# Stephenson

> District Court, E.D. Tennessee · August 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427115

## Case

- **Full name:** Jonathan Stephenson v. Kenneth Nelsen, Warden
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** August 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427115

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

JONATHAN STEPHENSON, )
) Case No. 3:14-CV-414
Petitioner, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Jill E. McCook
KENNETH NELSEN, Warden, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for leave to file an amended petition for habeas
corpus (Doc. 271) and proposed amended petition (Doc. 271-2). As discussed below, the motion
will be GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.
I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a state prisoner, faces a capital sentence based on his 1989 conviction for first-
degree murder. In August 2015, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition through appointed
counsel at the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee (“FDSET”). (Doc. 15.) The
petition raised five claims: Confrontation Clause violations (Claim I); equal protection violation
based on failure to provide new trial (Claim II); claims regarding the aggravating circumstance
(Claim III); ineffective assistance of counsel (Claim IV) and due process violation based on trial
judge’s religious comments during voir dire (Claim V). (Id.).
In May 2018, the Court removed FDSET as counsel due to a conflict of interest and
appointed the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of Tennessee (“FDMTN”) to
represent Petitioner. (Doc. 114.) Petitioner’s counsel from FDMTN filed a motion to amend the
petition in February 2023. (Doc. 208.) Among other changes, the motion sought to add a
prosecutorial-misconduct claim, based on the withholding of favorable evidence and presentation
of false testimony. (Doc. 208-1, at 76.)1 FDMTN subsequently moved for appointment of
substitute counsel, citing a conflict of interest. (Doc. 242, at 1.) The Court granted the motion
for substitution—appointing the Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania (“FCDO”) to represent Petitioner—and denied the pending motion to amend as
moot. (Doc. 260, at 21–22.) The Court then set a deadline for FCDO to file any motion to
amend the petition. (Doc. 263). That deadline was extended to December 12, 2025. (Doc. 270.)
On December 12, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant motion for leave to file an amended
petition (Doc. 271) and proposed amended petition (“amended petition”). (Doc. 271-2.) Claims
I, III–V, and VII–XI of the amended petition repled the claims in the initial petition, with some
changes in organization and supplemental arguments and legal authority. The amended petition
also raises two claims that were not presented in the original petition: a prosecutorial-
misconduct claim, previously raised in the mooted 2023 motion to amend (Claim II), and a due

process claim, alleging a violation of Petitioner’s right to present and cross-examine witnesses
(Claim VI). Finally, the amended petition adds an argument challenging the constitutionality of

1 All document citations are to the document and page number assigned in the CM/ECF system.
AEDPA deference,2 based on the United State Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enters.
v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).3 (Doc. 271-2, at 9–16.)
In support of the motion to amend, Petitioner contends that the amended petition will
promote judicial efficiency, allow for the full and orderly litigation of Petitioner’s claims, and
will not prejudice the State. (Doc. 274, at 2.) He also asserts that the interests of justice favor

granting the motion to amend, since he has been appointed new counsel and this is a capital case,
which warrants a heightened concern for fairness. (Id. at 4–5.)
In response, Respondent argues that the motion to amend should be denied as futile.
(Doc. 281, at 1.) The new prosecutorial-misconduct and due process claims are futile, he asserts,
because they are untimely4 and procedurally defaulted5, without a viable excuse. (Id. at 7–27,

2 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts
to defer to state court merits decisions unless the state court adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” United States
Supreme Court precedent; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) & (2); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

3 In Loper Bright, the United States Supreme Court overruled the holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), that federal courts must defer to federal agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 397, 412–13.

4 The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of an application for a federal
writ of habeas corpus, running from one of four triggering events outlined in 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). The limitations period is statutorily tolled while a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review” is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A court may
consider an untimely § 2254 motion if the petitioner shows that he is entitled to equitable tolling
of the limitations period or establishes a claim of actual innocence. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.
631, 649 (2010) (holding that § 2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569
U.S. 383, 392 (2013) (holding that a “credible showing of actual innocence” may overcome
AEDPA’s limitations period).

5 Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his
available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842
(1999). Exhaustion requires the petitioner to “fairly present” each federal claim to all levels of the
state appellate system by presenting the “same claim under the same theory” up to the state’s
highest court, Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2009), to ensure that states have
30–35.) With respect to the repled claims, Respondent primarily argues that any supplemental
arguments are without merit because they do not change the conclusion that the claims in the
initial petition are meritless. (See id. at 36, 40, 42, 48, 52, 54, 57, 58.). Finally, he asserts that
Petitioner’s argument challenging AEDPA deference is futile because it was rejected by the Sixth
Circuit in Sanders v. Plappert 168 F.4th 837 (6th Cir. 2026). (Id. at 5.)

In reply, Petitioner maintains that the Court should defer procedural and merits-based
analysis until after the amended petition has been filed, when all claims can be addressed at the
same time. (Doc. 290, at 5.) However, he also addresses Respondent’s arguments on a
claim-by-claim basis. Petitioner recognizes that the new claims are untimely and procedurally
defaulted. But he claims that untimeliness can be excused through equitable tolling or a showing
of actual innocence. (Id. at 17–31, 39–40.) And the procedural default can be excused through a
showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence. (Id. at 31–38, 40–66.) With respect to the
repled claims, Petitioner argues that it is improper for Respondent to fully analyze the merits of
those claims to determine if they are “futile.” (Id. at 67.) Petitioner also asserts that

Respondent’s analysis of the underlying merits is incorrect. (See, e.g., id. at 69.) Finally,
Petitioner acknowledges that his argument challenging AEDPA deference is contrary to the Sixth

a “full and fair opportunity to rule on the petitioner’s claims.” Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d
878, 881 (6th Cir. 1990).

Where a petitioner no longer “has the right under the law” to properly exhaust a claim with the
state courts, the claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(c); Atkins v. Holloway, 792 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 2015). Federal courts lack jurisdiction
to consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim unless the petitioner can establish
(1) “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law” or
(2) “that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
Circuit’s decision in Sanders. (Id. at 15–16.) However, he still wants to include the argument in
the amended petition to preserve the issue for a possible Supreme Court appeal. (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (providing that habeas corpus motions may be

amended in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). This liberal standard reflects
“the principle that cases should be tried on their merits rather than on the technicalities of
pleading.” Fisher v. Roberts, 125 F.3d 974, 977–78 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Courts
should grant a motion to amend unless there is a good reason to the contrary. Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Reasons to deny a motion to amend include “[u]ndue delay in filing, lack of notice to the
opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Wade v.
Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “Notice and

substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors[.]” Id. at 459. A court may also
deny leave to amend based on futility alone. Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 476 (6th Cir.
2003). However, “[d]elay by itself is not sufficient reason to deny a motion to amend.” Wade,
259 F.3d at 458 (citations omitted).
The Court finds no substantial reason to deny Petitioner’s motion to amend his claims.
Respondent has not alleged that he will suffer any prejudice from the proposed amendments.
The motion to amend was filed after a substitution of counsel, within the time frame allowed by
the Court. And this will be Petitioner’s first amended petition. Thus, there was no bad faith,
undue delay on the part of Petitioner’s new attorneys, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies.
Although a significant period of time has passed since the initial petition was filed, delay alone is
not sufficient reason to deny Petitioner an opportunity to amend.
Respondent’s only objection to the amendments is that he claims they are futile. “A
proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.”6 Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). “In

the habeas corpus context, amendments are futile where they seek to add claims that are
time-barred, procedurally defaulted, or lack merit.” Cunningham v. Warden, Madison Corr. Inst.,
No. 2:24-CV-291, 2025 WL 562876, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2025) (citation modified). While
futility is a sufficient basis to deny a motion to amend, courts may decline to address the viability
of a petitioner’s claims until after an amended petition has been filed. See Elmore v. Shoop, No.
1:07-CV-776, 2019 WL 3423200, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2019) (“[The futility inquiry]
requires evaluation of the merits of both the proposed pleading and any proffered affirmative
defenses and some courts prefer not to reach the merits on a motion to amend.”).
Here, Respondent’s objections to the repled claims involve a comprehensive analysis of

the merits of the amendments and the underlying claims. And Petitioner’s arguments, asserting
that he can overcome the procedural barriers to his new claims, implicate the underlying facts of
the case and merits concern. Given that the parties’ futility arguments are intertwined with the
broader merits of the case, the Court finds it most practical, and most consistent with the liberal
spirit of Rule 15, to permit the amendments and address all claims together when they are before
the Court for disposition. See Phillips v. Smith, No. 5:09-CV-01848, 2010 WL 2291143, at *2
(N.D. Ohio June 2, 2010) (declining to address respondent’s futility objections to a motion to

6 To survive a motion to dismiss, a [claim] must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (cleaned up).
amend, observing that such analysis is “in tension” with Rule 15’s direction to freely grant leave
to amend); Love-Camp v. Bean, No. 2:24-CV-00141-JAD-NJK, 2025 WL 3653995, at *4
(D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2025) (deferring consideration of procedural default issues until after the
amended petition was filed so that the court could “have the benefit of analyzing all of [the
Petitioner’s] claims against a fully developed factual and legal backdrop”). Respondent will not

be prejudiced, since he is free to raise his procedural and merits-based arguments in his amended
answer.
Finally, Petitioner’s argument challenging AEDPA deference is clearly futile. Petitioner
asserts that AEDPA deference is unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Loper Bright. But, as Petitioner recognizes, the Sixth Circuit recently rejected that very
argument. See Sanders v. Plappert, 168 F.4th 837, 848–49 (6th Cir. 2026). Petitioner contends
that the AEDPA deference challenge should be included in the amended petition so that he can
preserve the issue for a possible appeal to the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court affirmed
the constitutionality of AEDPA only a few years ago. See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118,

127 (2022) (“When Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision, federal courts
must follow it. In AEDPA, Congress announced such a rule.”). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Petitioner’s request to add an argument challenging AEDPA deference.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, with the exception of his request to add the AEDPA deference argument,
Petitioner’s motion to amend is GRANTED. To the extent he asks to include the AEDPA
deference argument, the motion is DENIED. Petitioner SHALL file his amended petition
within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order. Respondent SHALL file his amended answer
within ninety (90) days of when Petitioner files the amended petition. Any reply by Petitioner
should be filed within sixty (60) days of when Respondent files the amended answer.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11427115. Public record. Not legal advice.