# Brown

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427438

## Case

- **Full name:** Jordan Brown and Kellie Brown v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JORDAN BROWN and KELLIE :
BROWN,
Plaintiffs : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-546
Vv. (JUDGE MANNION)
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 13). For the

reasons stated herein, the motion will be DENIED IN PART with respect to
the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim and GRANTED IN PART with respect
to their bad faith claim.
I. BACKGROUND
This action stems from a January 3, 2024, pipe blockage resulting in
property damage to plaintiffs Jordan and Kellie Brown’s (‘the plaintiffs”)
home. (Doc. 1-3, 9/4).
According to the plaintiffs, on that date they heard a gurgling sound
coming from their basement sink and contacted Matt Waiters, a licensed
plumber. (Doc. 13-15 at 5-7). Walters inspected the pipe, concluded that

there were two blockages from frozen sewage and water, which caused the

pipe to burst, and completed the necessary repairs, charging $14,903.50.
(Doc. 13-5).
A week later, on January 10, 2024, the plaintiffs submitted a claim to

State Farm with the assistance of Schuylkill Public Adjusting Company. The
public adjuster, Jarod Luscavage, forwarded Walters’ invoice, report, and a
weather report for the day of the loss. (Doc. 13-4). Luscavage sent follow up
correspondence several times throughout the month of February, at times
citing the Pennsylvania Unfair Claims Practices Act because of alleged lack
of communication and prompt investigation by State Farm. (Doc. 1-3 at 88-
92).
Finally, on March 4, 2024, State Farm sent a denial letter, notifying the
plaintiffs of its conclusion that freezing was not the cause of the pipe damage.
(Doc. 13-10). In response, Luscavage requested that State Farm’s claim
adjuster, David Moncavage, cite to the specific policy language that
supported the denial. (Doc. 1-3 at 88-89). Over the following few months,
Luscavage allegedly made several atternpts at contacting Moncavage,
asking for clarification regarding the denial, and noting his concerns about
how it was handled and the delay in the decision. /d. at 88; see a/so (Doc.
18 at 5).

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Eventually, on June 22, 2024, Moncavage forwarded a report from

master plumber Joseph Pandalfo, dated March 1, 2024, which concluded
that the pipe blockage was due to dirt and debris and failure to upkeep, not
frozen waste or water. (Doc. 18 at 5); (Doc. 13-9).
Luscavage then retained David Walsavage, a civil engineer, who
prepared a report dated December 18, 2024, finding that Walters’ conclusion
that the damage was due to frozen water and waste was reasonable, based

on the fact that the pipe was a combined water and sewer system and that
the roof drains flow into the pipe, meaning that water exposed to sub-freezing
temperatures could have been entering the pipe. (Doc. 13-11). Luscavage
forwarded this report to Moncavage. See (Doc. 13-13). Pandalfo then
authored another report, dated January 22, 2025, again concluding that the
damage was due to improper maintenance, not frozen materials. (Doc. 13-
12). The next day, State Farm sent another letter notifying the plaintiffs that
the damage was not covered under their insurance policy. (Doc. 13-13).
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Court of
Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. However, on March 26, 2025, State
Farm removed the case to this court, pursuant to diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §1332(a). (Doc. 1). The plaintiffs assert claims for breach of

contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 1-3 at 6-
7, 1140-47).
Fact discovery closed on October 3, 2025. See (Doc. 10). Expert
discovery closed on November 21, 2025. /d. During the course of litigation,
State Farm also retained the services of meteorologist Jonn Scala and
licensed professional engineer Jason Besz, who together authored a report,
dated October 31, 2025, concluding that the blockages and resulting
damage were not due to weather. (Doc. 13-14).
On December 10, 2025, State Farm filed the instant motion for

summary judgment as to both claims against it, as well as an accompanying
brief in support. (Docs. 13, 15). On December 29, 2025, the plaintiffs filed
their brief in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 18). Finally, on January 12, 2026,
State Farm filed a reply brief to the brief in opposition. (Doc. 19). The motion
is thus ripe for disposition.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery
[including depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is [(1)] no
genuine issue as to any material fact and [(2)] that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). Material facts are those that “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is
“genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
At the summary judgment stage, “the judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” /d. at 249: see also Marino v. Indus.
Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a court may not
weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations). Rather, the court
must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d
Cir. 2007).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
The moving party can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the
essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial,
no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” /n re Bressman, 327

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F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving
party's burden has recently been explained this way:
In interpreting Rule 56, the Supreme Court has outlined two
closely related methods for a movant to succeed at summary
judgment. First, under the standard approach, the moving
party may produce material facts, established as genuinely
undisputed, that entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law’); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248-52 (1986) (explaining the meaning of the terms ‘material’
and ‘genuine’). Second, under the Ce/ofex approach, a moving
party may instead demonstrate that the nonmoving party has
not made “a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case .. . on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (emphasis added).
Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622 (3d Cir. 2024).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to material facts,” but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict
in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
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586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-

movant’s] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof
at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a

failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 322-23: Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d
Cir. 2007).
lil. DISCUSSION
a. Breach of contract
Under Pennsylvania law, the “necessary material facts that must be
alleged for [a breach of contract] action are simple: there was a contract, the
defendant breached it, and plaintiffs suffered damages from the breach.”
McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010) (citing Hart v.
Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 332 (Pa.Super.2005)). Moreover, in the insurance
context, “it is a necessary prerequisite to recovery upon a policy for the
insured to show a claim within the coverage provided by the policy.” Miller v.
Boston Ins. Co., 218 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. 1966) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the plaintiffs argue that under the insurance policy, State Farm

was obligated to cover the cost of repairs in the event of damage resulting
from a frozen pipe. Indeed, the policy provides that State Farm “will pay for
accidental direct physical loss to the property,” including “[f]reezing of a
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plumbing . . . appliance.” (Doc. 13-2 at 27-29). In support of their claim that
the pipe burst due to freezing, the plaintiffs offer the reports of Matt Walters,
a licensed plumber, who concluded that freezing was responsible for the pipe
bursting, and David Walsavage, a civil engineer, who found that Walters’
conclusion was reasonable. (Docs. 13-5, 13-11).
State Farm, on the other hand, argues that the loss was due to wear
and tear and failure to upkeep on the part of the plaintiffs, which would not
be covered under the policy, and that it could not have been due to freezing
given the weather on and around the date in question. See generally (Doc.
15). In support of its argument, State Farm relies on the conclusions of
master plumber Joseph Pandalfo, professional engineer Jason Besz, and
meteorologist John Scala. (Docs. 13-9, 13-12, 13-14). Furthermore, State
Farm asserts that the plaintiffs “have no evidence of direct physical loss or
damage to the building from the pipe break below the slab, i.e.[,] water
damage to the building, and they failed to make out a prima facie cause of
action,” requiring the court to grant summary judgment. (Doc. 13 at 11). State
Farm cites the deposition testimony of plaintiff Jordan Brown, in which he
stated that the burst pipe resulted in “minimal... an inch or two maybe” of
water in the basement sink that it connected to. (Doc. 13-15 at 11). According
to State Farm, the absence of legitimate water damage to the building means

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that there was no “accidental direct physical loss to the property” as required
by the insurance agreement. (Doc. 13-2 at 27). However, the plaintiffs assert
that the burst pipe was itself the accidental direct physical loss.
Finally, State Farm argues that the “[p]laintiffs also failed to comply with
the policy condition requiring them to exhibit the damaged property to State
Farm.” (Doc. 15 at 12-13) (citing Doc. 13-2 at 35 (“After a loss to which this
insurance may apply, you must cooperate with us in the investigation of the
claim and also see that the following duties are performed . . . as often as

we reasonably require: (1) exhibit the damaged property” (emphasis in
original))). According to State Farm, the plaintiffs’ failure to exhibit prevented
it “the opportunity to inspect” the property in violation of the policy, barring
recovery. (Doc. 15 at 15). However, when the plaintiffs submitted their claims
to State Farm, they forwarded photographs taken by Walters when he
assessed the damage before making repairs. (Doc. 13-4). Further, State
Farm had a master plumber, Pandalfo, inspect the pipe after the fact,
examine Walters’ photographs and invoice, and write a report on the cause
of the damage. (Doc. 13-9).
Assessing these arguments, it is clear that there exist genuine issues
of material fact. A jury could reasonably conclude—based on the insurance
policy covering pipe damage due to freezing—that the burst pipe was a direct

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accidental physical loss as required by the policy and that it resulted from
freezing. Furthermore, whether or not the plaintiffs failed to exhibit the loss

as required by the policy is a disputed issue best left for a factfinder.
Accordingly, State Farm’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the
plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim will be denied.
b. Breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing
A bad faith claim under 42 Pa.C.S. §8371 requires the plaintiffs to show
by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer: (1) did not have a
reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy and (2) knew of or
recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fogel, 656 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (1994)). The
Third Circuit has described “the essence of a bad faith claim” as “the
unreasonable and intentional (or reckless) denial of benefits.” /d. (quoting
UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro. Life. Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2004)).
“Bad faith” in this context means:

any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy;
it is not necessary that such refusal be fraudulent. For
purposes of an action against an insurer for failure to pay a
claim, such conduct imports a dishonest purpose and means
a breach of a known duty (/.e., good faith and fair dealing),

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through some motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence
or bad judgment is not bad faith.

Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688 (quoting BLAck's LAW DICTIONARY 139 (6th ed.
1990)); see also Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 523 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“[M]Jere negligence or bad judgment does not constitute bad faith;
knowledge or reckless disregard of a lack of a basis for denial of coverage
is necessary”) (citation omitted). As such, “an insurer may defeat a claim of
bad faith by showing that it had a reasonable basis for its actions.” Fogel,
656 F.3d at 179 (citing Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 57
F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, an insurer is not required to show
that “the process used to reach its conclusion was flawless or that its
investigatory methods eliminated possibilities at odds with its conclusion’;
rather, an insurer need only show “it conducted a review or investigation
sufficiently thorough to yield a reasonable foundation for its action.” Cronin

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:06-CV-1081, 2008 WL 11503863,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2008) (quoting Mann v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
No. 02-1346, 2003 WL 22917545, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003)); see also
Luse v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 411 F. App'x 462, 465 (3d Cir. 2011) (“an
insurer may defeat a bad faith claim by showing that it conducted a review

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or investigation sufficiently thorough to yield a reasonable foundation for its
action’).
A plaintiff's burden of proof in a bad faith insurance case is significant;
it requires evidence “so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a
clear conviction, without hesitation, about whether or not the defendants
acted in bad faith.” /d. (citation omitted). “[T]he plaintiffs burden in opposing
a summary judgment motion is commensurately high in light of the
substantive evidentiary burden at trial.” Post, 691 F.3d at 523 (citation
omitted).
Here, the plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden. They assert that
State Farm “exhibited ongoing, repeated, and constant patterns of delay, and
that, in and of itself, is enough to present to the jury the Bad Faith count.”
(Doc. 18 at 17). However, such a conclusion distorts the relevant standard.
As stated above, the plaintiffs must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the insurer: (1) did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits
under the policy and (2) knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of
reasonable basis in denying the claim. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d at 179.
It is clear that State Farm had a reasonable basis for denying the claim,
regardless of whether its denial was the correct decision.

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Following the plaintiffs’ claim submission, State Farm investigated the

claim. Pursuant to its investigation, State Farm hired master plumber
Pandalfo to investigate the cause of pipe damage and to review Walters’

report. Pandalfo concluded that the damage to the pipe was due to wear and

tear and failure to upkeep, not freezing. (Doc. 13-9). Pandalfo’s conclusion,
in conjunction with the policy not providing coverage where damage to a pipe
results from wear and tear and failure to upkeep, provided a reasonable
basis to deny the claim. Any delays in State Farm’s processing of the claim
do not undermine the simple fact that a reasonable basis existed.
Accordingly, the bad faith claim fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, State Farm’s motion will be DENIED IN
PART with respect to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim and GRANTED
IN PART with respect to their bad faith claim. An appropriate order shall
issue.

He “2 a United States District Judge
DATE:
25-546-01
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427438. Public record. Not legal advice.