# Ly

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427351

## Case

- **Full name:** Ousmane Ly v. Warden, Butler County Jail, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

OUSMANE LY,
:
Petitioner, :
:
v. : Case No. 1:26-cv-00378
: Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins
: Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall
WARDEN, BUTLER COUNTY JAIL, :
et al., :
:
Respondents.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Ousmane Ly, through his next friend,1 Dawn Weatherwax, seeks a stay of
removal pending the final resolution of a post-conviction appeal in the Indiana Court of Appeals,
and, after having now been removed from the United States, seeks this Court to order his return.
(See ECF Nos. 1, 4, 9, 26, 33.) Respondent the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) opposed Petitioner’s request on numerous grounds. (ECF No. 30.)
Separately, Respondent the Warden of Butler County Jail (the “Warden”) moves to dismiss the
Petition. (ECF No. 13.)

1 Respondent ICE challenges the next friend’s ability to represent the interests of Petitioner in this action.
“To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is unable to prosecute the
case on her own behalf due to ‘inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability’ and that the next friend is
‘truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.’” Paredes As Next
Friend of Argibay v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, No. 1:26-CV-1174, 2026 WL 1141135, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr.
28, 2026) (finding the next friend could proceed on the immigrant detainee’s behalf); see also Moiseev by Kandashkina
v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-CV-1446, 2026 WL 1413110, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. May 20, 2026) (permitting a spouse to
proceed as next friend, pro se, on behalf of her detained husband because the petition adequately demonstrated the
petitioner’s lack of access at the ICE detention facility, limited English proficiency, and that, as petitioner’s spouse,
she had a significant relationship with petitioner and was acting in his best interests); but see Martinez v. Warden, No.
4:26 CV 773, 2026 WL 1242933, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2026) (denying a request for a spouse to appear pro se
as next friend on behalf of her detained husband because “[a] non-lawyer cannot serve as a ‘next friend’ unless she,
herself, is represented by counsel”). Upon review of the caselaw that has addressed this issue, the Undersigned does
not find as a matter of law Ms. Weatherwax is barred from proceeding as next friend, and thus, will allow her to
proceed as next friend for purposes of this Petition, finding that she otherwise has demonstrated that Petitioner lacks
access to the courts, and that she has a significant relationship with Petitioner and has his best interests in mind.
For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Petitioner’s
claims for relief and GRANT the Warden’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed this second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 16, 2026. (ECF
No. 1.) In it, he alleges that he was taken into immigration custody on August 14, 2025, and

housed at Butler County jail, while removal proceedings were pending against him in immigration
court. (ECF No. 1, at PAGED #: 5.) Thereafter, on or about March 2, 2026, an immigration judge
ordered Petitioner’s removal to Senegal, finding that his 2021 sexual battery conviction in Indiana
state court qualified as an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101(a)(43)(F) in violation of
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)), and thus rendered him removable. (Id. at PAGEID #: 2, 6–7; see also Exhibit
G, ECF No. 30-6, at PAGEID #: 626–31.) According to his Petition, his appeal of that removal
order is currently pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Id. at PAGEID
#: 5.)

On April 9, 2026, Petitioner sought a stay of his removal to Senegal by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in this District. See Ousmane Ly v. Lyons, No. 1:26-cv-361-MWM-PBS,
Petition, ECF 1 (S.D. Ohio April 9, 2026). The Court soon after denied his Petition for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at Order and Opinion, ECF 6, at PAGEID #: 378 (S.D. Ohio April
10, 2026).
In this new Petition now at issue (filed a few days later), he indicates that he is not
challenging his removal, rather, he is challenging the validity of his Indiana state-court conviction,
which was used as the sole basis for the removal order. (ECF No. 1, at PAGEID #: 5.) He further
contends that his post-conviction appeal challenging that conviction is currently pending before
the Indiana Court of Appeals (Case No. 26A-PC-00389), and as such, he cannot be removed
pending a final determination of that case.2 (Id. at PAGEID #: 3, 19.) In his Grounds for Relief,
Petitioner raises many arguments addressing the validity of the state-court conviction. He also
contends that removal during a pending appeal that alleges constitutional violations violates the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause. (Id. at PAGEID #: 6–8.) Indeed, the vast majority

of Petitioner’s brief focuses on the alleged flaws related to his Indiana state-court conviction. (See
ECF No. 1, at PAGEID #: 30–92.) Relevant here, even though Petitioner’s brief in support of his
Petition states that he is challenging the Indiana conviction and not the removal order, see id. at
PAGEID #: 17, the relief he seeks is to stop his removal to Senegal. (See id. “Petitioner asks this
Court for one thing today: stop his removal to Senegal.”) In the alternative, Petitioner contends
that prolonged detention where removal was not reasonably foreseeable is presumptively unlawful.
(Id. at PAGEID #: 57.)
Petitioner initially sought a temporary restraining order and injunction preventing his
removal to allow him the opportunity to remain in the United States during the pendency of his

state-court appeal. (Id. at PAGEID #: 98–99; ECF No. 4.)
On May 29, 2026, Petitioner was removed from the United States to Senegal. (ECF No.
25, at PAGEID #: 475; ECF No. 30-8, Exhibit H, at PAGEID #: 635.) Since that time, Petitioner,
through his next friend, has filed numerous motions on the docket requesting expedited rulings
and the return of Petitioner to the United States. (See ECF Nos. 9, 15, 21, 23, 26, 27, 33.)
Petitioner also seeks discovery (ECF No. 36) and for the issuance of subpoenas (ECF No. 37).

2 Petitioner’s post-conviction relief before the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court challenging his 2021 sexual
battery guilty plea was denied on January 22, 2026. (ECF No. 1-1, at PAGEID #: 122–31.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal courts have the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Moreover, although the scope of § 2241’s reach includes non-
citizens, “district courts’ habeas powers are somewhat limited in the immigration context.”
See Hamama v. Homan, 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Congress stripped the
courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief” for challenges to removal orders); see also Jiang Lu
v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t , 22 F. Supp. 3d 839, 841 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (“Federal courts have
habeas jurisdiction to examine the statutory and constitutional bases for an immigration detention
unrelated to a final order of removal.”). Despite lacking “jurisdiction in habeas over issues such
as challenges to the legality of a removal order. . . [the Court] has jurisdiction to consider whether
a noncitizen is lawfully detained.” Gvarliani v. Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No.

3:26-CV-1324, 2026 WL 2042181, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2026), report and recommendation
(citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (further citations
omitted)).
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s arguments can be distilled to the following: he should not be removed, and,
now that he has been removed, should be returned to the United States because he has an appeal
pending in Indiana state court. (ECF No. 1.) In his view, a favorable outcome in that appeal would
undermine the validity of his state-court felony conviction, which in turn could nullify the grounds
for the immigration court’s removal order. (ECF No. 1.) At base, then, Petitioner seeks for this
Court to maintain the status quo until the state-court appeal process is complete. (See ECF No.
31, at PAGEID #: 640.) Respondent ICE contends that Petitioner’s claims fail for numerous
reasons, namely: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court decisions, other district court
decisions, and removal orders; (2) Petitioner’s claims are otherwise moot now that he has been
removed; (3) he cannot collaterally attack his state court felony convictions in this § 2241 habeas

proceeding; and (4) he has not demonstrated circumstances that warrant facilitation of his return.
(ECF No. 30.) Respondent Warden contends that because Petitioner is no longer housed in Butler
County Jail and was in the custody of ICE, not Butler County, the Warden should be dismissed.
(ECF No. 13.) Upon review, the Undersigned finds that Respondents have the better arguments.
A. Respondent Warden’s Motion to Dismiss
Respondent Warden moves to dismiss the Petition primarily because Petitioner is no longer
being housed at Butler County Jail. (ECF No. 13, at PAGEID #: 429.) Respondent Warden further
contends that although Petitioner was housed at Butler County Jail, Petitioner was at all relevant
times in the custody of ICE, not the Warden’s. (Id. at PAGEID #: 430.) For this reason, even

setting aside that Respondent is no longer housed at Butler County, the Warden is not a proper
party in this suit. See, e.g., Roman v. Ashcroft et al., 340 F.3d 314, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
that “although the warden of each detention facility technically has day-to-day control over alien
detainees, the INS District Director for the district where a detention facility is located ‘has power
over’ alien habeas corpus petitioners”). The Undersigned finds the Warden’s arguments to be well-
taken and recommends that its Motion to Dismiss be granted, and the Warden be dismissed as a
Respondent.
B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction for Relief Pertaining to Execution of Petitioner’s
Removal Order

1. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Stay the Execution of the Removal Order
As noted by the District Judge in his prior habeas case, the district court lacks jurisdiction
to review removal-based claims. See Ousmane Ly v. Lyons, No. 1:26-cv-361-MWM-PBS, Order
and Opinion, ECF 6, PAGEID # 378 (S.D. Ohio April 10, 2026) (“As [is] well established in the
Sixth Circuit . . . the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over removal-based claims.” (citing
Hamama v. Adducci, 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018)); see also Karki v. Jones, No. 25-3440, 2025
U.S. App. LEXIS 20660, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025) (“On its face, [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(g)’s text
prohibits judicial review of a habeas petition challenging the execution of a removal order issued
under Chapter 12 of Title 8.”) Section 1252(g) provides in relevant part that: “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); see also Hamama, 912 F.3d at
875–76 (finding that a request to stay the execution of a final order of removal is not something
over which district courts have jurisdiction).
Additionally, the doctrine of issue preclusion bars subsequent suits asserting the same
claims after dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Outdoor One Commc’ns LLC v. Charter Twp.
of Canton, 155 F.4th 776, 781 (6th Cir. 2025). Issue preclusion applies if:
(1) the issue was raised and litigated in the prior proceeding; (2) determining the
issue was necessary to that proceeding; (3) the prior decision was final and on the
merits; and (4) the party against whom the prior decision will be applied had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
Id. at 782.
As an initial matter then, Petitioner’s request for a stay of the execution of the removal
order is barred by issue preclusion because the same issue was raised, and thus litigated, in his
prior case. Further, the district court’s determination that the court lacked jurisdiction was
necessary to the determination and outcome of that case, was a final decision, and was against the
same parties. Thus, Petitioner cannot relitigate that which has already been decided, nor can this
Court act as a reviewer of the prior district court’s decision. See Yigal v. Butler, No. 1:22 CV 519,
2022 WL 2237847, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2022) (explaining that district courts lack subject

matter jurisdiction to review another district court’s prior decision).
But even if it was not barred by issue preclusion, Petitioner’s request for a stay of the
execution of the removal order falls squarely outside this Court’s jurisdiction. The immigration
court found that Petitioner was convicted of an aggravated felony, and thus was “removable under
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of a
crime of violence (aggravated felony) under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1
101(a)(43)(F).” (Order of Removal, ECF No. 30-6, at PAGEID #: 628.) Accordingly, under
§ 1252(g), the federal court does not have jurisdiction to hear any claims regarding the execution
of that removal order, and by seeking a stay of the execution of the final order of removal,

Petitioner is seeking for the Court to intervene where it does not have jurisdiction. See Karki, 2025
U.S. App. LEXIS 20660, at *7 (finding the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a stay of the
execution of a removal order); see also Hamama, 912 F.3d at 872–75 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that
attempts to stay “the Attorney General’s enforcement of long-standing removal orders falls
squarely under the Attorney General’s decision to execute removal orders and is not subject to
judicial review”).
The fact that Petitioner is trying to challenge the validity of his state-court conviction does
not change this conclusion because the Order of Removal was validity issued and final. As the
Order of Removal explained, Petitioner’s pursuit of “post-conviction relief in the form of a
collateral (for immigration purposes) attack on a conviction in state criminal court [did] not affect
the conviction’s finality for federal immigration purposes.” (Id.); see also Pola v. United States,
778 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Pending post-conviction motions or other collateral attacks do
not negate the finality of a conviction for immigration purposes unless and until the conviction is
overturned.” (quoting Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 2011)). Thus,

because the state-court conviction is deemed final for immigration purposes, the pending state-
court collateral appeal would not be a basis to stay execution of the removal order. See e.g. Zonou
v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 1:12-cv-69, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19974, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 14, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32220 (S.D. Ohio,
Mar. 8, 2013) (“To the extent that petitioner is not challenging his deportation, but only seeks
a stay while the instant habeas petition challenging his state conviction is pending, this Court still
lacks jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act to stay any removal order that has been entered or issued
in an immigration proceeding.”).
The caselaw upon which Petitioner relies is inapposite. He cites, for example, Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009), which explains that a federal appellate court has the authority to stay
a removal pending an appeal challenging the legality of that removal order in that appellate court.
Yet here, Petitioner contends that he is not challenging the legality of the removal order itself nor
does he have any appeal pending challenging the issuance of the removal order. See e.g. Ikharo
v. Shanks, No. 1:19-CV-256, 2020 WL 3490376, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3488925 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2020) (“[T]o the extent that
plaintiff seeks to challenge his final order of removal, his sole remedy is to file a petition for review
with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals”—not the district court).
Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that, to the extent the habeas petition seeking a stay of
the removal order is not barred by issue preclusion, it still otherwise fails because the district court
lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of removal orders under these circumstances.
2. Petitioner’s Stay of the Removal Order is Moot
Additionally, Petitioner’s request to stay of the execution of his removal order pending an

outcome in the Indiana appellate court is now rendered moot in light of his removal to Senegal.
“Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have the power to
adjudicate only ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Cal. Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc. v.
United States, 158 F.4th 726, 730 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Mokdad v. Sessions, 876 F.3d 167, 169
(6th Cir. 2017)). Article III requires “that there be a live case or controversy,” and a case becomes
moot when “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “As a general rule, a habeas petition
presents a live case or controversy only when a petitioner is in custody.” Alonso-Portillo v. Jones,
No. 25-3776, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 7418, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026).

Here, the relief Petitioner sought has been rendered moot now that he is no longer in
Respondents’ custody. See id. at *6–7 (“[A] habeas petition does not continue to present a live
controversy once the petitioner has been removed if the grounds for habeas relief will not redress
the collateral consequences complained of by the petitioner.” (citations omitted)); see also
Abdulhakim Mohamed v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-CV-2220, 2026 WL 2372132, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Aug. 14, 2026) (finding a § 2241 petition challenging detention moot after the petitioner was
removed from the United States); Gomez-Gomez v. Raycraft, No. 3:26-CV-1041, 2026 WL
1638980, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 5, 2026) (noting that district courts have held that once the
petitioner was deported, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant habeas relief); Zhen v. Doe, No. 3:25-
CV-2812, 2026 WL 941577, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2026), report and recommendation
(recommending that petitioner’s habeas relief be denied as moot because the requested relief could
no longer be granted). Likewise, any alternative basis challenging the length of Petitioner’s
detention is also rendered moot. See Yaser v. Detroit, No. 4:26-CV-00756-PAB, 2026 WL
1835511, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2026) (“The Sixth Circuit has held that a petition for writ of

habeas corpus challenging the length of an alien’s detention pending removal is rendered moot by
the alien’s removal from the United States.”).
Accordingly, in the alternative, Petitioner’s habeas Petition is moot as a result of his
removal and should thus be dismissed on that basis.
C. Petitioner Cannot Collaterally Attack His State-Court Conviction in this § 2241
Proceeding
Although Petitioner tries to circumvent the above outcome by stating that he is not
challenging the removal order itself, the relief he seeks indicates otherwise. Put differently, despite
contending that he is challenging the constitutionality of his Indiana state court conviction, in doing
so he is ultimately trying to invalidate the basis for, or interfere with the execution of, the removal
order itself. In any event, framing this Petition as one “challenging the validity of the [state-court]
conviction that is the sole predicate for the removal order” does not save this Petition. (ECF No.
31, at PAGEID #: 636.) This is because a non-citizen “may not collaterally attack a criminal
conviction that serves as the basis for the DHS’s initiation of removal proceedings against the
alien, regardless of whether the attack is raised in a habeas petition or . . . on review from a decision

of the BIA.” Al-Najar v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 708, 714 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).
Moreover, to the extent Petitioner is wanting this Court to review his state-court conviction
on the merits or convert this petition to one under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, that would likewise be
improper. That is, Petitioner was not “‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence [at issue] at
the time he file[d] his habeas corpus petition” given that he had already served any sentence related
to the 2021 conviction, and was therefore in ICE custody—not state custody—at the time he filed
the Petition. See, e.g., Adames v. Hinton, No. 2:16-CV-00963, 2016 WL 7386348, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 21, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2483814 (S.D. Ohio June 8,
2017) (“[B]eing in the custody of immigration authorities does not satisfy the ‘in custody’

requirement for federal habeas corpus proceedings, without which this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the §2254 petition.” (collecting cases)). Nor has he exhausted all state court remedies by
virtue of having a current, pending appeal challenging the state court conviction. See id. at *2–3
(finding a similar habeas petition brought under § 2254 unexhausted when state court proceedings
were still pending).
Accordingly, Petitioner’s pending state court appeal does not alter the recommendation of
dismissal.
D. Petitioner’s Request for Return to the United States
Petitioner’s request for emergency injunctive relief ordering ICE to facilitate his return to

the United States is also without merit. (ECF Nos. 9, 26.)
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the
movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet
v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant must
establish four factors: (i) a likelihood of success on the merits; (ii) a likelihood of irreparable harm
absent preliminary relief; (iii) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (iv) that an
injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.
Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008). The first two factors are “the most critical.” Karki, 2025 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20660, at *5.
To be sure, there are certain circumstances where ICE can be ordered to facilitate the return
of an individual that has been removed from the United States. See e.g. Noem v. Abrego Garcia,
__ U.S. __, 145 S. Ct. 1017, 1018 (2025) (per curiam) (recognizing that if a non-citizen was
removed in violation of the law, federal courts may require the Government to “facilitate” the
individual’s return and to “ensure that his case is handled as it would have been had he not been

improperly sent” elsewhere). This fact does not help Petitioner here. Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits because he offers no legal basis to
demonstrate that he is entitled to this extraordinary remedy. Specifically, in this case, Petitioner’s
order of removal is final given that there is not currently a pending BIA appeal,3 his state court
conviction has not been overturned, he does not have a valid motion to reopen pending before the
immigration court, and he does not allege that ICE violated any policies or procedures when
effectuating his removal. Cf. Sanchez Cruz v. Mullin, No. 25-CV-13347, 2026 WL 1298529, at
*4–6 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2026) (finding a non-citizen with a pending appeal challenging his
removal was entitled to injunctive relief, including for ICE to facilitate his return to the United

States, when ICE violated a statutory stay, failed to follow its own procedures, and he otherwise
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits).
Petitioner faces more hurdles, none of which can be surmounted here. For example, any
likelihood of success has to be on the merits of his habeas petition, not in any other pending appeal.
See Karki, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 20660, at *11. But the entire basis for Petitioner’s injunctive
relief here is that he has a meritorious post-conviction appeal pending—not that his habeas petition
is meritorious. Likewise, none of the other factors outweighs Petitioner’s failure to demonstrate a

3 Although Petitioner represents that he filed an appeal, a review of his immigration court case’s status
(available on the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s Automated Case Information System) associated with
his alien number provided in his Petition does not reflect that a BIA appeal was received for that case. See Automated
Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last visited August 17, 2026.)
likelihood of success on the merits. See e.g. Higuchi Int’l Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 103 F.4th
400, 409 (6th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, No. 23-1752, 2024 WL 3205995 (6th Cir. June 25, 2024)
(finding that the in the absence of likelihood of success on the merits a preliminary injunction
should not be granted).
Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Petitioner is not entitled to injunctive relief and

recommends that the Court deny his emergency requests for return to the United States. (ECF
Nos. 9, 26.)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS as follows:
1. Petitioner’s habeas Petition (ECF No. 1), Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 4), Emergency Motion to Order his Return
(ECF No. 9), Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Expedited Return
(ECF No. 26), and Motion to Expedite (ECF No. 33) be DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2. Petitioner’s habeas Petition (ECF No. 1) and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 4) be DENIED AS MOOT in the alternative;
and
3. Respondent Warden’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED (ECF No. 13).
It is further ORDERED that Petitioner’s other pending motions (ECF No. 3, 27, 36,
and 37) be DENIED AS MOOT.
V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14)days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ S. Courter M. Shimeall
S. COURTER M. SHIMEALL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427351. Public record. Not legal advice.