# SPEIGEL

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427375

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher W. Speigel v. Cape May County, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOPHER W. SPEIGEL, No. 23-cv-3556

Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM ORDER
CAPE MAY COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
Before the Court is pro se plaintiff Christopher W. Speigel’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint. ECF
No. 1 (“Compl.”). Having previously granted his in forma pauperis application, see ECF No. 5,
the Court must screen Plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte to determine whether it “(i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Brown v.
Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 22-6240, 2025 WL 3041821, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2025). For
the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (1) because Plaintiff seeks
monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief and (2) for failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.
WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by officer Benjamin Stiefel (“Stiefel”)
of the Middle Township Police Department (“MTPD”) on November 17, 2021, at 10:04 PM.
Compl. at 12. According to the relevant MTPD incident report, Plaintiff was arrested for
aggravated assault based on a “report of shots fired.” ECF No. 1-3 at 2. In connection with this
event, Plaintiff ultimately pled guilty to “second-degree burglary and first-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon.” State v. Speigel, No. A-2413-22, 2025 WL 2426837, at *1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 22, 2025). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at South Woods State Prison in
Bridgeton, New Jersey. ECF No. 10; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges that Stiefel immediately placed him in handcuffs on the night
of November 17. Compl. at 12. Plaintiff further alleges that he was then transported to MTPD
headquarters by officer Kenzee Delgado (“Delgado”), where Plaintiff remained until officer

Christian Quaranta (“Quaranta”) transferred him to Cape May County Correctional Center on
November 18 at 4:46 PM. Id. However, Plaintiff alleges that he remained handcuffed behind his
back for essentially1 the duration of his 18-hour detention in a processing room at MTPD
headquarters on November 17 and 18, 2021. Id. at 12–13; and
WHEREAS Plaintiff states that he began to experience sharp pain in his right shoulder
during his detention and complained to officers. Id. at 13. He states that around 3:15 AM on
November 18 he requested medical attention and was seen by an EMT. Id. Plaintiff alleges that
he was checked out by the EMT and received an ice pack to alleviate his pain. Id.; ECF No. 1-2;
and

WHEREAS after his detention on November 17 and 18, Plaintiff “began experiencing
higher levels of pain, numbness, and discomfort in [his] right shoulder and arm.” Id. at 13.
Plaintiff states that doctors later diagnosed him with shoulder impingement syndrome. Id. He
further alleges that he is now “virtually disabled,” lacks mobility in his right shoulder, and
continues to experience pain, discomfort, and numbness. Id. at 14; and
WHEREAS as a result of this incident, Plaintiff filed his complaint, in which he asserts
claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various police officers and judicial defendants.

1 Plaintiff states that “shortly after [his] arrival” at MTPD headquarters, officers “freed [him] from
[his] restraints” and placed “brown bags” over his hands. Compl. at 12; see Mirarchi v. Britton,
No. 08-1712, 2009 WL 3053731, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Petitioner had paper bags over
each hand so that he could be tested for gunshot residue.”); ECF No. 1-2.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims for (1) “improper training, deliberate indifference, and
neglect in duties” against then-MTPD police chief Chris Leusner; (2) “improper supervision,
neglect in duties, and deliberate indifference” against MTPD officers Mark Higginbottom, Tracey
Super, Lenny Larkin, and Brian P. Murphy; (3) “initiating rear restraints, neglect in duties, and
deliberate indifference” against Stiefel and Delgado; (4) “neglect in duties and deliberate

indifference” against MTPD officers Thomas Ritteroff, Kurt Seattler, Blake Martindale, Sarah
Lesniewski, Ursula Sharkey, Tyler Jackson, Quaranta, Shawn Karge, Christopher Baczek, and
Damiano; and (5) “abuse of discretion, deliberate indifference, and neglect in duties” against
Superior Court Judge Benjamin Podolnick (“Judge Podolnick”), Municipal Court Judge Thomas
Keywood (“Judge Keywood”), and Cape May County. Id. at 14–16; ECF No. 4; and
WHEREAS the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint entirely. First, the Court must
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Podolnick and Keywood because those claims seek
monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). “Judges enjoy absolute immunity from a suit for money damages for judicial

acts.” Livingston v. Gallina, No. 25-1948, 2025 WL 2673613, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 18, 2025).
Because Plaintiff does not allege that these state-court judges committed a “nonjudicial act” or
took judicial action “in the complete absence of jurisdiction,” his claims against them must be
dismissed based on judicial immunity. Id.; and
WHEREAS second, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing
a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.
App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). Under that standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will dismiss a complaint if it
lacks “‘enough [well-pled] facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element[s]’ of a claim for relief.” Seana, 506 F. App’x at 123 (quoting
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)). Because Plaintiff is proceeding

pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. See Malcomb v. McKean, 535 F. App’x 184,
186 (3d Cir. 2013); and
WHEREAS Plaintiff’s remaining claims appear to fall into three categories. First,
Plaintiff asserts § 1983 conditions of confinement claims against the officers who allegedly placed
him in handcuffs. Second, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims for deliberate indifference against the
officers who allegedly failed to provide him with adequate medical care. And third, Plaintiff
asserts § 1983 claims against other MTPD officers and Cape May County under a supervisor
liability theory and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which extends
§ 1983 liability to local governments whose policy or custom facilitates an underlying

constitutional violation; and
WHEREAS as an arrestee at the time of his confinement at MTPD headquarters,
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims stem from his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. See Carter v.
Kraus, No. 24-26, 2025 WL 1756682, at *5 n.7 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 2025); and
WHEREAS concerning the first category of claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable §
1983 conditions of confinement claim. “To establish a [conditions of confinement claim under
the] Fourteenth Amendment . . . , a pretrial detainee must allege that his conditions of confinement
amount to punishment.” Tolbert v. Atl. Cnty. Just. Facility, No. 24-10117, 2025 WL 50376, at *4
(D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2025). To do so, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the deprivation he experienced
“was sufficiently serious” and that “officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.
(citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a conditions of confinement
claim, because he does not allege (1) that any MTPD officer had an express intent to punish him
or (2) facts that allow for an inference of that intent. See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d
Cir. 2007). As such, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim. See

Talley v. Doyle, No. 19-1588, 2019 WL 6050739, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2019); Talley v. PA
Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-1687, 2019 WL 6050744, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2019); see also Gibbs
v. Hinds, No. 25-95, 2026 WL 809785, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2026); McCullon v. Saylor, No.
12-445, 2013 WL 1192778, at *17 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 12-445, 2013 WL 1192963 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2013); and
WHEREAS concerning the second category of claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable
§ 1983 claim based on inadequate medical care. To state “a Due Process deliberate indifference
to medical needs claim, a plaintiff must plead that (1) he had a ‘serious medical need’ and (2)
defendants’ acts or omissions exhibited a ‘deliberate indifference to that need.’” Brown, 2025 WL

3041821, at *3 (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to meet this high standard,
namely because Plaintiff explicitly alleges that he received medical attention from EMTs during
his detention at MTPD headquarters. Compl. at 13; ECF No. 1-2. Although Plaintiff characterizes
the treatment he received as “feeble,” Compl. at 13, the Constitution “is not a device to second
guess the medical decisions of prison personnel,” Turner v. Kirsch, No. 08-2005, 2011 WL
1430300, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2011). Therefore, absent additional factual detail, Plaintiff’s
inadequate medical care claim must be dismissed; and
WHEREAS concerning the third category of claims, Plaintiff’s theory of § 1983 liability
hinges on the viability of Plaintiff’s claims for the underlying constitutional violations he alleges,
i.e., the claims addressed just above. As such, given that it will dismiss Plaintiff’s “direct” § 1983
claims, the Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims grounded in supervisor and Monell
liability. Cappel v. Aston Twp. Fire Dep’t, 693 F. Supp. 3d 467, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2023).2
Accordingly, IT IS on this 26th day of August 2026;
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further
ORDERED that the Office of the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum
Order to Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Office of the Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this matter.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Claire C. Cecchi
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

2 To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, see Compl. at 1, the
Court “declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,” Tellus v. New
Jersey, No. 25-1727, 2025 WL 1024068, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2025).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427375. Public record. Not legal advice.