiff withdrew 23-cv-3232
2025 Plaintiff withdrew 25-cv-2321
2025 Plaintiff withdrew 26-cv-4467
2026 Dismissed for lack of proper service 26-cv-597
2026 Dismissed for lack of proper service 26-cv-1366
Dismissed for lack of subject matter
2026 jurisdiction 26-cv-281

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427442. Public record. Not legal advice.