# Wonsehleay

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427334

## Case

- **Full name:** John Sanwokaza Wonsehleay v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JOHN SANWOKAZA WONSEHLEAY, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. CIV-26-1226-HE
v. )
)
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., )
)
Respondents.1 )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner John Sanwokaza Wonsehleay, a noncitizen,2 seeks a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.3 United States District Judge
Joe Heaton referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. Respondents
filed a Response, Doc. 9, and Petitioner filed a Reply, Doc. 11.

1 David Venturella was announced as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement on June 1, 2026. He replaces Todd Lyons and is
substituted as the proper respondent pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).

2 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

3 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s request for habeas relief and order his immediate release

subject to an appropriate Order of Supervision (OOS) and dismiss without
prejudice Petitioner’s claims concerning removal to a third country as unripe.
I. Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Liberia who was admitted to the

United States as a refugee in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident in
1994. Doc. 1, at 7, 12. Between 2006 and 2008, Petitioner was convicted of three
drug-possession offenses in Texas state court. Id. at 12-13.
On May 21, 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served

Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging him as removable under §
237(a)(2)(A)(iii)4 and 237(a)(2)(B)(i)5 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). Id. at 13. On October 5, 2009, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered
Petitioner removed to Liberia. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on February 4, 2010, and his removal order

4 This section is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which provides
that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.”

5 This section is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that
an admitted noncitizen who “has been convicted of a violation of (or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana, is deportable.”
became administratively final on that date. Id. at 14; Doc. 1, Ex. 1, at 7; see 8
C.F.R. § 1241.1(a).

ICE could not effectuate Petitioner’s removal within the removal period,
and on April 26, 2010, following a post-order custody review, ICE released
Petitioner from custody subject to an OOS. Doc. 1, at 14; id. Ex. 1, at 3, 7-8.
The OOS required Petitioner, among other conditions, to appear in person

upon request, to report in person to the Dallas Field Office as directed, to notify
ICE of any change of residence or employment, to refrain from violating any
law, and to assist ICE in obtaining travel documents. Doc. 1, at 7, 14-15.
Petitioner remained on the OOS for approximately sixteen years. The parties’

dispute concerning Petitioner’s compliance with the conditions of his release
during that period is addressed below.
On May 15, 2026, ICE officers took Petitioner into custody.6 Doc. 9, Ex.
1, at 2. Petitioner filed this action on May 27, 2026. Doc. 1. On May 29, 2026,

ICE served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release (Revocation
Notice) and conducted an informal interview, at which Petitioner made a

6 The Petition alleges that ICE detained Petitioner on or about May 12,
2026. Doc. 1, at 17. Officer Detrés Bobé attests that the arrest occurred on May
15, 2026. Doc. 9, Ex. 1, at 2. The undersigned uses the date reflected in
Respondents’ declaration. The record does not otherwise document the arrest
itself. Respondents have not submitted a Form I-213, an arrest report, or a
declaration from any officer involved in the decision to re-detain Petitioner or
in the execution of that decision.
statement. Doc. 9, Exs. 2 & 3. Respondents have also submitted a declaration
from Deportation Officer Samuel J. Detrés Bobé. Doc. 9, Ex. 1.

On June 14, 2026, thirty days after re-detaining Petitioner, ICE
requested a travel document from the Embassy of the Republic of Liberia. Id.
at 2. Petitioner remains detained at the Diamondback Correctional Facility in
Watonga, Oklahoma.7

II. Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner asserts six claims for relief: (1) a violation of substantive due
process under the Fifth Amendment; (2) a violation of procedural due process
under the Fifth Amendment; (3) unlawful re-detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231,

8 C.F.R. § 241.13, and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (4) ultra vires
agency action; (5) unlawful removal to a third country without statutorily and
constitutionally compliant notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (6)
punitive third-country banishment in violation of the Fifth and Eighth

Amendments. Doc. 1, at 30-40. Petitioner asks the Court to order his
immediate release under reasonable conditions of supervision, to bar his

7 The Petition places the Diamondback Correctional Facility in Cushing,
Oklahoma, in one instance and in Watonga, Oklahoma, in another. Doc. 1, at
9, 10. The facility is located in Watonga. See
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last visited August 25, 2026).
transfer outside this district during the pendency of this action,8 and to enjoin
his removal to any country other than Liberia. Id. at 41.9 At bottom, Petitioner

contends Respondents unlawfully revoked his OOS and that his removal is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 8-9, 35-38.
III. Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

8 As to this request, the Court addressed this issue in its Order for
Response, Doc. 8. The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant that request. Under 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), “no court shall have jurisdiction to review any other
decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland
Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Id.
(citation modified). The decision regarding where to detain a noncitizen
pending removal is such a discretionary power. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(g)(1),
ICE “shall arrange for appropriate places of detention for aliens detained
pending removal or a decision on removal.”

9 Petitioner also requests attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and 5 U.S.C. § 504. Doc. 1, at 41. Any
application for fees must be filed within thirty days of final judgment, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B), and the undersigned does not address that request at this time.
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88).

IV. Analysis.
Petitioner’s regulatory and procedural due process claims are
intertwined, so the undersigned addresses them together. The Court finds
Respondents violated their regulations in revoking Petitioner’s OOS.10

Respondents have not shown that Petitioner violated a condition of his release
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1), nor have Respondents demonstrated the changed
circumstances that § 241.13(i)(2) requires. In addition, Respondents did not
follow the procedures mandated by § 241.13(i)(3). Each defect independently

warrants relief.
A. Regulatory framework governing revocation of an OOS.

An agency must follow its own regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954). “‘It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context of removal
proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam) (quoting
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)). The Due Process Clause is likewise

10 Petitioner does not expressly invoke the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) as a freestanding count, but Count Three references it. Doc. 1, at 35. To
the extent Petitioner raises an APA claim, the undersigned finds the Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it in this habeas proceeding. The APA does not
supply an independent vehicle to challenge the fact or duration of immigration
detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a).
implicated where “an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations
promulgated for his guidance or benefit and has suffered substantially because

of their violation by the agency.” United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752–
53 (1979).
When a noncitizen has been detained pursuant to a final order of
removal, ICE must release the noncitizen on an OOS if ICE determines there

is no significant likelihood of the noncitizen’s removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)-(h); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
Once ICE releases a noncitizen on an OOS, the agency may revoke that release
in only two circumstances: (1) for a violation of the “conditions of release”

specified in the OOS; or (2) “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE]
determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1)-(2).
Revocation “for either reason triggers a notification requirement and a review

process.” Tran v. Blanche, No. CIV-25-1357-G, 2026 WL 1181700, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 30, 2026) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3)).
The parties do not dispute that § 241.13(i) governs the revocation of
Petitioner’s release. The question presented is whether Respondents lawfully

revoked it. The undersigned concludes they did not.
B. Respondents have not shown that Petitioner violated a
condition of his release under § 241.13(i)(1).

Respondents rely principally on § 241.13(i)(1), the condition-violation
provision, asserting that Petitioner failed to appear for a check-in
appointment. Doc. 9, at 8. The record does not support that assertion.
The Revocation Notice identifies the violated condition as follows:
“Subject failed to report to the 08/16/2026 CART appointment.” Doc. 9, Ex. 2,
at 1. The Revocation Notice was served on May 29, 2026, nearly three months

before the appointment Petitioner allegedly failed to attend. Id. at 2. Officer
Detrés Bobé attests to a different date altogether, stating that Petitioner failed
to report for a scheduled check-in on August 19, 2025. Doc. 9, Ex. 1, at 2.
Respondents do not explain the discrepancy. Even assuming the date on the

Revocation Notice is a scrivener’s error, Respondents have not produced any
documentation showing that Petitioner had a check-in scheduled for August
19, 2025.
Significantly, the declaration’s account is contradicted by ICE’s own

records. On July 14, 2025, approximately five weeks before the allegedly
missed appointment, ICE’s appointment scheduling system issued Petitioner
a written Appointment Confirmation setting his next required appointment at
the Dallas Field Office for Wednesday, July 12, 2028. Doc. 1, Ex. 1, at 13-14.
That confirmation was attached to the Petition and was before Respondents
when they prepared their Response. Respondents did not address it.

The Reply resolves whatever ambiguity remained. A paralegal at
Petitioner’s counsel’s firm attests that on July 14, 2025, at Petitioner’s request
and in accordance with ICE’s published instructions, she rescheduled
Petitioner’s upcoming check-in through ICE’s online portal at checkin.ice.gov,

that the portal confirmed the new appointment date of July 12, 2028, and that
she printed the confirmation that same morning. Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 1-2. A
contemporaneous text message to Petitioner’s counsel corroborates that
account. Doc. 11, at Ex. 2. Petitioner’s statement at the informal interview,

that he “always attended [his] appointments on time” and did not appear on
the date at issue only because counsel’s office handled the check-in, is
consistent with this documentary record. Doc. 9, Ex. 3, at 1. Respondents
nowhere dispute Petitioner’s sixteen-year history of in-person compliance. See

Doc. 1, Ex. 1, at 6, 8.
Respondents selected the condition-violation ground and bear the
burden of justifying the resulting detention. See Owdetallah v. Bondi, No. CIV-
25-1546-SLP, 2026 WL 483648, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 2026) (detention

“may be maintained only upon compliance with applicable process” (quoting
Misirbekov v. Venegas, 796 F. Supp. 3d 436, 440 (S.D. Tex. 2025))); cf. Pham v.
Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20,
2025) (placing the burden on Respondents in the context of re-detention under
§ 241.13(i)).

Respondents characterize Petitioner’s statement at the informal
interview as an admission that he “did not report to his scheduled check-in on
the advice of his counsel.” Doc. 9, at 2; see also id. at 8, 12. However, read in
full, the statement is not an admission that Petitioner failed to attend a

required appointment. Petitioner stated that he has “always attended [his]
appointments on time,” that he has “never intentionally missed a date,” and
that he did not appear in person on the date in question because his attorney
“would check [him] in for the day.” Doc. 9, Ex. 3, at 1. That account describes

precisely what the documentary record shows: counsel’s office rescheduled the
appointment through ICE’s own check-in portal, and the portal confirmed the
new date. Doc. 1, Ex. 1, at 13-14; Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 1-2. Nothing in the oral
statement given by Petitioner identifies the date Petitioner supposedly missed,

and Respondents’ own submissions identify two different dates, one of which
had not yet occurred when the Revocation Notice was issued and Petitioner
was re-detained.
More fundamentally, the reason Petitioner did not appear in person is

immaterial unless an in-person appearance was required. Section 241.13(i)(1)
authorizes revocation for a violation of a condition of release, and the only
condition Respondents identify is the reporting requirement. Doc. 9, at 8. Since
the appointment had been rescheduled through the agency’s own system, there
was no reporting obligation to violate, regardless of the advice given by

Petitioner’s counsel. Respondents cannot convert Petitioner’s explanation of
how his counsel handled his check-in into proof of the violation they have
otherwise failed to document.
Respondents have produced two mutually inconsistent dates, no

documentation of either date, and no response to the confirmation generated
by their own scheduling portal. Respondents may possess records reconciling
these discrepancies, but they have not produced them, and an agency’s
obligation to comply with its own regulations cannot be discharged by silence.

Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268. On this record, the undersigned cannot find that
Petitioner violated any condition of his release.
C. To the extent Respondents invoke § 241.13(i)(2), they have
not demonstrated changed circumstances.

Although Respondents rely on the condition-violation provision, portions
of the Response invoke the language of § 241.13(i)(2), asserting that
“Petitioner’s removal has become reasonably foreseeable” considering Liberia’s
cooperation and recent removal statistics. Doc. 9, at 6, 8. To the extent
Respondents intend these assertions as an alternative basis for the revocation,
the record does not support one.
Revocation under § 241.13(i)(2) requires that ICE, “on account of
changed circumstances,” determine that “there is a significant likelihood that

the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2). The regulation contemplates an individualized determination
made by the agency as the predicate for revocation, not a rationale assembled
in litigation. See Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 619-20 (1st Cir. 2023);

Tran, 2026 WL 1181700, at *3. ICE bears the burden of showing that changed
circumstances necessitated revocation. Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *2. In
making that determination, ICE must consider the noncitizen’s history of
compliance, the Government’s prior removal efforts, and the views of the

Department of State regarding the prospects for removal. See 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(f).
Nothing in the record reflects that any such determination existed at or
before Petitioner’s re-detention. The corresponding box on the Revocation

Notice was left unchecked. Doc. 9, Ex. 2, at 1. ICE did not request a travel
document from the Embassy of the Republic of Liberia until June 14, 2026,
thirty days after Petitioner’s arrest. Id. Ex. 1, at 2. A determination that must
exist at the time of revocation cannot be supplied by efforts undertaken weeks

after the fact. See Munagi v. McDonald, 813 F. Supp. 3d 225, 228 (D. Mass.
2025) (“[T]he changed circumstances that make an alien’s removal likely in the
foreseeable future must have existed at or before the [OOS] revocation; post-
hoc justifications are inadequate.”) (emphasis added); Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803
F. Supp. 3d 775, 788 (D. Minn. 2025) (a request for travel documents weeks

after revocation “could not have constituted the supposedly changed
circumstances underlying the Notice”).
Finally, Respondents’ reliance on an increase in removals to Liberia is
insufficient to meet their burden. Doc. 9, Ex. 1, at 2-3. Judges in this District

have repeatedly rejected the notion that an increase in aggregate removals is
sufficient evidence of changed circumstances under § 241.13(i)(2). See Tran,
2026 WL 1181700, at *3 (a general “upswing” in a country’s “willingness to
repatriate” its nationals does not supply the individualized determination §

241.13(i)(2) requires); Hamidi v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1205-G, 2025 WL 3452454,
at *4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025) (rejecting declarations that did not identify any
country that had agreed to accept the petitioner); Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at
*2 (An “increase in frequency of removals alone does not demonstrate [a]

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); see
also Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149-52 (D. Mass. 2025) (rejecting a
“general” declaration stating only that the Government “has been successful in
removing individuals” to the country at issue).

Here, Respondents have failed to show that Petitioner’s removal to
Liberia is likely in the foreseeable future. Liberia has not agreed to accept
Petitioner, has not issued a travel document in the sixteen years since the
removal order became final, and had not received a request for a travel
document until a month after Petitioner’s re-detention.

D. Respondents did not follow the procedures required by §
241.13(i)(3).
Whichever substantive ground is invoked, § 241.13(i)(3) supplies the
procedure that must accompany any revocation:
Upon revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the
reasons for revocation of his or her release. [ICE] will
conduct an initial informal interview promptly after
his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the
[noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons
for revocation stated in the notification. The
[noncitizen] may submit any evidence or information
that he or she believes shows there is no significant
likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated
the order of supervision.

8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
This provision imposes two obligations: (a) notice of the reasons for
revocation, and (b) a prompt informal interview upon return to custody. Id. The
“reasons for revocation” ICE must provide cannot be conclusory; ICE must
identify the specific facts supporting its decision. See Bui v. Bondi, No. CIV-26-
91-J, 2026 WL 788947, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2026) (Section 241.13(i)(3)
“requires not just notice, but notice that specifies the reason for revocation of
his or her release.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts in this district
have uniformly recognized that these minimum procedures secure the process
the Fifth Amendment requires, such that a wholesale failure to provide them
“implicates those constitutional protections directly.” Liang Li v. Bondi, No.

CIV-25-1480-J, 2026 WL 475133, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 2026) (quoting
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 152); Owdetallah, 2026 WL 483648, at *5-
6; Pham, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (“A majority of district courts have found
such regulatory defects amount to due process violations that entitle a

petitioner to habeas relief.”) (collecting cases).
Respondents did not comply with either requirement. Petitioner neither
received any notice at the time of his arrest on May 15, 2026, nor was Petitioner
interviewed “promptly after his . . . return to [ICE] custody.” 8 C.F.R. §

241.13(i)(3). The notice and interview came fourteen days later, and only after
Petitioner had filed this action. “ICE, like any agency, ‘has the duty to follow
its own federal regulations.’” Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D.
Mass. 2017) (quoting Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 2003)).

Courts have held that “where an immigration ‘regulation is promulgated to
protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute,’
like the opportunity to be heard, ‘and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged
[action] is invalid.’” Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (quoting Waldron v. I.N.S.,

17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993)).
The process eventually supplied was defective in substance as well as
timing. The Revocation Notice identified as the sole reason for revocation an
appointment date nearly three months in the future. A notice premised on a
facially impossible event does not identify “the reasons for revocation” within

the meaning of § 241.13(i)(3), and an interview conducted in connection with
that notice could not afford Petitioner a meaningful “opportunity to respond to
the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). A
detainee cannot respond to an accusation of missing an appointment that has

not yet occurred. Petitioner received neither adequate notice nor a prompt
interview, so Respondents violated § 241.13(i)(3) as well.
E. The regulatory violations entitle Petitioner to habeas
relief, and release is the appropriate remedy.

Courts in this district have repeatedly held that ICE’s failure to comply
with § 241.13(i) in revoking an OOS renders the revocation unlawful and
warrants habeas relief. See Khaliq v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1154-SLP, 2026 WL
196631, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 26, 2026); Owdetallah, 2026 WL 483648, at
*5-6; Thabata v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-531-J, 2026 WL 1397059, at *3 (W.D.
Okla. May 19, 2026), adopted, 2026 WL 1495209 (W.D. Okla. May 28, 2026).11

11 This case does not present the curative circumstances found in
Bahadorani v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1091-PRW, 2025 WL 3048932, at *3-4 (W.D.
Okla. Oct. 31, 2025). There, the Court concluded that procedural defects had
been remedied because the petitioner “underwent a particularized interview
process regarding [his] removal after being detained” and the Government
made a convincing showing during the litigation that the petitioner’s removal
to Iran was imminent. Id. No comparable showing has been made here.
Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is immediate
release subject to the conditions of an appropriate OOS. See Thabata, 2026 WL

1397059, at *5; Bui, 2026 WL 788947, at *6 (ordering immediate release
“subject to an appropriate [OOS]”).
Because the unlawful revocation entitles Petitioner to release, the
undersigned need not separately address whether Petitioner’s removal is

significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future under Zadvydas, and
does not reach Petitioner’s substantive due process (Count One) or ultra vires
(Count Four) claims, which rest on the same operative facts and seek the same
relief. See Doc. 1, at 30-32, 38.

F. Petitioner’s third-country removal claims are not ripe.

Counts Five and Six seek to enjoin a removal that has not been proposed.
Respondents represent that ICE has requested a travel document only from
Liberia and that no removal to a third country is planned. Doc. 9, at 13-14.
Ripeness doctrine prevents courts “from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies” before an administrative decision
“has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003)

(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). Petitioner’s
only designated country of removal is Liberia, Doc. 1, at 13, and nothing in the
record suggests Respondents intend to remove him elsewhere. Counts Five and
Six should be dismissed without prejudice.

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court
grant Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, as to Counts Two
and Three, and order his immediate release from custody within three business

days, subject to an appropriate OOS. The undersigned further recommends the
Court dismiss Counts Five and Six without prejudice as unripe and deny
Petitioner’s request for an order barring his transfer outside this District.
Finally, the undersigned recommends the Court order Respondents to certify

compliance by filing a status report within ten business days of the Court’s
Order and provide a copy of the Court’s Order to the Warden of the
Diamondback Correctional Facility.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by September
2, 2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.12 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

12 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that
the rule establishing a 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus
petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates
the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2026.
hea “tered |
SUZANNE MITCHELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2012).

19

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427334. Public record. Not legal advice.